Wayne Sylvester Gunn v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )


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  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Frank
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    WAYNE SYLVESTER GUNN
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1788-99-3                      JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
    JUNE 13, 2000
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
    James F. Ingram, Judge
    Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Appellate Defender
    (Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for
    appellant.
    Thomas M. McKenna, Assistant Attorney General
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Wayne Sylvester Gunn (appellant) appeals his conviction for
    possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250.       On appeal,
    he contends the evidence was insufficient.      We disagree and affirm
    the conviction.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    Appellant was arrested by Officer Hancock of the Danville
    Police Department for being drunk in public.      The officer asked
    appellant if he had "any weapons or needles or anything on him."
    Appellant immediately put his left hand into his pocket.       The
    officer grabbed appellant's hand and asked appellant what he was
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    doing.    Appellant answered, "I'm just getting some money,
    man . . . I'm just getting some money."        The officer then pulled
    appellant's hand out of the pocket and saw money in appellant's
    hand.    Appellant put his hand back in his pocket, and the officer
    removed it when he placed appellant against the police car.       As
    the officer pulled appellant's hand out of his pocket on the
    second occasion, he observed something fall from the pocket onto
    the ground.    He could not tell what it was, and he did not
    retrieve it at that time.    After securing appellant in the police
    unit, the officer retrieved the item that had been dropped.       The
    officer found a suspected smoking device and a cigarette lighter
    exactly where appellant's left leg had been when he dropped the
    object.    There was nothing else in the area.     The pipe was
    analyzed and found to contain cocaine.
    II.    ANALYSIS
    Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting
    to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.       See
    Martin v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    , 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418
    (1987).    The judgment of a trial court will be disturbed only if
    plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.       See 
    id.
    (citations omitted).    The inferences to be drawn from proven facts
    are matters for determination by the fact finder.       See Hancock v.
    Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 774
    , 782, 
    407 S.E.2d 301
    , 306 (1991)
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    (citing Johnson v. Commonwealth, 
    209 Va. 291
    , 295, 
    163 S.E.2d 570
    ,
    574 (1968)).
    "To establish possession of a controlled substance, [it]
    generally is necessary to show that the defendant was aware of the
    presence and character of the particular substance and was
    intentionally and consciously in possession of it."   Gillis v.
    Commonwealth, 
    215 Va. 298
    , 301, 
    208 S.E.2d 768
    , 771 (1974).
    Constructive possession may be proved through evidence
    demonstrating "the accused was aware of both the presence and
    character of the substance and that it was subject to his or her
    dominion and control."   Wymer v. Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 294
    ,
    300, 
    403 S.E.2d 702
    , 706 (1991) (citing Drew v. Commonwealth, 
    230 Va. 471
    , 473, 
    338 S.E.2d 844
    , 845 (1986)).
    Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt so long as "all necessary circumstances proved
    [are] consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence
    and . . . exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."
    Bishop v. Commonwealth, 
    227 Va. 164
    , 169, 
    313 S.E.2d 390
    , 393
    (1984).   The Commonwealth "need not affirmatively disprove all
    theories which might negate the conclusion that the defendant
    [possessed the cocaine], but the conviction will be sustained if
    the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."
    Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 
    216 Va. 349
    , 353, 
    218 S.E.2d 534
    ,
    537 (1975) (citing Payne v. Commonwealth, 
    216 Va. 265
    , 217 S.E.2d
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    870 (1975); Orange v. Commonwealth, 
    191 Va. 423
    , 434, 
    61 S.E.2d 267
    , 271 (1950)).
    Proof of constructive possession necessarily rests on
    circumstantial evidence; thus, "'all necessary circumstances
    proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with
    innocence and exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.'"
    Garland v. Commonwealth, 
    225 Va. 182
    , 184, 
    300 S.E.2d 783
    , 784
    (1983) (citations omitted).
    The Commonwealth "'is not required to prove that there is no
    possibility that someone else may have planted, discarded,
    abandoned, or placed the drugs or paraphernalia where they were
    found near an accused.'"   Pemberton v. Commonwealth, 
    17 Va. App. 651
    , 655, 
    440 S.E.2d 420
    , 422 (1994) (quoting Brown v.
    Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 1
    , 10, 
    421 S.E.2d 877
    , 883 (1992) (en
    banc)).
    Appellant contends the area was a "high drug area" and the
    smoking device could have been discarded by another person.
    Appellant, therefore, reasons that because there is a reasonable
    hypothesis consistent with innocence, the evidence was
    insufficient to support his conviction.
    The trial court could infer from the evidence that appellant
    intended to discard the pipe to avoid detection.   Yet, under
    appellant's argument that the pipe was already at his feet, the
    trial court would have to infer that appellant discarded the
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    lighter, an innocuous object.    This is not a reasonable hypothesis
    and was rejected by the trial court.
    As the Supreme Court of Virginia has stated:
    Numerous decisions have affirmed convictions
    for possession of narcotic drugs resting on
    proof that a defendant was observed dropping
    or throwing away an identifiable object
    which, when subsequently recovered, was found
    to contain narcotics.
    Gordon v. Commonwealth, 
    212 Va. 298
    , 300, 
    183 S.E.2d 735
    , 737
    (1971) (citations omitted).
    In Collins v. Commonwealth, 
    13 Va. App. 177
    , 178, 
    409 S.E.2d 175
    , 175 (1991), the police observed the defendant make a throwing
    motion as he left his vehicle.    No one saw whether he had actually
    thrown anything.   See 
    id. at 179
    , 
    409 S.E.2d at 176
    .   Underneath
    the car in which the defendant had been sitting, the officers
    found a bag of cocaine.   See 
    id. at 178
    , 
    409 S.E.2d at 175
    .
    Despite varied proffered theories of innocence, including one like
    appellant's argument, this Court upheld the conviction, stating
    that the trial court's finding of possession was:
    binding on us, unless it is incredible or
    plainly wrong . . . . The trial court was
    not unmindful of Collins' argument that the
    cocaine might have already been under his
    car. The judge discounted this possibility,
    observing that the cocaine was "something of
    significant value and not something that one
    is likely to have abandoned or carelessly
    left in the area there."
    
    Id. at 179-80
    , 
    409 S.E.2d at 176
    .
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    Likewise, in Powell v. Commonwealth, 
    27 Va. App. 173
    , 
    497 S.E.2d 899
     (1998), this Court again upheld a conviction where the
    evidence showed that the defendant unclenched his fist when
    approached by the police in a high drug-crime area.    No one saw
    the defendant actually drop something, but the police recovered a
    bag of cocaine from the ground below where he made the dropping
    motion.    See id. at 176, 
    497 S.E.2d at 900
    .
    In Beverly v. Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 160
    , 
    403 S.E.2d 175
    (1991), we held that the bag of cocaine found in a
    heavily-traveled roadway was correctly held to be in the
    defendant's possession.   Earlier, the defendant tried to flee from
    approaching officers and dropped an unidentified object in the
    roadway.    See id. at 165, 403 S.E.2d at 177-78.   "We hold that the
    evidence was sufficient to permit an inference that the drugs
    found on the roadway were discarded by appellant as he sped from
    his arrest, and was sufficient to exclude any reasonable
    hypothesis of innocence which flowed from the evidence."    Id. at
    165, 403 S.E.2d at 178 (citations omitted).
    Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to find
    appellant in constructive possession of the cocaine.    An object
    fell from appellant's pocket as his hand was withdrawn from the
    pocket.    Appellant disobeyed the officer's direction to remove his
    hands from his pockets.   The pipe was found exactly where the
    object had fallen, where appellant's foot had been.
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    Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Affirmed.
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