Gary Clements Ridley v. Commonwealth ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Annunziata and
Senior Judge Overton
GARY CLEMENTS RIDLEY
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1850-01-1 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
JULY 16, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PORTSMOUTH
Dean W. Sword, Jr., Judge
(Stephen B. Plott; Cannon, Collins & Plott,
PLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant
submitting on brief.
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Kathleen
B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting
on brief.
Gary Clements Ridley (appellant) was convicted in a bench
trial of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of Code § 18.2-308.2, and receiving stolen goods, in
violation of Code § 18.2-108. On appeal, he contends that the
evidence was insufficient to prove he constructively possessed
the firearm or that he knew the vehicle was stolen. For the
following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
I. BACKGROUND
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
prevailing party below, granting to it all reasonable inferences
fairly deducible therefrom. See Juares v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.
App. 154, 156, 493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997).
So viewed, the evidence established that on August 24,
2000, at approximately 6:00 a.m., Officer Alphonzo Mannings
(Mannings) responded to a trespassing complaint and saw
appellant walking around the apartment complex. The complainant
identified appellant as the trespasser, and Mannings stopped him
and requested his identification. Mannings "ran" his
identification and learned that appellant had a suspended
driver's license. Mannings told appellant to leave the area,
and appellant agreed to get a taxi and leave. As Mannings
returned to his police car, he looked through the apartment
complex and saw appellant walk back toward the area he had just
been told to leave. Mannings could not get to the area in his
patrol car so he drove around the block to try to stop appellant
before he reached the apartment. Mannings then saw appellant
driving a light-blue Honda. Appellant saw the officers, parked
the car and exited the car with the keys in his hand. There was
no one else in or near the car. Mannings arrested appellant
after he determined the Honda was stolen. Incident to the
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arrest, the officers searched the vehicle and found a shotgun
under the passenger's seat. The seat was "leaning back" and
partially covered the shotgun so that the officers did not see
it when they first looked inside the car. The weapon was loaded
and operable. Appellant told police he paid $20 for the
vehicle, and he denied any knowledge of the shotgun.
At trial, appellant testified that he met someone he knew
as "Antonio" after he walked away from the police and negotiated
the use of the car for a few hours for $20. He said he never
saw the shotgun because the passenger's seat was leaning back.
Mannings testified that, at most, five to eight minutes passed
between the time he told appellant to leave the area and the
time he found appellant driving the Honda. He saw appellant
speak to no one. Appellant had been convicted of at least three
prior felonies.
The trial court found appellant's testimony "just
unbelievable."
[T]he reason that I don't believe it is
this. [Appellant] testified that he got
possession of the car from some individual
that he only knows as Antonio and that the
negotiations, his words, to use the car took
place after he was confronted by Officer
Mannings. Well, there's problems with that.
First of all, Officer Mannings didn't see
him negotiating with anybody while he's
trying to leave the area. And there is a
very, very small window of opportunity so
far as time was concerned within which you
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could have conducted such a
negotiation. . . .
* * * * * * *
I think that the evidence is sufficient,
drawing the inferences [from the recent
possession of stolen property] that the
Court may draw in considering all of the
evidence in this case, to find the
[appellant] guilty of grand larceny and
possession of stolen goods.
Now, as far as the shotgun is concerned, the
[appellant] has possession of the car. I
don't think it is unreasonable to draw a
conclusion again that the [appellant] was in
the sole custody and possession of the
shotgun by virtue of the fact that he was in
sole possession of the car, and the shotgun
was in the car and it wasn't hidden. If it
was in the trunk or something of that
nature, it's a different case.
Appellant appeals that decision.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, "the judgment
of the trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the
same weight as a jury verdict." Saunders v. Commonwealth, 242
Va. 107, 113, 406 S.E.2d 39, 42, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944(1991).
"[T]he trial court's judgment will not be set aside unless
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Hunley v.
Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 556, 559, 518 S.E.2d 347, 349 (1999).
"The credibility of a witness and the inferences to be drawn
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from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder's
determination." Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505,
509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998)(internal citation omitted).
III. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding the
evidence sufficient to prove that he knew the car was stolen,
pursuant to Code § 18.2-108. 1 He argues that the evidence at
trial failed to show he knew the person he called "Antonio"
stole the car. We disagree.
To convict a defendant under Code
§ 18.2-108, the Commonwealth must prove that
property was (1) previously stolen by
another, and (2) received by defendant, (3)
with knowledge of the theft, and (4) a
dishonest intent. Guilty knowledge is
sufficiently shown if the circumstances
proven are such as must have made or caused
the recipient of stolen goods to believe
they were stolen. The fact that a defendant
paid a patently low price for property is a
circumstance from which a trier of fact may
infer guilty knowledge.
