Sheldon Maurice Adams v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •                                             COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    UNPUBLISHED
    Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges O’Brien and Lorish
    Argued by videoconference
    SHELDON MAURICE ADAMS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
    v.     Record No. 0827-22-3                                     JUDGE LISA M. LORISH
    JULY 18, 2023
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF BRISTOL
    Sage B. Johnson, Judge
    Charles S. Hale, II (The Law Office of Charles S. Hale, II, PLLC, on
    brief), for appellant.
    Justin B. Hill, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
    Attorney General; Leanna C. Minix, Assistant Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    A jury convicted Sheldon Maurice Adams of possession with intent to distribute
    methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute AMB-FUBINACA, a Schedule I
    synthetic drug. Adams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, but for the reasons
    below, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    On April 2, 2019, Bristol Patrol Officer Brandon Moore began a traffic stop after he saw the
    vehicle Adams was driving run a red light. Officer Moore detained Adams’s passenger Linda
    Sproles after discovering an active warrant for her arrest; Moore later found marijuana in her purse.
    After Officer Moore arrested Sproles, Adams gave him consent to search the vehicle.
    Officer Moore found a blue duffel bag on the rear seat. The blue duffel bag contained a black
    *
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
    pouch, a blue case, and a glass jar. In the black pouch, Officer Moore found several credit and debit
    cards with Adams’s name as well as three crystal cylinders, plastic baggies, a glass smoking device,
    and a red straw. The blue case contained several glass smoking devices, two hoses, a funnel, a
    scale, a scale tray, and more empty baggies. The glass jar contained what subsequent forensic
    analysis determined was 8.9 grams of AMB-FUBINACA, a Schedule I cannabimimetic agent.
    Officer Moore then detained Adams. While Adams was in handcuffs, he attempted to
    remove a black case from his pocket. When Officer Moore searched that case, he found two
    baggies containing 1.47 grams of methamphetamine and a plastic bag containing .906 gram of
    AMB-FUBINACA. Officer Moore then took Adams to the jail. During processing there, Officer
    Moore found $818 in Adams’s wallet—$218 in the normal money pocket and an additional $600
    “folded up” in a different part of the wallet. When Officer Moore found the $600, Adams said:
    “Damn.”
    Testifying in his own defense, Adams denied any knowledge of the narcotics found in the
    blue duffel bag and in the black case that was in his pocket. He stated that several people rode in his
    car that day, and had been helping Sproles “move[] all her stuff.” He explained that the blue duffel
    bag was not his and “could have” belonged to Sproles; he did not have “any idea” how his debit and
    credit cards got into that bag along with the narcotics and trafficking paraphernalia. Adams asserted
    that the black case containing the narcotics had slid under his foot while he was driving, so he
    reached down and put it in his pocket without knowing its contents. He claimed that he would not
    have given Officer Moore consent to search the vehicle if he had known about the drugs.
    The jury convicted Adams on both counts. Adams timely moved to set aside the verdict,
    which the trial court denied. By final order of May 5, 2022, the Circuit Court of the City of
    Bristol sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment with all but six years and seven months
    -2-
    suspended. Adams now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
    convictions.
    ANALYSIS
    “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is
    presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
    support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 
    72 Va. App. 513
    , 521 (2020) (alteration in original)
    (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 
    296 Va. 450
    , 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does
    not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt.’” 
    Id.
     (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 
    296 Va. 204
    ,
    228 (2018)). “Instead, we ask only ‘whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Secret, 296 Va. at
    228). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to
    substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the
    finder of fact at the trial.’” Id. (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 
    69 Va. App. 149
    , 161
    (2018)).
    “The trier of fact is ‘free to believe or disbelieve, in part or in whole, the testimony of any
    witness.’” Washington v. Commonwealth, 
    75 Va. App. 606
    , 616 (2022) (quoting Bazemore v.
    Commonwealth, 
    42 Va. App. 203
    , 213 (2004) (en banc)). “Similarly, ‘[i]n its role of judging
    witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the
    accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.’” 
    Id.
     (alteration in
    original) (quoting Flanagan v. Commonwealth, 
    58 Va. App. 681
    , 702 (2011)).
    “Consistent with the standard of review when a criminal appellant challenges the
    sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence below ‘in the “light most favorable” to the
    Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.’” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74
    -3-
    Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 
    300 Va. 325
    , 329 (2021)). This
    standard “requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the
    Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and
    all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Perkins, 
    295 Va. 323
    , 324 (2018)).
