James Junior Fountain v. Commonwealth of VA ( 2002 )


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  •                    COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Humphreys
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    JAMES JUNIOR FOUNTAIN
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0262-01-2               JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
    MAY 7, 2002
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY
    Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge
    Andrea S. Lantz, Assistant Public Defender
    (Office of the Public Defender, on brief),
    for appellant.
    Stephen R. McCullough, Assistant Attorney
    General (Randolph A. Beales, Attorney
    General, on brief), for appellee.
    James Junior Fountain appeals his conviction, after a bench trial,
    for possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted
    of a felony, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. 1   Fountain
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    1
    Fountain was charged with concealed possession of "a weapon
    designed or intended to propel a missile of any kind," after
    having been previously convicted of a felony, in violation of Code
    § 18.2-308.2. Fountain was correctly indicted and arraigned on
    this charge. However, both the conviction and sentencing orders
    state that Fountain was convicted of being a "felon in possession
    of a firearm." The Commonwealth contends in their brief on appeal
    that the conviction and sentencing orders demonstrate a clerical
    error in this regard; we granted the Commonwealth leave to request
    that the trial court consider a motion to correct the orders, nunc
    pro tunc, and the trial court entered the orders December 21,
    2001, nunc pro tunc, February 15, 2001, correcting the clerical
    error. Fountain does not challenge this on appeal and argues on
    contends the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient
    as a matter of law to support the conviction. 2   We disagree and
    affirm the conviction.
    When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after
    conviction, it is our duty to consider it in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible therefrom.   We should affirm the
    judgment unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is
    plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 3
    So viewed, the evidence presented at trial established that on the
    evening of September 18, 1998, Officer John McKay, of the
    Albemarle Police Department, was patrolling the area of the Milton
    Boat Landing when he observed a vehicle parked at the bottom of
    the landing, past a sign indicating the area was closed.    McKay
    found Fountain and a female inside the car, which he described as
    a "small, two seat" 1986 Nissan 300ZX.   McKay informed Fountain
    that the area was closed and asked to see his driver's license.
    brief only that the weapon was not a "firearm" and that his
    conviction for "unlawfully, feloniously, knowingly and
    intentionally, after having been convicted of a felony, carrying
    on or about his person, hidden from common observation, a weapon
    designed or intended to propel a missile of any kind," was in
    error.
    2
    Fountain was also tried on one count of possession of
    cocaine. However, the trial court acquitted him of this charge.
    3
    Cook v. Commonwealth, 
    219 Va. 769
    , 770, 
    250 S.E.2d 361
    , 362
    (1979).
    - 2 -
    Fountain presented his license to McKay.   After running a "wanted
    check" on his license, McKay learned that there was an outstanding
    capias for Fountain.   McKay then placed Fountain under arrest and
    put him in his patrol car.
    Upon searching Fountain's car, McKay found marijuana, rolling
    papers, razor blades and Fountain's wallet in the console of the
    car.   McKay also found a "small corncob pipe" in front of the
    driver's seat, "where Fountain's feet would have been."   Finally,
    he found a pellet gun "stuffed" between the driver's seat and the
    console.   McKay could not see the gun when Fountain was in the car
    "because his leg was next to it."    However, after Fountain and the
    passenger had gotten out of the car, when McKay "stuck [his] head
    in . . . [he] could see the [pellet gun] . . . ."   He stated,
    "very little . . . just the very back of the grip" of the gun
    protruded above the level of the seat.   Fountain claimed that the
    gun belonged to his wife and that he had forgotten it was in the
    car.   Fountain had been previously convicted of malicious
    wounding, a felony.
    At the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, Fountain raised a
    motion to strike arguing that the Commonwealth had failed to
    establish concealment, as well as Fountain's knowledge of the
    presence of the gun at the time he was approached by McKay.    The
    trial court denied the motion.    Fountain renewed his motion at the
    close of the evidence.   It was again denied by the trial court.
    On appeal, Fountain contends only that the trial court erred in
    - 3 -
    finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction because
    the Commonwealth failed to establish that Fountain concealed the
    gun, or that he intended to conceal the gun.
