May Dept. Store Co v. CW, DEQ, etc ( 2002 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Bray and Annunziata
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    MAY DEPARTMENT STORES COMPANY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 3356-01-2              JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
    AUGUST 6, 2002
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
    DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
    AND THOMAS L. HOPKINS (NOW
    ROBERT G. BURNLEY), DIRECTOR
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
    George F. Tidey, Judge
    John S. Hahn (Julie Anna Potts; William C.
    Wood; Michael Ewing; Mayer, Brown, Rowe &
    Maw; Rawlings & Wood, on briefs), for
    appellant.
    (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Roger L.
    Chaffe, Senior Assistant Attorney General;
    John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney
    General, on brief), for appellee.
    May Department Stores Company ("May") appeals the judgment of
    the trial court affirming a Department of Environmental Quality
    ("DEQ") denial of reimbursement for soil removal undertaken as a
    result of a petroleum release.   May contends that the trial court
    erred in affirming the decision because (1) DEQ relied on post hoc
    rationales on appeal, and (2) DEQ's decision was arbitrary and
    capricious and not supported by substantial evidence.   For the
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and
    order the case remanded to DEQ for further consideration.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    On March 30 and April 5, 1993, May reported to DEQ the
    discovery of petroleum releases at the Hecht's Distribution
    Center in Henrico County, where May's contractors were removing
    underground storage tanks.       Two tanks had been removed and were
    intact.    However, the surrounding soil was visibly contaminated,
    apparently from the release of fuel oil.
    By letter dated April 2, 1993, DEQ directed May to submit
    an initial abatement measure report ("IAR") and a site
    characterization report ("SCR").      The letter explained that
    DEQ's review of the SCR would determine whether "further actions
    and/or a Corrective Action Plan" would be required.      On April 5,
    1993, May's contractor sought guidance from DEQ as to the extent
    of the necessary cleanup.    Without receiving a directive or site
    visit by DEQ, May's contractor began removing visibly
    contaminated soil for offsite disposal.
    On April 21, 1993, in a teleconference with May's
    consultant, DEQ directed May to remove visibly contaminated
    soil.    This directive was unqualified as to volume or scope, and
    made no reference to the water table.      May's IAR and SCR
    documented the removal of visibly contaminated soils.
    Photographs of the site excavation confirmed such.      In response
    to May's IAR and SCR, DEQ approved closure of the site, noting,
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    "this investigation is considered closed" and that "corrective
    action is not required."   Thus, May's efforts satisfied all
    cleanup requirements and no Corrective Action Plan was required.
    May applied for reimbursement from the Virginia Petroleum
    Storage Tank Fund ("Tank Fund") of approximately $600,000 in
    costs expended on the site cleanup.     See Code § 62.1-44.34:11; 9
    VAC 25-590-210.   DEQ authorized reimbursement of $76,706.30 and
    denied reimbursement of $525,592.30.    Its reasons for the denial
    included:   (1) May's incorrect application of DEQ's "usual and
    customary rates"; (2) DEQ's need for additional documentation
    for certain costs; and (3) May's failure to justify the
    necessity of certain actions.
    May sought reconsideration.   It reduced its claim to comply
    with DEQ's uniform customary rates and sought reimbursement of
    $420,979.63 of the $525,592.30 denied in the initial decision.
    A reconsideration panel awarded May reimbursement of an
    additional $61,891.04.   The panel based its denial of further
    reimbursement on May's failure to obtain written approval for
    soil removal before April 21, 1993, and on May's excavation
    below the water table, which DEQ asserted was at 5.5 feet below
    grade.   The reconsideration panel gave May credit for
    considering as sufficient the oral authorization that it
    received in the April 21, 1993 teleconference, and it allowed
    May reimbursement, in part, for the cost of excavation pursuant
    to that oral authorization.
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    The reconsideration panel determined that May had excavated
    3,374 tons of soil prior to the April 21, 1993 authorization.
    Holding that excavation to be unauthorized, it denied
    reimbursement for its cost.   It found that pursuant to the April
    21, 1993 authorization, May excavated an additional 1,675 tons
    of soil, but that this included excavating to a depth of 13.5
    feet, whereas the water table was encountered at 5.5 feet below
    grade.   It disallowed reimbursement for the cost of excavation
    below the water table.   It found that May had excavated 683 tons
    of soil, pursuant to authorization, down to the 5.5 foot water
    table level.   It allowed reimbursement for that amount of
    excavation.
    The trial court affirmed DEQ's reconsideration panel
    decision.
