Ronnie Matthew Cousins v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Beales and Senior Judge Clements
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
RONNIE MATTHEW COUSINS
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 2322-13-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
SEPTEMBER 30, 2014
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Steven C. McCallum, Judge
David S. Clements (Gordon, Dodson, Gordon & Rowlett, on briefs),
for appellant.
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Ronnie Matthew Cousins appeals his convictions for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in
violation of Code § 18.2-102, hit and run in violation of Code § 46.2-894, driving under the
influence in violation of Code § 18.2-266, and driving with a suspended license in violation of Code
§ 46.2-301. Cousins argues the trial court erred in determining that he was the operator of the car,
that he had knowledge an individual was injured, and that he used a car without the owner’s
consent. Cousins also argues the evidence was insufficient to support the driving under the
influence conviction because his behavior rebutted the presumption he was under the influence
based upon his blood alcohol content. Finding no error, we affirm.
As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case, and because this
memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of this
appeal.
BACKGROUND
“On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth,
26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App.
438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)).
So viewed, the evidence proved that on July 16, 2012, Sergeant Justin Aronson
responded to the intersection of Pocoshock Boulevard and Elkhardt Road where he saw a
woman, later identified as Tenisha Towns, sitting or standing twenty to thirty feet from a heavily
damaged guardrail. Aronson did not see a vehicle in the area. While speaking with Towns,
Aronson heard Towns’ cell phone “continuously” ring. Aronson attempted to speak to the caller,
but received no response and Towns gave Aronson a telephone number. After Towns was
transported by ambulance to a hospital, Aronson began to check the area for vehicles with
damage. Approximately one-quarter of a mile from the intersection where Aronson encountered
Towns, he saw a car with heavy front end damage stopped on a slight embankment.
Aronson and other officers searched the area for possible additional injured individuals,
and officers detained Cousins about three-quarters of a mile from where Aronson encountered
Towns. While speaking to Cousins, Aronson asked his dispatcher to call the number Towns had
given him and a cell phone in Cousins’ pocket rang.
After reading Cousins his rights protected by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
Aronson asked Cousins about the crash and why he ran from the scene. Cousins stated he ran
because he was scared and the accident had occurred approximately thirty to forty minutes
earlier. Cousins stated “his girl,” later identified as Crystal Sprouv, owned the car. Cousins
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stated that Sprouv was not aware that he had the car and he took the car without her knowledge
and permission. Aronson charged Cousins with unauthorized use of Sprouv’s car. Aronson
noticed an odor of alcohol and, based upon field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test,
Aronson charged Cousins with driving under the influence. A breath test showed a blood
alcohol content of .08. Cousins also admitted to Aronson that his license was suspended.
Tyron Green, Cousins’ friend, testified he was the driver of the car and Cousins, along
with a woman, were passengers. According to Green, he took the keys to the car without
Sprouv’s permission and Cousins did not drive because he had been drinking. When asked to
describe the accident, Green testified a car swerved into his lane which caused him to “ben[d]”
the steering wheel and strike the guardrail. Green testified he drove through the intersection,
“put the car in a ditch,” and fled the scene, leaving Cousins and the woman at the scene. Later,
Green testified he moved the car from where he hit the guardrail so that it was not blocking the
road, which contradicted his earlier testimony that he drove the car through the intersection
before placing it in the ditch. Green admitted he never notified the police that Cousins had been
arrested “falsely” and he first came forward at Cousins’ trial.
In rebuttal, Aronson testified Cousins never mentioned a third individual as being in the
car and, based upon conversations with Towns and Sprouv, he did not look for a third individual.
Neither Towns nor Sprouv testified at Cousins’ trial.
In finding that Cousins was the operator of a car, the trial judge, sitting as fact finder,
stated:
Here, much as I said before, I think the circumstantial
evidence of operation is very overwhelming.
That is, when the officer makes contact and speaks with
him and asks questions like, why did you leave the scene? When
did the accident occur? Have you had anything to drink since the
accident?
I think my common sense tells me that if someone were not
the operator of a motor vehicle, the first thing he’d say, the last
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thing he’d say, the thing he’d say five or ten times in between, is I
wasn’t driving. That’s what any person would say, if indeed they
were not the driver. There was never any denial in this evidence
produced by Officer Aronson that Mr. Cousins was not the
operator.
Turning to Mr. Green. Candidly, I don’t find him to be a
credible witness. There are many issues that impact his credibility.
He has certainly been a friend of some years to Mr.
Cousins. He certainly has admitted bias in that respect. Also, it is
fairly inexplicable why he would not speak up at the time of the
trial below, why he comes here today, but additionally, his
evidence today is inconsistent in several respects.
As I understood it, I think I finally understood it. Mr.
Green was saying that after he hit the guardrail, he left the car in
the ditch, by which he meant that he moved the car out of the
travel portion of the road at Pocoshock, whatever Pocoshock
turned into.
He got off the road and put it in the ditch. His testimony
was that was very, very near to where he hit the guardrail. That’s
what he said.
In point of fact, the sergeant said it was about a quarter of a
mile between the damage to the guardrail and where the vehicle
was found.
