Leah Bendele, An Infant v. CW, DMAS ( 1999 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Annunziata, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
LEAH BENDELE, AN INFANT, BY HER
NEXT FRIENDS AND PARENTS,
BRUCE AND BARBARA BENDELE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1219-98-4 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
MARCH 30, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, DEPARTMENT
OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY
James W. Haley, Jr., Judge
Daniel B. Streich for appellant.
Brian M. McCormick, Special Counsel (Mark L.
Earley, Attorney General; Ashley L. Taylor,
Jr., Deputy Attorney General; Siran S.
Faulders, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Leah Bendele appealed to the circuit court an adverse
ruling by the Department of Medical Assistance Services. The
circuit court dismissed the appeal because Bendele did not give
the agency sufficient notice of her filing of the petition for
appeal. Bendele argues that the trial court erred when it held
that mailing a copy of the petition for appeal to the agency did
not satisfy the notice requirements of the Administrative
Process Act. Concluding that the trial court did not err, we
affirm the dismissal.
The Department of Medical Assistance Services administers
the state Medicaid program. When it denied services to Bendele,
she gave notice of appeal to the agency and filed a petition for
appeal in the circuit court. On the same day, she mailed a copy
of the petition by certified mail return receipt requested to
the agency. The agency received it timely. Bendele did not
request that the clerk issue process and did not request service
of process. Bendele concedes that she did not comply with the
provisions of Rule 2A:4. 1 However, she asserts that Code
§ 8.01-288 2 cures that defect because the agency received a copy
of the petition within the time required.
1
Rule 2A:4. Petition for Appeal.
(a) Within 30 days after the filing of the
notice of appeal, the appellant shall file
his petition for appeal with the clerk of
the circuit court named in the first notice
of appeal to be filed. Such filing shall
include all steps provided in Rules 2:2 and
2:3 to cause a copy of the petition to be
served (as in the case of a bill of
complaint in equity) on the agency secretary
and on every other party.
(b) The petition for appeal shall designate
the regulation or case decision appealed
from, specify the errors assigned, state the
reasons why the regulation or case decision
is deemed to be unlawful and conclude with a
specific statement of the relief requested.
2
§ 8.01-288. Process received in time good
though neither served nor accepted.--Except
for process commencing actions for divorce
or annulment of marriage or other actions
wherein service of process is specifically
prescribed by statute, process which has
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The Administrative Process Act does not prescribe the procedure
for perfecting an appeal from the agency to the circuit court.
Code § 9-6:14:16 authorizes the Supreme Court to establish these
by rule, and they are contained in Part Two A, Appeals Pursuant
to the Administrative Process Act. Rule 2A:2 provides that a
party shall file a notice of appeal with the agency secretary.
Rule 2A:4 provides that within 30 days of filing the notice, the
party shall file a petition for appeal with the clerk of the
circuit court. The filing of the petition shall include all the
steps established in Rules 2:2 and 2:3 (the procedures for
initiating an equity bill of complaint and having the clerk
issue a subpoena in chancery). Rule 2A:4 states that the
purpose of the procedure is to cause a copy of the petition to
be served on the agency secretary.
Code § 8.01-288 cures defective service when process
actually reaches the necessary person within the prescribed time
limit. This cure extends to actions unless the particular
statute specifically provides it will not apply.
In our opinion, the emphasized language
of Code § 8.01-288 evidences a legislative
intent to exclude services of process from
its saving provision only in certain limited
instances. Such an intent is clearly
established with respect to suits for
reached the person to whom it is directed
within the time prescribed by law, if any,
shall be sufficient although not served or
accepted as provided in this chapter.
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divorce and annulment, which are expressly
excluded from the statute's saving
provision. Code § 8.01-288. In other
instances, the General Assembly has included
the following sentence in statutes creating
actions: "The provisions of § 8.01-288
shall not be applicable to the service of
process required in this subsection," or
like language. See Code § 38.2-2206(E) and
(F) (uninsured motorist actions); Code
§ 54.1-1120(1) (Contractor Transaction
Recovery Fund claims); Code
§ 54.1-2114(A)(1) (Real Estate Transaction
Recovery Fund claims).
Frey v. Jefferson Homebuilders, Inc., 251 Va. 375, 379-80, 467
S.E.2d 788, 790 (1996).
