Stephen James Franklin v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2012 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Kelsey, McCullough and Senior Judge Clements
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
STEPHEN JAMES FRANKLIN
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1819-11-1 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
NOVEMBER 6, 2012
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
William R. O’Brien, Judge1
T. Gregory Evans for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T.
Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Stephen James Franklin (appellant) was convicted of aggravated malicious wounding in
violation of Code § 18.2-51.2(A) and unlawful wounding during the commission of a felony in
violation of Code § 18.2-53. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in: (1) denying his
motion to suppress statements he made to police, and (2) finding his prosecution for both crimes
did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. For the reasons that follow, we affirm his
convictions.
BACKGROUND
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case, and because this
memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1
Judge O’Brien accepted appellant’s guilty pleas and entered the final conviction and
sentencing orders, but Judge A. Bonwill Shockley ruled on appellant’s motion to suppress his
statements and motion that he was punished twice for the same offense.
incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of
this appeal. On November 17, 2010, the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing relating to
suppression and double jeopardy. The trial court denied both motions, and on April 5, 2011,
appellant entered conditional guilty pleas to both crimes pursuant to Code § 19.2-254, thereby
preserving his right to appeal those rulings.
Following appellant’s guilty pleas, the parties stipulated that on August 21, 2010, at
approximately 1:50 a.m., appellant approached Janelle Moore from behind and cut the left side
of her throat with a sharp object. Moore was on the beach alone, talking on her cell phone when
appellant attacked her. Unaware she had been cut, Moore threatened to call the police.
Appellant cursed at her, knocked the phone out of her hand, and tackled Moore to the ground. A
struggle ensued during which Moore lost her shoes and glasses. A nearby resident heard Moore
scream, saw appellant on top of Moore and yelled at appellant, who fled the scene. Moore ran to
the resident’s home, at which time she realized she had been seriously wounded. Police arrested
appellant, who “initially denied involvement but later admitted to being the man who attacked”
Moore. Although appellant “denied hurting her intentionally, he wrote a letter to Ms. Moore,
apologizing for what he had done.”
In a statement to police, appellant admitted saying something to Moore on the beach and
trying to grab her phone when she tried to call police, but he denied intentionally robbing her or
trying to hurt her. Moore identified appellant at two court hearings as the man who confronted
her on the beach and attacked her.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Appellant contends he clearly invoked his right to counsel, and the trial court erred in
finding otherwise and in denying his motion to suppress his subsequent statements. He claims he
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continually asserted his desire for counsel, and the detective continually interrogated him in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.
“In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, ‘the burden is upon [the
defendant] to show that the ruling, when the evidence is considered most favorably to the
Commonwealth, constituted reversible error.’” McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193,
197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (quoting Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007,
1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980)).
On August 26, 2010, Detective Laino interviewed appellant, who had earlier been
advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The video-recorded
interview was transcribed and reflected, in relevant part, the following exchange between Laino
and appellant:
DML [Laino]: Say you get five years for the malicious assault
charge, and give you[ ] five year probation violation, they just say
run the time concurrent.
SJF [appellant]: Let me talk to my lawyer.
DML: OK, is that what you want to do?
SJF: Yeah.
DML: OK, alright man, we’re gonna take you back over to the
magistrate’s.
SJF: I mean, I’m not trying to blow you off.
DML: No, Dude, I understand 110%, it’s your absolute right, um
but I gotta job I gotta do myself.
SJF: I know, can you hold on until I get the lawyer.
DML: I gotta get the charges today, you know, do you have an
attorney already?
SJF: No, I’m trying to get a hold of someone, I don’t have no
phone numbers.
DML: Stephen, like I said.
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SJF: I don’t have no phone numbers so I can’t contact nobody to
talk to em.
DML: What do you need phone numbers for? In your phone?
SJF: Yes.
DML: Ok, well I can get phone numbers if you tell me who you
need.
SJF: I need Harold.
DML: I’ve got Harold’s number.
SJF: Do you have his cell phone number, too?
DML: He called me.
SJF: What did he say?
DML: I haven’t had a chance to talk to him, been playing phone
tag with him. But, I got his number.
SJF: He’s at work.
DML: Listen, I can’t talk to you anymore.
SJF: I’m trying to, I’m trying, because I really . . .
DML: I got to ask you this . . . do you want to talk to me yes or
no?
