Robert C. Lightburn v. Sheila Jones Lightburn ( 1998 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bumgardner
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
ROBERT C. LIGHTBURN
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2445-97-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
APRIL 14, 1998
SHEILA JONES LIGHTBURN
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY
Lloyd C. Sullenberger, Judge
D. Michael Atkins (McClure, Callaghan &
Atkins, on briefs), for appellant.
J. Barrett Jones (Jones & Green, on brief),
for appellee.
Robert C. Lightburn ("husband") appeals the trial court's
awards of equitable distribution, spousal support, and attorney
fees in his divorce from Sheila Jones Lightburn ("wife"). For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
Husband contends that the trial court erred when it
considered the factors of Code § 20-107.3(E) to determine its
award of equitable distribution. He argues that the trial court
misapplied Code § 20-107.3(E)(3) regarding the "duration of the
marriage" and Code § 20-107.3(E)(6) regarding the manner in which
the marital property was acquired. He also argues that the
evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's factual
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
finding regarding wife's non-monetary contributions to the
well-being of the family. We disagree.
Following this Court's reversal of its initial decision to
award wife one-half of the value of the marital residence, the
trial court reconsidered the factors of Code § 20-107.3 and
awarded wife approximately one-third of the property's value.
Code § 20-107.3, which governs awards of equitable
distribution, "is intended to recognize a marriage as a
partnership and to provide a means to divide equitably the wealth
accumulated during and by that partnership based on the monetary
and non-monetary contributions of each spouse." Williams v.
Williams, 4 Va. App. 19, 24, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1987). "Where an
equitable distribution is appropriate, then all of the provisions
of Code § 20-107.3 must be followed." Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App.
132, 136, 354 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1987). After classifying and
valuing all of the property at issue, the court may order the
division or transfer, or both, of jointly owned marital property
or grant a monetary award to either party. See Code
§ 20-107.3(A), (C), (D). The court must determine the amount of
its award of any of these remedies "upon the factors listed in
[Code § 20-107.3(E)]." Code § 20-107.3(C), (D). Subject to
these enumerated statutory factors, "[t]his division or transfer
of jointly owned marital property and the amount of any monetary
award . . . is within the sound discretion of the trial court."
Dietz v. Dietz, 17 Va. App. 203, 216, 436 S.E.2d 463, 471 (1993).
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Although, when making an equitable distribution decision, the
trial court is not required to quantify the weight given to each
factor or to weigh each factor equally, its considerations must
be supported by the evidence. See Marion v. Marion, 11 Va. App.
659, 664, 401 S.E.2d 432, 436 (1991).
First, we hold that the trial court's consideration of the
duration of the marriage under Code § 20-107.3(E)(3) was not
erroneous. The duration of the marriage is only one of numerous
factors that a trial court is required to weigh when determining
its award of equitable distribution. See Theismann v. Theismann,
22 Va. App. 557, 565, 471 S.E.2d 809, 812, aff'd en banc, 23 Va.
App. 697, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996). In its opinion letter, the
trial court did not expressly indicate how it weighed the short
duration of the parties' marriage in its overall analysis.
However, unlike its earlier award of equitable distribution, the
trial court did not consider the relationship between the short
duration of the marriage and wife's "hardships . . . from the
divorce," such as "the expenses associated with relocating and
the interruption of her private counseling practice," in
determining the amount of its monetary award. Lightburn v.
Lightburn, 22 Va. App. 612, 620, 472 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1996).
Although the trial court considered wife's non-monetary
contribution of joining the family in Madison County in
determining its award of equitable distribution, it reserved its
consideration of the negative effects of her quick return to
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Blacksburg for the issue of spousal support. Based on our review
of the record and the trial court's award, we cannot say that its
consideration of Code § 20-107.3(E)(3) was flawed. Cf.
Theismann, 22 Va. App. at 565, 471 S.E.2d at 812-13.
Next, we hold that the trial court's consideration of "how
and when" the marital residence was acquired under Code
§ 20-107.3(E)(6) was not erroneous. The record indicates that,
about ten months after the parties were married, husband arranged
to have a 10.474-acre tract of his farm, which included the
marital residence, parceled off and retitled to husband and wife
as tenants by the entirety. Husband previously conceded that
this transaction constituted a gift to wife and had the effect of
transmuting the marital residence into "marital property" for the
purposes of equitable distribution. See Lightburn, 22 Va. App.
at 617, 472 S.E.2d at 283. The "gifted status" of specific items
of marital property is relevant to the trial court's
consideration of Code § 20-107.3(E)(6) and (10). See Theismann,
22 Va. App. at 568-69, 471 S.E.2d at 814. Although, when
warranted by the evidence, a trial court has discretion to award
all or most of the gifted property's value to the donor spouse,
Code § 20-107.3 does not compel such an award. See id. at 568,
471 S.E.2d at 814. The trial court's opinion letter indicates
that it carefully considered the gifted status of the marital
residence in fashioning its award. The record does not indicate
that this consideration was erroneous or that the decision to
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award wife one-third of the value of this gifted property was an
abuse of discretion.
