Commonwealth v. Quincy Brown s/k/a Q. Jamil Brown ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Annunziata and
Senior Judge Overton
Argued by teleconference
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
*
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
Record No. 3062-01-2 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
MAY 17, 2002
QUINCY BROWN, S/K/A
QUINCY JAMIL BROWN
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Thomas N. Nance, Judge
Amy L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellant.
Prescott L. Prince (Carrie W. Witter, Third
Year Law Student; Clarke & Prince, on brief),
for appellee.
Quincy Brown (defendant) stands indicted for murder,
attempted murder, carjacking, and robbery. The Commonwealth
appeals a pretrial ruling granting defendant's motion to suppress
a statement he made during a custodial interrogation. It
contends the statement should not be suppressed because Brown
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel and his right to remain silent. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Background
Viewed in the light most favorable to Brown, the party
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
prevailing below, Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066,
1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991), the evidence proved that on July
13, 2001 at 4:00 p.m., two uniformed police officers approached
Brown, fifteen years old at the time, because they suspected he
had participated in several crimes they were investigating. They
found him smoking a marijuana cigarette. The officers informed
Brown that he had been seen in the victim's automobile.
Detective James E. Foster, who was investigating the crimes,
arrived at the scene soon thereafter. One of the officers
searched Brown and found in his back pants pocket a gold ring
belonging to one of the victims. The officer then arrested
Brown. After Brown was informed of his Miranda rights, Detective
Foster took him to the police station for questioning.
The police did not attempt to contact Brown's mother to
advise her that he had been arrested and was in police custody.
The police knew he was fifteen years old with only an eighth
grade education. They did not know he had an intellectual
functioning capacity of an eight year old.
In the interrogation room, Detective Foster, after some
preliminary questions, told Brown:
I'm going to read you your rights before I
start talking to you.
* * * * * * *
What I'd like for you to do is listen to me
while I read you these rights. Don't make
any comment to me, don't get mad, don't get
abrupt, just listen and then, I'll tell you
and then you can tell your side of the
story.
[Reading from the form] You have an absolute
right to remain silent and make no statement
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to me. Any statement you make [inaudible]
an attorney may be used as evidence against
you. You have the right to the presence of
an attorney at this or any future interview
the police may have with you. If you are
unable to hire an attorney, the court will
appoint one for you. You understand those
rights? [Brown nods.]
And understanding these rights, if you wish
to waive them and make a statement to me you
can if you wish. 1
What I want you to do is sign your name here
[handing him the form] that I read you your
rights and that you understand them.
Complying with the detective's directive, Brown signed the
form without reading it. Detective Foster did not give Brown an
opportunity to read the form, nor did he further explain that by
signing it, Brown was giving up his constitutional rights. He
did not specifically ascertain whether Brown understood that he
was waiving his right by signing the form. He did not ask Brown
if he could read, or if he had difficulty in school. Indeed,
Foster testified that he did not know if Brown understood the
meaning of the term "waiver."
After Brown signed the form, Foster told Brown the facts
known to the police. He informed him that the police had found a
ring belonging to one of the victims in Brown's back pocket,
which would pose a problem for him because it "put [him] at the
scene." Foster promised Brown he would ask the prosecutor for
leniency toward Brown if he "[told him] the whole truth."
Although Brown had six prior criminal charges against him in
1
The form, however, states: "I understand these rights and
wish to waive them and make a statement."
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the juvenile system, the record does not indicate whether he had
ever before been in an interrogation room or had been advised of
his Miranda rights.
Based on the totality of the circumstances as evidenced by
the videotape, which the trial court viewed, and the other
evidence before it, the trial court granted Brown's motion to
suppress his statement, reasoning as follows:
[Y]ou have got a child, a young man
here who is borderline retarded. I don't
know if he can read or write or not.
I was impressed by the fact that he
responded properly to Detective Foster when
he talked to him and when he read his rights
to him. But, you can never convince me that
he understood his rights. I think he
probably did. 2
But once he was told that the
[victim's] ring was [found] in [his] pocket,
and you're gonna have to tell us, and your
job is to tell us, I'm going to go to the
Commonwealth's Attorney, I don't think . . .
that would be a voluntary waiver of his
rights.
Analysis
The Commonwealth contends the trial court erred in
suppressing Brown's confession. It claims the trial court erred
in finding that Brown did not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive his rights. For the reasons that follow, we
disagree.
On review of a Commonwealth's pretrial appeal of a
2
In the context of the entire record, we treat this
apparent inconsistency as a scrivener's error and read this
sentence as stating, "I think he didn't."
