Roger Donovan Freeman v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2001 )


Menu:
  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Bray, Clements and Agee
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    ROGER DONOVAN FREEMAN
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1584-00-3                  JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
    JULY 24, 2001
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
    James F. Ingram, Judge
    Brian H. Turpin (Turpin & Haymore, on brief),
    for appellant.
    Paul C. Galanides, Assistant Attorney General
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Amy L.
    Marshall, Assistant Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Roger Donovan Freeman (defendant) was convicted of "carnal
    knowledge of a minor," "statutory rape," two counts of sodomy,
    "participating in child pornography," possession of child
    pornography, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and
    possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute.    On appeal,
    he contends the trial court erroneously declined to suppress
    evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant issued
    without the requisite probable cause and otherwise invalid.    We
    disagree and affirm the convictions.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
    memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
    disposition of the appeal.
    In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a suppression motion,
    we consider the evidence in the "light most favorable to . . . the
    prevailing party below," the Commonwealth in this instance.
    Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 
    12 Va. App. 1066
    , 1067, 
    407 S.E.2d 47
    ,
    48 (1991).    Our consideration of the record includes evidence
    adduced at both the trial and the suppression hearing, if any.
    DePriest v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 577
    , 583, 
    359 S.E.2d 540
    ,
    542-43 (1987).
    Because search warrants are favored, and
    warrantless searches . . . presumptively
    invalid under the Fourth Amendment, . . . a
    presumption of validity attaches when a
    search is conducted pursuant to a warrant
    issued by a neutral and detached magistrate
    or judicial officer. Therefore, where the
    police conduct a search pursuant to a
    judicially sanctioned warrant, the defendant
    must rebut the presumption of validity by
    proving that the warrant is illegal or
    invalid.
    Lebedun v. Commonwealth, 
    27 Va. App. 697
    , 711, 
    501 S.E.2d 427
    ,
    434 (1998) (citations omitted).
    I.
    On February 18, 2000, Danville Police Officer David Austin
    "knocked at the door" of 226 North Avenue, seeking a juvenile
    - 2 -
    "runaway," Rachel Baker, then the subject of an arrest warrant.
    Defendant answered and Austin "told him [he] was . . . looking for
    . . . Baker . . . and . . . needed to talk to her."    Defendant,
    replied, "wait a minute" and twice "went downstairs," finally
    returning with Baker.   Austin then arrested the juvenile,
    conducted an incidental search, and discovered three photographs
    in her pocketbook, including pictures of defendant "holding his
    erect penis" and Baker in sexually suggestive poses.    In response
    to Austin's questioning, Baker explained "those were pictures that
    [defendant] allowed her to take of him masturbating."
    Prompted by such information, Austin appeared before Danville
    Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Judge Dale M. Wiley
    to obtain a search warrant of defendant's residence.    Austin's
    attendant affidavit requested a search "in relation to an offense
    described as follows:   [p]ossession of obscene photos, pictures,
    or film of any person and any camera or video equipment used to
    make or show these pictures."   The affidavit identified defendant
    and his residence, 226 North Avenue, as the "place, person or
    thing to be searched" and listed "obscene photos, pictures, film,
    and any cameras, video equipment, or tapes that show or contain or
    can be used to show, print, or present for viewing obscene
    material" as the "things or persons to be searched for."     The
    - 3 -
    affidavit also detailed the "material facts constituting probable
    cause." 1
    Based upon the affidavit and an examination of the photos,
    the judge issued the warrant and Austin, accompanied by several
    additional police officers, returned to defendant's residence to
    undertake the related search.   Upon execution of the warrant,
    police discovered several "obscene" photographs, which defendant
    acknowledged variously depicted Baker, another unnamed juvenile
    and himself engaged in sexual activity or provocative poses.
    Defendant, also found in possession of marijuana, $753 cash and a
    pager, was subsequently arrested and indicted for the instant
    offenses.