SJF: Yes, I want to talk to you but I need to talk to somebody first.
DML: Who do you need to talk to?
SJF: I need to talk to Harold.
DML: Ok, I will get you Harold’s phone number and everything,
but, I may have it in here, I’ll get you a phone and let you talk to
Harold. But I need to know the truth first, the truth.
SJF: I mean if you let me talk to him then I’ll consider telling you,
I mean, what I think happened. Ok?
Laino explained to appellant he wanted to hear appellant’s side of the story in order to
determine what charges to bring and asked, “[D]o you want me to get a phone for you?”
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Appellant said, “Yes please,” and Laino left the interview room. Laino returned nine minutes
later, and the following exchange ensued:
DML: Alright man, I tracked down a phone. We’ll get you a
phone call, I got Harold’s number. Dude, is it cold in here or is it
just me?
SJF: Yes, it’s cold.
DML: Alright, cause you said you want an attorney and then you
said you want to talk.
SJF: Let me find if I should get an attorney first. That’s all I’m
saying.
DML: So you want to find out if you want to get an attorney first?
SJF: Yes.
DML: Alright, well let’s go through this and then you tell me after
you do whatever you need to do.
SJF: Ok.
DML: Fair enough?
SJF: That’s fine.
DML: Ok. We’ve already been through this a couple times.
We’ll just go through it again. You understand you have the right
to remain silent. Right, Right?
SJF: um huh.
DML: Anything you say can be used against you in court. Right.
SJF: Right.
DML: You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him being
present while you are being questioned.
SJF: Right.
DML: If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed
to represent you for any questions you wish. You understand that.
You can decide at any time to exercise these rights and answer any
questions or make any statements. You understand that right?
SJF: Uh huh.
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DML: Ok, just put your initials next to here, do you understand
each of these rights as I explained to you. Yes or no? Just put
your initial.
SJF: Check yes?
DML: Just put your initial. Ok, having these rights in mind do
you wish to talk to us? And you can take that back after your
phone call, if you decide you don’t want to.
SJF: Do I have to sign that now?
DML: Uh, do you want to wait?
SJF: Yea[h], can I wait to sign it.
DML: Yeah, if you want to.
SJF: Do you want me to sign this?
DML: No, we’ll just hold off. Ok, I’ll leave this here for you.
Laino let appellant use the phone to call Harold. Laino asked if he should leave the
room, and appellant said he did not care. Appellant spoke with Harold, after which Laino asked
appellant if Harold wanted to speak with the detective since Harold called Laino earlier and left a
message. Appellant asked Harold if he wanted to speak with Laino and handed the phone to
Laino, who spoke with Harold. Laino told Harold he wanted to get appellant’s side of the story
before charging him. After the phone call, the following exchange took place between appellant
and Laino:
DML: Ok, I explained to [Harold] what’s going on, you heard the
conversation. Ah, you know, I’m in a situation where the last
thing I want to do is the wrong thing. To some people it might be
the right thing but in my heart I know it’s not the appropriate thing.
Uh, Stephen you are the same age as me, I’m 39 years old. You
are a grown man. Uh - - .
SJF: No, I did not attack the woman.
DML: Ok, alright but so we we’ll go through the rest of this with
you. Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to me? Yes
or no?
SJF: What did [Harold] say I should do?
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DML: He said you are a grown man, he said, I guess he told you
that if you want you should get an attorney, but he’s not gonna pay
for an attorney or anything like that. He goes, but I can understand
where you are coming from where you need to get his side of the
story. Cause he said he appreciates me being honest with him and
explaining the position I’m in. So this is where I’m at with that,
and you heard what I told him, I don’t want to put the wrong
charges that don’t need to be put.
SJF: Are you ready. I did not intentionally rob this woman or try
to hurt her.
DML: Ok.
SJF: We were walking down the beach, I said something to her
[and] she said something to me. Right, she said well I’m gonna
call the police. I tried to grab the phone out of her hand, I had the
beer bottle, it was the coozie or whatever it was in my hand.
DML: Well, was it one of those bottle cuzzies with a zipper on the
side?
SJF: Yeah, yeah.
DML: Alright, then what happened?
SJF: I tried to knock the phone out of her hand. She screamed I
ran, that’s what happened.
DML: Ok.