That’s just one of several inconsistencies, respectfully, that
cause me to attach little credence to Mr. Green’s testimony.
ANALYSIS
Cousins argues since he never admitted to Aronson that he was the operator of the car,
the trial court erred in finding that he should have denied being the operator when Aronson
questioned him because he was not required to discuss his actions with an arresting officer.
Cousins also argues the trial judge arbitrarily rejected Green’s testimony that Green was the
operator of the car.1
“Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct
evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except
that of guilt.” Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983).
“Circumstantial evidence is not viewed in isolation.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505,
1
Whether Cousins was the operator of the car is common to all four convictions.
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514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003). “Whether a hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a
question of fact.” Patrick v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 655, 662, 500 S.E.2d 839, 843 (1998).
“The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely
for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.”
Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995).
“The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a
jury verdict, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.” Beck v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 170, 172, 342 S.E.2d 642, 643 (1986).
The trial judge heard the testimony of the witnesses and observed their demeanor. The trial
judge reviewed Green’s testimony and noted the inconsistencies in Green’s testimony and his
failure to notify the authorities earlier when Cousins, his friend, was charged. After reviewing all
the evidence, the trial judge determined that Green’s testimony was not credible and that Cousins’
hypothesis of innocence that Green was the driver was not reasonable. Aronson saw Towns on the
side of the road alone and near a damaged guardrail. A damaged car was approximately one-quarter
of a mile away from Towns. While Aronson spoke to Towns, her cell phone rang several times and
Aronson eventually obtained the number of the phone that was calling Towns. Officers found
Cousins approximately three-quarters of a mile from where Aronson saw Towns, and Cousins
stated the accident occurred approximately thirty to forty minutes earlier. Although there was no
evidence Cousins admitted he was the operator of the car, when Aronson called the number he
obtained while with Towns, Cousins’ cell phone rang. Cousins also admitted he ran from the scene
because he was scared.
Based upon a review of the record, there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial judge’s
credibility determination regarding Green and whether Cousins’ hypothesis of innocence was
reasonable. Cousins’ proximity to the scene, his admissions to Aronson, Cousins’ failure to
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mention that a third individual was in the car, and Cousins’ cell phone ringing after the dispatcher
called the number of the individual trying to reach Towns were sufficient circumstances proving
Cousins was the operator of the car.
Cousins argues the evidence was insufficient to prove he operated the car without Sprouv’s
authorization. Cousins argues since Sprouv did not testify, it can be inferred that her testimony was
adverse to the Commonwealth.
“Under Code § 18.2-102, a conviction of unauthorized use of a vehicle requires proof of use
without the consent of the owner with intent to deprive the owner of possession temporarily, but
without intent to steal.” Overstreet v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 234, 236, 435 S.E.2d 906, 907
(1993).
Although Sprouv did not testify at Cousins’ trial, the prosecutor stated during the motion to
strike that she was not calling Sprouv as a witness because her testimony would be different from
what she initially told the authorities. Under the facts and circumstances, in the record here, the
Commonwealth’s decision not to call Sprouv does not affect the evidentiary basis for the
factfinder’s conclusion that Cousins committed unauthorized use of a vehicle under Code
§ 18.2-102. Cousins admitted to Aronson that Sprouv had not given him permission to use her car
and she had no knowledge that he had her car. Cousins’ admissions were sufficient to prove
Cousins used Sprouv’s car without her consent.
Cousins argues the Commonwealth failed to prove the nature or type of injury to Towns to
support the conviction of felony hit and run and that he had knowledge an individual was injured.2
2
Code § 46.2-894 provides in part:
Any person convicted of a violation of this section is guilty of (i) a
Class 5 felony if the accident results in injury to or the death of any
person, or if the accident results in more than $1000 of damage to
property or (ii) a Class 1 misdemeanor if the accident results in
damage of $1000 or less to property.
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“The Court of Appeals will not consider an argument on appeal which was not presented
to the trial court.” Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998).
See Rule 5A:18.
At the motion to strike at the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, defense counsel
stated, “I’m not questioning that there was an accident. We know there was an accident. A lady
was injured. Someone was injured and transported to the hospital.” At the conclusion of all the
evidence, defense counsel renewed his motion to strike and presented further argument, but he
never argued the Commonwealth failed to prove the nature or type of injury to Towns or that he had
knowledge an individual was injured. Accordingly, Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of this
argument on appeal. Moreover, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the good cause
or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18.
Cousins argues he rebutted the presumption of driving under the influence created by his .08
blood alcohol breath test because he passed one of the field sobriety tests, his speech was not
slurred, he did not stumble, he was aware of the time and location, and his behavior was not erratic.
During argument at the conclusion of the evidence, defense counsel stated, “Cousins was under the
influence.” Cousins failed to present the argument to the trial court that he raises on appeal, and
Rule 5A:18 bars consideration of it on appeal. Moreover, the record does not reflect any reason to
invoke the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial judge’s decision
that Cousins was the operator of the car and the evidence was sufficient to prove he used Sprouv’s
car without her consent. The Commonwealth’s evidence was competent, was not inherently
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incredible, and was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of
unauthorized use, hit and run, driving under the influence, and driving with a suspended license.
Affirmed.
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