Commonwealth v. Eric Lamont Flythe ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued by teleconference
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0759-03-1 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
JULY 18, 2003
ERIC LAMONT FLYTHE
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY
Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellant.
Anthony J. Nicolo (Ferrell, Sayer & Nicolo,
P.C., on brief), for appellee.
The grand jury indicted Eric Lamont Flythe for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute. The Commonwealth appeals from
the trial judge's pretrial order granting Flythe's motion to
suppress evidence. See Code § 19.2-398. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the order.
I.
"Upon appeal from a trial [judge's] ruling on a motion to
suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, in this instance [Flythe], granting to him
all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from the evidence."
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Commonwealth v. Spencer, 21 Va. App. 156, 159, 462 S.E.2d 899, 901
(1995). Moreover, "we are bound by the trial [judge's] findings
of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to
support them." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487
S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). Viewed in this light, the
evidence at the suppression hearing proved that Lynn Lawson, a
convicted drug felon, approached Detective Walter Joyner on the
street while the detective was investigating an incident unrelated
to this prosecution. The detective testified that Lawson, who was
"not a, per se, informant" but had "provided information to [the
detective] in the past," said he had seen Antwon Hicks and Eric
Lamont Flythe "selling crack cocaine and that they've got guns and
they were the same people that shot at him before." The detective
testified he asked Lawson "specifically did he see them selling
crack." Lawson said he did and described the vehicle, giving a
specific license plate number and a location.
When the detective drove to the location Lawson indicated, he
did not see the vehicle. The detective testified that after he
drove "up and down the street" looking for the vehicle, Lawson
again approached him and said the vehicle was at an apartment
complex. The detective drove to the apartments; however, he did
not see the vehicle at that location. As the detective drove from
the apartments, he received information from another officer and
drove a distance of four blocks where he saw the vehicle.
- 2 -
Although Lawson had said two men were in the vehicle, the
detective testified three men were in the vehicle when he saw it.
The detective and two officers followed the vehicle,
"eventually" made the stop, and approached the vehicle with their
guns unholstered. Flythe asked why he had been stopped. The
detective told him they "had information he was dealing crack
cocaine and had guns in the vehicle." When Flythe denied having
guns, the detective ordered him to exit the vehicle. The
detective testified that although Flythe was not under arrest, he
was not free to leave. He described the reason for detaining
Flythe as follows:
I would characterize it as we had
information on individuals committing
felonies and we were stopping them,
consistent with the information we were
given, and we were going to search them and
do what we were suppose to do and that's why
we stopped them.
The detective testified that Flythe continuously said he
did not have drugs or guns and "was being evasive." At one
point, when Flythe "stuck his hand in his left pocket" and
protested that the detective could not search him, the detective
pointed his gun at him and ordered him to put his hand on the
vehicle. The detective testified that the following events
occurred after he put cuffs on Flythe's wrists:
I walked him over to my patrol car and as
we got there, I began to pat him down and I
was feeling his right pocket. And in the
process of feeling that I felt what appeared
to be a rather linear object. It wasn't
- 3 -
solid like a brick, but it appeared solid to
me at the time. And I felt what I believed
to be a plastic bag. And through feeling
that, I felt hard objects in that. And from
my experience of being a drug enforcement
officer, I felt possibly he did have drugs
in his pocket, so I went in his pocket and
took that out, as well as the linear object
at the same time.
* * * * * * *
After I found that, then I placed him
under arrest for possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute and continued to search
him. Then I found another baggy in his left
pocket which contained what appeared to be
crack cocaine.
The detective further explained that when he "felt the
plastic [during the frisk, he] was feeling all of it to try to
find out what he had in his pocket." He also testified that the
"linear object" was a piece of cloth. Another officer detained
the passengers and arrested one of them for possessing a firearm
after having been convicted of a felony.
Lawson testified that he was a probationer when these
events occurred and that he had been convicted of six felonies,
most of which were drug related. He described his participation
as follows:
I was traveling Downtown Franklin. . . . It
was me and my friend. And as I was going to
the light. I looked over to the right. I
seen [Flythe] on the phone. So I went over
in the parking lot. . . . [H]e came to the
van and the conversation was that I asked
him why did he shoot at me [several months
earlier] and he said that he thought I had a
gun, that's why he shot at me. That was the
conversation.
