Maher Elgnawey v. Northern VA Steel Corp. ( 2000 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Benton and
    Senior Judge Duff
    MAHER ELGNAWEY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1144-99-4                 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
    MARCH 21, 2000
    NORTHERN VIRGINIA STEEL CORPORATION
    AND TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Maher Elgnawey, pro se, on brief).
    Appellant submitting on brief.
    (Roger S. Mackey, on brief), for appellees.
    Appellees submitting on brief.
    The Workers' Compensation Commission denied Maher Elgnawey's
    claim for total and permanent disability benefits.      Elgnawey
    contends the commission erred in ruling that he failed to prove 1)
    he sustained an injury to the brain, resulting in total and
    permanent disability, or 2) he was unable to use his legs in any
    substantial degree in gainful employment, resulting in total and
    permanent disability.    For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
    commission's decision.
    I.
    It is a fundamental principle that the commission's factual
    findings are binding on appeal if they are supported by credible
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    evidence.   See Code § 65.2-706(A); Spruill v. C.W. Wright Constr.
    Co., 
    8 Va. App. 330
    , 332, 
    381 S.E.2d 359
    , 360 (1989).     "In
    determining whether credible evidence exists, the appellate
    court does not retry the facts, reweigh the preponderance of the
    evidence, or make its own determination of the credibility of
    the witnesses."    Wagner Enterprises v. Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    ,
    894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35 (1991).    Therefore, unless we determine,
    as a matter of law, that Elgnawey proved by a preponderance of
    the evidence that he is totally and permanently disabled as a
    result of his industrial accident, the commission's contrary
    decision is binding and conclusive.      See Owens v. Virginia Dept.
    Transportation/Commonwealth, 
    30 Va. App. 85
    , 87, 
    515 S.E.2d 348
    ,
    349 (1999).
    The statute in effect at the time of Elgnawey's injury,
    provided as follows:
    The loss of both hands, both arms, both
    feet, both legs, or both eyes, or any two
    thereof, in the same accident, or an injury
    for all practical purposes resulting in
    total paralysis as determined by the
    Commission based on medical evidence or an
    injury to the brain resulting in incurable
    imbecility or insanity shall constitute
    total and permanent incapacity.
    Code § 65.1-56(18).    Applying this statute, we have defined
    "incurable imbecility" as "an irreversible brain injury which
    renders the employee permanently unemployable and so affects the
    non-vocational quality of his life [that it] eliminat[es] his
    ability to engage in a range of usual cognitive processes."
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    Barnett v. D.L. Bromwell, Inc., 
    6 Va. App. 30
    , 36, 
    366 S.E.2d 271
    , 274 (1988).
    II.
    Credible evidence in the record supports the commission's
    finding that Elgnawey was not entitled to total and permanent
    disability benefits for the injury he suffered.   Viewed in the
    light most favorable to the prevailing party, see Owens, 
    30 Va. App. at 87
    , 
    515 S.E.2d at 349
    , the evidence proved that on May
    26, 1987, Elgnawey fell off a ladder, injuring his back.   A
    physician initially diagnosed muscle strain.   Later, Dr. Joseph
    White diagnosed a herniated disc and performed a discectomy and
    a laminectomy.   In an April 1998 report, Dr. White gave Elgnawey
    a twenty-percent impairment rating in both lower extremities
    and, several weeks later, concluded that Elgnawey was disabled
    from multiple etiologies, noting that his "depression is . . .
    of significant concern."   Dr. White further opined that
    Elgnawey's "low back pain and the fact that he cannot trust his
    legs, keeps him from any gainful employment at this time."
    Dr. Richard Baither, a licensed clinical psychologist,
    diagnosed Elgnawey with major depression due to chronic pain and
    recommended inpatient chronic pain management treatment.   In
    October 1997, Dr. Baither opined that Elgnawey is totally and
    permanently disabled because of his psychiatric condition, which
    is causally related to the work injury.   Dr. Baither testified
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    that he based his diagnosis of depression on subjective
    complaints from Elgnawey rather than on objective symptoms.
    Dr. Baither also testified that although Elgnawey suffered
    a sudden shock to his spinal cord, he did not suffer a brain
    injury and does not have post-traumatic stress disorder.      He
    believed that the changes to Elgnawey's central nervous system
    were such that Elgnawey's nerve cells are no longer able to
    produce sufficient amounts of neurotransmitters.    He also
    testified that the two strokes Elgnawey suffered could have a
    traumatic effect on the brain.    Dr. Baither further said that
    Elgnawey's neck injuries from automobile accidents in 1992 and
    1995 were additional sources of pain and that a 1997 heart
    attack was a significant source of stress for Elgnawey.
    Elgnawey's vocational rehabilitation specialist testified
    that Elgnawey is not employable.    He also testified that
    Elgnawey's strokes, heart attack, and automobile accidents could
    be the cause of his disability.    He conceded that he did not
    attempt to determine the cause of Elgnawey's disability.
