Thomas A. Chilton, Jr., s/k/a v. Commonwealth of VA ( 2001 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Coleman
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
THOMAS A. CHILTON, JR., S/K/A
THOMAS ARTHUR CHILTON, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0442-00-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
AUGUST 28, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY
John R. Alderman, Judge
Matthew P. Geary (Hairfield & Morton, PLC, on
briefs), for appellant.
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General;
Amy L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
A jury convicted Thomas A. Chilton, Jr. of robbery, use of a
firearm in the commission of a robbery, and entering a banking
house armed with a deadly weapon with the intent to commit
larceny of money. He contends (1) that all the convictions
should be reversed because the judge gave the jury an erroneous
instruction and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to
support the conviction for use of a firearm in the commission of
robbery. We reverse the conviction for the use of a firearm in
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
the commission of a robbery, and we affirm the other two
convictions.
I.
A teller at a bank in Hanover County testified that Chilton
entered the bank and requested change for a $100 bill. After
she had given him the change, he demanded that she give him "all
the money." The teller testified that she noticed an object
lying on the counter that "appeared to be a gun." The teller
identified Commonwealth's Exhibit Number 4 as the weapon she
saw, and she said Chilton's hand was on the weapon in such a
manner that caused her to believe she was seeing the barrel of
the gun. She gave Chilton approximately $300, including several
marked "bait" bills.
Another bank employee saw a blue car departing the bank and
recorded the license number. Later that day, a police officer
saw Chilton sitting in a blue car and arrested him for a
narcotics violation. When the officer called in the license
number, he learned that that car might have been involved in a
bank robbery. The officer searched Chilton and found $260 in
various denominations, which included the "bait" bills. The
officer also found the weapon identified as Commonwealth's
Exhibit Number 4. On cross-examination, the officer testified
as follows regarding the weapon:
Q: [Y]ou didn't find any real guns?
A: No.
- 2 -
Q: How did you determine that this was not
a real gun?
A: I looked at it.
Q: Okay, so you physically took it out of
the sheathing and found that it was a knife
that actually retracts and just happens to
have a handle which looks like a gun handle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you don't see anything, other than
wood here, when it's inside the sheathing,
do you?
A: No, just a pistol grip.
Q: Okay.
A: And metal.
Q: You don't see any barrel of any sort?
A: No, sir.
Chilton testified and denied that he robbed the bank. He
admitted, however, that he told the police he robbed the bank.
He testified that when he sought change for the $100 bill, the
teller misinterpreted his intent. He said he did not ask for
the money that she gave him. Although he testified that he was
disoriented and confused and could not remember what happened to
him between the time he left the bank and his arrest, he
admitted changing his clothes and shaving his mustache after
leaving the bank because he didn't want to be arrested. He
testified that the knife the officer found on him had a "pistol
grip."
- 3 -
The jury convicted Chilton of all three charges. The trial
judge imposed the jury's recommended sentences of five, three,
and twenty years for robbery, use of a firearm in a robbery, and
armed bank robbery, respectively.
II.
Chilton contends that the trial judge erred in giving one
of the jury instructions and that, therefore, all three of his
convictions must be reversed. The instruction stated: "Where a
victim reasonably perceived a threat or intimidation by a
firearm, it is not necessary that the object in question was in
fact a firearm." The Commonwealth contends that Rule 5A:18 bars
our consideration of this issue.
When the trial judge reviewed the proposed instructions
with the attorneys, Chilton's trial counsel said of this
instruction, "I prefer not to have it, Judge, but I think the
case law is clear, he's entitled to have it." Chilton's trial
attorney's statement fails to fulfill the contemporaneous
objection requirement of Rule 5A:18. Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 2
Va. App. 619, 621, 347 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1986) (holding that to
preserve an issue for appeal the grounds for an objection must
be "stated with specificity").
Moreover, the record does not support application of the
Rule's exception "for good cause" or "to attain the ends of
justice." In a prosecution for robbery, "a victim's perception
that the assailant was armed is sufficient to establish the
- 4 -
necessary element of violence or intimidation." Yarborough v.
Commonwealth, 247 Va. 215, 219 n.2, 441 S.E.2d 342, 344 n.2
(1994). The phrase "threat or intimidation" mentioned in the
instruction is germane to the elements of robbery and could be
considered by the jury for the purpose of determining Chilton's
guilt or innocence on that charge. For robbery, the real nature
of the alleged weapon is not important, only the intimidation
suffered by the victim. Thus, the instruction was relevant to
the robbery issue before the jury. Chilton's trial attorney did
not offer a limiting instruction as to the other issues.
III.
Chilton also contends that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of using a firearm during a felony because the
evidence proved only that he had a knife during the robbery.
