Trellis Cafe Restaurant v. Jean B Dano ( 2003 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Benton, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton
    TRELLIS CAFÉ RESTAURANT AND GRILL
    AND MERCHANTS OF VIRGINIA GROUP
    SELF-INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.   Record No. 0499-03-1                         PER CURIAM
    JULY 1, 2003
    JEAN B. DANO
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Arthur T. Aylward; Thomas C. Bunting;
    Midkiff, Muncie & Ross, P.C., on briefs), for
    appellants.
    (Stephen F. Forbes; Mark C. Grohler;
    Forbes & Broadwell, on brief), for appellee.
    Trellis Café Restaurant and Grill and its insurer contend
    the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that
    (1) Jean B. Dano sustained a low back injury as a result of her
    November 13, 1998 compensable injury by accident; (2) Dano
    proved that she developed Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome/Reflex
    Sympathetic Dystrophy (CRPS/RSD) as a result of her injury by
    accident; (3) Dr. Mark Newman's opinions were credible;
    (4) Dano's fall on January 14, 2001 was caused, in part, by her
    compensable knee injury; and (5) Dano's January 14, 2001 fall
    was causally related under the "two causes rule" to her
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    compensable knee injury.   Upon reviewing the record and the
    parties' briefs, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
    Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision.
    Rule 5A:27.
    I.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.    R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).
    Furthermore, we will uphold on appeal the commission's factual
    findings if they are supported by credible evidence.    See James
    v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 
    8 Va. App. 512
    , 515, 
    382 S.E.2d 487
    , 488 (1989).   "Questions raised by conflicting medical
    opinions must be decided by the commission."    Penley v. Island
    Creek Coal Co., 
    8 Va. App. 310
    , 318, 
    381 S.E.2d 231
    , 236 (1989).
    Low Back Injury
    The commission affirmed the deputy commissioner's finding
    that Dano's claim associated with her low back injury was barred
    by the statute of limitations.   Dano did not appeal that ruling.
    Thus, the issue whether the commission erred when it found that
    Dano sustained a low back injury at the time of her compensable
    November 13, 1998 injury by accident is moot.   We, therefore,
    will not address it on appeal.
    CRPS/RSD
    In ruling that Dano proved that she developed CRPS/RSD as a
    result of her compensable November 13, 1998 injury by accident,
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    the commission gave greater weight to the opinions of Dr. Mark
    Newman and Dr. Jeffrey D. Moore, the treating physicians.   In so
    ruling, the commission made the following findings:
    [Dano] suffered from a significant
    work-related injury to her left knee
    necessitating two surgeries. While we
    recognize that the pain in [Dano's] left
    knee improved throughout 1999 to the point
    that Dr. Newman believed she could return to
    work with certain limited restrictions, we
    also note that [Dano] continued to complain
    of pain in her left knee from the time of
    her industrial accident until immediately
    before her fall on January 14, 2001. In the
    opinion of Dr. Newman, [Dano] developed
    CRPS/RSD as a direct result of her
    work-related injury and that her CRPS/RSD
    caused her continued pain after her two
    surgeries in 1999.
    Dr. Newman's opinion is supported by
    the conclusion of Dr. Moore, another of
    [Dano's] treating physicians, who thought
    [Dano] was "dealing with a RSD process" when
    he referred her to Dr. Newman. Dr. Gibson,
    an orthopedist, also examined [Dano] on
    October 5, 1999, and concluded that [she]
    "probably" suffered from RSD.
    In contrast, Dr. Ross, who examined
    [Dano] on behalf of the employer on October
    13, 1999, questioned [Dano's] diagnosis of
    CRPS/RSD. However, Dr. Ross acknowledged
    that there was a temperature differential
    between [Dano's] two limbs -- a symptom of
    CRPS/RSD. Dr. Ross also did not completely
    rule out the possibility that [Dano]
    suffered from CRPS/RSD when he noted that
    her positive reaction to a lumbar
    sympathetic block "would support the
    diagnosis of [RSD/CRPS]."
    The only doctor who has definitely
    opined that [Dano] did not develop CRPS/RSD
    as a result of her injury on November 13,
    1998, is Dr. Broder. Dr. Broder never
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    examined [Dano]. He merely examined [her]
    medical records and his review of those
    records appears to have been selective and
    somewhat flawed. Moreover, while Dr.
