Arnold H. Holeman, Jr. v. Harold Holeman ( 2001 )


Menu:
  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Bumgardner
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    ARNOLD HAROLD HOLEMAN, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
    v.   Record No. 3074-00-2                 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
    AUGUST 28, 2001
    HAROLD HOLEMAN, GRANITE STATE
    INSURANCE COMPANY AND AMERICAN
    INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT COMPANY, INC.
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Andrew J. Reinhardt (Kerns, Kastenbaum &
    Reinhardt, on briefs), for appellant.
    S. Vernon Priddy III (Patsy L. Mundy; Sands
    Anderson Marks & Miller, on brief), for
    appellees.
    The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether the
    Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that Arnold
    Harold Holeman, Jr., did not use reasonable efforts to market
    his residual work capacity.    We affirm the commission's
    decision.
    I.
    For over twenty years, Holeman was the sole proprietor of a
    construction business.    His work primarily consisted of
    residential remodeling projects, including trimming, siding, and
    building Florida rooms and decks.     On October 7, 1998, Holeman
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    sustained injury to his neck, back and shoulder in an automobile
    accident.   Holeman filed a claim for benefits and was awarded,
    by stipulation and a consent order, temporary total disability
    benefits for the period of October 8, 1998 through February 11,
    1999, and temporary partial disability benefits from February
    12, 1999 through July 15, 1999.   Holeman later filed a claim
    alleging a change in condition and seeking temporary total and
    temporary partial disability benefits from July 9, 1999 and
    continuing.
    At the evidentiary hearing, Holeman testified that he was
    unable to work for eight months after the automobile accident.
    He initially returned to employment by working for his friends,
    where he earned "cash" money performing light duty work.    Once
    he "could get back on [his] feet," he restarted his own
    construction business.   By that time, he had lost the business
    connections he had established through other contractors,
    especially for work involving the building of Florida rooms and
    decks.   Holeman testified that he has tried to re-establish his
    prior contacts, but that he has "had to change [his] type of
    work" and now does trim and siding work.   Holeman said he has
    also modified his business to better suit the limitations of his
    injuries and does "a lot of subcontracting."
    Holeman has been averaging one job per week and testified
    that he will be able to earn a "decent" wage in the next six to
    twelve months.   According to his records, his business
    - 2 -
    experienced a loss of about $23,000 for the period of July 9,
    1999 through April 22, 2000.   Holeman testified that he earned
    $48.13 in August 1999, the only month which his business did not
    reflect an overall loss.    He explained that although he has
    earned no money, he has "bought quite a bit of the tools that
    [he] need[s] to do . . . the work . . . just to stay in the
    business until [he] get[s] back on [his] feet."
    The deputy commissioner ruled that Holeman was making
    adequate efforts to market his residual earning capacity and
    awarded him compensation.   On review, the commission found that
    Holeman has "work skills that should permit him to earn
    significant wages in the construction industry."    The commission
    found it unreasonable that Holeman did not seek suitable
    employment from other employers after his self-employment proved
    to be unprofitable.   The commission reversed the award.   Holeman
    appeals from that decision.
    II.
    An employee who seeks an award for temporary partial
    disability benefits has the burden of proving that he or she
    made "a 'reasonable effort' to market his [or her] remaining
    work capacity."   National Linen Serv. v. McGuinn, 
    8 Va. App. 267
    , 269, 
    380 S.E.2d 31
    , 33 (1989).     We reiterated in McGuinn
    the rule that "'[t]he employee must . . . exercise reasonable
    diligence in seeking employment, and what is reasonable in a
    given case will depend upon all the facts and circumstances.'"
    - 3 -
    8 Va. App. at 270-71, 380 S.E.2d at 33 (quoting Great Atlantic &
    Pacific Tea Co. v. Bateman, 
    4 Va. App. 459
    , 467, 
    359 S.E.2d 98
    ,
    102 (1987)).
    Holeman contends that his case presents a novel issue
    because he was returning to self-employment.   Based upon this
    assertion, he argues that we should apply a standard less
    deferential to the commission's findings.   We decline to
    establish a different standard for self-employed persons because
    the issue confronting the commission is the same for all
    employees:   Were the efforts of the employee to market his or
    her residual work capacity reasonable under the circumstances,
    including circumstances of self-employment?
    In applying the McGuinn rule, the commission clearly
    engaged in a fact-finding task.   According to well established
    appellate principles, we will uphold "[f]actual findings of the
    . . . Commission . . . if supported by credible evidence."
    James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 
    8 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989).   Furthermore, we must view the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below to
    determine if credible evidence supports the findings.    Crisp v.
    Brown's Tysons Corner Dodge, 
    1 Va. App. 503
    , 504, 
    339 S.E.2d 916
    , 916 (1986).   So viewed, the evidence proved that Holeman
    initially returned to employment by working for his friends in
    the construction industry for "cash" wages.    Since that time, he
    has worked to re-establish his own business.   The record
    - 4 -
    contains credible evidence to support the commission's findings
    that Holeman's "physical work restrictions are not severe" and
    that his work skills would "permit him to earn significant
    wages."   The evidence also proved, and the commission found,
    that Holeman "has not even attempted to locate other higher
    paying work."    Holeman concedes on brief "that he did not
    job-hunt."
    The record supports the commission's finding that Holeman
    has used his earnings to invest in tools and equipment in an
    attempt "to reorganize his unprofitable construction business."
    Credible evidence also supports the commission's finding that
    Holeman acted unreasonably when he "did not seek suitable
    employment from other employers, particularly after his
    self-employment activities . . . failed to generate any profit
    [and] lost considerable amounts of money for an extended period
    of time."    In making that finding, the commission appropriately
    considered Holeman's "age, skills, work history, and minimal
    restrictions."    See McGuinn, 8 Va. App. at 272, 380 S.E.2d at
    34.
    In addition, the commission reviewed Holeman's records and
    found "it speculative at best . . . whether [Holeman's]
    construction business will ever generate additional revenues."
    The record supports the commission's finding that Holeman was
    using "his company's revenues for capital investment and payment
    of salaries to other employees rather than paying himself."     As
    - 5 -
    the commission found, Holeman made the decision to limit his
    wages "by continuing with unprofitable, if not failing,
    self-employment activity."
    Holeman contends the commission erred in ruling that ARA
    Services v. Swift, 
    22 Va. App. 202
    , 
    468 S.E.2d 682
     (1996), was
    not applicable to his circumstances.     In that case, a disabled
    employee returned to her pre-injury employment, but could only
    perform light-duty work.   She worked fewer hours a week and
    therefore earned less money.     Id. at 204, 468 S.E.2d at 683.     We
    affirmed the commission's ruling that the employee had
    adequately marketed her residual work capacity.    Credible
    evidence established that the employee acted reasonably because
    she might have lost benefits if she had refused to accept the
    light-duty position.   Id. at 207, 468 S.E.2d at 684.
    We agree with the commission that Holeman's case is
    distinguishable because his wage loss results "from a
    combination of the loss of business referrals and his
    reinvestment in his business."    Credible evidence supports the
    commission's finding that his wage loss does not result "from
    part-time employment or from his acceptance of a light duty
    position offered by his pre-injury employer (himself)."    We
    hold, therefore, that the evidence supports the commission's
    ruling that Holeman's decision to forego employment as a
    construction worker and, instead, to attempt to re-establish his
    - 6 -
    business was not, under these circumstances, a reasonable effort
    to market his work capacity.
    Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    - 7 -