ARA Health Services and Old Republic Ins. v. Flaz ( 2000 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Lemons ∗ and Frank
    Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
    ARA HEALTH SERVICES AND
    OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION ∗∗ BY
    v.   Record No. 1660-99-1                  JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS
    MARCH 28, 2000
    EDITH FLAX
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    S. Vernon Priddy III (Sands, Anderson,
    Marks & Miller, on brief), for appellants.
    Matthew H. Kraft (Stephen A. Strickler;
    Inman & Strickler, P.L.C., on brief), for
    appellee.
    ARA Health Services and Old Republic Insurance Company
    ("employer") appeal the decision of the Virginia Workers'
    Compensation Commission.     On appeal, the employer contends:   (1)
    the commission erred by holding that it has the authority and
    jurisdiction to award retroactive cost-of-living benefits more
    than ninety days before the date of the application seeking such
    benefits; (2) that the commission erred when it held that it has
    the authority and jurisdiction to award retroactive
    ∗
    Justice Lemons prepared and the Court adopted the opinion
    in this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the
    Supreme Court of Virginia.
    ∗∗
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    cost-of-living benefits for up to 500 weeks of benefits; (3)
    that the commission erred when it held that Edith Flax's claim
    for cost-of-living benefits was timely under the applicable
    statute of limitations; and (4) that the commission erred when
    it failed to bar Flax's claim for cost-of-living benefits under
    the doctrine of laches.   Finding no error, we affirm the
    decision of the commission.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    On May 22, 1987, the claimant, Edith Flax, tripped and fell
    in an unlit stairwell while working for the employer and
    suffered a compensable injury to her right knee.    The claim was
    accepted and compensation benefits paid for the statutory
    period, terminating on January 6, 1997.     During this time, the
    total amount of compensation benefits paid Flax was $97,135.31.
    Flax did not apply for cost-of-living supplements during the 500
    weeks that she received compensation.
    On June 19, 1997, Flax filed her application seeking
    permanent partial disability benefits as well as cost-of-living
    supplements in the amount of $19,166.26.    Accompanying the claim
    was documentation from the Social Security Administration that
    Flax had been denied supplemental Social Security income, was
    ineligible for Social Security disability and, therefore, had
    not received any money from the Administration.
    Deputy Commissioner Phillips heard the matter on October 9,
    1997 and issued an opinion dated November 10, 1997 awarding Flax
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    cost-of-living supplements and denying permanent partial
    disability benefits.      Employer requested a review of the award,
    and the full commission remanded the matter to the hearing
    docket because Flax had a pending application for Social
    Security benefits.    Flax was denied Social Security benefits for
    the period for which she sought cost-of-living supplements.        The
    parties stipulated that the deputy commissioner supervising the
    matter on remand could return it to the review docket for
    decision upon the record and written submissions that had
    followed the original opinion and request for review.         The full
    commission affirmed the award of cost-of-living supplements.
    Employer appeals the commission's award.
    II.   COST-OF-LIVING SUPPLEMENTS
    A.    TIMELINESS OF FLAX'S APPLICATION
    Employer contends that Flax's application for
    cost-of-living supplements was not timely made and if no statute
    of limitations is applicable, in the alternative, it contends
    that the application was still untimely under the doctrine of
    laches.   When Flax's accident occurred, Code § 65.1-99.1
    governed her entitlement to cost-of-living supplements.        These
    supplements are not self-executing, see Jewell Ridge Coal Corp.
    v. Wright, 
    222 Va. 68
    , 71, 
    278 S.E.2d 820
    , 822 (1981), however,
    and to receive cost-of-living supplements, the claimant must
    file an application pursuant to Code § 65.2-708.       Code
    § 65.2-708 states, "[n]o such review shall be made after
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    twenty-four months from the last day for which compensation was
    paid, pursuant to an award under this title . . . ."      We agree
    with the commission that Flax was clearly within this time frame
    when she requested cost-of-living supplements.