The trial court ruled as follows:
I guess the first question is, as Mr. Evans said, whether there is a
clear invocation of his right not to speak. And in reviewing the
Redmond 2 case, I think we’ve come awful close; but I don’t think
we’ve crossed the line, so I’m going to rule that it is not -- well,
it’s an ambiguous statement and that therefore, as per the
Commonwealth’s argument, the sequence of events in Redmond
after that track pretty closely with the sequence of events that we
have here. And that seems to be the closest to the fact pattern that
we have. So the motion to suppress the statement is denied.
In response to that ruling, appellant sought to “clarify” his position regarding “a number
of other statements that [he] believe[d] . . . were also clear invocations of counsel,” and he cited
2
Commonwealth v. Redmond, 264 Va. 321, 568 S.E.2d 695 (2002).
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and discussed statements he made on pages two, five, and eight of the transcribed conversation
with Laino. The following discussion took place when appellant discussed a statement he made
on page eight:
MR. EVANS [for appellant]: Your Honor, just for the sake of the
record, I want to go through the remaining ones. The other one we
maintain is an invocation of counsel is on Page 8. All right. I’ll
try to get a lawyer. All right. Here. We maintain that was also an
unequivocal request for counsel.
THE COURT: Where are you on Page 8? Oh.
MR. EVANS: It’s after his initials. It’s his - -
THE COURT: Well, he’s talking to Harold on the phone [when he
said he’ll try to get a lawyer].
MR. EVANS: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. EVANS: And it’s your - -
THE COURT: And we have - - and then we have the signed
waiver and his voluntary statement.
MR. EVANS: Just note I take exception to all of those rulings and
also maintain that all of them together clearly form overall a clear
invocation of counsel.
THE COURT: Okay.
(Emphasis added).
“The issue whether a suspect invoked his right to counsel presents a mixed question of
law and fact . . . .” Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 270 Va. 42, 49, 613 S.E.2d 579, 584 (2005).
[I]n applying independent appellate review of the mixed question
of law and fact whether a defendant clearly requested an attorney
during a custodial interrogation, “the determination of what [the
defendant] actually said is a question of fact that we review only
for clear error. . . . Whether those words are sufficient to invoke
the right to counsel is a legal determination that we review de
novo.”
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Commonwealth v. Redmond, 264 Va. 321, 327, 568 S.E.2d 695, 698 (2002) (quoting United
States v. Uribe-Galindo, 990 F.2d 522, 523 (10th Cir. 1993)).
“If [a] suspect invokes the right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney
has been made available to the suspect or the suspect reinitiates the interrogation.”
Commonwealth v. Quarles, 283 Va. 214, 220, 720 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2012).
When a “circuit court did not make any factual findings regarding
what [the defendant] actually said because the parties did not
dispute the content of his statements to the police” our “appellate
consideration of the circuit court’s denial of [the defendant’s]
motion to suppress is restricted to a de novo review of the legal
issue whether [his] words, taken in context, were sufficient to
invoke his right to counsel.”
Zektaw v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 127, 134-35, 677 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2009) (quoting Hilliard, 270
Va. at 50, 613 S.E.2d at 584).
We find that appellant’s statement to Laino, “Let me talk to my lawyer,” was an
unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding he did
not invoke his right to counsel. However, after reviewing the exchange between appellant and
Laino, we find that appellant reinitiated further conversation with Laino pursuant to Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), when the detective attempted to take appellant before the
magistrate and charge him.
In Edwards, the Court “extended the principles set forth in Miranda to subsequent
interrogation,” Commonwealth v. Gregory, 263 Va. 134, 146, 557 S.E.2d 715, 722 (2002), by
holding that, after a suspect “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,”
interrogation must cease until either his counsel has been made available to him or until “the
accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversation with the police,”
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
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To determine the admissibility of a statement under the Edwards rule, we apply a
three-part analysis. The first step in this analysis is determining “whether the accused
unequivocally invoked his or her right to counsel.” Giles v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 527,
532, 507 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1998). The second step is to “determine whether the accused, rather
than the authorities, reinitiated further discussions or meetings with the police” after that
invocation. Id. The third step is to determine whether, after the accused reinitiated
communication with the police, he made a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of the previously
invoked right to counsel. Id.; see also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
Because we find appellant’s statement, “Let me talk to my lawyer,” an unequivocal
invocation of his right to counsel, the first step of the Edwards analysis is met. 3
The second step in the Edwards analysis is whether appellant “reinitiated further
discussions” with the police. Giles, 28 Va. App. at 532, 507 S.E.2d at 105. In Rashad v.
Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 528, 651 S.E.2d 407 (2007), after determining that the defendant
invoked his right to counsel, this Court “determine[d] de novo whether [Rashad] initiated the
discussion that resulted in his statements to the police.” Id. at 535, 651 S.E.2d at 411. The Court
explained:
“While we doubt that it would be desirable to build a
superstructure of legal refinements around the word ‘initiate’ in
this context, there are undoubtedly situations where a bare inquiry
by either a defendant or by a police officer should not be held to
‘initiate’ any conversation or dialogue. There are some inquiries,
such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a
telephone that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to
represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more
generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the
investigation. Such inquiries or statements, by either an accused or
a police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial
3
At oral argument, the Commonwealth conceded that statement “appears to be a clear
invocation.” In his brief and at oral argument, appellant argued that Laino continued to
interrogate him and ask questions designed to elicit responses.
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relationship, will not generally ‘initiate’ a conversation in the sense
in which that word was used in Edwards.”
Id. at 535-36, 651 S.E.2d at 411 (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983)).
In determining whether appellant initiated the dialogue with Laino, “we must review the
entire exchange between appellant and the [police].” Id. at 536, 651 S.E.2d at 411 (citing
Medley v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 19, 37, 602 S.E.2d 411, 417 (2004) (en banc)).
Since appellant does not contest the accuracy of the recorded
dialogue, our consideration of the trial court’s denial of appellant’s
motion to suppress is restricted to a de novo review of the legal
issue of whether appellant’s words, taken in context, were
sufficient to indicate whether appellant initiated further dialogue
with the officers.
Id. (citing Medley, 44 Va. App. at 30, 602 S.E.2d at 416).
As soon as appellant invoked his right to counsel, Laino made sure that is what he wanted
to do. After appellant acknowledged that was his desire, Laino told him, “alright,” and advised
appellant he was going to take him before the magistrate. Appellant equivocated and told Laino
he was not trying to “blow [him] off,” to which Laino replied, “I understand.” Laino then
acknowledged to appellant, “[I]t’s your absolute right,” however, Laino explained that he
(Laino) had a job to do, namely, to take appellant before the magistrate, not question him.
Rather than allowing Laino to do that, appellant asked if Laino could “hold on” until appellant
gets a lawyer. Laino reiterated he had to file charges against appellant but asked if appellant had
a lawyer. Appellant said he had no lawyer, but he wanted to talk to someone named Harold
about getting a lawyer. Laino again provided appellant with Miranda warnings, after which
Laino facilitated appellant’s request to speak with Harold. After the conversation with Harold,
Laino again asked appellant. “Having these rights in mind do you wish to talk to me?” Appellant
asked what Harold said he should do, and after Laino told appellant what Harold said, appellant
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volunteered without being questioned, “I did not attack that woman,” “intentionally rob [her],” or
“try to hurt her.”
After reviewing the totality of the exchange between Laino and appellant, we find that
appellant reinitiated contact with Laino when he said he did not want to “blow off” Laino and for
Laino to “hold on.” Moreover, the resulting exchange after appellant’s reinitiation with Laino
fails to reflect any interrogation by Laino regarding the crime itself. The entire conversation
after appellant reinitiated contact involved appellant’s desire to discuss the matter with Harold.
After Laino allowed appellant to speak with Harold, appellant asked Laino what Harold said, and
Laino responded. Appellant then volunteered that he did not attack, rob or try to hurt Moore
despite not being asked a question at the time.
Regarding the third step of the Edwards analysis, namely, whether, after the accused
reinitiated communication with the police, he made a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of the
previously invoked right to counsel, Giles, 28 Va. App. at 532, 507 S.E.2d at 105, we find that,
even though appellant took “exception” to the trial court’s rulings, including its acknowledgment
that “we have the signed statement and his voluntary statement,” appellant failed to include any
argument on that issue in his brief. 4
In Rashad, the defendant contended, inter alia, the trial court erred in refusing to suppress
statements he made after he invoked his right to counsel. Rashad, 50 Va. App. at 531, 651
S.E.2d at 409. After evaluating the dialogue between Rashad and police officers, the “trial court
concluded that, assuming appellant’s request for counsel was unequivocal, appellant initiated
4
Although appellant acknowledged in his opening brief, a “subsequent waiver of [one’s
Miranda] right[s] is not sufficient to make admissible any incriminating statements thereafter
obtained, even if investigators have re-Mirandized the accused, unless the statements are
initiated by the defendant and shown to be based on a knowing and intelligent, and voluntary
waiver,” (emphasis added), he failed to include any argument that his subsequent waiver was not
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
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further conversation with the police and that appellant voluntarily waived his right to counsel.”