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suppression motion, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party prevailing below, in this case Brown.
Grimstead, 12 Va. App. at 1067, 407 S.E.2d at 48. Whether a
waiver of Miranda rights was made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily is a question of fact. Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244
Va. 576, 581, 423 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1992). Thus, "the trial
court's resolution of that question is entitled on appeal to a
presumption of correctness." Id. We will not disturb the trial
court's factual finding unless it is plainly wrong. Watkins v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 477, 331 S.E.2d 422, 429-30 (1985)
(citations omitted).
"'In order to be able to use statements obtained during
custodial interrogations of the accused, the State must warn the
accused prior to such questioning of his right to remain silent
and of his right to have counsel, retained or appointed, present
during interrogation.'" Grogg v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 598,
611, 371 S.E.2d 549, 555 (1988) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707, 717 (1979)); see also Va. Const. art. I, §§ 8 and 11.
An accused, including a juvenile, may waive his or her right to
remain silent or have counsel present. Fare, 442 U.S. at
724-25.
A waiver, however, is valid only if it is made knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 475 (1966); Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 611, 371 S.E.2d at 556.
"[T]he Commonwealth must demonstrate that the waiver 'not only be
voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege . . .
.'" Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 611, 371 S.E.2d at 556 (quoting Edwards
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v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981)). "The courts must presume
that a defendant did not waive his rights." North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); see also Grogg, 6 Va. App. at
611, 371 S.E.2d at 556 ("Courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver." (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 404 (1977))). Hence, "a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to retained or appointed counsel." Miranda, 384
U.S. at 475; accord Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 611, 371 S.E.2d at 556.
As in all cases where the validity of a Miranda waiver is an
issue on appeal, we must consider whether the "totality of the
circumstances" supports the trial court's finding on the issue.
Fare, 442 U.S. at 725; Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 612, 371 S.E.2d at
556. Such circumstances include "[the accused's] background and
experience and the conduct of the police," Correll v.
Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 464, 352 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1987)
(citations omitted), and, in the case of a juvenile, his or her
age, education, and intelligence, as well as his or her "capacity
to understand the warnings given him [or her], the nature of his
Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those
rights." Fare, 442 U.S. at 725.
However, because the "admissions and confessions of
juveniles require special caution," courts have applied an
augmented test to determine whether the juvenile's waiver of his
or her rights rights is valid. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45
(1967). In such cases, the trial court must find that the police
"took care to ensure that [the juvenile] understood his rights."
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442 U.S. at 726; accord Green v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 706, 710,
292 S.E.2d 605, 608 (1982) (affirming the trial court's finding
that defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary because "the
police exercised the greatest care in seeing Green's rights were
protected . . .").
In Fare, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's finding that the juvenile knowingly waived his Miranda
rights because the police read and explained the rights to the
juvenile twice, and "ascertained that [he] understood those
rights." 442 U.S. at 726. The officer asked the accused, "Do
you understand all of these rights as I have explained them to
you?" Id. at 710. The defendant responded, "Yeah." Id. The
officer then asked, "[D]o you wish to give up your right to
remain silent and talk to us about this murder?" Id. After
further explanation, the defendant responded, "Yeah, I might talk
to you." Id. The officer then asked, "Do you want to give up
your right to have an attorney present here while we talk about
it?" Id. When the juvenile asked for his probation officer
instead, the officer again clarified, "You have the right to an
attorney." Id. A few seconds later, the officer repeated,
"[W]ill you talk to us without an attorney present?" and the
defendant responded, "Yeah I want to talk to you." Id. at 711.
In Virginia, we require the same assurance that a juvenile
in police custody has knowingly waived his or her rights before a
subsequent confession may be used against the juvenile. In
Green, for example, the Virginia Supreme Court found that the
Commonwealth established the voluntariness of Green's waiver
because "the police exercised the greatest care in seeing Green's
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rights were protected." 223 Va. at 710, 292 S.E.2d at 608. The
police advised the accused of his Miranda rights three times and
twice cautioned him not to make a statement without his mother
present. Id. The officer asked Green if he understood the
offenses with which he was charged, and Green defined the terms
with specificity. Id. at 709, 292 S.E.2d at 607. Only after the
officer had thus ensured Green's understanding of his rights and
the consequences of waiving them, Green made incriminating
statements. Id. at 710, 292 S.E.2d at 608; accord Simpson v.
Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557, 564, 318 S.E.2d 386, 390 (1984)
(upholding trial court's determination that defendant voluntarily
and intelligently waived his Miranda rights because the police
read the warning "three times, in clear and simple language, . .
