Associated Building, etc. v. Roy Frank Blair ( 1996 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Senior Judge Cole
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    ASSOCIATED BUILDING
    CONTRACTORS, INC., ET AL.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.         Record No. 0978-96-2             JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
    NOVEMBER 26, 1996
    ROY FRANK BLAIR
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Joy C. Fuhr (Stephen D. Busch; McGuire,
    Woods, Battle & Boothe, L.L.P., on brief),
    for appellants.
    No brief or argument for appellee.
    Associated Building Contractors, Inc. and Commonwealth
    Contractors, GSIA (appellants) appeal the order of the Virginia
    Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) dismissing Roy
    Frank Blair's (appellee) claim for benefits without prejudice.
    For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    I.
    FACTS
    On September 21, 1995, appellee filed a claim against
    Associated Building Contractors, Inc. (Associated) for temporary
    total disability benefits.   In October, appellants requested
    appellee to produce his tax returns for the past three years.    In
    December, appellee's counsel responded that appellee could not
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    produce his tax returns because they were lost.
    Appellants then requested appellee to sign a release form
    authorizing the IRS to release his tax returns and to sit for a
    deposition.   In response, appellee's counsel informed appellants'
    counsel that appellee had moved to Chicago due to financial
    hardship and suggested that the deposition be conducted by
    telephone rather than in person to avoid further unnecessary
    hardship to appellee.
    In January, 1996, at the request of appellants' counsel, the
    commission entered two discovery orders requiring appellee to
    provide his federal tax returns either directly or by authorizing
    their release and to submit to a deposition in person inside the
    Commonwealth.   Appellee's counsel was unable to communicate the
    existence of either order to appellee because appellee's counsel
    did not know his new residence in Chicago.
    Pursuant to the orders of the commission, appellants sent to
    appellee's counsel a release form regarding his tax returns and
    served appellee's counsel with a notice of appellee's deposition
    that was scheduled this time for February 19.   Appellee's counsel
    was still unable to contact appellee to inform him of either the
    release form or the deposition.    On February 16, appellee's
    counsel advised appellants' counsel that he was uncertain if
    appellee would appear for his deposition because appellee's
    whereabouts were unknown to him and appellee had been out of
    contact with him "for some time."
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    On February 19, appellee failed to appear at the scheduled
    deposition and had still failed to endorse the form authorizing
    the release of his federal taxes.     On February 20, appellants
    moved the deputy commissioner to dismiss appellee's claim with
    prejudice pursuant to commission Rule 1.8(K) as a sanction for
    failing to comply with the commission's discovery orders.     In
    response, appellee's counsel requested that appellee's claim be
    dismissed without prejudice because he had not communicated with
    appellee regarding either of the commission's discovery orders.
    On February 27, the deputy commissioner ordered appellee's claim
    dismissed with prejudice.   Appellee's counsel appealed the
    deputy's decision, and the full Commission modified the order of
    dismissal so that appellee's claim was dismissed without
    prejudice.
    II.
    DISMISSAL OF APPELLEE'S CLAIM WITHOUT PREJUDICE
    Appellants argue that the commission abused its discretion
    when it modified the deputy's order of dismissal so that
    appellee's claim was dismissed without prejudice instead of with
    prejudice.   We disagree.
    The commission has the same authority as a court to punish
    for noncompliance with its discovery orders.     Jeff Coal, Inc. v.
    Phillips, 
    16 Va. App. 271
    , 278, 
    430 S.E.2d 712
    , 717 (1993).
    Under commission Rule 1.12, the commission may impose certain
    sanctions for discovery violations, including dismissal of a
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    claim or application.   Rules of the Virginia Workers'
    Compensation Commission, 16 V.A.C. § 30-50-20 (1996).    As do
    trial courts under Rule 4:12(b), the commission has "broad
    discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, will be imposed
    upon a litigant who fails to respond timely to discovery."
    Rappold v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co., 
    246 Va. 10
    , 14-15,
    
    431 S.E.2d 302
    , 305 (1993) (quoting Woodbury v. Courtney, 
    239 Va. 651
    , 654, 
    391 S.E.2d 293
    , 295 (1990));   see Jeff Coal, 16 Va.
    App. at 
    278-79, 430 S.E.2d at 717
    (holding that commission has
    same discretion as a trial court to strike a party's defenses
    under Rule 4:12).   Thus, the commission's decision whether or not
    to dismiss a claim as a sanction for noncompliance with its
    discovery rules and orders will only be reversed for an abuse of
    discretion.
    In this case, we hold that the commission did not abuse its
    discretion in modifying the order of the deputy so that
    appellee's claim was dismissed without prejudice.   "Dismissal of
    an action with prejudice is a drastic punishment and should not
    be invoked except in those cases where the conduct of the party
    shows deliberate and contumacious disregard of the [commission]'s
    authority."   Swindle v. Reid, 
    242 So. 2d 751
    , 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
    App. 1971); accord 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions and Discovery § 385
    (1983).   In this case, the record indicated that appellee's
    counsel was unable to communicate the existence of either of the
    commission's discovery orders to appellee and was unable to
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    determine appellee's current residence at the time of appellants'
    motion to dismiss.   Nothing in the record shows that appellee's
    failure to sign the release form and to attend his deposition was
    either contumacious or deliberate.    The commission was not
    unreasonable to conclude that appellee's noncompliance with its
    discovery orders may have been due to his unawareness "of the
    activity in regard to his workers' compensation claim."   Thus,
    the commission did not abuse its discretion in modifying the
    deputy's order to dismiss appellee's claim without prejudice.
    In light of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of
    the commission.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 0978962

Filed Date: 11/26/1996

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021