Richard Wood v. Janice Wood Chambliss, f/k/a J.Wood ( 2000 )


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  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Coleman, Humphreys and Senior Judge Overton
    Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
    RICHARD WOOD
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 2615-99-1              JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
    JULY 25, 2000
    JANICE WOOD CHAMBLISS, F/K/A
    JANICE C. WOOD
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
    H. Thomas Padrick, Jr., Judge
    Cheshire I'Anson Eveleigh (Wolcott, Rivers,
    Wheary, Basnight & Kelly, P.C., on brief),
    for appellant.
    Leonard D. Levine (Gordon, Allison & Levine,
    P.C., on brief), for appellee.
    Richard Wood (Richard) appeals from a denial of his petition
    to reopen the divorce proceedings between him and his former wife,
    Janice Wood Chambliss (Janice), for the purpose of terminating
    payments to wife of a portion of husband's pension.   For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
    A final decree of divorce ending the marriage between Richard
    and Janice was entered by the circuit court on October 3, 1988.
    This decree in pertinent part stated as follows:
    [T]he Complainant, Janice C. Wood is entitled
    to receive a monetary award of $53,861.00,
    which is 50% of the Defendant's [Richard's]
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    New York Police Department pension benefits
    (the present value of which is $107,722.00),
    payable to her at the rate of $424.00 per
    month, based upon consideration of all
    marital property of the parties, including
    the Defendant's New York Police Department
    retirement benefits and the Defendant,
    Richard Wood, being entitled to receive same,
    it is ORDERED that the New York City Pension
    Bureau, City of New York, shall pay the
    portion due to Complainant [Janice] pursuant
    to the provisions of this Order directly to
    the Complainant. The first payment shall be
    due Complainant on October 1, 1988. These
    payments shall resolve the matter of the
    Complainant's interest in the Defendant's
    Police Department pension and these payments
    are made as a division of property pursuant
    to Virginia Code Section 20-107.3. The
    Complainant shall receive her proportionate
    share of said retirement payment income each
    month for as long as Defendant receives his
    pension or until one of the parties dies.
    After Janice received $53,861 from Richard's pension, Richard
    petitioned the circuit court to reopen and place the matter back
    on the docket for the purpose of entering an order terminating
    further payments to Janice, as well as her interest in Richard's
    pension benefits.
    By letter opinion, the circuit court denied Richard's
    petition and in doing so "determined that the source of the
    confusion at the time [of the entry of the decree] was the law's
    requirement [at that time] that the present value of the
    Defendant's pension had to be established and some prior hearings
    had not done so."
    - 2 -
    Code § 20-107.3(E)(8) as it existed prior to July 1, 1988,
    required the court to consider the present value of a pension in
    making a monetary award.   This requirement existed even if the
    payments were deferred.    However, in Zipf v. Zipf, 
    8 Va. App. 387
    ,
    
    382 S.E.2d 263
     (1989), we held:
    [U]se of the present value to fix a sum
    certain monetary award derived from a pension
    is not only unnecessary, but inappropriate
    where distribution is deferred, we conclude
    that in this instance the legislature did not
    intend the present value to serve as a means
    of diminishing the true value of the monetary
    award. The present value calculation serves
    two important functions. First, it provides
    the trial judge with an informational base
    figure to assist in calculating the amount of
    the award. In addition, the present value of
    a pension would be useful information for the
    "party against whom a monetary award is
    made," who might wish immediately to "satisfy
    the award, in whole or in part, by conveyance
    of property, subject to the approval of the
    court."
    
    Id. at 397-98
    , 
    382 S.E.2d at
    269 (citing Code § 20-107.3(D)).
    In cases such as this one, a present value calculation
    of any pension benefits is virtually meaningless because the
    pension is divided by percentage and paid over time.   In this
    instance, Janice was awarded a 50% share of Richard's pension
    stream, payable as he received payments.   We find that the
    reference in the decree to the sum Janice was entitled to
    receive did not defeat the trial court's clear award of an
    ongoing 50% share in Richard's pension benefits.
    - 3 -
    Richard relies on our decision in Hastie v. Hastie, 
    29 Va. App. 776
    , 
    514 S.E.2d 800
     (1999), as authority that the pension
    payments to Janice should be terminated.   His reliance on Hastie
    is misplaced.   The decree entered in Hastie allocated 40% of the
    husband's retirement pension valued at $102,496.40 payable at the
    rate of $575.04 monthly "until paid in full."   Id. at 778, 
    514 S.E.2d at 801
     (emphasis in original).   In contrast, the plain
    language of the decree here required the pension payments to
    Janice to continue "as long as [Richard] receives his pension or
    until one of the parties dies."   (Emphasis added).
    We therefore find no error in the decision of the trial
    court.
    Affirmed.
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2615991

Filed Date: 7/25/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021