Kenneth Ray Lewis v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Elder, Willis and Senior Judge Cole
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    KENNETH RAY LEWIS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0843-99-2                   JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE
    JULY 25, 2000
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
    Margaret P. Spencer, Judge
    Esther J. Windmueller for appellant.
    Richard B. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney
    General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Kenneth Ray Lewis, appellant, was convicted upon his guilty
    plea of first-degree murder. 1   Appellant contends that the trial
    court erred by allowing a police officer to testify at sentencing
    regarding statements made by another inmate.    For the following
    reasons, we find no error and affirm the conviction.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    1
    The Court notes that the final sentencing order entered by
    the trial court erroneously reflects that the appellant was
    found guilty of "capital murder." Accordingly, this case is
    remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of amending the
    final order to reflect that appellant was found guilty, pursuant
    to his guilty plea, of first degree murder.
    Facts
    Appellant and the victim, Michael Smith, were having a
    cookout on Smith's front porch when appellant began striking Smith
    on the head and neck with a hammer.      Smith's blood splattered on
    the walls.   Appellant dragged Smith's body through the house, and
    tried to put Smith's body into the trunk of Smith's car.      Unable
    to get Smith's body into the trunk, appellant put the body in the
    backseat of the car, drove to Caroline County, and dumped the body
    into the Mattaponi River.    Thereafter, appellant admitted his
    crime to Johnny Wright.   Appellant explained how he threw chicken
    bones and hamburger grease on the blood trail in the house in an
    attempt to get dogs to lick up Smith's blood.     Appellant asked
    whether Wright's wife could dye his hair.     Hair dye was found in
    the car trunk along with cleaning items used to try to clean the
    blood out of the car.   Prior to trial, appellant tried to "take
    out a contract" on Wright, the Commonwealth's main witness against
    him.
    Analysis
    The only issue properly before this Court is the narrow issue
    of whether the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony
    during appellant's sentencing.    Special Agent Carl Fisher
    testified that he interviewed inmate John Wallace about statements
    appellant made to Wallace.   Appellant objected to any testimony
    from Fisher, arguing that
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    if the Commonwealth wants that information
    . . . there's no reason that it could not
    . . . subpoena Mr. Wallace so we could have
    a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine
    the source. . . . [W]hile I understand
    certain hearsay is admissible at sentencing,
    this is one where, in fairness, if the Court
    wants to hear it, it should be able to hear
    it [from Wallace] . . . and we should have
    the opportunity to cross-examine [Wallace].
    The trial court overruled appellant's objection and stated:
    The Court understands that certain hearsay
    evidence is admissible, and the Court will
    take into consideration when it hears the
    evidence, the fact that you will not have
    the opportunity to cross-examine that person
    who made those statements.
    Fisher then testified about his interview of Wallace.
    Wallace told Fisher that appellant admitted to him killing a man
    with a hammer on that man's front porch and that he had thrown
    the body into the river.   Wallace also stated that appellant
    offered him $1,500 to kill Johnny Wright, the Commonwealth's
    main witness against appellant.   Appellant cross-examined
    Fisher.   During allocution, appellant denied offering Wallace
    money to kill the Commonwealth's witness.
    A sentencing hearing is not a trial.   The rules applicable
    in a proceeding to determine a defendant's guilt are not
    necessarily applicable in a sentencing proceeding.   See Moses v.
    Commonwealth, 
    27 Va. App. 293
    , 300, 
    498 S.E.2d 451
    , 455 (1998)
    (right to confrontation a trial right, not a right in sentencing
    proceeding); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 
    18 Va. App. 656
    , 659, 
    446 S.E.2d 469
    , 471 (1994) (en banc) (during sentencing, court may
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    consider defendant's criminal record, including dismissed
    juvenile charges and pending charges, charges for which accused
    has been indicted but not convicted, offenses for which
    defendant has been convicted but not sentenced, convictions on
    appeal, and evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity).    In
    holding that a judge could use a presentence report containing
    hearsay and evidence of unadjudicated crimes without offending
    the due process guarantee, the Supreme Court noted that "most of
    the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the
    intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if
    information were restricted to that given in open court by
    witnesses subject to cross-examination."     See Williams v. New
    York, 
    337 U.S. 241
    , 250 (1949).
    "In the sentencing phase of a case, the trial court may
    rely upon hearsay testimony."     Alger v. Commonwealth, 
    19 Va. App. 252
    , 258, 
    450 S.E.2d 765
    , 768 (1994).    "The information
    relied upon by the court must, however, have some indicia of
    reliability."   
    Id.
    At the arraignment held on December 18, 1998, appellant
    pled guilty to the first degree murder of Michael Anthony Smith
    and admitted to the trial judge he understood this guilty plea
    lost him his right to confront and examine the Commonwealth's
    witnesses.
    As a factual basis for the plea, the Commonwealth's
    attorney set forth in great detail the Commonwealth's evidence
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    to support the charge of murder.    Special Agent Fisher and
    several Richmond police officers had interviewed Johnny Wright.
    Wright advised the officers that appellant, a friend, had
    admitted to him in a conversation he had with him in the late
    evening hours of August 23, 1998, that he had struck Smith with
    a hammer several times and dragged him into the house, where he
    struck him several more times.    Appellant further admitted to
    Wright that he had placed the victim in the backseat of his car,
    driven it to Caroline County, and dumped the body into the
    Mattaponi River.
    The Commonwealth's attorney further represented to the
    court another piece of evidence that appellant, while
    incarcerated, was housed with an inmate named John Wallace.      If
    called as a witness, Wallace would testify to "the exact same
    story that Mr. Lewis relayed to him [Wallace] in jail."    Wallace
    also would testify that appellant asked him "when he got out of
    jail, would [he] find [Wright] and do harm to him, if he were to
    testify."
    The trial judge asked appellant if the facts as stated by
    the Commonwealth's attorney "were they a fair statement of the
    facts in the case."    Appellant personally responded that they
    were.
    Almost four months later during sentencing, this same
    information was elicited from Special Agent Fisher.    Appellant
    clearly knew about this evidence prior to his sentencing
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    hearing, cross-examined Fisher about this evidence, and denied
    the accuracy of the evidence during allocution.   Appellant's
    agreement that the Commonwealth's evidence would prove these
    facts gives the evidence the necessary "indicia of reliability."
    The trial court properly admitted Fisher's hearsay
    testimony during appellant's sentencing proceeding.   For these
    reasons, we find no error in appellant's conviction, and
    accordingly affirm.
    Affirmed.
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