Hardees of Norton No. 2849 v. Lena Marie Stephens ( 2002 )


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  •                       COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Frank, Clements and Senior Judge Willis
    HARDEES OF NORTON NO. 2849 AND
    BODDIE-NOELL ENTERPRISES, INC.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.   Record No. 1109-02-3                         PER CURIAM
    SEPTEMBER 17, 2002
    LENA MARIE STEPHENS
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    (Monica Taylor Monday; Mary Beth Nash;
    Gentry Locke Rakes & Moore, on brief), for
    appellants.
    (D. Allison Mullins; Lee & Phipps, P.C., on
    brief), for appellee.
    Hardees of Norton No. 2849 and Boddie-Noell Enterprises,
    Inc. (employer) contend the Workers' Compensation Commission
    erred in finding that Lena Marie Stephens (claimant) proved by
    clear and convincing evidence that her right carpal tunnel
    syndrome was causally related to her employment. 1    Upon reviewing
    the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that this appeal
    is without merit.     Accordingly, we summarily affirm the
    commission's decision.     Rule 5A:27.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    1
    Claimant did not appeal the commission's finding that she
    failed to prove that her left carpal tunnel syndrome was caused
    by her employment. Accordingly, we will not address that issue
    on appeal.
    On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party below.    R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
    Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788 (1990).
    So viewed, the evidence proved that claimant began to work
    for employer as a biscuit maker on October 23, 2000.   She
    hand-prepared seven batches of dough, which made about three
    dozen rolls and biscuits per batch.   She was required to pour
    the dough into a large bowl and mix it by hand, then put it on a
    table and roll it and cut it.    She made dough for about one hour
    and forty-five minutes to two hours during each six to
    eight-hour shift.   After three to four weeks of performing her
    job, claimant began to have bilateral arm swelling and numbness.
    Her left arm had bothered her before beginning work for
    employer, but she had no problems with her right arm before her
    employment.
    Jimmy Stidham, employer's manager, confirmed that claimant
    made dough for approximately one to two and one-half hours each
    shift.   She also operated a cash register, waited on customers,
    cleaned the dining room, and stocked items.   Within a few weeks
    of starting work, claimant told Stidham that her doctor told her
    to stop making biscuits because of something in her back.     As a
    result, he reassigned her to work as a full-time cashier.
    On November 10, 2000, claimant complained to Dr. Neal A.
    Jewell, an orthopedic surgeon, that she suffered from back pain,
    lower extremity pain, and a "recent onset of swelling in her
    - 2 -
    hands, numbness in her hands at night."   She told Dr. Jewell
    that she started working for employer on October 23, 2000 and
    that she made biscuit dough.   She told him how she kneaded and
    cut the dough.   Dr. Jewell diagnosed possible early carpal
    tunnel syndrome.   He recommended that claimant stop the
    biscuit-making job duties because her symptoms seemed to improve
    with rest.   Dr. Jewell noted that the symptoms started "almost
    immediately following the beginning of the work activities."
    On December 4, 2000, claimant continued to complain to
    Dr. Jewell of "carpal tunnel type of symptoms with intermittent
    numbness in both hands, increased after work and increased at
    night."   Dr. Jewell diagnosed cervical spondylosis, bilateral
    carpal tunnel syndrome, and chronic lumbar pain.   He told
    claimant to stop her job "since it is chronically aggravating
    her carpal tunnel symptoms."
    In a December 6, 2000 letter, Dr. Jewell opined that
    claimant should stop her food preparation duties at work because
    "[c]onstant kneading of the dough and other biscuit making
    activities have, from the outset of her employment at Hardee's,
    caused these carpal tunnel symptoms."
    On January 4, 2001, claimant told Dr. Jewell she had not
    been working for the past two weeks and that her symptoms, other
    than right index finger numbness, seemed to be resolving.     On
    February 15, 2001, Dr. Jewell noted that claimant's "right
    carpal tunnel symptoms are unchanged [with] . . . persistent
    - 3 -
    numbness and pain in the median nerve distribution [and]
    . . . diffuse hand pain and intermittent swelling in the hand."
    Dr. Jewell diagnosed right carpal tunnel syndrome secondary to
    claimant's work duties beginning on October 23, 2001 and
    "longstanding" left carpal tunnel syndrome.   Bilateral nerve
    conduction studies done on February 20, 2001 revealed
    "compression of the median nerves at the wrist as in carpal
    tunnel syndrome."
