Dept. of Health/Commonwealth v. Joanne Butler Keene ( 1997 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick
    DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH/
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 1732-96-1                         PER CURIAM
    JANUARY 7, 1997
    JOANNE BUTLER KEENE
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General;
    Gregory E. Lucyk, Senior Assistant Attorney
    General; Lee Melchor Turlington, Assistant
    Attorney General, on brief), for appellant.
    (Jonathan A. Smith-George; Patten, Wornom &
    Watkins, on brief), for appellee.
    Virginia Department of Health/Commonwealth of Virginia
    ("employer") contends that the Workers' Compensation Commission
    ("commission") erred in (1) finding that Joanne B. Keene
    ("claimant") proved she was injuriously exposed to asbestos while
    working as a nurse epidemiologist for employer in the James
    Madison Building; (2) finding that claimant's mesothelioma
    constituted a compensable occupational disease or ordinary
    disease of life as defined by Code §§ 65.2-400 and 65.2-401,
    respectively; and (3) admitting into evidence certain documents
    related to asbestos contained in the James Madison Building.
    Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we
    conclude that this appeal is without merit.   Accordingly, we
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    summarily affirm the commission's decision.    Rule 5A:27.
    I. and II.
    On appeal, the commission's findings must be viewed in the
    light most favorable to the prevailing party below.     R.G. Moore
    Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788
    (1990).   "'Whether a disease is causally related to the
    employment and not causally related to other factors is . . . a
    finding of fact.'    When there is credible evidence to support it,
    such a finding of fact is 'conclusive and binding' on this
    Court."     Ross Laboratories v. Barbour, 
    13 Va. App. 373
    , 377-78,
    
    412 S.E.2d 205
    , 208 (1991) (citation omitted).    "In determining
    whether credible evidence exists, the appellate court does not
    retry the facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or
    make its own determination of the credibility of the witnesses."
    Wagner Enters, Inc. v. Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35 (1991).
    Code § 65.2-400 defines an occupational disease as one
    "arising out of and in the course of employment."    The statute
    provides that "[a] disease shall be deemed to arise out of the
    employment" when the evidence establishes six elements.      Element
    (1) requires that there be "[a] direct causal connection between
    the conditions under which work is performed and the occupational
    disease."    Element (3) requires that the disease "can be fairly
    traced to the employment as the proximate cause."    Employer
    contends that the commission erred in finding that claimant's
    2
    evidence proved the requisite causal connection between her
    mesothelioma and her employment. 1
    Claimant's testimony regarding the white dust she frequently
    encountered in her work environment, the testimony and opinions
    of Dr. Joseph Guth, an industrial hygienist, the opinions of
    claimant's physicians, Drs. Legier and Schepers, and the
    documents reflecting that friable asbestos was located above the
    acoustical ceiling tiles on every floor of the James Madison
    Building and in the building's air handling system, constitute
    ample credible evidence to support the commission's finding that
    claimant acquired mesothelioma as a direct result of her exposure
    to asbestos during her thirteen years of working for employer in
    the James Madison Building.    Because the commission's factual
    findings are supported by credible evidence, they are binding and
    conclusive upon this Court on appeal.   Accordingly, we cannot say
    as a matter of law that the commission erred in finding that
    claimant proved she sustained a compensable occupational disease
    pursuant to Code § 65.2-400.
    1
    The commission did not err in treating claimant's
    mesothelioma as a compensable occupational disease in accordance
    with the six requirements of Code § 65.2-400 rather than as an
    ordinary disease of life pursuant to Code § 65.2-401. If a
    claimant's occupational disease resulted from substantial
    exposure outside of the employment, the claimant must meet the
    more rigorous standard of proof contained in Code § 65.2-401.
    Holly Farms Foods, Inc. v. Carter, 
    15 Va. App. 29
    , 38-39, 
    422 S.E.2d 165
    , 170 (1992). Here, credible evidence supports the
    commission's findings that claimant encountered no substantial
    exposure to the causes of mesothelioma outside of her employment.
    There was no evidence that claimant was exposed to asbestos
    outside of her employment which might have led to her disease.
    3
    III.
    "[R]igid or technical rules of pleading, evidence, or
    practice in the conduct of hearings shall not apply so long as
    the procedures adopted protect the substantial rights of the
    parties."   Sergio's Pizza v. Soncini, 
    1 Va. App. 370
    , 376, 
    339 S.E.2d 204
    , 207 (1986).   See also Rule 2.2, Rules of the Virginia
    Workers' Compensation Commission.     The commission is entitled to
    accept hearsay evidence without corroboration.      Franklin Mortgage
    Corp. v. Walker, 
    5 Va. App. 95
    , 99, 
    360 S.E.2d 861
    , 864 (1987),
    aff'd on reh'g en banc, 
    6 Va. App. 108
    , 
    367 S.E.2d 191
    (1988).
    In light of the rules according the commission wide
    discretion in determining the evidence it will receive and
    consider, we cannot say that the commission abused its discretion
    in allowing the documents, some of which were employer's own
    records, into evidence.   These documents, which related largely
    to the removal of asbestos from the James Madison Building, were
    relevant and material to the issues of exposure and causation.
    Furthermore, we find nothing to indicate that the commission
    violated employer's due process rights.      The documents admitted
    into evidence were either prepared by the Commonwealth's
    employees or were studies of the James Madison Building that were
    2
    commissioned or requested by employer.
    2
    We note that claimant's exhibits E-1 and E-14 were not
    admitted into evidence or considered by the deputy commissioner.
    Therefore, we find no merit in employer's argument with respect
    to these two documents.
    4
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    5