Stevie Joe Yates v. Commonwealth ( 2001 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Agee and Senior Judge Coleman
Argued at Salem, Virginia
STEVIE JOE YATES
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1171-00-3 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN, III
JUNE 19, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY
Keary R. Williams, Judge
Terrence Shea Cook (Bolling, Hearl, Cook, on
brief), for appellant.
Amy L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
The sole question presented in this appeal is whether the
evidence is sufficient to support Stevie Joe Yates's conviction
for involuntary manslaughter. Finding that the evidence is
insufficient, we reverse Yates's conviction and dismiss the
indictment.
I. Facts
Yates and his sons participated in a camping trip with the
Boy Scouts at Breaks Interstate Park, a location 31.4 miles from
their home in Buchanan County. After arriving at the campsite,
Yates and his sons pitched their tents and participated in
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
organized events before going to bed around 11:00 p.m. The next
morning, they awoke around 7:00 a.m., ate breakfast, and
participated in more organized activities before packing their
vehicle and driving home around 11:30 a.m. Yates drove west on US
460, which is a curvy, steep mountain route. After driving
thirteen miles toward home from the campsite, Yates's vehicle
crossed the double solid line and struck a vehicle driven by
Donald Jones. This collision spun Yate's vehicle around so it hit
Matthew Keene's truck, pushing it off the highway. Keene died as
a result of the injuries sustained in this accident.
While at the hospital being treated for injuries, Yates told
Trooper P.A. Skeens that he did not know what caused the accident
and that he did not "remember anything about the accident." Yates
told the trooper that he had not gotten much sleep lately and "was
sleepy, but not that sleepy." Trooper Skeens testified that no
evidence indicated that Yates had been speeding, or that he had
been under the influence of alcohol or drugs. At trial, Yates
acknowledged that he could have fallen asleep but testified "I
don't remember being real sleepy." No evidence was introduced
that he had nodded off or fallen asleep or driven off the road
prior to the accident. On the day of the accident, the weather
was sunny, and the roads were dry.
In addition to evidence about how the collision occurred, the
Commonwealth presented evidence that at the campsite Lawrence
Blankenship's vehicle had been parked next to Yates's vehicle.
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Prior to camping, Blankenship's vehicle was free from damage or
scratches. The day when Blankenship prepared to leave the
campsite, approximately four hours after Yates left, Blankenship
noticed a scratch on his vehicle's fiberglass bumper. No one saw
how the damage was caused. Hundreds of children and about fifty
adults, all with camping gear, attended the camp-out and parked in
the same area with the Yates and Blankenship vehicles. About a
month after the accident, Blankenship was involved in an argument
with Yates regarding how Yates was coaching Blankenship's son on a
basketball team. During the argument, Blankenship threatened to
"whip" Yates. At trial, according to Blankenship, Yates then said
either "he was sorry about the scratch on [Blankenship's]
vehicle," or "sorry about scratching [Blankenship's] truck." When
the defense asked Blankenship about the apparent inconsistency,
Blankenship testified that Yates made both statements.
At trial, Yates denied scratching Blankenship's vehicle and
denied later making the statement to Blankenship.
II. Analysis
When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal in
a criminal case, "'we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" Archer v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997)
(citation omitted). "The credibility of the witnesses and the
weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact
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finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as
it is presented." Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133,
138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995).
"[I]nvoluntary manslaughter in the operation of a motor
vehicle [is defined] as an 'accidental killing which, although
unintended, is the proximate result of negligence so gross,
wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard of human
life.'" Conrad v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 113, 120, 521
S.E.2d 321, 325 (1999) (citation omitted). To sustain an
involuntary manslaughter conviction, criminal negligence must be
proved. Criminal negligence results when a person "'act[s]
consciously in disregard of another person's rights or . . .
with reckless indifference to the consequences, with the
defendant aware, from his knowledge of existing circumstances
and conditions, that his conduct probably would cause injury to
another.'" Tubman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 267, 271, 348
S.E.2d 871, 873 (1986) (quoting Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 317,
321, 315 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1984)). Criminal negligence may be
found to exist where the offender either knew or should have
known the probable results of his acts. See Keech v.
Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 272, 279, 386 S.E.2d 813, 817 (1989).
