Robert T. Huber v. Commonwealth ( 2005 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Frank
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
ROBERT T. HUBER
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1926-04-2 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
OCTOBER 4, 2005
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DINWIDDIE COUNTY
Pamela S. Baskervill, Judge
James T. Maloney for appellant.
Richard B. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Judith
Williams Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Robert T. Huber, appellant, was convicted, in a bench trial, of unauthorized use of a
vehicle in violation of Code § 18.2-102. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in finding
the evidence was sufficient to convict. Specifically, he argues he had permission to use the
vehicle and did not exceed the scope of authority. For the reasons stated, we affirm the
conviction.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was to move in with his sister, Carla Bumgardner, on October 24, 2003. That
day, Bumgardner loaned appellant her Ford Focus, valued at more than $200, so appellant and
Bumgardner’s daughter could visit appellant’s mother. Appellant returned the car about twenty
minutes later.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Bumgardner’s ex-husband, Tim Nunnally, also was at her home that day. Nunnally had a
set of keys to the Focus and had her permission to use the car whenever he wanted.
Bumgardner and appellant picked up her son from a football game and returned home.
She went to bed around 11:00 p.m.
Bumgardner did not give appellant permission to use her car later that night. However,
after Bumgardner had gone to bed, appellant asked Tim Nunnally for his keys to Bumgardner’s
car so he could go to his boss’ house, about a mile away on the same road.
Nunnally testified he gave appellant permission to use the vehicle to go to his boss’
house. He told appellant “to make sure he brings it back.” Nunnally “gave [appellant] the keys
and told him to make sure he come [sic] back. He knew the consequences.” When Nunnally
was asked what he had meant when he said the appellant “knew the consequences” of not
returning the car, he testified: “It wasn’t my car to loan out to begin with, but he needed the
car.”
Nunnally did not give appellant permission to keep the vehicle overnight, nor did he give
appellant permission to go anywhere other than his boss’ house. In fact, appellant did not ask for
permission to use the car for any other purpose. However, Nunnally did not give appellant a
specific time to return the vehicle, nor was there a specific admonition not to use the vehicle for
other purposes.
When the car had not been returned by 5:00 p.m. the next afternoon, Bumgardner called
the police. The police thereafter found Bumgardner’s Focus parked in a Burger King parking
lot. The set of keys Nunnally had loaned appellant were under the seat of the locked car. The
car had been “abandoned.” Ms. Bumgardner finally got her car back about 7:30 p.m. on October
25.
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The trial court convicted appellant, finding that even if Nunnally had the authority to
grant appellant permission to use Bumgardner’s vehicle, appellant exceeded the scope of
Nunnally’s “limited permission.”1
ANALYSIS
On appeal, appellant contends his use of his sister’s vehicle was not limited to driving to
his boss’ house because Nunnally never specifically restricted his use of the vehicle.
Our analysis therefore focuses on whether the trial court erred in finding Nunnally’s
permission was limited, i.e., whether appellant’s use of the vehicle exceeded the scope of
permission.
When considering on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence presented below, we
“presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct” and reverse only if the trial court’s
decision is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 39
Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002); see also McGee v. Commonwealth, 25
Va. App. 193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). This means a jury’s verdict cannot
be overturned on appeal unless no “‘rational trier of fact’” could have come to the conclusion it
did. Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (quoting
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Pease v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 342, 355,
573 S.E.2d 272, 278 (2002) (en banc) (“We let the decision stand unless we conclude no rational
juror could have reached that decision.”), aff’d, 266 Va. 397, 588 S.E.2d 149 (2003). Under this
standard, “a reviewing court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Myers v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 113, 118,
596 S.E.2d 536, 538 (2004) (citation omitted and emphasis in original). It asks instead whether
1
For the purpose of this opinion, we assume Nunnally had permission to loan the car to
appellant.
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“‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Kelly, 41 Va. App. at 257, 584 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319). ‘“This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. at 257-58, 584 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319). Thus, we do not “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact” even if our opinion
were to differ. Wactor v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002).
Clearly, appellant initially had permission to use his sister’s vehicle. Yet, pursuant to
Code § 18.2-102:
When an owner consents to another person having temporary
possession of the owner’s vehicle, but does not consent to its use
beyond a designated period of possession, the statute is violated
when such use continues without the owner’s consent and is
accompanied by an intent to temporarily deprive the owner of
possession of the vehicle. See Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 17
Va. App. 234, 238, 435 S.E.2d 906, 908-09 (1993).
Tucker v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 490, 494, 604 S.E.2d 66, 68 (2004).