In Broomfield v. Jackson, 18 Va. App. 854, 858, 447 S.E.2d
880, 882 (1994), this Court held:
When the legislature has deemed it prudent
to do so, it has made specific reference in
the APA to selected provisions of Title
8.01. See, e.g., Code § 9-6.14:5. From our
review of the legislative policy statement
in the APA, see Code § 9-6.14:3, we discern
no legislative intent to supplement the
provisions of an agency's basic laws and the
APA with the general laws of the
Commonwealth. See also Code § 9-6.14:4(C).
The legislative policy statement is
consistent with "[t]he general rule in other
jurisdictions . . . that rules of civil
procedure do not apply to administrative
proceedings unless the rules specifically so
provide." State Oil and Gas Bd. v. McGowan,
542 So. 2d 244, 247 (Miss. 1989).
We need not decide if Bloomfield is distinguishable from
this case because the appellant’s actions did not bring her
within the provisions of Code § 8.01-288. Bendele mailed a copy
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of the petition for appeal that she had filed to the agency.
That was not process. Process in this case would have been a
subpoena in chancery, which the clerk would have attached to a
copy of the filing. Process is an official notice informing the
recipient of a pending action filed and advising when a response
is required.
"Process to commence an action is normally an order
(summons) to a court official (sheriff) to notify (summon) a
defendant to answer the plaintiff’s complaint at a time and
place mentioned in the order." Kent Sinclair & Leigh B.
Middleditch, Jr., Virginia Civil Procedure § 7.1, at 333 (3d ed.
1998). When following the equity procedures incorporated by
Rule 2A:4, process would be the subpoena in chancery. See id.
The clerk of the issuing court would attach process, the
subpoena in chancery, to a copy of the bill of complaint and
direct it to the sheriff of the bailiwick for service. See id.
§ 7.3, at 335. Under Rule 2A:4, the clerk would attach the
subpoena in chancery to a copy of the petition for appeal and
direct it to the sheriff for service.
The formality of process serves a legitimate purpose.
Process is official notice which informs the opposing party of
the litigation and instructs the party when and where it must
respond. Without this official notice, the recipient knows
neither if the action was filed nor when it was filed. The
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party would not know when critical time limits expire. Without
process a party would need to resort to other means to obtain
essential information. The practical solution is to telephone
the clerk of court to ask if and when the action was filed.
However, a party relies on the informal information received
over the telephone at its own risk. If the information is
incorrect, it acted at its own peril. "But one who takes the
shortcut of asking the clerk's employees to examine the record
for him relies on the response at his peril." School Bd. v.
Caudill Rowlett Scott, Inc., 237 Va. 550, 556, 379 S.E.2d 319,
322 (1989).
Cases that have applied Code § 8.01-288 involved process
received by means other than service. In Frey, 251 Va. 375, 467
S.E.2d 788, process was issued by the clerk and delivered to the
defendant’s registered agent. In Davis v. American
Interinsurance Exch., 228 Va. 1, 319 S.E.2d 723 (1984), copies
of the notice of motion for judgment, which did indicate the
return date, were only mailed but were received.
Parker v. Prince William Cty., 198 Va. 231, 93 S.E.2d 136
(1956), dealt with a notice of disallowance rather than process.
The Supreme Court indicated that the saving provisions of Code
§ 8-53 (now Code § 8.01-288) applied when notice was actually
received though not served. See id. at 234, 93 S.E.2d at 138.
The case did not deal with process because the statute
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prescribed the form requirements for giving notice of actions
taken by the Board of Supervisors. Code § 8.01-285(1) defines
"process" for purposes of interpreting the chapter concerning
process within Title 8.01 of the Code. The term "shall be
deemed to include notice.” However, if process includes notice,
it does not follow that any notice must constitute process. If
a procedure requires that a party receive process, informal
notice will not necessarily meet the requirement for process.
We conclude that the saving provisions of Code § 8.01-288
do not apply when the party mails a simple copy of the document
to the opposing party rather than follow the requirements of
Rule 2A:4. Because Code § 8.01-288 does not apply and because
the appellant concedes that she did not comply with Rule 2A:4,
the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear this
administrative appeal. See Mayo v. Dep't of Commerce, 4 Va.
App. 520, 358 S.E.2d 759 (1987). We affirm the dismissal by the
trial court of the appeal.
Affirmed.
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