    1
    Austin's sworn narrative recited, in pertinent part, that
    he had
    obtained information from the Pitts Co.
    Sherriffs [sic] Dept. that a runnaway [sic]
    W/F age 17 was in Danville near Claiborne
    St. and that she was staying with a W/M only
    known to them as "Donnavan." The female's
    name is Rachel Annette Baker DOB 11-7-82
    XXX-XX-XXXX. She was also wanted for
    violation of "outreach" in Pitts Co. I knew
    of a Roger Donnavan Freeman W/M DOB-2-13-75
    SSN XXX-XX-XXXX who lives at 226 North Ave.
    I went to this address and Mr. Freeman
    answered the door. He said Ms. Baker was
    there and I took her into custody. In her
    pocket book I found obscene pictures of
    Roger Freeman that Rachel Baker said she
    took of him masturbating. She said Mr.
    Freeman allowed her to take nude pictures of
    himself while masturbating himself and the
    pictures were taken with his camera at his
    house at 226 North Ave.
    - 4 -
    On the morning of trial, defendant moved the court to
    suppress evidence gathered in the search.   Following a related
    evidentiary hearing, the court denied defendant's motion and trial
    immediately followed, resulting in the instant convictions and
    appeal.
    II.
    Defendant first contends the search warrant erroneously
    "fail[ed] to state the items to be seized" and, "[a]lthough [a]
    description was included in the affidavit, there was no evidence
    that the affidavit was attached to the warrant, as required by
    . . . Code § 19.2-56."   However, Commonwealth's "Exhibit 5," a
    single exhibit identified by Austin, embraces both the search
    warrant and affidavit, attached one to the other.   Thus, the
    record affirmatively establishes the affidavit was "a part of" the
    warrant in accordance with Code § 19.2-56, thereby strengthening
    the presumption of regularity.    Offering no evidence to the
    contrary, defendant clearly failed to carry his burden to "prov[e]
    the warrant . . . illegal or invalid" for an infirmity arising
    from an insufficient description of the objects sought by police
    or otherwise violative of Code § 19.2-56.   See Lebedun, 27 Va.
    App. at 
    710-12, 501 S.E.2d at 432-34
    ; Code § 19.2-56.
    Defendant next maintains "the description of the items to be
    seized was overly broad" but, again, his argument is without
    merit.
    - 5 -
    Code § 19.2-54 expressly prohibits issuance of a "general
    warrant for the search of a house, place, compartment, vehicle or
    baggage."    See U.S. Const. amend IV; see also Va. Const. art. 1,
    § 10.    "The 'distinct objective'" of such limitations "'is that
    . . . searches deemed necessary . . . be as limited as possible;'
    . . . to prevent 'a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's
    belongings.'"    Moyer v. Commonwealth, 
    33 Va. App. 8
    , 23, 
    531 S.E.2d 580
    , 587 (2000) (citation omitted).      "The test for
    determining the requisite degree of particularity . . . 'is a
    pragmatic one:    "The degree of specificity required . . . may
    necessarily vary according to the circumstances and type of items
    involved . . . ."'"    Morke v. Commonwealth, 
    14 Va. App. 496
    , 500,
    
    419 S.E.2d 410
    , 413 (1992) (citation omitted).     Thus, "[s]o long
    as the 'search warrant describe[s] the objects of the search with
    reasonable specificity,' it complies with the dictates of the
    Fourth Amendment."    
    Id. (citation omitted). "The
    determination
    whether the warrant possesses the requisite degree of specificity
    requires a fact-specific, case-specific analysis."     
    Id. at 500-01, 419
    S.E.2d at 413.
    The instant warrant was issued in relation to the
    "Production, Sale, Possession, Etc. Of Obscene Items," supported
    by an affidavit that specifically enumerated the "things or
    persons to be searched for," all items reasonably "related to
    [the] particular offenses."    
