Darian G. Pleasant, s/k/a Darian Glendon Pleasant v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2011 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Petty and Senior Judge Bumgardner
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
DARIAN G. PLEASANT, S/K/A
DARIAN GLENDON PLEASANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1765-10-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
NOVEMBER 15, 2011
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY
Joseph J. Ellis, Judge
Ronald Hur, Assistant Public Defender II, for appellant.
Susan M. Harris, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli,
II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Darian G. Pleasant appeals his convictions for possession of marijuana and possession of
cocaine with the intent to distribute. He contends that the trial court erred by admitting a
statement he made to the police and in finding the evidence sufficient to convict. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Police arranged for a confidential informant to purchase crack cocaine from the defendant
at a gas station in western Spotsylvania County. The defendant was the sole occupant of a
minivan parked in the station lot. The police arrested him on outstanding warrants, removed him
from the minivan, and placed him in handcuffs. An officer advised the defendant of his Miranda
rights just after they removed him from the vehicle, and the defendant indicated he understood
his rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
After a drug dog alerted, the officers searched the defendant’s van and found a shoe box
between the two front seats. It contained sixteen knotted plastic baggie corners containing
cocaine and one baggie containing marijuana. The officers also recovered several cell phones, a
digital scale, and a box of sandwich baggies from a backpack located behind the driver’s seat.
After recovering the drugs from the vehicle, Sergeant Murdock Woodard asked the
defendant, “Do you have any more up your ass?” The defendant responded, “No.” Woodard
testified further, “After I asked that, he made a statement about the only thing he had was in the
center console area.”
The defendant moved to suppress the statement that “the only thing he had was in the
center console area.” He argued the statement was made in response to interrogation and the
evidence did not show that he had waived his Miranda rights. The trial court found the statement
was a spontaneous comment and “no question was asked that that would have been a response
to.” It denied the motion to suppress.
Even if the statement would be considered responsive to the question and made without a
voluntary waiver of Miranda rights, admission of the statement would have been harmless error.
The defendant concedes that the drugs and contraband found in his vehicle were lawfully
obtained and admissible. The record contains overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt so
that any possible error in admitting his statement about the contents of the center console would
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 454, 423
S.E.2d 360, 366 (1992) (admission of a confession harmless based on overwhelming evidence of
guilt). Admission of the statement was not reversible error.
The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he knowingly possessed
marijuana and possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute. “On appeal, ‘we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
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inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492
S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d
415, 418 (1987)). “We also accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly
deducible from the evidence.” Riner v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 296, 303, 601 S.E.2d 555, 558
(2004).
The defendant was parked at the designated location of an arranged drug buy. He was
the sole occupant of the minivan and was seated in close proximity to drugs found next to the
driver’s seat and to drug paraphernalia found behind the driver’s seat. The cocaine was
packaged into sixteen baggie corners. Expert testimony explained that sandwich bags were often
used to package drugs and that crack cocaine is “most often” packaged in knotted, torn, plastic
baggie corners like the baggies recovered in this case. Additional empty baggies and a digital
scale were also items used in the distribution of drugs. No user paraphernalia was found, and the
street value of the cocaine was about $300.
A fact finder may rely on expert testimony to discern the incriminating import of
seemingly innocuous circumstances that nonetheless have incriminating relevance in the drug
trade. Williams v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 194, 202, 662 S.E.2d 627, 631 (2008). The
presence of equipment related to drug distribution and the manner in which drugs are packaged
may be probative of intent to distribute. McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 493, 545
S.E.2d 541, 547 (2001). The absence of user paraphernalia is “regularly recognized” as a factor
indicating an intent to distribute. Scott v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 166, 173, 684 S.E.2d
833, 837 (2009) (en banc).
The trial court could infer that the defendant was aware of the nature and character of the
drugs located in the minivan, that they were subject to his dominion and control, and that he
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intended to distribute the cocaine. The evidence was sufficient to prove both offenses beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
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