Ruth Ann Jones v. Louise Obici Memorial Hosp ( 1995 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Judges Koontz, Bray and Senior Judge Hodges
    RUTH ANN JONES (WIFE),
    SUSAN D. JONES (DAUGHTER), AND
    ESTATE OF JOHNNIE L. JONES (DECEASED)
    v.   Record No. 0005-95-2                      MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    PER CURIAM
    LOUISE OBICI MEMORIAL HOSPITAL                    MAY 16, 1995
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Annette Miller; Parker, Pollard & Brown, on brief),
    for appellants.
    (George J. Dancigers; Colleen T. Dickerson; Heilig,
    McKenry, Fraim & Lollar, on brief), for appellee.
    Ruth Ann Jones, wife, Susan D. Jones, daughter, and the
    Estate of Johnnie L. Jones (deceased) (hereinafter collectively
    referred to as "appellants") contend that the Workers'
    Compensation Commission erred in finding that the evidence did
    not prove that Johnnie Jones' April 27, 1992 heart attack arose
    out of his employment with Louise Obici Memorial Hospital.     Upon
    reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude
    that this appeal is without merit.   Accordingly, we summarily
    affirm the commission's decision.    Rule 5A:27.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.   R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).     A
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    finding of the commission that an injury did or did not arise out
    of the employment is a mixed finding of law and fact and is
    properly reviewable on appeal.    City of Richmond v. Braxton, 
    230 Va. 161
    , 163-64, 
    335 S.E.2d 259
    , 261 (1985).
    In order to recover, a claimant must show that he suffered
    an injury by accident "arising out of and in the course of his
    employment."   Code § 65.2-101.   "The phrase arising 'out of'
    refers to the origin or cause of the injury."    County of
    Chesterfield v. Johnson, 
    237 Va. 180
    , 183, 
    376 S.E.2d 73
    , 74
    (1989).    Unless we can say as a matter of law that the
    appellants' evidence sustained their burden of showing that
    Jones' heart attack arose out of his employment on April 27,
    1992, the commission's findings are binding and conclusive upon
    us.   Tomko v. Michael's Plastering Co., 
    210 Va. 697
    , 699, 
    173 S.E.2d 833
    , 835 (1970).
    In holding that the evidence did not prove that Jones' heart
    attack arose out of his employment, the commission found as
    follows:
    After careful review of the record the
    Full Commission on review finds that the
    evidence fails to establish that the
    claimant's fatal heart condition arose out of
    his employment. There is no evidence that
    the decedent was engaged in any unusual or
    strenuous work task prior to being stricken.
    For approximately 15 to 20 minutes the
    claimant waited for the steam pressure to
    decrease. In addition the medical evidence
    fails to establish any causal connection
    between the claimant's employment and his
    death. The reports indicate only severe
    atherosclerosis.
    2
    Based upon the lack of any medical evidence causally
    relating Jones' work activity on April 27, 1992 to his heart
    attack, coupled with the medical evidence indicating that Jones
    suffered from severe atherosclerosis, we cannot say as a matter
    of law that the appellants' evidence sustained their burden of
    proving that Jones' heart attack arose out of his employment.
    Moreover, the testimony of Jones' co-worker, Verlin E. Bright,
    supports the commission's finding that there was no evidence that
    Jones engaged in any unusual or strenuous work prior to his heart
    attack.
    Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
    3