    To convict a defendant of possessing illegal drugs, “the Commonwealth must prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was aware of the presence and character of the drug
    and that the accused consciously possessed it.” Yerling v. Commonwealth, 
    71 Va. App. 527
    , 532
    (2020). “[P]roof of actual possession is not required; proof of constructive possession will
    suffice.” 
    Id.
     (alteration in original) (quoting Walton v. Commonwealth, 
    255 Va. 422
    , 426
    (1998)). The Commonwealth may prove constructive possession by establishing “acts,
    statements, or conduct of the accused or other facts or circumstances which tend to show that the
    [accused] was aware of both the presence and character of the [contraband] and that it was
    subject to his dominion and control.” 
    Id.
     (first alteration in original) (quoting Drew v.
    Commonwealth, 
    230 Va. 471
    , 473 (1986)).
    “Mere proximity to a controlled drug is not sufficient to establish dominion and control.”
    
    Id.
     (quoting Drew, 
    230 Va. at 473
    ). But occupancy of the vehicle and proximity to the
    contraband “are probative factors to be considered in determining whether the totality of the
    circumstances supports a finding of possession.” Hall v. Commonwealth, 
    69 Va. App. 437
    , 448
    (2018) (quoting Wright v. Commonwealth, 
    53 Va. App. 266
    , 274 (2009)). In proving possession,
    as with any other element, “circumstantial evidence is competent and is entitled to as much
    weight as direct evidence[,] provided that the circumstantial evidence is sufficiently convincing
    to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Finney v. Commonwealth, 277 Va.
    -4-
    83, 89 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Dowden v. Commonwealth, 
    260 Va. 459
    , 468
    (2000)).
    Adams concedes that the “Commonwealth could easily establish that [he] was in
    possession of drugs because they were found in a container on his person.” He still contends that
    “[t]he Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] possessed the case with
    knowledge of its nature and character” because he “testified that he picked up the case . . .
    because it rolled under his seat into the floorboard of the driver’s seat.” Likewise, he asserts that
    although Officer Moore found AMB-FUBINACA and multiple items consistent with narcotics
    trafficking next to Adams’s debit and credit cards in the blue duffel bag, Adams “maintained that
    the blue bag . . . was not his.” Finally, Adams asserts that he “provided a concrete purpose for
    the cash in his possession: he had just withdrawn his monthly social security benefits.”
    The “actual, physical possession of drugs permits the inference” that a defendant
    “knowingly possessed them aware of their illegal nature and character.” Morris v.
    Commonwealth, 
    51 Va. App. 459
    , 466 (2008). Here, Adams had a black case in his pocket that
    contained both methamphetamine and AMB-FUBINACA. While Adams argued that he picked
    up the case from the floor without knowing what was inside, a rational jury could reject this
    testimony. See Washington, 75 Va. App. at 616. That same jury could consider Adams’s
    attempt to remove the case from his pocket—while handcuffed—as an attempt to discard the
    case before Officer Moore found it, and infer from this that Adams was aware of the case’s
    contents. See id.
    What is more, a jury could also find beyond a reasonable doubt that Adams
    constructively possessed the drugs and the drug trafficking paraphernalia contained in the blue
    duffel bag in the backseat of the vehicle he was driving. Not only was Adams near the bag; his
    credit and debit cards were in the same pouch containing the contraband. AMB-FUBINACA
    -5-
    was also found in both the duffel bag and the case in his pocket, strengthening the connection
    between the two. Finally, Adams had a large amount of cash in his possession, stored in separate
    parts of his wallet, and cursed when Officer Moore found the folded up $600. Adams’s assertion
    that he “had many passengers in his vehicle” and that the “bag . . . did not belong to him” is,
    again, supported only by his self-serving testimony, which the jury did not credit.1 See
    Washington, 75 Va. App. at 616. Because a rational jury could have found Adams knew about
    the contents of the case from his pocket and the duffel bag, both convictions must be affirmed.
    CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, we affirm Adams’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute
    methamphetamine and AMB-FUBINACA.
    Affirmed.
    1
    Although Adams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove possession, he
    does not separately contend that the Commonwealth failed to prove intent to distribute.
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0827223

Filed Date: 7/18/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/18/2023