    Upon its review, the commission rejected Elgnawey's
    contention that a brain injury can be compensable under the
    statute even if it is a slow and gradual consequence of an
    injury by accident to the spinal cord.   Citing Allan & Rocks,
    Inc. v. Briggs, 
    28 Va. App. 662
    , 
    508 S.E.2d 335
     (1998), Elgnawey
    argues that the commission erred.    We disagree.   Briggs, which
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    decided issues related to "compensable consequences" of a work
    related injury, does not support his argument.
    Our cases establish that total and permanent disability
    resulting from brain injury under Code § 65.1-56(18) is
    established only when an employee proves a sudden shock or
    injury specifically to the brain, not to some other body part
    such as the spinal cord.   See, e.g., Daniel Const. Co. v.
    Tolley, 
    24 Va. App. 70
    , 76, 
    480 S.E.2d 146
    , 148 (1997) (holding
    that post-traumatic stress disorder induced by a dynamite blast
    was "an 'injury' that resulted in 'structural changes' to the
    brain"); Barnett, 6 Va. App. at 32, 
    366 S.E.2d at 272
     (noting
    that injury was caused by a direct trauma to the brain which
    occurred when the employee was hit by a fireplace door).
    In Tolley, this Court affirmed a finding by the commission
    that Tolley was entitled to total and permanent disability
    benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from a
    sudden dynamite explosion which occurred in the course of his
    employment.   See 24 Va. App. at 77, 480 S.E.2d at 148.    The
    commission relied upon the doctor's testimony that Tolley had
    suffered a severe brain injury and upon Tolley's medical
    records, which indicated that his injury had been consistently
    diagnosed since the time of the explosion.   See id. at 77, 480
    S.E.2d at 148-49.   The doctor reported "that post-traumatic
    stress disorder results in irreversible structural changes
    within the neurons in the brain that include damage to
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    neurosynaptic receptors and serotinergic neurotransmitters . . .
    [and] opined that such damage had occurred to [Tolley's] brain
    and that this injury impaired [his] cognitive abilities."     Id.
    at 78, 480 S.E.2d at 149.   Thus, "we [held] that the evidence
    was sufficient to prove that [Tolley] suffered an injury to his
    brain."   Id. at 77, 450 S.E.2d at 148.
    In this case, however, the evidence proved that Elgnawey
    suffered an injury to his spinal cord, rather than his brain.
    Thus, Elgnawey did not prove the necessary link between his
    injury by accident and entitlement to total and permanent
    disability for injury to his brain pursuant to Code
    § 65.1-56(18).
    III.
    Under the former statute, total and permanent disability
    benefits may be awarded if the employee proved "the loss of both
    . . . legs . . . in the same accident, or an injury for all
    practical purposes resulting in total paralysis as determined by
    the Commission based on medical evidence."   Code § 65.1-56(18).
    The statute further provided that "[i]n construing this section
    the permanent loss of use of a member shall be held equivalent
    to the loss of such member."   Id.
    Credible evidence supported the commission's finding that
    Elgnawey did not suffer a permanent loss of use of his legs.
    The phrases "total and permanent loss" or
    "loss of use" of a leg do not mean that the
    leg is immovable or that it cannot be use[d]
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    in walking around the house, or even around
    the block. They do mean that the injured
    employee is unable to use it in any
    substantial degree in any gainful
    employment.
    Virginia Oak Flooring Co. v. Chrisley, 
    195 Va. 850
    , 857, 
    80 S.E.2d 537
    , 541 (1954).
    Elgnawey contends that his disability is far more severe
    than the disability that qualified the employee for total and
    permanent benefits in Pantry Pride v. Backus, 
    18 Va. App. 176
    ,
    
    442 S.E.2d 699
     (1994).    In Backus, however, the "employee could
    not return to work . . . [because she] would have required
    transportation to and from work, could not climb stairs, would
    need to remain seated and supported, might need to shift
    positions every few minutes because of pain, and would require
    sedating medication."     Id. at 180, 442 S.E.2d at 701-02.
    Moreover, we held that "[t]he evidence of a rated loss of
    twenty-five percent of both legs, coupled with the additional
    evidence of her incapacity for employment, support[ed] the
    commission's finding that the employee is permanently
    unemployable as a consequence of her loss of function in both
    legs."   Id. at 189, 442 S.E.2d at 702.
    The evidence did not establish that Elgnawey is permanently
    unemployable because of the loss of function of his legs.
    Indeed, the evidence proved and the commission found that
    Elgnawey is able to drive an automobile, has ascended and
    descended stairs, walked on the beach while on vacation, and was
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    able to travel by airplane to Egypt.   Moreover, Elgnawey's wife
    testified that his pain has decreased since a morphine pump was
    surgically implanted in his back.
    In addition, the rehabilitation specialist testified that,
    if disability to Elgnawey's legs were the only disability from
    which he suffered, he could be accommodated in a work
    environment.   The evidence proved, however, that Elgnawey has
    suffered a number of injuries unrelated to his employment,
    including two car accidents, two strokes, and a heart attack.
    Thus, Dr. White opined that Elgnawey is disabled due to
    "multiple etiologies."
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the commission's
    decision.
    Affirmed.
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