Finally, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support
the trial court's factual finding regarding wife's non-monetary
contribution to the family. The evidence regarding the personal
and professional concessions made by wife to join husband at the
marital residence and the associated practical inconveniences was
sufficient to support the trial court's finding that her
relocation constituted a significant non-monetary contribution to
the well-being of the family.
II.
SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Husband challenges the trial court's award of spousal
support on two grounds. He contends that the trial court erred
when it (1) concluded that wife was entitled to spousal support
and (2) applied the factors of Code § 20-107.1 to determine the
amount of its award. We disagree.
"The determination of whether a spouse is entitled to
support and of the amount of that support is a matter committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court." Theismann, 22 Va.
App. at 572, 471 S.E.2d at 816. "'When the record discloses that
the trial court considered all of the statutory factors, the
court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal' absent a clear
abuse of discretion." Id. (quoting Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App.
558, 574, 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992)).
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We hold that the trial court did not err when it determined
that wife was entitled to spousal support.
Where [a] wife has established her need for
support and the husband's ability to provide
it, and she was not shown to be guilty of
misconduct entitling her husband to a
divorce, the chancellor abuse[s] his
discretion when he denie[s] the wife support
and maintenance.
Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 514, 347 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1986)
(citing Rowand v. Rowand, 215 Va. 344, 346, 210 S.E.2d 149,
150-51 (1974)). Husband, who had a net worth of well over three
million dollars and substantial income from a multitude of
investments, does not contend that the record failed to establish
his ability to provide support. Regarding wife's needs, the
trial court found that "wife had suffered substantial economic
detriment" as a result of her move to Madison County and that her
net worth was "practically nothing." Contrary to husband's
assertion, the record contains ample support for both of these
findings. Based on wife's lost opportunity to continue working
as an employee of St. Albans Psychiatric Hospital, her reduced
income and negative cash flow following the parties' separation,
and her comparatively minuscule net worth, we cannot say that the
trial court erred when it concluded that she was in need of
spousal support.
We also hold that the trial court's determination of the
amount of spousal support was not an abuse of discretion. "In
fixing the amount of the spousal support award, a review of all
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of the factors contained in Code § 20-107.1 is mandatory, and the
amount awarded must be fair and just under all of the
circumstances." Gamble, 14 Va. App. at 574, 421 S.E.2d at 644.
"[W]hen the record discloses that the [trial] court has
considered all of the statutory factors, its ruling will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion." Lambert
v. Lambert, 10 Va. App. 623, 628, 395 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1990).
The trial court's opinion letter indicates that, following the
hearing on remand, it carefully considered all of the factors of
Code § 20-107.1, including the sharply contrasting financial
conditions of the parties, the reduction in wife's award of
equitable distribution, and her tax liability for any spousal
support she received.
We disagree with husband that the trial court's
consideration of the duration of the marriage was inappropriate
or that it considered at all the "emotional difficulties"
encountered by wife as a result of her successive relocations.
In our previous consideration of this case, we held that wife's
hardships from the divorce, which were "exacerbated" by the short
duration of the parties' marriage, "were appropriate
considerations for spousal support." Lightburn, 22 Va. App. at
620, 472 S.E.2d at 285. In light of this directive and the
evidence in the record regarding the financial ramifications of
wife's departure from and then return to the Blacksburg area, we
cannot say that the trial court's consideration of the duration
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of the marriage was erroneous. Moreover, the trial court's
finding does not indicate that it gave any consideration to the
"emotional" difficulties associated with wife's relocations.
Rather, when read in context with its statement regarding the
"substantial economic detriment" encountered by wife, the trial
court's finding indicates that it considered only the financial
and practical problems that confronted wife because of her
back-to-back moves.
III.
ATTORNEY FEES
We disagree with husband's contention that the trial court
erred when it awarded attorney fees to wife and not to him. "An
award of attorney fees is a matter submitted to the trial court's
sound discretion and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of
discretion." Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d
554, 558 (1987). The key to a proper award of attorney fees is
"reasonableness under all of the circumstances." McGinnis v.
McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277, 338 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1985). Based
on the circumstances and equities of this case, including each
parties' needs, abilities, resources, and the course and outcome
of these lengthy proceedings, we cannot say that the trial
court's award of $14,500 of wife's attorney fees was an abuse of
discretion. Wife's request for additional attorney fees is
denied.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's
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awards of equitable distribution, spousal support, and attorney
fees.
Affirmed.
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