Again, the Commonwealth contends that Rule 5A:18 bars an appeal
on this issue.
The record establishes, however, that Chilton raised this
precise issue in a motion to set aside the verdict. In a
similar case, McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 357 S.E.2d
738 (1987), we addressed a situation in which a defendant filed
a timely motion to set aside the verdict under Rule 3A:15(b).
We noted that the defendant raised specific objections to the
sufficiency of the evidence, and we held that the motion was
adequate to allow us to consider those issues on appeal. Id. at
321-22, 357 S.E.2d at 739-40. Indeed, we have specifically held
- 5 -
that "[a] proper motion to set aside a verdict will preserve for
appeal a sufficiency of the evidence question." Brown v.
Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 474, 480, 382 S.E.2d 296, 300 (1989).
The Commonwealth argues that Chilton's motion does not
comply with Rule 5A:18 because the trial judge failed to rule on
it and because it was not filed through Chilton's attorney.
Although "the record [in McGee did] not indicate whether the
trial judge ruled on the motion," 4 Va. App. at 321, 357 S.E.2d
at 740, we addressed the merits of the appeal. Moreover, the
record in this case indicates that the Commonwealth replied to
the motion and the trial judge was aware of the motion. At a
hearing on April 3, 2000, the trial judge replaced Chilton's
appointed attorney and said: "[W]ith respect to the other
matters, I think I am deprived of jurisdiction, the notice of
appeal having been made, so I am unable to rule on any of those
motions, and in any event, wouldn't do so without the
participation of counsel." Those comments manifest the trial
judge's erroneous impression that he lacked jurisdiction over
the case. The judge did not enter final judgment in this case
until May 22, 2000, more than a month after the hearing.
Although the jury returned its verdict and sentence on February
15, 2000, "'[t]here is a distinction between the rendition of a
judgment and the entry of a judgment.'" Wagner v. Shird, 257
Va. 584, 587, 514 S.E.2d 613, 615 (1999) (citation omitted).
- 6 -
The judge retained jurisdiction until twenty-one days after the
entry of the final judgment. Rule 1:1.
Chilton's pro se filing of this motion does not render it
ineffectual in raising the sufficiency issue before the trial
judge. In the same motion, Chilton asked for a new attorney to
be appointed. Although Chilton's attorney's actions are binding
on him, Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988), and, as
an indigent, Chilton could not discharge his court-appointed
attorney at will, Kinard v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 524, 526,
431 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1993), he petitioned the trial judge for a
new attorney and in so doing moved to set aside the verdict.
The evidence at the final hearing indicated that Chilton and his
appointed attorney had such serious differences that the trial
judge appointed a new attorney. In such a circumstance, the pro
se motion sufficiently fulfilled the requirement of Rule 5A:18
that the matter be addressed to the trial judge.
Furthermore, the ends of justice exception applies to
obviate the need for a contemporaneous objection in this case.
In order for an accused to take advantage of this exception, the
accused must show affirmatively that a miscarriage of justice
has occurred, not that a miscarriage might have occurred.
Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 433, 436, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744
(1987). Specifically, when challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence in this manner, the accused "must demonstrate that he
or she was convicted for conduct that was not a criminal offense
- 7 -
or the record must affirmatively prove than an element of the
offense did not occur." Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App.
215, 222, 487 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1997).
An accused "may not be convicted for the use of a firearm
under Code § 18.2-53.1 unless the evidence discloses beyond a
reasonable doubt that the object used to cause the victim to
reasonably believe it was, in fact, a firearm." Sprouse v.
Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 548, 551-52, 453 S.E.2d 303, 306
(1995). In this case, the Commonwealth relied on the testimony
of the teller to prove the existence of the firearm. The teller
identified the knife recovered from Chilton as the weapon she
saw when he robbed her. Counsel for the Commonwealth conceded
at oral argument that this testimony was "not helpful" on this
issue. The Commonwealth asks us to speculate, however, that
Chilton had another weapon, a firearm, which he discarded after
leaving the bank but before the police officer discovered him.
The evidence in the record established that Chilton had a knife
that looked like a gun when he committed the robbery. In other
words, "the evidence proved that the charged offense did not
occur." Redman, 25 Va. App. at 222, 487 S.E.2d at 273. We will
not speculate otherwise. Thus, we hold that the bar of Rule
5A:18 does not apply and that the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, proved Chilton did not use a
firearm during the commission of the robbery.
- 8 -
IV.
For these reasons, we reverse the conviction for use of a
firearm in the commission of a robbery in violation of Code
§ 18.2-53.1, and we affirm the convictions of robbery and of
entering a banking house armed with a deadly weapon with the
intent to commit larceny of money.
Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
- 9 -