Wampler-Longacre, Inc. v. Kathy L. Custer ( 1997 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
    WAMPLER-LONGACRE, INC.
    AND
    PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 1756-97-4                           PER CURIAM
    DECEMBER 9, 1997
    KATHY S. CUSTER
    FROM THE VIRGINIA
    WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Cathleen P. Welsh; Wharton, Aldhizer
    & Weaver, on brief), for appellants.
    (Kermit L. Racey; Racey & Racey, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Wampler-Longacre, Inc. and its insurer (hereinafter referred
    to as "employer") contend that the Workers' Compensation
    Commission erred in finding that Kathy Custer proved (1) that her
    post-April 1994 right shoulder and right arm symptoms were
    causally related to her 1992 compensable right shoulder injury;
    and (2) that she was totally disabled after October 11, 1995,
    and, therefore, she did not have a duty to market any residual
    capacity.   Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the
    parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
    Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision.      Rule
    5A:27.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    Causation
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.   See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).      "The
    actual determination of causation is a factual finding that will
    not be disturbed on appeal if there is credible evidence to
    support the finding."   Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 
    7 Va. App. 684
    , 688, 
    376 S.E.2d 814
    , 817 (1989).    "Questions raised by
    conflicting medical opinions must be decided by the commission."
    Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 
    8 Va. App. 310
    , 318, 
    381 S.E.2d 231
    , 236 (1989).
    In finding that Custer sustained her burden of proving a
    compensable change-in-condition, the commission found as follows:
    [Custer's] medical treatment and disability
    have been caused, at least in part, by the
    1992 compensable injury. Dr. [Galen] Craun
    stated on April 21, 1994, that "I believe she
    has a cervical neuritis as well as rotator
    cuff tendinitis from prior repair." In his
    disability statement on May 18, 1994, he
    indicated a diagnosis of status post right
    shoulder cuff reinjury. In his letter to the
    carrier dated June 28, 1994, Dr. Craun wrote,
    "I have seen Kathy Custer with complaints of
    severe pain in the shoulder, shoulder blade,
    and right upper thoracic area. She has been
    symptomatic since her rotator cuff repair by
    Dr. Edward Chappell. . . . On the same date,
    he diagnosed myofascial pain syndrome and
    rotator cuff tendinitis, right shoulder. On
    September 19, 1994, Dr. Craun wrote: "I can
    only conclude that the patient's current
    situation stems from her February 10, 1992
    condition since she has had as much pain
    after her surgery in 1992 as she did before.
    In other words, she has continued to be
    symptomatic throughout her post-operative
    course stemming back to 1992.
    2
    "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but is
    subject to the commission's consideration and weighing."
    Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 
    11 Va. App. 675
    , 677, 
    401 S.E.2d 213
    , 214 (1991).   In its role as fact finder, the
    commission was entitled to weigh the medical evidence, to accept
    Dr. Craun's opinions, and to reject any contrary medical
    opinions.   Dr. Craun's opinions, along with Custer's account of
    continuing symptoms, constitute credible evidence to support the
    commission's decision.    "The fact that there is contrary evidence
    in the record is of no consequence if there is credible evidence
    to support the commission's finding."     Wagner Enters., Inc. v.
    Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35 (1991).
    Disability
    In ruling that Custer remained totally disabled since July
    18, 1994, and had not been released to return to work, the
    commission found as follows:
    Dr. Craun excused [Custer] from work on [July
    18, 1994]. Dr. [Glenn] Deputy took her out
    of work on August 9, 1994. Dr. [D.L.] Perry
    declared her disabled on August 24, 1994, and
    on January 5, 1995, until further notice.
    Dr. Perry reported her "still off work" in
    February and July, 1996. There has been no
    release to return to work, and [Custer's]
    testimony is that she remains symptomatic.
    The commission was entitled to accept the opinions of
    Drs. Craun, Deputy, and Perry.   These opinions, coupled with
    claimant's continuing symptoms, constitute credible evidence to
    support the commission's findings.    Therefore, those findings are
    3
    conclusive on appeal.   See James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 
    8 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989).   "In determining
    whether credible evidence exists, the appellate court does not
    retry the facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or
    make its own determination of the credibility of the witnesses."
    Wagner, 12 Va. App. at 894, 
    407 S.E.2d at 35
    .
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    4