- 4 -
Q: Y'all shook hands and left peacefully;
did you not?
A: Yes, sir.
* * * * * * *
Q: And later on that evening you saw
Detective Joyner?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell the Judge, please, about your
conversation with him.
A: I told Joyner that it was an unknown
number called my house, saying that Eric and
his cousin were looking for me with a gun.
Q: You specifically told that to Detective
Joyner?
A: Yes, sir.
* * * * * * *
Q: And that person said that [Flythe] and a
friend of his had a gun and they were
looking for you?
A: Yes.
Q: And that's the specific information you
gave to Detective Joyner?
A: (Witness nodding affirmatively.) Well,
I said that they were looking for me with a
gun, right, and then I said -- I asked him
did he know [Flythe]. He said, "Yeah, I
know him, because of the incident that
happened between y'all like seven months
ago. He shot at you and you came to the
police station and told the police." But I
didn't take no warrant out on him.
* * * * * * *
Q: Did you give Detective Joyner a
description of the vehicle?
- 5 -
A: Yeah, I told him it was a burgundy car,
Honda Accord.
Q: Did you give him the license plate
number at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
On cross-examination, Lawson testified that he did not know
whether Flythe and his passenger had guns or drugs when he saw
them in the parking lot.
Finding that the officer received a report "that Mr. Flythe
had a gun . . . I don't recall anybody saying they saw him
brandish a gun, use a gun," the trial judge ruled that the
officers had conducted "a proper Terry investigative stop." The
trial judge also found "that this [detention] is not an arrest,
this is not a search incident to an arrest, . . . I've heard
nothing to stand for that proposition." When the prosecutor
argued "there was an arrest" the trial judge responded "the
Court's already ruled" and further noted as follows:
[T]he only information, when he searched
Mr. Flythe, was an informant's information.
And I don't think we go around arresting
people just because an informant hits the
license plate number correct. It takes more
than that.
II.
"At a hearing on a defendant's motion to suppress, the
Commonwealth has the burden of proving the challenged action did
not violate the defendant's constitutional rights." Russell v.
Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 604, 604, 535 S.E.2d 699, 701 (2000).
- 6 -
Although "[t]he test of constitutional validity is whether at
the moment of arrest the arresting officer had knowledge of
sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a reasonable man
in believing that an offense has been committed," Bryson v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 85, 86-87, 175 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1970),
"[p]robable cause to arrest must exist exclusive of the incident
search." Russell, 33 Va. App. at 604, 535 S.E.2d at 702.
At the hearing, the prosecutor contended that the officer
searched Flythe incident to an arrest. The trial judge found
that although the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion
sufficient to detain Flythe, the officer's search of Flythe was
not predicated upon an arrest. He specifically found "this is
not an arrest . . . because the only information, when he
searched Mr. Flythe, was [a criminal] informant's information."
In short, the judge found that the officer detained Flythe under
Terry, not for an arrest, and that the frisk must be governed by
Terry standards.
Despite the ruling by the trial court that no arrest had
occurred, the prosecutor persisted in arguing that the search
was justified as incident to arrest. The prosecutor advanced no
other argument before the trial court to support the validity of
the search at issue.
On appeal the Commonwealth does not contend the trial judge
erred in ruling the officer's detention of Flythe was not an
arrest. Instead, the Commonwealth contends the evidence proved
- 7 -
probable cause to make an arrest and to search incident to that
arrest. However, because the Commonwealth failed to raise this
argument before the trial court, we do not consider it for the
first time on appeal. See Rule 5A:18; see also West Alex. Prop.
v. First Va. Mort., 221 Va. 134, 138, 267 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1980)
("On appeal, though taking the same general position as in the
trial court, an appellant may not rely on reasons which could
have been but were not raised for the benefit of the lower
court."); Floyd v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 575, 584, 249 S.E.2d
171, 176 (1978) (holding that appellate court will not consider
an argument on appeal that is different from the specific
argument presented to the trial court, even if it relates to the
same general issue).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
Affirmed.
- 8 -