    Having determined that the applicable statute of
    limitations for receiving cost-of-living supplements is found in
    Code § 65.2-708 and that Flax brought her claim within the
    limitations period, employer's plea of laches must fail and we
    do not address the issues of prejudice that it has argued on
    appeal.    As has been stated,
    [n]o principle is better established, or
    more uniformly acted on in courts of equity,
    than that in respect to the statute of
    limitations- equity follows the law- that is
    to say, if a legal demand be asserted in
    equity, which at law is barred by statute,
    it is equally barred in a court of equity;
    and if not barred by statute at law, neither
    is it barred in equity. Rowe v. Bentley, 
    29 Gratt. 756
    -759.
    Coles v. Ballard, 
    78 Va. 139
    , 149 (1883) (emphasis added); see
    United States v. Mack, 
    295 U.S. 480
    , 489, 
    55 S. Ct. 813
    , 818, 
    79 L.Ed. 1559
     (1935) ("Laches within the term of the statute of
    limitations is no defense at law.").
    B.    RETROACTIVE AWARD OF COST-OF-LIVING SUPPLEMENTS
    Even if the application was timely made, employer argues
    that pursuant to the ninety-day limitation under the
    commission's Rule 13(B) (now Rule 1.2(B)) and the decision of
    Bristol Door & Lumber Co. v. Hinkle, 
    157 Va. 474
    , 
    161 S.E. 902
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    (1932), an award of cost-of-living supplements for any period
    before ninety days prior to the filing of a request for such
    supplements, especially after the claimant waited until her 500
    week period of receiving disability benefits ended, is barred
    and, if the ninety-day limitation does not apply, Bristol Door
    and its progeny bar an award for cost-of-living adjustments for
    any period prior to the filing of a request for such
    supplements.   We disagree.
    The time limitations that the employer would apply to bar
    the payment of retroactive cost-of-living supplements govern
    compensation benefits paid pursuant to the Workers' Compensation
    Act, such as temporary total, temporary partial, permanent
    partial and permanent total benefits.   Employer's argument
    confuses cost-of-living supplements with compensation benefits
    payable pursuant to the Act and contends that Flax's
    cost-of-living benefits should, therefore, be subject to the
    same limitations applicable to compensation benefits.
    This Court in Commonwealth Dept. of Highways and Transp. v.
    Williams, 
    1 Va. App. 349
    , 
    338 S.E.2d 660
     (1986), and the
    commission, in Rule 1.2(B), have specifically held that the
    limitation precluding the award of benefits for more than ninety
    days prior to the filing of a claim under Code § 65.2-708 is not
    applicable to cost-of-living supplements.   We recognized that
    the commission "has consistently ruled that cost-of-living
    benefits are not compensation within the meaning of Rule 13(B)."
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    Williams, 1 Va. App. at 356, 
    338 S.E.2d at 665
    .    The purpose of
    cost-of-living supplements is "to ensure, as much as possible,
    that the value of benefits paid under the Act does not diminish
    due to inflation."     Id. at 354, 
    338 S.E.2d at 664
    .   We noted
    that "Bristol Door was decided long before the Act provided for
    cost-of-living benefits" and that the concern there was that "if
    claimants could receive retroactive compensation awards
    employers might not be given the opportunity to furnish medical
    or rehabilitative aid at the time a changed condition came
    about."    Id. at 356-57, 
    338 S.E.2d at 665
    .   "Such concerns,
    however, are not relevant to cost-of-living entitlements because
    the determination whether a claimant is entitled to a
    cost-of-living supplement is not based on any actions which the
    employer may or may not have taken."     Id. at 357, 
    338 S.E.2d at 665
    .
    Furthermore, within the context of change in condition
    applications, the commission, since Williams, has incorporated
    Rule 13(B) into Rule 1.2, and in section (B) of that Rule has
    specifically stated:    "Additional compensation may not be
    awarded more than 90 days before the filing of the claim with
    the Commission.    Requests for cost of living supplements are not
    subject to this limitation."     Rule 1.2(B), Rules of the Virginia
    Workers' Compensation Commission (emphasis added).      Accordingly,
    retroactive cost-of-living supplements are not limited by Rule
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    13(B) or the Supreme Court of Virginia's holding in Bristol
    Door.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we affirm the commission's
    award.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1660991

Filed Date: 3/28/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014