Henh Chu Ngo v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2008 )


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  •                                COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges McClanahan, Petty and Senior Judge Annunziata
    Argued by teleconference
    HENH CHU NGO
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.     Record No. 1671-06-4                                JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
    JUNE 17, 2008
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
    Jane Marum Roush, Judge
    Jonathan Shapiro (Peter D. Greenspun; Greenspun, Shapiro,
    Davis and Leary, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
    Joshua M. Didlake, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F.
    McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    Henh Chu Ngo appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and use of a firearm in the
    commission of a felony. He argues the trial court erred in admitting into evidence out-of-court
    statements made by Phuc Nguyen (“Phuc”) and Hoan Minh Le (“Le”) to Officer Cooper and to
    Detective Allen. The Commonwealth concedes error, but argues the error was harmless. We
    agree with the Commonwealth and affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Phuc, Le, and the murder victim, Ngoc Quy Doan Nguyen (“Quy”), left a pool hall and
    were approached by two men who asked them if they were members of a certain gang. Phuc
    denied any such membership.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    Phuc, Le, and Quy got into Quy’s car and were about to drive away when Quy returned
    to the pool hall to retrieve an item. While Quy was inside the pool hall, a man approached the
    car and asked Phuc to lower the window. Phuc refused because he saw that the man’s right hand
    was under his jacket. The man walked to the front of the car and, as Quy returned to the car, the
    man again asked Quy about his membership in the gang. Phuc was unable to hear Quy’s
    response, but immediately hearing gunshots, Phuc ducked inside the car. The shooter then fired
    twice into the car’s windshield.
    The police arrived at the scene within minutes of the shooting where Le told Detective
    Ellis that appellant was the shooter. Phuc also identified appellant as the shooter when he spoke
    with Officer Cooper at the police station.
    Phuc testified and identified appellant as the shooter. Over appellant’s objection, Officer
    Cooper testified that Phuc provided little information at the scene, but at the police station Phuc
    told him appellant was the shooter. Le testified that as Quy walked to the car, appellant
    approached Quy and appellant shot him. Detective Ellis testified, without objection, that he
    spoke to Phuc at the scene and Phuc identified appellant as the shooter. 1 Detective Allen
    testified that he prepared a photo lineup and that Phuc and Le separately identified appellant as
    the shooter. Over appellant’s objection, Detective Allen testified Le told him that appellant shot
    Quy.
    1
    At oral argument, appellant conceded he failed to object to Detective Ellis’ testimony,
    but contended it would have been futile given the court’s earlier ruling. However, the futility of
    presenting an objection cannot alone constitute cause for a failure to object at trial. See
    Snurkowski v. Commonwealth, 
    2 Va. App. 532
    , 536, 
    348 S.E.2d 1
    , 3 (1986) (discussing the
    good cause exception to Rule 5A:18).
    -2-
    ANALYSIS
    The Commonwealth concedes the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay testimony by
    Officer Cooper and Detective Allen. Therefore, the issue before the Court is whether the error
    was harmless.
    In Virginia, non-constitutional error is harmless “[w]hen it plainly appears from the
    record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and
    substantial justice has been reached.” Code § 8.01-678.
    “[A] fair trial on the merits and substantial justice” are not
    achieved if an error at trial has affected the verdict. Consequently,
    under Code § 8.01-678, a criminal conviction must be reversed
    unless “it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at
    the trial that” the error did not affect the verdict. An error does not
    affect a verdict if a reviewing court can conclude, without usurping
    the jury’s fact finding function, that, had the error not occurred, the
    verdict would have been the same.
    Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 1003
    , 1005, 
    407 S.E.2d 910
    , 911 (1991) (en banc).
    In other words:
    An error is harmless (1) if “other evidence of guilt is ‘so
    overwhelming and the error so insignificant by comparison that the
    error could not have affected the verdict,’” or, “even if the
    evidence of the defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming, [(2)] if the
    evidence admitted in error was merely cumulative of other,
    undisputed evidence.”
    McLean v. Commonwealth, 
    32 Va. App. 200
    , 211, 
    527 S.E.2d 443
    , 448-49 (2000) (quoting
    Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 
    16 Va. App. 9
    , 12, 
    427 S.E.2d 442
    , 444-45 (1993)).
    In making this decision with respect to non-constitutional error, the
    level of confidence used by a reviewing court is not “beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” It is, instead, whether “it plainly appears from
    the record and the evidence given at trial,” a more absolute
    measure and one more suitable for application to questions of law.
    Lavinder, 12 Va. App. at 1006, 
    407 S.E.2d at 911
    . “The effect of an error on a verdict varies
    widely ‘depending upon the circumstances of the case.’ Each case must, therefore, be analyzed
    -3-
    individually to determine if an error has affected the verdict.” 
    Id. at 1009
    , 
    407 S.E.2d at 913
    (citation omitted).
    Since no forensic evidence linked appellant to the murder and Phuc and Le, the only
    eyewitnesses to identify appellant as the shooter, were friends of Quy and members of a rival
    gang, 2 it cannot be said that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Thus, in order for us to
    conclude the error was harmless, the evidence admitted in error must be found to be merely
    cumulative of other, undisputed evidence. Here, Phuc and Le testified without objection that
    appellant was the shooter in this case. Detective Allen’s testimony that they identified appellant
    as the shooter in a photo lineup was also admitted without objection, as was Detective Ellis’s
    testimony that Le told him appellant was the shooter. It follows that the detectives’ challenged
    hearsay statements that Phuc and Le identified appellant as the shooter were merely cumulative
    of other undisputed evidence. 3
    Thus, any error in the admission of the evidence was harmless. Accordingly, appellant’s
    convictions for first-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony are
    affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    2
    The Commonwealth stipulated that Phuc, Le, and Quy were members of a street gang
    and argued that the killing was motivated by gang rivalries and in retaliation for an earlier attack
    on appellant.
    3
    Appellant argues that the admission of the hearsay statements was not harmless because
    the jury deliberated for more than five hours and recommended a minimal sentence of
    twenty-three years for the first-degree murder conviction, despite the identification testimony by
    Phuc and Le. This argument is without merit. Where credible evidence supports the jury’s
    verdict an appellate court will not speculate on the jury’s reasoning. See Harris v.
    Commonwealth, 
    19 Va. App. 518
    , 522, 
    452 S.E.2d 292
    , 295 (1995).
    -4-