Id. at 533, 651 S.E.2d at 410. On appeal, this Court performed a de novo review on the second
prong of the Edwards analysis and determined that Rashad, not the police, reinitiated contact
after Rashad invoked his right to counsel. Id. at 536-38, 651 S.E.2d at 411-12. Regarding the
third prong of Edwards, this Court declined to “address it” because it “is not before the Court” in
that Rashad “does not argue the third prong of the Edwards analysis.” Id. at 535 n.3, 651 S.E.2d
at 411 n.3.
Like the defendant in Rashad, appellant failed to present any argument on appeal that his
subsequent waiver after reinitiating contact was not knowing and intelligent. Accordingly, we
will not address that issue. Id.Summarizing, we find that appellant initially invoked his right to counsel, then reinitiated
contact with Laino when the detective attempted to take appellant before the magistrate and
charge him with the crimes. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress his
statements.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Appellant argues he was punished twice for the same offense. Appellant also contends
the trial court erred in finding that his “prosecution for both aggravated malicious wounding and
wounding in the commission of a felony did not violate double jeopardy.”
The Commonwealth charged appellant with aggravated malicious wounding in violation
of Code § 18.2-51.2, and unlawful wounding in the commission of a felony in violation of Code
§ 18.2-53. The evidence proved that appellant attacked Moore while armed with a deadly
weapon and severely cut her neck requiring her to undergo emergency vascular surgery.
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Code § 18.2-53 provides, “If any person, in the commission of, or attempt to commit, a
felony, unlawfully shoot, stab, cut or wound another person he shall be guilty of a Class 6
felony.”
Code § 18.2-51.2 is entitled “Aggravated Malicious Wounding,” and provides,
If any person maliciously shoots, stabs, cuts or wounds any other
person, or by any means causes bodily injury, with the intent to
maim, disfigure, disable or kill, he shall be guilty of a Class 2
felony if the victim is thereby severely injured and is caused to
suffer permanent and significant physical impairment.
At the pretrial hearing, appellant argued that charging him with aggravated malicious
wounding and unlawful wounding, stabbing or cutting while committing a felony violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court rejected appellant’s double jeopardy argument based on
this Court’s decision in Hall v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 892, 421 S.E.2d 455 (1992) (en
banc).
In Hall, the defendant stabbed two store employees during a robbery, and one of Hall’s
accomplices shot one of the stabbed employees in the back. Id. at 895, 421 S.E.2d at 458.
Following a bench trial, the court found Hall guilty of unlawfully stabbing during the
commission of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-53, two counts of malicious wounding in
violation of Code § 18.2-51, one count of aggravated malicious wounding in violation of Code
§ 18.2-51.2, and two counts of armed robbery. Id. at 894-95, 421 S.E.2d at 458. Hall contended,
inter alia, “that double jeopardy protections bar[red] his convictions for [unlawfully]
stabbing/cutting [the victims during the commission of a felony] after he was convicted of
malicious wounding of these same victims.” Id. at 900, 421 S.E.2d at 461. This Court rejected
that argument and held that “Hall’s punishment for two counts of malicious wounding resulting
from the stabbing of two victims and for two counts of stabbing/cutting the same victims during
the commission of a felony does not offend the double jeopardy clause because the General
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Assembly intended to impose multiple punishments when enacting Code § 18.2-53.” Id. at
900-01, 421 S.E.2d at 461.
The decision in Hall remains valid and is dispositive of this assigned error. Moreover,
under the Blockburger 5 test, each statute contains an element which the other does not.
Aggravated malicious wounding requires malice, an intent to maim, and resulting permanent and
significant physical injury, whereas Code § 18.2-53 requires a wounding during the commission
of an underlying felony. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s double
jeopardy argument.
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
Affirmed.
5
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161, 166 (1977).
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