In Tucker, the vehicle’s owner gave Tucker permission to use his vehicle to visit a
restaurant and convenience store, after which he was to return the car to the owner. At the
restaurant, the owner again told Tucker to “[g]o back to the house and I’ll be there.” Id. at 492,
604 S.E.2d at 67. Tucker did not return with the car. Id. Several days later, when the owner
saw Tucker in his vehicle, Tucker “sped off” when the owner attempted to approach the vehicle.
Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia, in affirming the conviction, concluded:
We also find no merit in Tucker’s contention that he could not be
convicted of unauthorized use because the vehicle owner did not
specify the time or date when the owner’s consent would
terminate. Code § 18.2-102 contains no such requirement, and the
evidence plainly allowed the fact finder to conclude that the
owner’s permission to let Tucker use the car to go to a restaurant
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and a store did not extend to a period of several days afterward in
which the car was removed from the owner’s lawful possession.
Id. at 494-95, 604 S.E.2d at 68-69.
Appellant contends that since Nunnally did not specifically tell appellant he must return
the vehicle that night, nor did he specifically limit appellant’s use to visiting his boss and no
other purpose, his use was not unauthorized.
Nunnally told appellant to “make sure he come [sic] back” with the vehicle. Appellant
did not comply with this demand. The car was found the next day, abandoned at a fast-food
restaurant. From the fact that the keys given to appellant were locked inside the car, the fact
finder could reasonably conclude appellant had no intention of returning to the vehicle, and had
likewise no intention of returning the vehicle to his sister. This, in itself, violated the scope of
the consent to use the vehicle.
As we said in Overstreet:
Thus, where the owner gives consent to a temporary possession or
a possession for a limited purpose, the expiration of that
qualification creates a constructive revestment of possession in the
true owner with “bare charge or custody” in the other person. A
violation of the owner’s possessory right constitutes a trespassory
taking.
17 Va. App. at 236, 435 S.E.2d at 908 (quoting 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 23 (1970)).
Further, appellant asked for permission to use the vehicle to visit his boss, a short
distance away. Therefore, appellant, himself, limited the scope of the permission granted.
Nunnally acceded to appellant’s request to use the vehicle for a limited purpose. See Bass v.
State, 138 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Wis. 1965) (holding that permission to use a vehicle for one
purpose cannot, under any reasonable interpretation, be construed as implied consent to take the
vehicle to an unknown destination on an errand completely non-beneficial to owner and
completely unrelated to the purpose for which possession of vehicle was given).
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Based on appellant’s representation that he would use the vehicle to visit his boss,
Nunnally relinquished possession of the vehicle to appellant. The evidence clearly demonstrates
that appellant exceeded the permission he had received for its use and supports the trial court’s
finding of criminal intent to temporarily deprive his sister of the use of the vehicle.
We reject appellant’s argument that Nunnally must specifically tell appellant of the
limited scope of permission. Appellant cites footnote 2 in Overstreet that states, “This is not to
say that in every instance where a person is in possession of property with the owner’s consent,
an unanticipated use constitutes a trespass.” 17 Va. App. at 238 n.2, 435 S.E.2d at 908 n.2. We
then concluded in the footnote, “Our focus is strictly on acts that violate the owner’s express
limitations of the scope or duration of the consent given.” Id. This footnote is dicta to clarify
and limit the scope of the opinion. It was not necessary to resolve the issues in that case. See
Newman v. Newman, 42 Va. App. 557, 565, 593 S.E.2d 533, 537 (2004) (en banc) (“Dicta in a
prior decision generally refers to that portion of an opinion ‘not essential’ to the disposition in
the case.” (quoting Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 431 (2001))).
In his brief, appellant offers a number of scenarios that he contends are a reasonable
hypothesis of innocence, such as another person used the vehicle instead of appellant. He claims
no evidence indicated he used the vehicle after visiting the boss’ house, nor was there any
evidence that the Burger King parking lot “fell beyond the distance between his sister’s home
and the boss’s home.”
As the Supreme Court stated in Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513, 578 S.E.2d
781, 785 (2003):
The issue upon appellate review is not whether “there is some
evidence to support” these hypotheses. The issue is whether a
reasonable jury, upon consideration of all the evidence, could have
rejected Hudson’s theories in his defense and found him guilty of
murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
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First, we should note there is no evidence to support this hypothesis, nor did appellant
argue these issues in his motion to strike. His sole argument below was there was no limitation
of his use of the vehicle. “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for
reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the
ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of
justice.” Rule 5A:18. We will not consider an argument on appeal that was not presented to the
trial court. Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998).
We conclude that the scope of the authorization does not need to be expressly stated as
long as the limitation is amply clear to the appellant, based on the totality of the circumstances.
Here, appellant was told to return with the vehicle. He did not. He asked only for permission to
use the car to visit his boss. The car was found abandoned at a location other than the boss’
house.
We, therefore, affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
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