    Id. at 502, 419
    S.E.2d at 414.    Thus,
    the pertinent instruments sufficiently detailed the objects
    - 6 -
    subject of the search, together with a compelling nexus to the
    offenses under investigation, thereby satisfying both
    constitutional and statutory safeguards.    See 
    id. Finally, defendant asserts
    that "[t]he probable cause
    requirement was not fulfilled by evidence of the Commonwealth."
    Once more, however, defendant fails to demonstrate the necessary
    deficiency in the warrant.    While "[t]he Fourth Amendment provides
    that a search warrant shall issue only upon a showing of probable
    cause supported by oath or affirmation," 
    Lebedun, 27 Va. App. at 706
    , 501 S.E.2d at 431,
    "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is
    simply to make a 'practical, common-sense
    decision whether, given all the
    circumstances set forth in the affidavit
    before him, including the veracity and the
    basis of knowledge of persons supplying
    hearsay information, there is a fair
    probability that contraband or evidence of a
    crime will be found in a particular place.'
    And the duty of a reviewing court is simply
    to ensure that the magistrate had a
    'substantial basis for . . . concluding'
    that probable cause existed.
    *      *        *      *      *      *        *
    [Thus,] an after-the-fact review of a
    magistrate's decision should not be made de
    novo[,] . . . great deference should be
    given to the magistrate's finding of
    probable cause."
    
    Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis
    added); Code § 19.2-54; see
    also Gwinn v. Commonwealth, 
    16 Va. App. 972
    , 975, 
    434 S.E.2d 901
    ,
    903 (1993) (magistrate "need only conclude that it would be
    - 7 -
    reasonable to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the
    affidavit").
    Here, Austin's affidavit recited the discovery of "obscene
    pictures" of defendant during the search of Ms. Baker, a runaway
    juvenile, immediately following her apprehension at defendant's
    home.    The affidavit further disclosed Baker's contemporaneous
    explanation that defendant "allowed her to take [the] nude
    pictures of himself while masturbating, . . . with his camera at
    his house."    The judicial officer had the opportunity to
    actually view the pictures seized from Baker, including
    photographs of defendant holding his erect penis and sexually
    suggestive poses of Baker.    We have previously found that
    exposure of the aroused male genitalia "to others" constituted
    conduct "'substantially beyond' acceptable community standards"
    and, therefore, obscene as a matter of law.     Copeland v.
    Commonwealth, 
    31 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    525 S.E.2d 9
    , 10-11 (2000).
    Thus, when considered in totality, the circumstances clearly
    gave rise to a "fair probability" that like contraband or
    evidence of a crime would be found within defendant's residence
    and justified issuance of the disputed warrant.
    Defendant mistakenly relies upon Upton v. Commonwealth, 
    211 Va. 445
    , 
    177 S.E.2d 528
    (1970), and Lee Art Theater v.
    Commonwealth, 
    210 Va. 315
    , 
    170 S.E.2d 769
    (1969), to invoke
    First Amendment jurisprudence as a heightened threshold of
    probable cause to support the warrant in issue.    Here, the
    - 8 -
    actual photographs and attendant circumstances, including an
    explanation of the images, were before the judicial officer
    issuing the warrant, providing facts that substantially enhanced
    the measure of probable cause in support of the warrant. 2
    Accordingly, we find no constitutional or statutory taint
    to the affidavit, search warrant or related search and affirm
    the trial court.
    Affirmed.
    2
    For the first time on appeal, defendant also contends the
    affidavit failed to establish probable cause of an intent to
    sell "obscene materials" in violation of Code § 18.2-374, the
    offense referenced in the affidavit and warrant. However,
    "[t]he Court of Appeals will not consider an argument which was
    not presented to the trial court." Ohree v. Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 299
    , 308, 
    494 S.E.2d 484
    , 488 (1998) (citation
    omitted); see also Rule 5A:18.
    - 9 -