Shaver v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 789, 800-01, 520 S.E.2d 393,
399 (1999)(internal citations omitted).
Appellant initially stated that he paid $20 for the car and
later said that he met "Antonio" after he was confronted by the
police officers and paid him $20 for the use of the car for a
1
Code § 18.2-108 provides in pertinent part: "If any
person . . . receive from another person . . . any stolen
goods . . . knowing the same to have been stolen, he shall be
deemed guilty of larceny thereof . . . ."
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few hours. The car had a value of $1,950. He said he met
"Antonio" about one and a half weeks earlier and that he knew
"Antonio" was going to use the $20 fee to purchase drugs.
The trier of fact was not required to believe appellant's
version of how he acquired the car and was entitled to infer
appellant knew the car was stolen. "[T]he element of guilty
knowledge may be supplied by circumstantial evidence, including
the circumstance that the accused was in possession of recently
stolen property." Roberts v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 264, 271-72,
337 S.E.2d 255, 260 (1985). Proof of this possession
constituted prima facie evidence that appellant knew the car was
stolen and cast upon him the burden of going forward with
evidence in explanation.
Here, the trial court specifically found appellant's
version of how he acquired the car "unbelievable." The car had
been stolen three days earlier. In the parking lot of an
apartment building at 6:00 a.m., appellant paid $20 for a car
valued at almost $2,000 from a man he had known less than two
weeks. See also Shaver v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 789, 520
S.E.2d 393 (1999). Credible evidence supports the trial court's
ruling.
IV. POSSESSION OF FIREARM AFTER FELONY CONVICTION
Appellant next contends the trial court erred in finding
the evidence sufficient to prove he knew the shotgun was in the
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car, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. 2 He argues that the
evidence at trial failed to show any indicia of possession
beside its presence in the car. We disagree.
"[T]he [trial court] was not required to believe the
[appellant's] explanation, and if that explanation is not
believed, the [trial court] may infer the accused is lying to
conceal his guilt." Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459,
469-70, 536 S.E.2d 437, 442 (2000). See also Phan v.
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 506, 511, 521 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1999);
Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 842, 284 S.E.2d 608, 610
(1981); Toler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 782, 51 S.E.2d 210,
214 (1949); and Speight v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 83, 88, 354
S.E.2d 95, 98 (1987)(en banc).
"Inferences may be drawn from proven facts so long as they
are reasonable and justified." Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va.
166, 169, 198 S.E.2d 603, 606 (1973) (citing Webb v.
Commonwealth, 204 Va. 24, 34, 129 S.E.2d 22, 29 (1963)).
To support [a] conviction . . . [based
upon constructive possession] the
Commonwealth must point to evidence of acts,
statements, or conduct of the accused or
other facts or circumstances which tend to
show that the [appellant] was aware of both
the presence and character of the [shotgun]
and that it was subject to his dominion and
2
Code § 18.2-308.2 provides in pertinent part: "It shall
be unlawful for (i) any person who has been convicted of a
felony . . . to knowingly and intentionally possess . . . any
(a) firearm . . . ."
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control. Proof that the [shotgun] was found
in . . . a vehicle . . . occupied by the
[appellant] is insufficient, standing alone,
to prove constructive possession. Such
evidence is probative, but it is only a
circumstance which may be considered . . .
along with the other evidence.
Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 474, 476, 316 S.E.2d 739, 740
(1984).
In the instant case, the trial court did not believe that
appellant acquired the car from "Antonio." Here, when
questioned about the location of the shotgun in the car,
Mannings said, "When we first spotted the shotgun, the
passenger's seat was leaning back in order to cover it up a
little bit." The trial judge, after viewing the evidence
photographs of the placement of the shotgun in the car, found:
[A]s a part of the search of the stolen
vehicle, the shotgun is discovered, which I
think it's fair to say partially concealed
by the passenger's seat, by both part of it
being under the seat and the passenger's
seat being tilted backwards to partially
obscure the vision - and I'm not sure how it
would obscure the driver's vision, but
someone looking in the vehicle obviously
would have trouble seeing it.
* * * * * * *
[I]t's an entirely different view that
you have when you're sitting in the driver's
seat of a car and being able to see what's
right here, as opposed to standing outside
the car and looking in the car.
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Appellant was the sole occupant of the car. The shotgun
was located under the passenger's seat, in close proximity to
appellant and shotgun shells were found, in plain view, on the
backseat of the car. Credible evidence supports the trial
court's finding that appellant knew the shotgun was under the
passenger's seat.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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