    On March 8, 2001, Dr. Jewell opined that claimant's "right
    carpal tunnel symptoms are related to the job activities at
    Hardee's."   Dr. Jewell noted that the left carpal tunnel
    symptoms were not related to the employment due to claimant's
    pre-existing positive nerve conduction studies on the left.
    Dr. Richard Blume, an occupational medicine specialist,
    reviewed claimant's medical records for employer.   On June 7,
    2001, Dr. Blume opined that the medical findings failed to
    document the presence of carpal tunnel syndrome in either upper
    extremity.   He concluded that claimant's complaints did not
    support a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome and that her work
    history did not suggest a risk of carpal tunnel syndrome.    He
    emphasized that claimant's symptoms could indicate fibromyalgia
    and noted that she was a twenty-year cigarette smoker.
    Carpal tunnel syndrome, an ordinary disease of life under
    Code § 65.2-401, is compensable, if a claimant proves
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    by "clear and convincing evidence, (not a
    mere probability)," that the disease (1)
    "arose out of and in the course of [her]
    employment as provided in Code
    § 65.2-400 . . . "; (2)"did not result from
    causes outside of the employment"; and (3)
    "follows as an incident of occupational
    disease . . . [;] is an infectious or
    contagious disease contracted in the course
    of [specified types of employment];
    or . . . is characteristic of the employment
    and was caused by conditions peculiar to
    such employment." . . . [A] disease arises
    out of the employment "if there is [inter
    alia,] . . . [a] direct causal connection
    between the conditions under which work is
    performed and the occupational disease;
    . . . [and] [i]t can be fairly traced to the
    employment as the proximate cause . . . ."
    *      *      *      *      *         *     *
    The commission's determination
    regarding causation is a finding of fact.    A
    finding of causation need not be based
    exclusively on medical evidence. . . .
    In determining whether credible
    evidence exists to support the commission's
    findings of fact, "the appellate court does
    not retry the facts, reweigh . . . the
    evidence, or make its own determination of
    the credibility of the witnesses." Thus,
    unless we can say as a matter of law that
    claimant failed to sustain her burden of
    proving causation, the commission's findings
    are binding and conclusive upon us.
    Lee County Sch. Bd. v. Miller, 
    38 Va. App. 253
    , 259-61, 
    563 S.E.2d 364
    , 377-78 (2002) (citations omitted).
    Claimant's testimony and Dr. Jewell's medical records and
    opinions constitute credible evidence to support the
    commission's finding that claimant proved by clear and
    convincing evidence that her right carpal tunnel syndrome was
    - 5 -
    caused by her employment.   Dr. Jewell, who was aware of
    claimant's job duties and the fact that her symptoms began
    shortly after she started working for employer, opined that her
    job activities caused her right carpal tunnel symptoms and that
    her right carpal tunnel symptoms were related to her job
    activities.   As fact finder, the commission was entitled to
    accept Dr. Jewell's unequivocal opinion and to reject
    Dr. Blume's contrary opinion.    Dr. Blume reviewed medical
    records at employer's request.    However, unlike Dr. Jewell,
    Dr. Blume never examined claimant nor did he treat her over an
    extended period of time.
    Furthermore, credible evidence supports the commission's
    finding that claimant met her burden of proving her right carpal
    tunnel syndrome did not result from causes outside her
    employment.   Claimant testified that she started having problems
    with her right arm within several weeks after she began working
    for employer.   When she first saw Dr. Jewell, she described her
    biscuit-making duties to him.    Dr. Jewell's medical records and
    opinions, coupled with claimant's testimony, provided clear and
    convincing evidence that claimant's right carpal tunnel syndrome
    resulted from the activities required by her job making biscuits
    for employer rather than any other medical condition or her
    twenty-year history of smoking cigarettes.   As the commission
    noted,
    - 6 -
    Dr. Jewell repeatedly advised that the right
    carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by
    [claimant's] employment. While employer
    referred to potential causes of the
    claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome, such as
    an existing neck condition or her smoking
    habit, these possibilities do not mean that
    there were causes outside of the employment.
    The claimant also showed that the condition
    was peculiar to her duties of making the
    dough. She suffered symptoms soon after she
    began these industrial activities and
    Dr. Jewell documented these complaints. The
    . . . Act does not require that the claimant
    perform the work activity continuously for
    an eight-hour shift or for several months to
    be a compensable ordinary disease of life.
    Based upon this record, we cannot find as a matter of law
    that claimant's evidence failed to sustain her burden of proving
    by clear and convincing evidence that her right carpal tunnel
    syndrome was causally related to her employment and did not
    result from causes outside of her employment.   Accordingly, we
    affirm the commission's decision.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1109023

Filed Date: 9/17/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021