    Newman's expertise is the field of pain
    management and thereby implies a certain
    degree of experience in diagnosing CRPS/RSD,
    Dr. Broder's area of expertise is unclear
    from the record.
    We also reject the employer's attempt
    to discredit Dr. Newman's diagnosis of
    CRPS/RSD based upon [Dano's] alleged failure
    to advise Dr. Newman of her assault of 1999.
    Dr. Newman never testified that [Dano] did
    not, in fact, advise him of this incident.
    Instead, he testified that he did "not
    recall" if she did. Regardless,
    Dr. Newman's letter dated October 25, 1999,
    to Dr. Moore reflects that [Dano] did tell
    Dr. Newman about her assault soon after it
    occurred.
    "Medical evidence is not necessarily conclusive, but is
    subject to the commission's consideration and weighing."
    Hungerford Mechanical Corp. v. Hobson, 
    11 Va. App. 675
    , 677, 
    401 S.E.2d 213
    , 215 (1991).   In its role as fact finder, the
    commission was entitled to weigh the medical evidence.   It did
    so and accepted the opinions of the treating physicians, while
    rejecting the contrary opinions of Dr. Ross and Dr. Broder.
    "The fact that there is contrary evidence in the record is of no
    consequence if there is credible evidence to support the
    commission's finding."    Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 
    12 Va. App. 890
    , 894, 
    407 S.E.2d 32
    , 35 (1991).   The opinions of
    Dr. Newman and Dr. Moore constitute credible evidence to support
    the commission's decision.
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    Dano's January 14, 2001 Fall
    Dano testified that on January 14, 2001, immediately before
    she fell and broke her leg, she "had some twitching in [her]
    left knee, and [she] went to step down, and it didn't hold [her]
    weight, and [she] fell."   As fact finder, the commission
    accepted Dano's testimony regarding the January 14, 2001
    accident as credible.   The commission also concluded that no
    evidence in the record established that Dano ever told anyone
    that she "slipped and fell down while walking on wet stairs at
    home."    It is well settled that credibility determinations are
    within the fact finder's exclusive purview.    Goodyear Tire &
    Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 
    5 Va. App. 374
    , 381, 
    363 S.E.2d 433
    , 437
    (1987).
    Based upon Dano's testimony and the medical evidence, the
    commission ruled that Dano's January 14, 2001 fall was caused,
    in part, by her pre-existing left knee condition.   In so ruling,
    the commission found as follows:
    As late as January 10, 2001, just four days
    before her accident, [Dano] complained of "a
    grinding sensation with either going up or
    down stairs" and "an intermittent sharp,
    stabbing sensation at the inferior medial
    portion of her patella." These complaints
    of pain are consistent with [Dano's] later
    description of her fall.
    We acknowledge that [Dano's] treating
    physician has opined that her fall on
    January 14, 2001, was caused, at least in
    part, by a back spasm. However, he also
    opined that [Dano] probably would have
    fallen due to the condition of her knee even
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    if she had not suffered from back pain
    before she fell. [Dano] testified that she
    fell after she felt a back spasm and after
    she felt a sensation in her left knee. We
    conclude, therefore, that [Dano] fell
    because of two causes, one of which -- her
    back pain -- relates to an injury which is
    barred by the statute of limitations and one
    of which -- the pre-existing condition of
    her left knee -- was a compensable injury.
    The "two-causes rule" provides that a condition which has
    two causes, one related to a work injury, and one not, is
    compensable and the treatment of that condition is the
    employer's responsibility.   See Shelton v. Ennis Bus. Forms,
    Inc., 
    1 Va. App. 53
    , 55, 
    334 S.E.2d 297
    , 299 (1985).     In
    addition, the commission may consider the testimony of a
    claimant in determining causation.     Henrico County School Bd. v.
    Etter, 
    36 Va. App. 437
    , 444, 
    552 S.E.2d 372
    , 375 (2001).
    Contrary to employer's argument, the "more probable than not
    rule" is not applicable to this case because that rule
    "'addresses those cases where only one of a number of possible
    factors caused the disability.'"     
    Id. at 446
    , 
    552 S.E.2d at 376
    (citation omitted).
    Dano's testimony, the medical records substantiating her
    continuing complaints of ongoing knee pain, and Dr. Newman's
    opinion provide credible evidence to support the commission's
    finding that Dano's January 14, 2001 fall was caused, in part,
    by her compensable November 13, 1998 knee injury.    Accordingly,
    that finding is binding and conclusive upon us on appeal.
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    II.
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
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