. [and] amplified the warnings in words which, in the expert's
opinion, [the juvenile] could not fail to understand"); Roberts
v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 554, 445 S.E.2d 709 (1994)
(upholding trial court's determination that defendant's waiver
was knowing where he verbally responded in the affirmative each
time the officers asked him if he understood his Miranda rights);
Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 615, 371 S.E.2d at 558 (upholding trial
court's determination that defendant's waiver was knowing where
"[t]he waiver and consent form contained simple, understandable
language," and the officer "read each individual Miranda warning
and asked [the juvenile] if he understood the right").
This standard for measuring the validity of a waiver of
Miranda rights in cases involving juveniles is particularly
applicable when neither a parent, guardian, nor counsel is
present at the time of the juvenile's waiver. Grogg, 6 Va. App.
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at 613, 371 S.E.2d at 557 (the absence of a parent or counsel is
"'a circumstance that weigh[s] against the admissibility of the
confession'" (quoting Miller v. Maryland, 577 F.2d 1158, 1159
(4th Cir. 1978))); see also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54
(1962) (the confession of a fourteen year old, obtained in the
absence of his parents, violated his right against self-
incrimination because such a child "is unlikely to have any
conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible
only to the police, . . . [and] is unable to know how to protect
his own interests or how to get the benefits of his
constitutional rights"). Thus, we begin our analysis of the
present case noting that neither counsel nor a parent or other
independent person was present with Brown during the
interrogation, and we look for evidence in the record showing
that the police "took care to ensure that [Brown] understood his
rights." Fare, 442 U.S. at 726.
As made clear by the videotape of the interrogation, which
was reviewed by the trial court, Detective Foster not only failed
to ensure that Brown understood his rights, he did not ascertain
whether Brown, to the extent he was aware that he had
constitutional rights during the interrogation, wished to waive
those rights. First, Detective Foster began the presentation of
Brown's Miranda rights by admonishing him, "[L]isten to me while
I read you these rights. Don't make any comment to me, don't get
mad, don't get abrupt, just listen and then I'll tell you and
then you can tell your side of the story."
Next, he rapidly and without pause read Brown a Miranda
form. He offered neither explanation of the rights nor an
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invitation to seek an explanation. Detective Foster's manner in
reading the Miranda rights to Brown served to confirm that Brown
was to remain silent while his rights were read and that
interruptions for clarification would not be tolerated.
Immediately upon reading the last Miranda right printed on
the form from which he was reading, Detective Foster said, "You
understand these rights?" Brown quickly nodded in the
affirmative, and Detective Foster continued, saying, at the same
rapid pace, "Understanding these rights and if you wish to waive
them and make a statement to me you can if you wish." Then he
handed Brown the form and told him, "[S]ign your name here that I
read you your rights and that you understand them." Brown
followed the directive, which effectively foreclosed his reading
the form.
Detective Foster never pointed out that Brown's signature on
the form was an indication that he chose to give up his rights. 3
Nor did Foster ask Brown orally whether he chose to give up his
rights. The entire procedure from the time Foster began giving
Brown his Miranda rights to the time Brown signed the form took
less than one minute.
In short, Detective Foster did not ensure that Brown
understood that he had a right to remain silent and a right to
have an attorney present and that he wished to give up either or
both of those rights. In fact, Foster testified that he did not
know if Brown understood the meaning of the term "waiver," which
3
In fact, Detective Foster did not read the portion of the
form that stated, "I understand these rights and wish to waive
them and make a statement."
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was the only term used to suggest to Brown that he was giving up
his rights.
Evidence apart from the videotaped interrogation also
demonstrates that Brown was of low intellectual function, a fact
that supports the trial court's conclusion that he did not
understand his rights or the consequences of waiving them. 4 The
record shows that the police knew Brown was only fifteen years
old with only an eighth grade education; they failed to ascertain
his intellectual capacity and functioning, however. A
psychological report prepared to assess Brown's educational needs
listed his verbal IQ at 60, his verbal comprehension at 59, and
his full scale IQ at 65. These scores placed his overall
intellectual functioning within the range of "significant mental
deficiency." Indeed, the tests indicated that Brown was
5
"struggling with basic phonetic skills, including vowel sound
and consonant blends. In short, his ability to "decode words"
was significantly impaired. These language limitations,
considered together with, and in the context of, the manner in
which the Miranda rights were presented, including Detective
4
The Commonwealth contends the trial court incorrectly
stated that it was not able to conclusively find that Brown
could read. However, the record indicates that Brown's reading
and writing skills were in the bottom one percent of children
his age. Accordingly, the trial court's doubt as to whether
Brown could read or write is not unfounded. Furthermore, since
the record establishes that Brown was not given an opportunity
to read the waiver form and that he did not read it, the point
is moot.
