Timothy Shawn Daugherty v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2011 )


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  •                                 COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys
    Argued by teleconference
    TIMOTHY SHAWN DAUGHERTY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.      Record No. 0297-11-3                                    JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
    NOVEMBER 1, 2011
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY
    Charles J. Strauss, Judge
    James C. Martin (Martin & Martin Law Firm, on brief), for
    appellant.
    Rosemary V. Bourne, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T.
    Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    Timothy Shawn Daugherty, appellant, pled guilty to failure to appear in violation of Code
    § 18.2-456, evading and eluding in violation of Code § 46.2-817,1 and driving while under
    suspension, third or subsequent offense within ten years, in violation of Code § 46.2-301. Appellant
    challenges the trial court’s imposition of sentence for the failure to appear. For the reasons stated,
    we reverse. 2
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    1
    In this appeal, defendant does not challenge the evading conviction.
    2
    Appellant initially appealed his twelve-month sentence for driving while his license was
    suspended claiming that it violated the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution
    prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Upon his motion prior to oral argument, the
    Court allowed appellant to withdraw this assignment of error.
    BACKGROUND
    On March 2, 2010, appellant failed to appear in Pittsylvania General District Court. That
    court issued a capias for his arrest, charging appellant with contempt of court under Code
    § 18.2-456, which sets forth the types of behavior that are punishable by summary contempt.
    Subsequently, the general district court found appellant guilty of contempt and sentenced him to ten
    days in jail pursuant to Code § 18.2-458. Appellant noted his appeal to the Circuit Court for
    Pittsylvania County.
    On October 18, 2010 a grand jury indicted appellant for driving with a suspended operator’s
    license, third or subsequent offense. On November 30, 2010, appellant pled guilty in the circuit
    court to that charge and to the misdemeanor contempt for failure to appear. On January 11, 2011,
    the trial court sentenced appellant to twelve months in jail for the driving offense and six months in
    jail for failure to appear.
    At trial, appellant never argued that the court lacked authority to impose a six-month
    sentence for summary contempt.
    This appeal follows.
    ANALYSIS
    Appellant contends that since he was convicted of summary contempt, Code § 18.2-4583
    limits the maximum incarceration to ten days, not the six months imposed by the trial court. We
    agree, as does the Commonwealth.
    3
    Code § 18.2-458 provides:
    A judge of a district court shall have the same power and
    jurisdiction as a judge of a circuit court to punish summarily for
    contempt, but in no case shall the fine exceed $250, or the
    imprisonment exceed ten days, for the same contempt.
    -2-
    It is uncontested that appellant was convicted of summary contempt for failure to appear
    under Code § 18.2-456, which states in part: “The courts and judges may issue attachments for
    contempt, and punish them summarily, only in the cases following: . . . (5) disobedience or
    resistance of an officer of the court, juror, witness or other person to any lawful process, judgment,
    decree or order of the court.”
    Summary contempt is “‘[w]here the contempt is committed in the presence of the court, it
    is competent for it to proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts, and to punish the offender
    without further proof, and without issue or trial in any form.’” Davis v. Commonwealth, 
    219 Va. 395
    , 398, 
    247 S.E.2d 681
    , 682 (1978) (quoting Burdett v. Commonwealth, 
    103 Va. 838
    , 845-46,
    
    48 S.E. 878
    , 880-81 (1904)). “A petty, direct contempt may be subject to summary
    adjudication.” Gilman v. Commonwealth, 
    275 Va. 222
    , 227, 
    657 S.E.2d 474
    , 476 (2008).
    Summary contempt is punishable by a fine not to exceed $250, and/or imprisonment of no more
    than ten days. Code § 18.2-458.
    The circuit court is bound by Code § 18.2-458 as is the district court. The circuit court’s
    appellate jurisdiction is derivative of the general district court’s jurisdiction. Davis v. County of
    Fairfax, 
    282 Va. 23
    , 30, 
    710 S.E.2d 466
    , 469 (2011).
    The Commonwealth concedes the trial court erred in imposing a six-month sentence for a
    summary contempt conviction. While we are not obliged to accept the Commonwealth’s
    concession of legal error, Copeland v. Commonwealth, 
    52 Va. App. 529
    , 
    664 S.E.2d 528
    (2008),
    we agree with the Commonwealth. As we said in Copeland:
    We have no obligation to accept concessions of error, see
    United States v. Hairston, 
    522 F.3d 336
    , 340 (4th Cir. 2008)
    (recognizing “the government’s concession of error is not binding
    on this court”), and, to be sure, we would never do so if the issue
    were a pure question of law, Logan v. Commonwealth, 
    47 Va. App. 168
    , 172, 
    622 S.E.2d 771
    , 773 (2005) (en banc). “Our
    fidelity to the uniform application of law precludes us from
    accepting concessions of law made on appeal. Because the law
    -3-
    applies to all alike, it cannot be subordinated to the private
    opinions of litigants.” 
    Id. Copeland, 52 Va. App.
    at 
    531-32, 664 S.E.2d at 529
    (footnote omitted).
    The fact that appellant did not preserve this issue below is of no moment. “[A] sentence
    imposed in violation of a prescribed statutory range of punishment is void ab initio because ‘the
    character of the judgment was not such as the [C]ourt had the power to render.’” Rawls v.
    Commonwealth, 
    278 Va. 213
    , 221, 
    683 S.E.2d 544
    , 549 (2009) (quoting Anthony v. Kasey, 
    83 Va. 338
    , 340, 
    5 S.E. 176
    , 177 (1887)). “‘A sentence in excess of that prescribed by law is not void ab
    initio because of the excess, but is good in so far as the power of the court extends, and is invalid
    only as to the excess.’” 
    Id. at 218, 683
    S.E.2d at 547 (quoting Royster v. Smith, 
    195 Va. 228
    ,
    236, 
    77 S.E.2d 855
    , 859 (1953)). An order that is void ab initio is a “complete nullity” that may be
    “impeached directly or collaterally by all persons, anywhere, at any time, or in any manner.” Singh
    v. Mooney, 
    261 Va. 48
    , 52, 
    541 S.E.2d 549
    , 551 (2001). A void sentence may be attacked for the
    first time on appeal. See Morrison v. Bestler, 
    239 Va. 166
    , 170, 
    387 S.E.2d 753
    , 756 (1990) (“[T]he
    lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time in the proceedings, even for the first
    time on appeal.”).
    Based on the summary contempt violation and the sentence that exceeded the statutory
    maximum of ten days in jail, we find the trial court erred in sentencing appellant to six months
    for summary contempt.
    -4-
    CONCLUSION
    Finding that the trial court sentenced appellant to a term that exceeded the statutory
    maximum on the summary contempt offense, we reverse and remand for a new sentence not to
    exceed a term of ten days. 4
    Reversed and remanded.
    4
    See Rawls, 
    278 Va. 213
    , 
    683 S.E.2d 544
    .
    -5-