Commonwealth of Virginia v. Robert Lee Brown ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Annunziata
Argued by teleconference
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2741-01-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
FEBRUARY 26, 2002
ROBERT LEE BROWN
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
Gary A. Hicks, Judge
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellant.
Christopher A. Bain (Goodwin, Sutton & DuVal,
P.L.C., on brief), for appellee.
Robert Lee Brown (defendant) stands indicted for possession
of cocaine. Pursuant to Code § 19.2-398, the Commonwealth
appeals a pretrial ruling granting defendant's motion to
suppress all evidence resulting from a routine traffic stop
which he contended evolved into an unlawful seizure. The trial
court apparently found that the questioning which led to
defendant's arrest constituted both an unreasonable seizure and
a custodial interrogation for which defendant had not been read
his Miranda rights. Under the particular facts of this case, we
hold that the brief stop supported by probable cause and the
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
limited questioning which led to defendant's admitting he had
illegal drugs in his possession violated neither the Fourth nor
the Fifth Amendment. Thus, we reverse the trial court's ruling
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
BACKGROUND
On March 28, 2001, while on routine patrol on the interstate
in Henrico County, State Trooper D.J. Corbett observed a vehicle
traveling 68 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone. Trooper
Corbett activated his blue lights, and the vehicle pulled to the
shoulder and stopped. Trooper Corbett asked the driver,
defendant, for his license and registration. Because the car was
rented, the rental agreement served as the registration.
Defendant gave Trooper Corbett his license, and while
defendant was retrieving his rental agreement, Trooper Corbett
asked him why he was speeding. Defendant responded that he was
late for court in New York. Trooper Corbett asked defendant why
he was going to court, and defendant replied "that he had a
possession charge." Suspecting defendant might have drugs in
his possession at that time, as well, Trooper Corbett then asked
defendant, "[W]ell, you don't have anything illegal on your
person now, do you?" Defendant said he did, and when Trooper
Corbett asked him what it was, defendant responded that he had
some marijuana. At the time defendant admitted having marijuana
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in his possession, he was still looking for his rental
agreement.
Trooper Corbett then asked defendant "if he minded [Trooper
Corbett's] search[ing] his person." Defendant responded, "No,"
and said "it was in his left front pants pocket." Trooper
Corbett then found a small glass vial containing a powdered
substance which he concluded was cocaine, and he placed defendant
under arrest for possessing cocaine. The arrest occurred five to
ten minutes after Trooper Corbett first activated his blue lights
to effect the traffic stop.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence. In granting the
suppression motion, the trial court concluded that Trooper
Corbett's questions to defendant about "possession" were not
supported by reasonable suspicion and, thus, impermissibly
exceeded the scope of the stop. It also ruled that by pursuing
this alternate investigation, Trooper Corbett turned the
encounter into a custodial interrogation.
II.
ANALYSIS
On appeal of a ruling on a motion to suppress, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party,
here the defendant, granting to the evidence all reasonable
inferences deducible therefrom. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12
Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). "[W]e are bound
by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless 'plainly
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wrong' or without evidence to support them," McGee v.
Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997)
(en banc), but we review de novo the trial court's application
of defined legal standards such as probable cause and reasonable
suspicion to the particular facts of the case, Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L. Ed. 2d
911 (1996).
A.
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Although "Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect
is subject to 'custodial interrogation,'" not every detention
"constitute[s] a custodial interrogation for purposes of
Miranda." Cherry v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 135, 140, 415
S.E.2d 242, 244 (1992) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)).
A routine, roadside traffic stop and
the usual questioning associated with such a
brief stop generally will not be considered
"custodial interrogation" because the
detention is usually of very short duration
and the attendant circumstances "are not
such that the motorist feels completely at
the mercy of police." Such stops are
usually in public and only one or perhaps
two officers are usually present.
Consequently, Miranda warnings are not
required prior to the type [of] questioning
usually associated with such stops.
Id. at 138-39, 415 S.E.2d at 243-44 (quoting Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3148-49, 82
L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)) (citation omitted). Although a stop based
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on reasonable suspicion to conduct a narcotics investigation may
not be a "routine" traffic stop, it nevertheless does not become
a custodial interrogation simply because the subject is
narcotics. Id. A suspect is "'in custody' for purposes of
Miranda [only] if [he] has been arrested or if his freedom of
action has been curtailed to a degree associated with arrest."