5
Webster's defined "phonetic" as "of or relating to spoken
language or speech sounds." Webster's Third International
Dictionary 1700 (1993).
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Foster's failure to determine whether Brown wished to give up his
rights, compel us to conclude the trial judge's ruling that he
was not persuaded that Brown understood his rights, and that
Brown's waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent, is fully
supported by the record.
The Commonwealth cites Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177,
184, 427 S.E.2d 379, 385 (1993), vacated on other grounds, Wright
v. Virginia, 512 U.S. 1217 (1994), and Correll, 232 Va. at 464,
352 S.E.2d at 357-58, to support its proposition that a juvenile
6
of limited intelligence is capable of executing a valid waiver.
In each of these cases, however, the facts supported the trial
court's finding that the juvenile understood his rights and the
consequences of waiving them. Because Brown's situation differs
substantially from the defendants in Wright and Correll, they are
not persuasive.
In Wright, for example, the Virginia Supreme Court noted
that Wright had experienced a number of prior arrests, his
psychologist testified that his test scores did not accurately
reflect his "street smarts," and Wright stated specifically that
he understood his rights. Id. Likewise, the Court in Correll
held that the defendant understood his Miranda rights and
intelligently waived them because he "had on a number of prior
6
The Commonwealth also argues that our decision in Novak v.
Commonwealth supports its position that Brown intelligently
waived his rights. 20 Va. App. 373, 386-87, 457 S.E.2d 402,
408-09 (1995). However, the defendant in Novak was not of
limited intelligence. Rather, the trial court found that Novak
was "highly intelligent," and had "a full understanding of the
interview process and what was being said and why he was there."
20 Va. App. at 387, 457 S.E.2d at 409. Consequently, Novak does
not support a conclusion that the trial court's finding that was
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occasions dealt with the police and received Miranda warnings,"
and had received them several times in connection with the
conviction before the Court. 7 232 Va. at 464, 352 S.E.2d at 358.
Nothing in the record suggests Brown had significant
experience with the police or exhibited "street smarts."
Likewise, nothing in the record suggests Brown was familiar with
the Miranda warnings or the consequences of waiving them.
Although he had prior criminal charges against him in the
juvenile system, the record does not indicate that he had ever
before been in an interrogation room or received Miranda
warnings.
Finally, we conclude that the waiver was not voluntary.
First, Brown could not voluntarily give up a right the import of
which he did not understand. Second, Brown was interrogated
while in handcuffs, a factor properly considered when determining
the voluntariness of the waiver. Cf. Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 614,
371 S.E.2d at 557 (considering the fact that the juvenile was not
in handcuffs during questioning in determining whether the
interrogation was coercive). Further, the detective's manner in
plainly wrong.
7
Brown was also given his Miranda rights at the time of his
arrest, although he was not interrogated at that time. While
repeated exposures to Miranda rights may weigh in favor of
concluding the defendant knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily waived those rights, see Correll, 232 Va. at 464,
352 S.E.2d at 358, the record fails to show the circumstances
under which the rights were first given to Brown, the manner in
which they were given, the degree of focus Brown manifested when
the rights were read to him, and other relevant factors from
which the trier of fact could weigh and evaluate the
effectiveness of the presentation and consequent understanding
of those rights. In short, we cannot be certain from this
record that Brown understood his rights or the consequences of
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giving Brown his rights, which afforded him no opportunity to
raise questions or concerns, together with the detective's quick,
terse directive to "just listen," and his concluding directive to
"sign here," did little to "dispel the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458. Under the
facts of this case, a presentation of Miranda rights in this
manner can properly be seen as intimidating and coercive.
In conclusion, the evidence, viewed in its totality and in
the light most favorable to Brown, supports the trial court's
finding that Brown's waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's finding and
its suppression of Brown's subsequent statement. Because we
affirm on this ground, we do not address the Commonwealth's
contention that the confession was voluntary and thus improperly
8
suppressed.
Affirmed.
waiving them from these prior advisements.
8
This inquiry "differs from the discrete inquiry of whether
the waiver was voluntary. The former requires a determination
of whether the procedure was fundamentally fair . . . while the
latter requires only a factual inquiry." Harrison v.
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 581, 423 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1992)
(citation omitted); accord Kauffmann v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App.
400, 405, 382 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1989) (assessing the
voluntariness of the confession after determining waiver was
valid).
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