    II.    ANALYSIS
    Separate standards of review determine the degree of
    deference, if any, to be given on appeal to an administrative
    agency's decision.    Holtzman Oil Corp. v. Commonwealth, 
    32 Va. App. 532
    , 539, 
    529 S.E.2d 333
    , 337 (2000).
    Where the issue is whether there is
    substantial evidence to support findings of
    fact, great deference is to be accorded the
    agency decision. Where the issue falls
    outside the specialized competence of the
    agency, such as constitutional and statutory
    interpretation issues, little deference is
    required to be accorded the agency decision.
    Where, however, the issue concerns an agency
    decision based on the proper application of
    its expert discretion, the reviewing court
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    will not substitute its own independent
    judgment for that of the agency but rather
    will reverse the agency decision only if
    that decision was arbitrary and capricious.
    Finally, in reviewing an agency decision,
    the courts are required to consider the
    experience and specialized competence of the
    agency and the purposes of the basic law
    under which the agency acted.
    Id. (quoting Johnston-Willis Ltd. v. Kenley, 
    6 Va. App. 231
    ,
    246, 
    369 S.E.2d 1
    , 9 (1988)).     Agency decisions must be in
    writing and become part of the record.      See Code §§ 2.2-4020
    and -4023.
    When the decision on review is to be made on
    the agency record, the duty of the court
    with respect to issues of fact shall be
    limited to ascertaining whether there was
    substantial evidence in the agency record
    upon which the agency . . . could reasonably
    find them to be as it did.
    Code § 2.2-4027.
    A.   POST HOC RATIONALE
    May first argues that the trial court erroneously
    considered, as grounds for affirmance, reasons not underlying
    DEQ's decision.    "Under well-established principles of
    administrative law, the Court may not accept counsel's post hoc
    rationalizations for agency action.      Rather, the Court must
    determine the validity of agency rules solely on the basis
    articulated by the agency itself in the administrative record
    made in connection with the rulemaking."      Jordan v. Lyng, 
    659 F. Supp. 1403
    , 1416 (E.D. Va. 1987).
    - 5 -
    The DEQ reconsideration panel based its denials of
    reimbursement on two holdings:    First, that its regulation
    VR 680-13-02 authorized soil removal only upon written
    pre-approval by DEQ and non-compliant soil removal was not
    reimbursable; and second, that excavation below the ground water
    table was not standard practice and was not reimbursable.
    DEQ argued before the trial court that May's excavation
    prior to April 21, 1993, was neither an "initial response,"
    VR 680-13-02 § 6.2, 1 nor an "initial abatement," VR 680-13-02
    § 6.3. 2   It argued that the excavation for which reimbursement
    was sought was a "corrective action plan," VR 680-13-02 § 6.6, 3
    which required prior written authorization by DEQ.    It argued
    further that excavation below the ground water table contravened
    standard industry practice and prudent cleanup management and
    thus was ineligible for reimbursement.
    We hold that the position taken by DEQ before the trial
    court was in support of its reconsideration panel's
    determination and lay along the same lines.    Thus, that position
    was not a post hoc rationale.
    1
    Recodified as 9 VAC 25-580-240.
    2
    Recodified as VAC 25-580-250.
    3
    Recodified as VAC 25-580-280.
    - 6 -
    B.    MERITS OF THE DEQ DETERMINATION
    1.     REQUIREMENT OF WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
    The Tank Fund, Code § 62.1-44.34:11, provides reimbursement
    for "reasonable and necessary costs incurred by 'owners and
    operators' of underground petroleum storage tanks 'in taking
    corrective action for any release of petroleum into the
    environment . . . .'"      Holtzman, 32 Va. App. at 540, 529 S.E.2d
    at 337 (quoting Code § 62.1-44.34:11(A)(2)(a)).        The Tank Fund
    provides reimbursement for three types of corrective action:
    (1) initial response pursuant to VR 680-13-02 § 6.2, (2) initial
    abatement pursuant to VR 680-13-02 § 6.3, and (3) activity
    pursuant to an approved corrective action plan pursuant to VR
    680-13-02 § 6.6.      Id. at 541, 529 S.E.2d at 338.
    VR 680-13-02 § 6.2 "initial response" requires an owner or
    operator, upon discovering a petroleum release, (1) to report
    the release, (2) to take immediate action to prevent further
    release into the environment, and (3) to identify and mitigate
    fire, explosion and vapor hazards.        "The DEQ has interpreted VR
    680-13-02 § 6.2 to include those activities involving 'hazards'
    to 'human health, safety, and the environment,' which 'must be
    initiated immediately.'"      Holtzman, 32 Va. App. at 541, 529
    S.E.2d at 338.
