Chickan Lamont Carter v. Commonwealth ( 2003 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Felton, Kelsey and Senior Judge Willis
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
CHICKAN LAMONT CARTER
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1051-02-2 JUDGE WALTER S. FELTON, JR.
JULY 8, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE
James E. Kulp, Judge Designate
William T. Linka (Boatwright & Linka, on
brief), for appellant.
Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney
General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General,
on brief), for appellee.
Chickan Carter was convicted in a bench trial of felony
burglary, in violation of Code § 18.2-89, and misdemeanor
peeping, in violation of Code § 18.2-130. On appeal, Carter
contends that the trial court erred when it determined he
possessed the intent required for a conviction of breaking and
entering a dwelling with the intent to commit larceny. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 18, 2000, Ida Lewis, who lives alone, went to bed
at approximately 11:00 p.m. Prior to going to bed, she closed
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
and latched the windows in her house and closed and locked the
doors. In her bedroom, she closed and latched the screen then
she left the window approximately halfway open. Her window
shade was left open at the same level as the window.
At approximately 2:45 a.m., on August 19, Ms. Lewis was
awakened by a noise at her window. When she went to the window,
she noticed it was all the way up and the shade was raised
higher than when she had gone to bed. Initially, she believed
the screen had been cut, but realized that it had been raised as
far as possible. In the open window, Ms. Lewis saw Carter's
face and chest. She picked up the telephone and told him she
was calling 911. Carter stepped down and backed away from the
window, but did not immediately run. 1 She called 911 and began
speaking with the 911 operator. Carter then ran.
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 19, two students,
Jennifer Beales and Jessica Gillespie, saw a man dressed in all
black run from behind Ms. Lewis' house, between their houses,
and to a house across the street. Beales and Gillespie lived
next door to Ms. Lewis. According to the two women, the man ran
across the street, diagonally, to a house two or three houses
away. The police arrived at Ms. Lewis' house shortly
thereafter. Gillespie and Beales pointed out to Officer
Bomgardner the house where the man had run.
1
Carter stood on a lawn chair in order to get up to the
window.
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Officer Bomgardner went to the house and found Carter
sitting on the back deck. The officer noticed that Carter's arm
was bandaged and bleeding. In addition, he noticed Carter
appeared intoxicated. Detective Sergeant Campbell spoke to
Carter as well. Carter told Detective Sergeant Campbell that he
was intoxicated and confused. He stated he locked himself out
and may have gone to the wrong house. 2 Detective Sergeant
Campbell noted the smell of alcohol from Carter, but Carter did
not appear to be intoxicated and did not slur his speech. He
did not appear to be "staggering drunk."
The police brought Carter to Ms. Lewis' house, and she
identified him as the man she saw in her window. Evidence
technicians took photographs of the crime scene and collected
evidence. Among the evidence collected were blood samples from
a stain located on the inside windowsill in Ms. Lewis' room and
stains from the chair located outside her window. 3 The blood
samples were analyzed, and DNA testing determined the blood to
be that of Carter.
2
At trial, a forensic toxicologist, Dr. Joseph Saady,
testified that Carter's blood alcohol level at the time of the
offense would have been such as to affect complicated tasks that
require thought. However, he stated that it would not affect
one's ability to perform an uncomplicated and repetitive task,
such as returning home.
3
The evidence technicians found no fingerprints at the
crime scene and found no blood on the window shade.
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On January 16, 2002, Carter was convicted in a bench trial
of felony burglary, in violation of Code § 18.2-89, and
misdemeanor peeping, in violation of Code § 18.2-130.
II. ANALYSIS
Carter contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the breaking and entering of
Lewis' house was with the intent to commit larceny. We
disagree.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is
challenged on appeal, it is well established
that we must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting
to it all reasonable inferences fairly
deducible therefrom. The conviction will be
disturbed only if plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 566, 572, 414 S.E.2d 193, 196
(1992).
Code § 18.2-89 states, "If any person break and enter the
dwelling house of another in the nighttime with intent to commit
a felony or any larceny therein, he shall be guilty of
burglary . . . ."
It is elementary that where, as here, the
statute makes an offense consist of an act
combined with a particular intent, proof of
such intent is as necessary as proof of the
act itself and must be established as a
matter of fact. Patterson v. Commonwealth,
215 Va. 698, 699, 213 S.E.2d 752, 753
(1975); Dixon v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 380,
382, 89 S.E.2d 344, 345 (1955).
Intent is the purpose formed in a person's
mind which may, and often must, be inferred
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from the facts and circumstances in a
particular case. The state of mind of an
alleged offender may be shown by his acts
and conduct. Hargrave v. Commonwealth, 214
Va. 436, 437, 201 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1974);
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 295,
163 S.E.2d 570, 574 (1968).
Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 313, 314
(1979).
Our jurisprudence provides that in the absence of evidence
showing a contrary intent, the trier of fact may infer that a
person's unauthorized presence in a business or home was with
the intent to commit larceny. See id. at 836-37, 252 S.E.2d at
314; Thompkins v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 460, 461, 184 S.E.2d
767, 768 (1971); Hucks v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 168, 175,
531 S.E.2d 658, 661 (2000); Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20
Va. App. 133, 137-38, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995).
In the case before us, no contrary intent was provided to
explain Carter's unauthorized presence in Ms. Lewis' house. 4
Carter explained to the police at the time of his arrest and to
the trial court that he was at Ms. Lewis' house because he
locked himself out of his house and believed that he was trying
4
Carter opened the screen, window, and put up the window
shade. In addition, his blood was found on the inside
windowsill. The trial court found that this evidence satisfied
the elements and proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Carter
broke and entered Ms. Lewis' house. See Franklin v.
Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 719, 721-22, 508 S.E.2d 362, 363-64
(1998); Phoung v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 457, 460-61, 424
S.E.2d 712, 713-14 (1992). The issue of whether there was a
breaking and entering is not before the Court, and we do not
address it on appeal.
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to enter his house. He attributed this mistake to his
intoxication and confusion. The trial court rejected Carter's
explanation, stating that the moment Carter was confronted by
Ms. Lewis, he knew exactly where his house was located and ran
directly there. He did not deviate in going to his house, and
he showed no confusion in getting there. With Carter's
explanation rejected, there was an absence of evidence showing a
contrary intent, thus permitting the trial court to infer that
Carter's unauthorized presence in Ms. Lewis' house was with the
intent to commit larceny.
We hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove breaking
and entering with the intent to commit larceny. The judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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