Dirk Neal Campbell v. Lyntool, Inc. and Merchants ( 2000 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Elder, Bray and Senior Judge Overton
    DIRK NEAL CAMPBELL
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.   Record No. 1529-00-3                         PER CURIAM
    OCTOBER 31, 2000
    LYNTOOL, INC. AND
    MERCHANTS OF VIRGINIA GROUP
    SELF-INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Philip B. Baker; Sanzone & Baker, P.C., on
    brief), for appellant.
    (Kathryn Spruill Lingle; Brenner, Evans &
    Yoffy, P.C., on brief), for appellees.
    Dirk Neal Campbell (claimant) contends that the Workers'
    Compensation Commission erred in finding that his claims for an
    award of medical benefits related to his left leg injury and for
    an award of permanent partial disability benefits for impairment
    to his left leg were barred by the applicable statute of
    limitations.     Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the
    parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
    Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision.        See
    Rule 5A:27.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.     See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).
    Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence
    sustained his burden of proof, the commission's findings are
    binding and conclusive upon us.   See Tomko v. Michael's
    Plastering Co., 
    210 Va. 697
    , 699, 
    173 S.E.2d 833
    , 835 (1970).
    The evidence proved that on September 8, 1995, claimant
    sustained a compensable injury by accident while working for
    Lyntool, Inc. (employer).   Employer's First Report reflected an
    injury to claimant's right leg.   Pursuant to a Memorandum of
    Agreement executed by the parties on June 11, 1996, the
    commission entered an award for compensation and medical
    benefits related solely to an injury to claimant's right leg.
    On July 26, 1997, the commission entered an award for
    compensation benefits for an additional period of disability.
    On May 23, 1997, claimant filed a letter application with
    the commission alleging a change-in-condition with regard to his
    September 8, 1995 accident.   This application did not refer to a
    left leg injury or make any claim for a left leg injury.
    Claimant sought additional temporary partial disability
    benefits.
    On March 2, 1998, claimant filed a "Request for Hearing"
    seeking payment for medical treatment related to a left leg
    injury that he claimed occurred on September 8, 1995, the
    original accident date.   On June 24, 1998, the commission held a
    hearing with respect to the May 23, 1997 change-in-condition
    - 2 -
    application and the March 2, 1998 claim for payment of medical
    expenses related to the left leg.
    By letter dated August 4, 1998, claimant's counsel
    requested that the commission enter an order allowing him to
    non-suit the March 2, 1998 claim with respect to injury and
    treatment of the left extremity arising from the accident of
    September 9, 1995.   He wrote that claimant did not "wish to
    proceed with the issue of temporary partial disability and our
    claim thereunder."   On September 30, 1998, the deputy
    commissioner rendered an opinion dismissing the March 2, 1998
    claim without prejudice per claimant's request.   The deputy
    commissioner specifically noted that "[w]e expressly make no
    finding as to whether this claim may be time-barred."    Neither
    party appealed the dismissal of the March 2, 1998 claim with
    respect to injury to the left leg.
    On September 8, 1998, claimant filed a claim requesting an
    award of lifetime medical benefits as to his lower left
    extremity and permanent partial disability benefits for
    impairment of his lower left extremity related to his original
    accident of September 8, 1995.    On July 1, 1999, claimant's
    counsel requested that his September 8, 1998 claim be docketed
    for a hearing with respect to a determination that the lower
    left extremity is causally related to the September 8, 1995
    accident and for an award of permanent partial disability
    benefits for the left and right lower extremities.
    - 3 -
    In ruling that claimant failed to file a timely claim for
    medical benefits related to his left leg injury or for permanent
    partial disability benefits related to left leg impairment, the
    commission found as follows:
    The Agreements, the Employer's First Report
    of Accident, and other records filed with
    the Commission fail to indicate any claim
    for an accident with an injury to the left
    leg until March 2, 1998. The May 23, 1997,
    claim for a change in condition cannot be
    construed as being for a left leg. This
    claim does not specifically identify that
    benefits were sought for a left extremity
    injury. In addition there had never been a
    claim for an injury to the left leg thus
    there could be no change in condition claim
    for this injury. The only claim for which
    an agreement was reached and an Award
    entered was for the right leg. That counsel
    was aware that the May claim was not for the
    left extremity is evidenced by the later
    filing of a claim for the left leg on March
    2, 1998. After a hearing in which evidence
    was taken on both claims, claimant's counsel
    . . . requested that the March 2, 1998,
    claim be non-suited. This was done by
    Opinion of September 30, 1998. This opinion
    also adjudicated all issues raised by the
    May 23, 1997 claim. No appeal was taken
    from this decision. Counsel did not refile
    any claim until September 8, 1998.