    May reported discovering the release.        No other
    circumstances contemplated by VR 680-13-02 § 6.2 obtained, and
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    May performed no activity pursuant to VR 680-13.02 § 6.2 for
    which it sought reimbursement.
    On June 8, 1993, May submitted to DEQ a report, which
    stated:
    No vapors or free product were observed in
    the site storm sewers or basements of the
    site buildings. Sanitary sewers were not
    observed in the vicinity of the UST
    [underground storage tank] areas. Ambient
    air was monitored in the UST removal work
    areas using an HNu PID [photo-ionization
    detector]. There was no instrument response
    during ambient air monitoring.
    This site characterization report stated that the petroleum
    remaining in the soils was "immobile and not volatile."     With no
    fire, explosion, or vapor hazard present, May's actions were not
    performed as an initial response activity pursuant to VR
    680-13-02 § 6.2.   See Holtzman, 32 Va. App. at 542, 529 S.E.2d
    at 338.
    A corrective action plan developed under VR 680-13-02 § 6.6
    is a detailed strategy for responding to contaminated soil and
    ground water.   It is designed to provide direction, with agency
    specifications, in the cleanup process and to ensure the
    protection of human health, safety, and the environment.    A
    corrective action plan must be approved by DEQ.   See
    VR 680-13-02 § 6.6.   May submitted no corrective action report,
    and DEQ approved no corrective action plan.   Thus, May's
    activities were not pursuant to VR 680-13-02 § 6.6 and do not
    qualify for reimbursement under that section.
    - 8 -
    Because May's actions fell within the ambit of neither
    Section 6.2 nor Section 6.6, the issue is whether its actions
    constituted initial abatement pursuant to Section 6.3.
    Under Section 6.3, owners and operators, unless otherwise
    directed, must, among other things:
    (1) remove as much of the regulated
    substance from the [excavated] system as is
    necessary to prevent further release to the
    environment;
    (2) visually inspect any above ground
    releases or exposed below ground releases
    and prevent further migration of the
    released substance into surrounding soils
    and ground water;
    (3) [not applicable;]
    (4) remedy hazards posed by contaminated
    soils that are excavated or exposed as a
    result of release confirmation, site
    investigation, abatement, or corrective
    action activities;
    (5) [not applicable;]
    (6) investigate to determine the possible
    presence of free product, and begin free
    product removal as soon as practicable and
    in accordance with 9 VAC 25-580-270
    [relating to the matter of handling and
    disposing of free petroleum product].
    VR 680-13-02 § 6.3 (emphasis added).    The measures required of
    owners and operators under VR 680-13-02 § 6.3 are not
    conditioned upon prior written authorization and must be
    accomplished absent contrary direction by DEQ.
    The excavations performed by May fell within its
    obligations under VR 680-13-02 § 6.3.   May promptly reported its
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    discovery of the petroleum leakage and undertook diligently and
    efficiently to perform and satisfy its obligations under the
    regulation.   It removed the escaped regulated substance and
    contaminated soil and water.    It forestalled further migration
    of the regulated substance.    DEQ never directed it to do
    otherwise.    Indeed, on April 21, 1993, DEQ directed May to
    continue the operation in progress.      DEQ misconstrued its
    regulation when it held that VR 680-13-02 § 6.3 required prior
    written authorization for May's activity.     Furthermore, it makes
    no sense to approve and permit reimbursement for excavation
    subsequent to the April 21, 1993 telephone conference while
    denying reimbursement for identical and equally necessary
    excavation prior to that date.    Thus, we hold that DEQ committed
    an error of law in misconstruing its regulation and that the
    trial court erred in affirming that error.
    2.   EXCAVATION BELOW THE WATER TABLE
    DEQ justified its denial of reimbursement upon a finding
    that May had excavated below the water table level, which it
    stated was located at 5.5 feet below grade.     No evidence
    supports this finding.    DEQ attributed its ascertainment of the
    water table depth to May's site characterization report.
    However, that report did not identify the water table level.
    Rather, it referred to "[a]n apparent perched ground water at
    the site occurs at a depth between approximately 5.5 and 9.0
    feet as measured in ground water monitoring wells . . . ."
    - 10 -
    Perched water is a containment or pooling of water not connected
    to the water table.   Thus, DEQ's determination that May
    excavated below the water table level is unsupported by
    evidence, and the trial court erred in affirming that finding.
    We reverse the judgment of the trial court and direct that
    the case be remanded to DEQ for determination whether May's
    excavation and cleanup efforts accorded with the requirements of
    VR 680-13-02 § 6.3 and whether May is entitled to reimbursement
    for its attendant expenses.
    Reversed and remanded.
    - 11 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3356012

Filed Date: 8/6/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021