United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 130 (4th Cir. 1998).
Here, Trooper Corbett had probable cause to stop defendant
for speeding. The stop occurred on the interstate, in public
view, Trooper Corbett was the only officer at the scene, and the
stop was brief, lasting no more than five to ten minutes.
Trooper Corbett immediately requested defendant's driver's
license and registration and asked him why he was speeding,
routine actions in a traffic stop. Defendant indicated he was
late for a court appearance. When Corbett inquired about the
nature of the court appearance, defendant responded that it was
a possession charge. Trooper Corbett's inquiry as to whether
defendant had any illegal substances in his possession at that
time, although unrelated to the reasons for an ordinary traffic
stop, did not convert the brief encounter into a formal arrest
or indicate to defendant that his freedom of movement was being
curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
Thus, although we defer to the trial court's findings of
fact, we hold as a matter of law that defendant was not subject
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to a custodial interrogation when he admitted having marijuana
in his possession.
B.
QUESTIONING ABOUT DRUG POSSESSION UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
"The 'custody' that implicates the Miranda rule is
conceptually distinct from a seizure implicating the Fourth
Amendment. . . . Even though a routine traffic stop does not
amount to a custodial detention of the motorist, it does
constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." Sullivan, 138 F.3d at 131.
An officer may effect a traffic stop when, inter alia, he
has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred.
See Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 172, 177, 543 S.E.2d
623, 626 (2001). He may "request a driver's license, insurance
papers, vehicle registration, run a computer check thereon, and
issue a citation." United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437
(5th Cir. 1993). Once the purpose of the stop has been
completed, the stop may not be extended absent consent or
additional information amounting to reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. See Dickerson, 35 Va. App. at 178, 543 S.E.2d
at 626. However, during the stop, the officer may question the
person on subjects not directly related to the reasons which
provided the basis for the stop, even if he lacks reasonable
suspicion as to the unrelated subjects, as long as "the
detention to that point continue[s] to be supported by the facts
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that justified its initiation" and "the questioning [does]
nothing to extend the duration of the initial, valid seizure."
Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 437 (approving questioning about travel
plans and request for consent to search from driver stopped for
speeding while police awaited results of computer check of
driver's license); see also United States v. Childs, ___ F.3d
___, ___ (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc); State v. Hickman, 763 A.2d
330, 336-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). But see United
States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (rejecting reasoning of Shabazz).
Here, the evidence establishes that, at the time Trooper
Corbett asked defendant whether he had "anything illegal on
[his] person" and defendant responded that he was carrying
marijuana, defendant was searching for and had not yet found the
rental car agreement which served as the registration for the
vehicle. Thus, the purpose of the stop had not yet been
achieved when defendant admitted he had marijuana in his
possession. The evidence also established that the entire stop,
from the time Trooper Corbett activated his blue lights until he
found the cocaine in defendant's pocket, took no more than five
to ten minutes. Thus, at the time defendant told Trooper
Corbett he had marijuana in his possession, which provided
probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of marijuana,
"the detention . . . continued to be supported by the facts that
justified its initiation" and "the questioning did nothing to
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extend the duration of the initial, valid seizure." Shabazz,
993 F.2d at 437.
In short, under the facts of this case, Trooper Corbett's
seizure of the cocaine violated neither the Fourth nor the Fifth
Amendment. The questioning which led to the discovery of the
cocaine occurred during a routine traffic stop supported by
probable cause, in which Trooper Corbett was entitled to obtain
defendant's license and registration. The trooper's inquiry
regarding whether defendant had anything illegal in his
possession occurred before defendant had located his vehicle
registration and, thus, did not unduly prolong the stop.
Further, this questioning flowed logically from defendant's
response to the officer's inquiry about why he was speeding and
involved only a limited number of questions. Finally, the stop
was of limited duration, lasting no more than five to ten
minutes. Once defendant admitted he had marijuana in his
possession, Trooper Corbett had probable cause to arrest him for
that offense and to search him incident to arrest. Pursuant to
that search, Trooper Corbett found what he believed to be
cocaine, giving him probable cause to arrest defendant for
possession of cocaine. Thus, we reverse the trial court's
decision to grant the suppression motion, and we remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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