Barie Tyrone Polhamus v. Commonwealth ( 1995 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:  Chief Judge Moon, Judge Fitzpatrick and
    Senior Judge Hodges
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    BARIE TYRONE POLHAMUS
    v.       Record No. 1703-94-4              MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA                      OCTOBER 31, 1995
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY
    William Shore Robertson, Judge
    Roger A. Inger (Massie, Inger, Boyd & Iden,
    P.C., on brief), for appellant.
    Robert B. Beasley, Jr., Assistant Attorney
    General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
    General, on brief), for appellee.
    Barie Tyrone Polhamus (appellant) was convicted of driving
    under the influence of alcohol, second offense in ten years.    On
    appeal, appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove
    that a blood test, to measure his blood alcohol content, was
    reasonably unavailable at the time of his arrest.   We disagree
    and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    I.
    At 5:35 p.m., on Sunday, January 30, 1994, in Rappahannock
    County, Virginia State Trooper Sean Knick stopped appellant for
    speeding.   As a result of the stop, Knick charged appellant with
    driving under the influence of alcohol.   Knick advised appellant
    of the implied consent law, but told him that in Rappahannock
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    County, no blood test was available.      A breath test subsequently
    was administered to appellant, who voiced no objection to that
    test.       The test showed a blood alcohol content of .15 percent by
    weight by volume.
    Trooper Knick testified that he was the only trooper on duty
    in Rappahannock County at the time he stopped appellant.      Knick
    testified that he was aware of no facility or qualified person
    authorized to perform the blood test in Rappahannock County, that
    during the five and one-half years he had worked as a trooper he
    had never been aware of such a facility or person located in the
    county, and that the State Police policy during that entire
    period had been that no blood test was available in Rappahannock
    County.
    Knick stated that the nearest facility available for a blood
    test would be Fauquier Hospital in Warrenton.      The trooper was
    not permitted to leave Rappahannock County without first
    notifying his supervisor.      Knick testified that had he left
    Rappahannock County to take appellant to Fauquier Hospital, a
    trip which would have required over an hour to complete, no
    trooper would have been on duty in Rappahannock County.
    Trooper Knick and Rappahannock County Sheriff John Woodward
    testified that state troopers, not sheriff's deputies,
    investigate traffic accidents in Rappahannock County. 1      Sheriff
    1
    An exception, not applicable in this case, is a minor
    traffic accident, without injury, which occurs during the
    midnight shift.
    2
    Woodward testified that during the 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift on
    Saturdays and Sundays, two deputies are on patrol, in a single
    car, in the county.   Woodward stated that the deputies are not
    permitted to leave Rappahannock County.
    Woodward also testified that, with the exception of a period
    of six to nine months when a Ms. Rustic performed blood tests, he
    was aware of no facility or individual in the county that was
    authorized to draw or analyze blood.      The Rappahannock Medical
    Center, the only clinic facility in the county, had refused to
    administer the blood test. 2   The policy of the sheriff's
    department was that a blood test was not available.
    The trial court, relying on this Court's opinion in Talley
    v. Commonwealth, 
    16 Va. App. 473
    , 
    431 S.E.2d 65
     (1993), found
    that the unavailability of the blood test, under these
    circumstances, was reasonable.      Appellant, thereafter, entered a
    conditional guilty plea to the charge.
    II.
    Code § 18.2-268.2(B), in effect at the time of appellant's
    arrest, provided that a motorist arrested for driving under the
    influence of alcohol "shall elect to have either a blood or
    3
    breath sample taken . . . . "
    2
    The Commonwealth introduced letters, dated September 10,
    1985, and June 15, 1994, from Dr. Jerry W. Martin, of the
    Rappahannock Medical Center, to the Commonwealth's Attorney,
    Peter Luke, stating the clinic's unavailability for such tests.
    3
    Effective January 1, 1995, Code § 18.2-268(B) requires that
    an arrested person "shall submit to a breath test. If the breath
    test is unavailable or the person is physically unable to submit
    3
    If either test is unavailable, the accused
    must take the available test, and the
    unavailability of the other test may not be
    asserted as a defense. Only if both tests
    are available is the accused entitled to
    choose the test to be administered. Once an
    accused elects to take either the blood or
    the breath test, if the election is not
    honored because of unavailability, the
    Commonwealth must establish a valid reason
    for the lack of availability of the test
    requested.
