Commonwealth of Virginia v. Scott Hunter Horton ( 1999 )


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  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Lemons and Frank
    Argued by teleconference
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0418-99-1             JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
    JULY 20, 1999
    SCOTT HUNTER HORTON
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
    Robert W. Curran, Judge
    Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Ruth M.
    McKeaney, Assistant Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellant.
    Erin J. Goodman (George Holton Yates &
    Associates, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
    On appeal from an order suppressing evidence obtained in
    the search of a vehicle, the Commonwealth contends that the
    search was lawful because it was incident to the arrest of the
    vehicle's occupants.   We agree and reverse the judgment of the
    trial court.
    "We view the evidence in a light most favorable to . . .
    the prevailing party below, and we grant all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible from that evidence."   Commonwealth
    v. Grimstead, 
    12 Va. App. 1066
    , 1067, 
    407 S.E.2d 47
    , 48 (1991).
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    On July 15, 1998, police officers executed a search warrant
    at a residence in Newport News.   During the search, Officer Bell
    and Detective Price received telephone calls from Robert and Amy
    Price (the Prices), inquiring about the purchase of drugs.   The
    officers encouraged the couple to come to the house.
    Soon thereafter, a Ford Bronco driven by Scott Hunter
    Horton arrived and parked on the public street in front of the
    residence.   The Prices, who were passengers in the Bronco, got
    out and walked up to the house.   They were met on the porch by
    Detective Price, who was posing as a drug dealer.    The three
    spoke for a moment and then entered the house, where the
    officers identified themselves and arrested the Prices.
    Upon the Prices' arrest, Detective Price approached the
    Bronco, identified himself to Horton, explained the situation,
    and requested permission to search the vehicle.   Horton replied,
    "I'd rather you did not."   At the same time, Sergeant Trawitzki
    approached the vehicle and informed Horton that he was going to
    search the vehicle's passenger compartment incident to the
    Prices' arrest, but that Horton was free to leave.
    Upon searching the vehicle, the officers found in the rear
    passenger seat a backpack belonging to Horton that contained
    drugs.   Horton was charged with possession of marijuana with
    intent to distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-248.1, and
    possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of
    Code § 18.2-248.
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    Holding that the warrantless search of the Bronco violated
    Horton's Fourth Amendment rights, the trial court granted his
    motion to suppress as evidence the drugs found in the search.
    The Commonwealth argues that the search was lawful because it
    was incident to the arrest of occupants of the vehicle.     We
    agree.
    [W]hen a policeman has made a lawful
    custodial arrest of the occupant of an
    automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous
    incident of that arrest, search the
    passenger compartment of that automobile.
    New York v. Belton, 
    453 U.S. 454
    , 460 (1981).   This rule applies
    whether the occupant arrested is the driver or a passenger.      See
    United States v. Ortiz, 
    63 F.3d 952
    , 954 (1995).
    The Prices were placed under lawful custodial arrest after
    they attempted to purchase drugs from the police officers.
    Immediately prior to their arrest, they had been passengers in
    the Bronco driven by Horton.   The issue raised in this appeal is
    whether the search of the Bronco was made "as a contemporaneous
    incident of" the Prices' arrest.   We hold that it was.
    The fact that the Prices were taken into custody before the
    search does not alter the foregoing rule.   See Glasco v.
    Commonwealth, 
    257 Va. 433
    , 438-39, 
    513 S.E.2d 137
    , 140 (1999).
    "A police officer may search the passenger
    compartment of an automobile incident to the
    lawful custodial arrest . . . even if the
    arrestee has been separated from his car
    prior to the search."
    - 3 -
    
    Id. at 438
    , 
    513 S.E.2d at 140
     (citation omitted).   In Glasco,
    the police officer initiated contact after Glasco had exited his
    vehicle and was walking toward a house across the street.    The
    police searched the vehicle after arresting Glasco and securing
    him in the rear of a police cruiser.
    "[O]fficers may conduct valid searches
    incident to arrest even when the officers
    have secured the suspects in a squad car and
    rendered them unable to reach any weapon or
    destroy evidence."
    
    Id. at 439
    , 
    513 S.E.2d at 140
     (citation omitted).
    In White v. Commonwealth, 
    24 Va. App. 446
    , 
    482 S.E.2d 876
    (1997), White had pulled into a driveway and begun walking
    rapidly away from his car before the police officer initiated
    contact with him.   Upholding the search of White's car, we said:
    Subsequent to his custodial arrest, the
    passenger compartment of the vehicle of
    which he had been a "recent occupant" was
    searched, producing a plastic bag containing
    crack cocaine. The search was performed
    pursuant to a lawful custodial arrest and
    was contemporaneous with the arrest.
    Id. at 451, 
    482 S.E.2d at 878
    .
    The search of Horton's vehicle flowed immediately and
    without temporal disruption from the Prices' arrest.   Because
    the Prices were occupants of the vehicle and the search was a
    contemporaneous incident of their arrest, the search was lawful,
    and the trial court erred in granting Horton's motion to
    suppress.
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    The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
    Reversed.
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