Tyrone Allen Patterson v. Commonwealth ( 2002 )


Menu:
  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Frank, Felton and Kelsey
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    TYRONE ALLEN PATTERSON
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 3330-01-2                   JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
    DECEMBER 3, 2002
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
    Margaret P. Spencer, Judge
    Craig S. Cooley for appellant.
    Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
    General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
    on brief), for appellee.
    Tyrone Allen Patterson (appellant) was convicted in a bench
    trial of possession of heroin with the intent to distribute, in
    violation of Code § 18.2-248.    On appeal, he challenges the
    sufficiency of the evidence to prove intent to distribute. 1    For
    the reasons stated, we affirm.
    In reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence, we examine the record in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting
    to it all reasonable inferences fairly
    deducible therefrom. See Martin v.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    1
    While appellant further contends the trial court erred in
    qualifying Sergeant Capriglione as an expert witness in drug
    distribution, this Court did not grant an appeal on that issue
    and, therefore, we will not consider it. See Code
    § 17.1-407(D); Rule 5A:15.
    Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    , 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1987). The judgment of a
    trial court will be disturbed only if
    plainly wrong or without evidence to support
    it. See id. The credibility of a witness,
    the weight accorded the testimony, and the
    inferences to be drawn from proved facts are
    matters to be determined by the fact finder.
    See Long v. Commonwealth, 
    8 Va. App. 194
    ,
    199, 
    379 S.E.2d 473
    , 476 (1989).
    Glasco v. Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 763
    , 773, 
    497 S.E.2d 150
    ,
    155 (1998), aff'd on alt. grounds, 
    257 Va. 433
    , 
    513 S.E.2d 137
    (1999).
    Where an offense consists of an act combined
    with a particular intent, proof of the
    intent is essential to the conviction.
    Patterson v. Commonwealth, 
    215 Va. 698
    , 699,
    
    213 S.E.2d 752
    , 753 (1975). Because direct
    proof of intent is often impossible, it must
    be shown by circumstantial evidence. But
    "[w]here . . . the Commonwealth's evidence
    of intent to distribute is wholly
    circumstantial, 'all necessary circumstances
    proved must be consistent with guilt and
    inconsistent with innocence and exclude
    every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.'"
    Wells v. Commonwealth, 
    2 Va. App. 549
    , 551,
    
    347 S.E.2d 139
    , 140 (1986) (quoting Inge v.
    Commonwealth, 
    217 Va. 360
    , 366, 
    228 S.E.2d 563
    , 567 (1976)).
    "The quantity of a controlled substance is a
    factor which may indicate the purpose for
    which it is possessed. Possession of a
    small quantity creates an inference that the
    drug is for personal use." Monroe v.
    Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 154
    , 156, 
    355 S.E.2d 336
    , 337 (1987). Possession of a
    small quantity of a controlled substance,
    however, when considered with other
    circumstances, may be sufficient to
    establish an intent to distribute. Dutton
    v. Commonwealth, 
    220 Va. 762
    , 765, 
    263 S.E.2d 52
    , 54 (1980).
    - 2 -
    Servis v. Commonwealth, 
    6 Va. App. 507
    , 524, 
    371 S.E.2d 156
    , 165
    (1988).
    Other factors to consider include the manner in which the
    drugs are packaged, the presence of a large amount of cash or
    firearms, and the presence of equipment related to drug
    distribution.   See, e.g., Dukes v. Commonwealth, 
    227 Va. 119
    , 123,
    
    313 S.E.2d 382
    , 384 (1984) (considering the manner in which
    marijuana was packaged); Colbert v. Commonwealth, 
    219 Va. 1
    , 3-4,
    
    244 S.E.2d 748
    , 749 (1978) (considering the packaging of the
    recovered marijuana and the discovery of over $200 in cash); Wells
    v. Commonwealth, 
    32 Va. App. 775
    , 782-83, 
    531 S.E.2d 16
    , 19 (2000)
    (considering evidence of drug distribution paraphernalia and of a
    large amount of cash); Clarke v. Commonwealth, 
    32 Va. App. 286
    ,
    305, 
    527 S.E.2d 484
    , 493 (2000) (considering where the drugs were
    found and the presence of a pistol).   Additional factors include a
    defendant's use of drugs, see, e.g., Poindexter v. Commonwealth,
    
    16 Va. App. 730
    , 735, 
    432 S.E.2d 527
    , 530 (1993), and the absence
    of evidence suggesting personal use, see, e.g., Clarke, 32
    Va. App. at 305, 527 S.E.2d at 493.
    Appellant does not challenge the finding that he possessed
    heroin.   Instead, he contends the evidence was insufficient to
    establish he had an intent to distribute the drug.   However,
    consideration of the entirety of the evidence supports the trial
    court's finding of guilt.
    - 3 -
    Detective Breedlove of the Richmond Police Department stopped
    appellant's truck and executed a search warrant on appellant's
    person.   Breedlove recovered a plastic baggy containing 32 plastic
    bag corners, each corner containing heroin, having a total weight
    of 1.89 grams and a street value of $640.   The drugs were found in
    appellant's underwear.
    Immediately thereafter, the police executed a search warrant
    at the residence on Nelson Street which appellant had left
    immediately before his vehicle was stopped.   They recovered $2,148
    in cash (two $50 bills, forty-five $20 bills, seventy-seven $10
    bills, forty-six $5 bills and 148 $1 bills) and a "black digital
    scale," all found in a "back bedroom."   Both the money and scales
    were inside a box in a dresser drawer.   In the same drawer, police
    found financial documents addressed to appellant at the Nelson
    Street residence and mail "addressed to a Terry Pryor for Bunch
    Place."   Officers also located an operating police scanner in the
    bedroom on a nightstand.   Male and female clothing were found in
    the bedroom.
    In a trash can in the kitchen, police found "sandwich baggies
    with the corners that had been cut out of them" and a pair of
    latex gloves.   The gloves appeared to be "medical-type" gloves, as
    opposed to those used for dishwashing.
    Officers did not find any drugs in the residence.   No devices
    used to ingest drugs were found on appellant's person, in his car,
    or in the residence.
    - 4 -
    Sergeant Capriglione, who qualified as an expert witness in
    drug distribution, testified the thirty-two "hits" of heroin were
    inconsistent with personal consumption, which is usually one "hit"
    a day.   On cross-examination, he conceded he could not completely
    exclude the possibility that an addict would have thirty-two
    "hits" for personal use.    However, he testified he has not found
    "many [users] to make large purchases or bulk purchases like
    that."   The expert further explained that the large sum of cash
    and its denominations, the packaging of the heroin, the scales,
    the scanner, and the latex gloves are all involved in illegal drug
    sales.
    Appellant contends 1.89 grams of heroin is not a sufficient
    amount to prove intent.    However, the amount of narcotics found is
    but one factor in distribution cases.   Dutton, 220 Va. at 765, 263
    S.E.2d at 54.   Appellant then attempts to disassociate himself
    from the items found in the residence, arguing that those items
    are attributable to Terry Pryor.   However, the fact finder could
    properly infer that the residence was appellant's, not Pryor's,
    since the mail found in the dresser was addressed to appellant at
    the residence's address.    Even if Pryor had some interest in the
    items, the fact finder could infer appellant jointly possessed
    those items with Pryor.    See Josephs v. Commonwealth, 
    10 Va. App. 87
    , 101-02, 
    390 S.E.2d 491
    , 499 (1990) (en banc).
    - 5 -
    Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find the
    evidence sufficient to convict.   We, therefore, affirm the
    conviction.
    Affirmed.
    - 6 -