    . . . [I]n order to assert a claim for
    a left extremity injury, a claim must have
    been filed with the Commission on or before
    September 8, 1997. The first claim filed
    asserting a left knee injury was on March 2,
    1998. This claim was withdrawn and
    dismissed. We also note that it was not a
    timely claim in that it was filed more than
    two years after the date of accident. For
    the same reason, the September 8, 1998, and
    - 4 -
    July 1, 1999, claims for the left extremity
    were not timely filed.
    (Footnote omitted.)
    The commission's findings are amply supported by the
    record.    No evidence in the record established that claimant
    filed a claim for medical benefits related to treatment of his
    left leg within the applicable statute of limitations provided
    in Code § 65.2-601.   The fact that there may have been
    references to a left leg injury in claimant's medical records or
    that employer may have paid medical expenses at some point in
    time related to treatment of claimant's left leg did not negate
    claimant's statutory obligation to file a timely claim with
    regard to his left leg to invoke the commission's jurisdiction.
    Claimant was aware, as early as April 17, 1997, that employer
    specifically denied responsibility for treatment of his left
    leg.   Claimant's counsel confirmed this in his July 15, 1997
    correspondence to the carrier.    Yet, claimant failed to file a
    claim for treatment related to his left leg until March 2, 1998,
    more than six months after the two-year statute of limitations
    expired.   Furthermore, appellant non-suited the March 2, 1998
    claim and did not refile it until September 8, 1998, again well
    outside the applicable two-year limitations period.
    We also find no merit in claimant's argument that Code
    § 65.2-708(A) somehow saved his claim from the bar of the
    - 5 -
    statute of limitations.   Code § 65.2-708(A) provides in
    pertinent part as follows:
    No such review [of any award] shall be made
    after twenty-four months from the last day
    for which compensation was paid, pursuant to
    an award . . . except: (i) thirty-six months
    from the last day for which compensation was
    paid shall be allowed for the filing of
    claims payable under § 65.2-503 . . . .
    Thus, a review pursuant to Code § 65.2-708(A) requires the
    existence of a prior award.   See Lynchburg Foundry Co. v.
    McDaniel, 
    22 Va. App. 307
    , 311, 
    469 S.E.2d 85
    , 87 (1996).
    Appellant did not file a claim for an injury to his left
    leg within two years of the accident date.   No prior award
    existed with respect to his left leg injury.   "Thus, . . . Code
    § 65.2-708(A) did not save [his] . . . claim [for medical
    expenses] from the jurisdictional bar of Code § 65.2-601."      Id.
    Code § 65.2-708(B) provides that "'[i]n those cases where
    no compensation has been paid, the Commission may make an award
    under § 65.2-503 within 36 months from the date of the
    accident.'"   Id. (citation omitted).   Although Code
    § 65.2-708(B) does not require a prior award, it requires that a
    claimant file a claim for the specific injury alleged within two
    years of the accident as required by Code § 65.2-601.      See id.
    at 311-12, 
    469 S.E.2d at 88
     (where original claim for injury was
    filed within two years of accident, claim for permanent partial
    disability benefits was filed within thirty-six months of
    accident, and no compensation had been paid, permanent partial
    - 6 -
    disability benefits were awardable under Code § 65.2-708(B)).
    Because claimant failed to file a timely claim for a left leg
    injury under Code § 65.2-601, Code § 65.2-708(B) did not act to
    save his September 8, 1998 claim for permanent partial
    disability benefits related to his left leg.
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1529003

Filed Date: 10/31/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021