Christopher R. Beach v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Frank and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Salem, Virginia
CHRISTOPHER R. BEACH
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2405-98-3 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES
MARCH 7, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY
Thomas H. Wood, Judge
Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr., Appellate Defender
(Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for
appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Appellant was convicted of statutory burglary and grand
larceny. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred: (1) in
not finding that this case "rose no higher than an accessory after
the fact," and (2) in denying his request for an accessory after
the fact jury instruction. We disagree and affirm his
convictions.
BACKGROUND
Appellant drove William Summerfield, Amber Minnick and Karen
Smith to the home of Virginia Smith, who is not related to Karen
Smith. Appellant had lived in Virginia Smith's home approximately
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
ten years earlier and knew that she had guns in her home.
Appellant and Summerfield knocked on the door and appellant opened
the door. Appellant returned to the car, and Summerfield went
inside. Summerfield returned to the car, and they drove away. A
short time later, appellant dropped off Summerfield a second time
at the Smith house and left. Later, appellant saw Summerfield
walking away from Smith's house and appellant picked him up.
Summerfield sat in the backseat and showed three handguns to Karen
Smith.
ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT
At trial, the Commonwealth's theory of the case was that
appellant was a principal in the second degree.1 Appellant argued
that his participation was no more than an accessory after the
fact, and requested such an instruction.
"[B]efore a defendant can be tried and convicted of being an
accessory after the fact, he must be charged with that offense.
Unless such a charge is specifically made, neither the
Commonwealth nor an accused is entitled to an
accessory-after-the-fact instruction." Dalton v. Commonwealth,
___ Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2000).
Appellant was not charged with being an accessory after the
fact. Therefore, the trial court did not err in not finding that
1
In his petition for appeal, appellant also argued that the
evidence was insufficient to prove that he was a principal in
the second degree. Appellant's petition for appeal was denied
as to this question.
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this case "rose no higher than an accessory after the fact" and in
denying appellant's request for an accessory after the fact jury
instruction.
Affirmed.
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