"'The law recognizes three degrees of negligence, (1)
ordinary and simple, (2) gross, and (3) willful, wanton, and
reckless.'" Tubman, 3 Va. App. at 270, 348 S.E.2d at 873
(quoting Griffin, 227 Va. at 321, 315 S.E.2d at 212). The third
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type, which forms the basis for criminal negligence, is greater
than ordinary or gross negligence. Criminal negligence is
"'[m]arked by or manifesting arrogant recklessness of justice,
of the rights or feelings of others, . . . merciless;
inhumane.'" Forbes v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 304, 310, 498
S.E.2d 457, 459 (1998) (citation omitted).
In Hargrove v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 618, 394 S.E.2d
729 (1990), a tired driver dozed off while driving home after
working the midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift, and struck and killed a
pedestrian. The evidence was insufficient to support an
involuntary manslaughter conviction because the evidence did not
exclude the reasonable hypothesis that Hargrove, who had not
previously dozed off while driving prior to the accident, could
reasonably have believed that he could drive himself home
without endangering human life. Id. at 622, 394 S.E.2d at 732.
The evidence failed to show that Hargrove's falling asleep while
driving showed a willful, wanton, reckless disregard for human
life. At most, the evidence showed that Hargrove was negligent.
In contrast, the evidence in Conrad supported an
involuntary manslaughter conviction where Conrad had been awake
for twenty-two hours without sleep and chose to drive his
vehicle after dozing off several times, before he struck and
killed a jogger by driving off the road. Conrad, 31 Va. App. at
124, 521 S.E.2d at 327. Even though Conrad dozed off four or
five times but "snapped out of it," he continued driving knowing
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that he had been falling asleep. We upheld the trial court's
holding that Conrad should have known because he had dozed off
four or five times, that his driving abilities were affected
and, therefore, should have known of the risks to human life
that his driving created. Id. His decision to continue driving
in such a condition constituted "a callous act of indifference
to the safety of others." Id. We held that the evidence
supported a finding of criminal negligence and upheld Conrad's
involuntary manslaughter conviction. Id.
In the present case, the evidence does not show that Yates
had dozed off or was sleepy prior to the fatal accident. The
evidence fails to show that at the time he was driving he
exhibited a callous disregard or indifference to the safety of
others. The evidence does not exclude the reasonable hypothesis
that, even if Yates did not get much sleep at the camp-out the
previous night, Yates reasonably could have believed that he
could drive home without endangering human life. No evidence
was presented to prove that Yates knew or should have known
prior to the accident that he was so sleepy that he was a danger
to others on the highway.
The Commonwealth apparently relies on the fact that
Blankenship's fender was scratched as some evidence tending to
prove that Yates was on notice before he left the campsite that
he was sleepy and that his ability to operate his vehicle was
impaired. However, that evidence viewed in the light most
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favorable to the Commonwealth does not tend to prove or support
the conclusion that Yates was sleepy and dozing off when he left
the campground. First, the evidence is equivocal at best and
fails to prove that Yates, rather than someone else at the
camp-out, scratched Blankenship's truck fender. The
Commonwealth relies on the fact that Yates's vehicle was parked
next to Blankenship's vehicle for some of the time at the
campground and on Blankenship's inconsistent testimony regarding
Yates's statement a month later to prove that Yates caused the
damage. However, this vague and inconsistent circumstantial
evidence is not sufficiently credible to prove that Yates caused
the scratches to Blankenship's truck.
But moreover, even if we accept that Yates's car did
scratch Blankenship's fender, that evidence does not prove that
Yates was sleepy or that his driving was impaired due to sleep
deprivation. The fact that Yates may have scratched
Blankenship's truck as he exited the parking lot was irrelevant
and proves nothing as to Yates's state of alertness or his being
on notice that he was sleepy. Danny Davis, who saw Yates leave
the campsite, said Yates appeared to be well rested and did not
appear to be tired or in any way impaired. The evidence
indicated that Yates had no trouble driving the thirteen miles
prior to the accident. The evidence does not prove that Yates
knew or should have known that driving home "probably would
cause injury to another."
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Yates's conduct may have constituted ordinary or even gross
negligence, but it did not, without more, support a finding of
criminal negligence. Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient
to prove the criminal negligence necessary to support an
involuntary manslaughter conviction.
For these reasons, we reverse Yates's conviction for
involuntary manslaughter and dismiss the indictment.
Reversed and dismissed.
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