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Renard C. Fields v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Clements and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
RENARD C. FIELDS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v.   Record No. 2192-99-1                   JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
OCTOBER 3, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge
Christopher P. Reagan, Assistant Public
Defender, for appellant.
Thomas M. McKenna, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Renard C. Fields (defendant) was convicted by a jury for
malicious wounding and a related firearm charge.       On appeal,
defendant, an African-American, complains that the trial court
erroneously permitted the Commonwealth to exercise race-based
peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky,
    476 U.S. 79 
    (1986).    We disagree and affirm the convictions.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of the appeal.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
An accused enjoys the "right to be tried by a jury whose
members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminating criteria."
    Id. at 85-86. 
      Thus, the exercise of a peremptory challenge to strike
"potential jurors solely on account of their race" violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
    Id. at 89. 
      The protocols that govern determination of a Batson motion
are well established.
The opponent of a peremptory challenge must
establish a prima facie case of
discrimination (step 1); once a prima facie
case is made, the burden of production
shifts to the proponent of the strike to
produce a race-neutral or, as in this case,
a gender-neutral explanation (step 2); if a
neutral explanation is proffered, the trial
court must then decide whether the opponent
of the strike has met its burden and proved
purposeful discrimination (step 3).
Riley v. Commonwealth,
    21 Va. 330
    , 333,
    464 S.E.2d 508
    , 509
(1995) (citations omitted).
In assessing the prosecutor's explanation at step 1,
assuming a prima facie case of discrimination, "'the issue is
the facial validity . . . [and] [u]nless a discriminatory intent
is inherent in the . . . explanation, the reason offered will be
deemed race neutral.'"    Purkett v. Elem,
    514 U.S. 765
    , 768
(1995) (citing Hernandez v. New York,
    500 U.S. 352
    , 360 (1991)).
The prosecution's reasoning need not be "persuasive, or even
plausible[,]" only race neutral as a matter of law.
    Id. If found 
    race neutral, the inquiry proceeds to the third step,
requiring defendant "'to show both that [the race neutral
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explanations] were merely pretextual and that race . . . was the
real reason'" for the strike.    Robertson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.
App. 635, 638,
    445 S.E.2d 713
    , 715 (1994) (citation omitted).
Thus, generally, "the decisive question" before the trial
court ultimately becomes "whether counsel's race neutral
explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed" and,
"once that has been settled, there seems nothing left to
review."
    Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365
    , 367.   Such determination
constitutes a factual finding by the trial court, accorded
"'great deference on appeal'" and disturbed only if unsupported
by the evidence.   Barksdale v. Commonwealth,
    17 Va. App. 456
    ,
460,
    438 S.E.2d 761
    , 763 (1993) (en banc) (citations omitted).
Here, following the court's finding of prima facie
"racially discriminatory challenges" by the Commonwealth, the
prosecutor offered racially neutral explanations for each
disputed strike, including the proximity of addresses provided
by two venirepersons and certain defense witnesses.   In
response, defense counsel was admittedly uncertain whether the
addresses were "near," recalling only the venirepersons in issue
had not expressed recognition of any witness previously
disclosed to the panel by the court.
In overruling the motion, the trial court accepted the
prosecutor's representations, "as an officer of the court,"
concluding that the explanations were race neutral and not
pretextual, findings properly supported by the record.
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Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
Affirmed.
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