    Code § 18.2-308.2 provides as follows, in relevant part:
    A. It shall be unlawful for (i) any person
    who has been convicted of a felony . . . to
    knowingly and intentionally carry about his
    person, hidden from common observation, any
    weapon described in subsection A of
    § 18.2-308.
    Pursuant to Code § 18.2-308(A), as it read at the time of the
    offense, it is a crime to conceal from common observation, "any
    pistol, revolver, or other weapon designed or intended to propel
    a missile of any kind . . . or [] any weapon of like kind as
    those enumerated in this subsection . . . ." 4
    Referring to Code § 18.2-308, the Supreme Court of Virginia
    has stated "'[t]he purpose of the statute [is] to interdict the
    practice of carrying a deadly weapon about the person, concealed,
    and yet so accessible as to afford prompt and immediate use.'" 5
    Code § 18.2-308.2(A) defines a concealed weapon as one "hidden
    from common observation."   "Such a weapon is 'hidden from common
    observation when it is observable[,] but is of such deceptive
    4
    In 2001, the General Assembly amended the section by
    inserting the phrase "by action of an explosion of any
    combustible material" at the end of clause (i) in subsection A.
    5
    Schaaf v. Commonwealth, 
    220 Va. 429
    , 430, 
    258 S.E.2d 574
    ,
    574-75 (1979) (quoting Sutherland's Case, 
    109 Va. 834
    , 
    65 S.E. 15
     (1909)).
    - 4 -
    appearance as to disguise the weapon's true nature.'"6     Therefore,
    where a weapon is "hidden from all except those with an unusual or
    exceptional opportunity to view it," it is hidden from public view
    and "concealment of it in this fashion [is] unlawful." 7    Here, the
    evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth, demonstrates that initially McKay was unable to see
    the gun "because [Fountain's] leg was next to it."     Further, once
    Fountain got out of the car and McKay "stuck [his] head in the
    car," he could see "very little" of the pellet gun – namely, "just
    the very back of the grip" of the gun, protruding above the seat.
    From this evidence, the fact finder could infer beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the pellet gun was "hidden from all except
    those with an unusual or exceptional opportunity to view it" and
    therefore, that it was concealed from public view. 8   We do not
    address Fountain's argument concerning whether the Commonwealth
    established he intended to conceal the gun, or whether he made
    some conscious effort to conceal it, as our review of the record
    reveals that Fountain raised no such argument below.     Instead,
    Fountain merely argued that the gun was not factually concealed.
    6
    Main v. Commonwealth, 
    20 Va. App. 370
    , 372, 
    457 S.E.2d 400
    , 401 (1995).
    7
    Id. at 372, 373, 457 S.E.2d at 402.
    8
    See id. at 371, 457 S.E.2d at 401 ("We hold that carrying
    a weapon in one's back pocket, covered by a duffle bag,
    constitutes carrying a concealed weapon if the handle of the
    weapon, the only part of the weapon extending outside of the
    pocket, is concealed by the duffle bag.").
    - 5 -
    Thus, Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of this issue. 9   Further,
    the record reflects no reason to invoke the good cause or ends of
    justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18. 10
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial
    court.
    Affirmed.
    9
    See Rule 5A:18; see also Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.
    App. 299, 308, 
    494 S.E.2d 484
    , 488 (1998) ("The Court of Appeals
    will not consider an argument on appeal which was not presented
    to the trial court.").
    10
    Nevertheless, the evidence clearly demonstrated that
    Fountain had knowledge the gun was in the car, as he told
    Officer McKay that "he'd forgot[ten] that it was in the car."
    Further, the gun was found between the driver's seat and the
    console of the "small, two seat, sports" car. Thus, it was
    directly next to Fountain as he operated the car. Further,
    Fountain's wallet was in the console between the seats. From
    these facts, it is reasonable to assume that the gun was at
    least visible to Fountain while he was in the car.
    - 6 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0262012

Filed Date: 5/7/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021