Alonzo L. Williams v. Commonwealth of VA ( 2002 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Annunziata
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    ALONZO L. WILLIAMS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 2258-01-2                  JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
    MAY 21, 2002
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY
    Robert G. O'Hara, Jr., Judge
    Steven Brent Novey (Tomko & Novey, on brief),
    for appellant.
    Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General
    (Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Alonzo Williams was convicted by a jury for forcible sodomy
    of a child under the age of thirteen.      The jury set his sentence
    at life in prison.    Williams moved to set aside the sentence on
    the ground that the prosecutor's argument at sentencing was
    prejudicial.   The trial court heard argument on the motion,
    denied it, and sentenced Williams to life in prison.      Williams
    appeals that sentence.     For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Background
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
    party prevailing below, the evidence proved that, on May 19,
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    2000, Williams entered the bedroom of his eleven-year-old
    daughter and orally sodomized her.      See Burlile v. Commonwealth,
    
    32 Va. App. 796
    , 798, 
    531 S.E.2d 26
    , 27 (2000).     The jury found
    Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Testifying in his own behalf, Williams admitted that he had
    been convicted of two prior felonies and three misdemeanors.
    At sentencing, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of two prior
    convictions.   One of the convictions was for attempted
    aggravated sexual battery of a four-year-old child.     Williams
    introduced no evidence.   The prosecutor's argument to the jury
    at sentencing was as follows:
    We've all done a days [sic] work today. The
    Court will present you when you leave with
    two copies of the defendant's prior criminal
    record. I tell you now that one of them is
    a prior aggravated sexual battery, against a
    four year-old. I'm going to keep it very
    brief and very easy. You've done the hard
    part as far as I'm concerned today. You
    have a range of five years to life. It's a
    huge sentence one way or the other. Five
    years is a long time. Life is a long time.
    My question to you is, I'm going to turn the
    tables around and ask you a question. When
    do you want to let this defendant out so he
    can live next to you, to your family, to
    your daughter, to your sister, to your
    mother, to anyone that you don't want
    sexually abused? He's done it twice, to
    children. All I'm asking you is when do you
    want him to come out and live next to you?
    Thank you.
    Defense counsel did not object to any portion of this
    argument or move for a mistrial.   Instead, he made his own
    closing argument to the jury.   He argued that it was the jury's
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    "job" to determine what part of the five to life range of
    punishment he deserved and pointed out several facts in
    mitigation, including the fact that the prior similar offense
    had been committed 11 years earlier and that he would be at
    least 60 years old before he could be paroled.   He concluded by
    asking the jury to give Williams a sentence that the jury
    thought was "just," within the range of punishment.    The jury
    returned a sentence of life in prison.
    Williams filed a motion to set aside the jury sentence
    based on his claim that the prosecutor's argument was improper
    and prejudicial.   After considering argument and briefs, the
    trial court overruled the motion and sentenced Williams to life
    in prison.
    Analysis
    Williams claims that his case should be remanded for
    resentencing on the ground that the prosecutor's closing
    argument at sentencing was improper and prejudicial.   Because
    this argument is procedurally barred, we will not consider it on
    appeal.   Rule 5A:18.
    "It is well-settled that errors assigned because of a
    prosecutor's alleged improper comments or conduct during
    argument will not be considered on appeal unless an accused
    timely moves for a cautionary instruction or for a mistrial."
    Cheng v. Commonwealth, 
    240 Va. 26
    , 38, 
    393 S.E.2d 599
    , 605-06
    (1990) (emphasis added); accord Yarbrough v. Commonwealth, 262
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    Va. 388, 396, 
    551 S.E.2d 306
    , 311 (2001); Yeatts v.
    Commonwealth, 
    242 Va. 121
    , 137, 
    410 S.E.2d 254
    , 264 (1991);
    Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 
    212 Va. 741
    , 744, 
    187 S.E.2d 174
    , 176
    (1972); Russo v. Commonwealth, 
    207 Va. 251
    , 257, 
    148 S.E.2d 820
    ,
    825 (1966); Mack v. Commonwealth, 
    20 Va. App. 5
    , 7-9, 
    454 S.E.2d 750
    , 751-52 (1995).   "Making a timely motion for mistrial means
    making the motion 'when the objectionable words were spoken.'"
    
    Yeatts, 242 Va. at 137
    , 410 S.E.2d at 264 (quoting Reid v.
    Baumgardner, 
    217 Va. 769
    , 774, 
    232 S.E.2d 778
    , 781 (1977)).
    "Counsel cannot remain silent when improper argument is made and
    after the whole argument is concluded and in the absence of the
    jury successfully move for a mistrial."     See 
    Russo, 207 Va. at 257
    , 148 S.E.2d at 825.   The rationale for this rule is that an
    objection to a prosecutor's statements at the time the
    objectionable words are spoken allows the trial court to cure
    the claimed error with a curative instruction, a remedy that it
    cannot effect after the jury has retired.     See id.; Craddock v.
    Commonwealth, 
    16 Va. App. 402
    , 405, 
    429 S.E.2d 889
    , 891 (1993)
    (considering appellant's objection despite failure to request a
    mistrial, because the objection was made before the judge and,
    thus, did not require a cautionary instruction).
    Moreover, Williams' failure to object to the prosecutor's
    argument at the time it was made, or shortly thereafter, does
    not come within either the "good cause" or "ends of justice"
    exceptions to the contemporaneous objection rule.     See M. Morgan
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    Cherry & Assocs. v. Cherry, 
    37 Va. App. 329
    , 339-40, 
    558 S.E.2d 534
    , 538-39 (2002) (holding that appellant's failure to object
    was without good cause because he failed to utilize his ample
    opportunity to object); Brown v. Commonwealth, 
    8 Va. App. 126
    ,
    131, 
    380 S.E.2d 8
    , 10 (1989) (noting that the "ends of justice"
    exception is narrow and to be used sparingly, and requires a
    determination that the error affected the outcome of the case).
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Williams' conviction
    and sentence.
    Affirmed.
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