    Snead v. Commonwealth, 
    17 Va. App. 372
    , 374, 
    437 S.E.2d 239
    , 241
    (1993) (citation omitted).   "The reasonableness of the
    Commonwealth's explanation is determined from a review of all the
    facts, and courts must subject these facts to particular scrutiny
    when 'office procedures' are cited in support of an assertion
    that one test was unavailable at the time of the defendant's
    arrest."   Commonwealth v. Gray, 
    248 Va. 633
    , 636, 
    449 S.E.2d 807
    ,
    809 (1994).
    An accused, moreover, has no duty to demand a particular
    test in order to be entitled to it.   Rather, the Commonwealth is
    required to instruct an accused as to his or her statutory
    options.   Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 
    17 Va. App. 376
    , 379, 
    437 S.E.2d 242
    , 244 (1993).   "If the defendant 'consents' to one test
    or the other without being fully informed of her or his options
    under the statute, the defendant has not truly 'elected' one test
    over the other as required by law."   Id.
    In Talley, the Powhatan County Sheriff's Department had a
    to the breath test, a blood test shall be given."
    4
    policy whereby after-hours blood tests could be obtained at a
    hospital in nearby Chesterfield County, "as long as more than one
    field officer was on duty to cover the county."       Talley, 16 Va.
    App. at 476, 431 S.E.2d at 67.    Talley was arrested by a Powhatan
    sheriff's deputy one minute before the only other deputy on duty
    was scheduled to end his shift.    The arresting officer advised
    Talley that he believed the blood test to be unavailable.      In
    fact, the deputy scheduled to go off duty administered the breath
    test, over forty minutes after Talley's arrest.
    We held in Talley that "the policy in this case was neither
    arbitrary nor capricious; facially or as applied, the policy was
    reasonable in order to ensure that one field deputy was available
    within the county at all times."       Talley, 16 Va. App. at 476, 431
    S.E.2d at 67.   See also Mason v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 583
    ,
    585-86, 
    425 S.E.2d 544
    , 545-46 (1993) (Commonwealth established
    reasonable basis for unavailability of blood test where arresting
    officer was only state police officer on duty in Powhatan County
    on evening of arrest, and he had orders not to leave the county).
    Here, Trooper Knick was the only state trooper on duty in
    Rappahannock County at the time of appellant's arrest.      State
    troopers investigate all traffic accidents in the county during
    the evening shift.   Knick could not leave the county without
    first notifying his supervisor.    At most, the sheriff's
    department had only two deputies, in one vehicle, patrolling the
    roads, and the sheriff forbade his deputies to leave the county.
    5
    No facility or individual authorized to administer the blood
    test was known to be available in Rappahannock County at the time
    of appellant's arrest. 4
    In this case, as in Talley, the policy that a blood test was
    unavailable in Rappahannock County is neither arbitrary nor
    capricious, but was reasonable based on the limited number of
    officers available to serve the locality and the absence of
    facilities or persons within the county to administer such tests.
    We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the
    Commonwealth had provided a reasonable explanation for the
    unavailability of the blood test.   Accordingly, we affirm
    appellant's conviction.
    Affirmed.
    4
    This case is distinguishable from Snead v. Commonwealth, 
    17 Va. App. 372
    , 
    437 S.E.2d 239
     (1993). In Snead, "[t]he
    Commonwealth's evidence proved only that, as a matter of police
    department policy, no public facility for taking a blood sample
    is available on a twenty-four hour basis in Hanover County." 17
    Va. App. at 374-75, 437 S.E.2d at 241. In this case, Sheriff
    Woodward testified that the clinic in Rappahannock had refused.
    He also stated that no one other than Ms. Rustic, temporarily,
    had been available to perform the test. He testified that no
    doctor maintains an office in the county, and no laboratory
    authorized to draw or analyze blood is located there. When asked
    if he was aware of any registered nurse, lab technician or other
    private facility, Woodward stated, "None to my knowledge that has
    ever come forward." On cross-examination, Woodward stated that
    he was aware from a previous court case that two doctors, who
    work in Culpeper, live in Rappahannock County.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1703944

Filed Date: 10/31/1995

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021