Ronald James Williams, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Huff and Lorish
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
RONALD JAMES WILLIAMS, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0373-22-1 JUDGE LISA M. LORISH
JUNE 13, 2023
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
Randall D. Smith, Judge Designate1
Michelle C.F. Derrico, Senior Appellate Attorney (Virginia Indigent
Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
Mason D. Williams, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Ronald James Williams, Jr. (“Williams”) appeals from his convictions for forcible sodomy
of a child under thirteen while Williams was over the age of eighteen, two counts of indecent
liberties with a child under fifteen, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Williams contends
that the trial court erroneously admitted a video depicting the child victim’s forensic interview and a
letter disclosing her alleged sexual abuse under Code § 19.2-268.3, which creates a hearsay
exception for specific statements by child victims of certain crimes. Williams also argues that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions because the victim’s testimony was inherently
incredible. Finally, Williams asserts that the trial court’s imposition of the mandatory life sentence
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
1
Judge Randall D. Smith presided at the jury trial and entered the final sentencing order
in this matter. Judge Rufus A. Banks, Jr., presided at the hearing on the Commonwealth’s
motion in limine to admit the child victim’s out-of-court statements under Code § 19.2-268.3.
for the forcible sodomy conviction violated the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND 2
In the summer of 2017, twenty-nine-year-old Williams lived in an apartment with his
partner, Francine Williams (“Francine”), and their four children. The family included
Williams’s and Francine’s daughter K.W., who was then ten years old, and her sister, who was
eleven years old. Williams or another relative would watch the children at the apartment while
Francine worked twelve-hour shifts. Williams continued to reside with his family until late
December 2017, when he was incarcerated for an unrelated offense. 3 Francine and the children
moved to a new residence soon after.
In April or May 2018, while Williams was incarcerated, K.W.’s sister texted Francine a
photograph of a letter K.W. had written alleging that Williams had sexually abused her. 4
Francine told Williams’s probation officer about the letter but did not report K.W.’s alleged
abuse to police because Francine had an outstanding arrest warrant and feared losing custody of
her children.
On September 27, 2018, Jenna Spagnuolo conducted a video-recorded forensic interview
of K.W. regarding her alleged abuse. K.W. told Spagnuolo that when she was ten years old,
2
On appeal, we review the evidence “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth,
the prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)).
3
The record does not reflect the circumstances of Williams’s incarceration.
4
The letter stated, “I don’t know if I already told you but did I ever tell you that daddy
always use to sexual harase [sic] or however you say it but have I told you that daddy . . . .
Never mind.” The letter also stated that Williams “[a]lways touch my behind”; “[t]ells me to
touch his dingaling”; and “forced me to suck his dingaling.” Finally, the letter stated, “[T]hat’s
why sometimes I don’t love him and sometimes I am actually happy that he is in jail so he won’t
do them things to me.”
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Williams “sexually harass[ed]” her multiple times at her apartment while her mother was at
work. K.W. said that Williams would “touch” and “rub[]” her “behind” with his hand and tell
her to “suck [his] dingaling.” Once, Williams took her to his bedroom, and ordered her to rub
his penis through his clothing; when she refused, he grabbed her hand and forced her to do so.
Another time, Williams forced her to fellate him by grabbing her head and moving her mouth
“back and forth” on his penis. During the interview, K.W. confirmed the allegations contained
in her letter to her sister, which she read aloud at Spagnuolo’s request. K.W. also said that her
siblings were present during one incident when Williams touched her buttocks.
On March 5, 2019, a grand jury indicted Williams for forcible sodomy of a child under
thirteen while he was over the age of eighteen, two counts of indecent liberties with a child under
fifteen, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Before trial, the Commonwealth moved to
admit K.W.’s letter and the video of her forensic interview under Code § 19.2-268.3. Qualified
“as an expert in child forensic interviews and child abuse,” Spagnuolo testified at a hearing on
the motion that she conducted K.W.’s forensic interview in “a neutral setting” and followed
“nationally recognized protocols and evidence-based research” in doing so. Before the
interview, Spagnuolo made “no determination as to what happen[ed] next with the
investigation.” Spagnuolo testified that K.W. responded to questions in an “age-appropriate
manner” and did not seem “scared” during the interview, although K.W. became “tearful” when
she discussed her abuse. Spagnuolo authenticated a copy of the forensic interview video and,
without objection, the Commonwealth played a portion of it for the trial court. 5
During argument on the Commonwealth’s motion, Williams asserted that the forensic
interview video would be “more prejudicial than probative and cumulative” of K.W.’s
5
At the hearing on the motion in limine, the Commonwealth did not introduce the
forensic interview video as a formal exhibit, and the record is ambiguous as to exactly what
portions of the video the trial court reviewed.
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anticipated testimony at trial. Acknowledging that K.W. could “identify the written statement”
and “identify herself in the video,” Williams argued that “it would be more appropriate to hear
directly from [K.W.]” regarding those statements. He also argued K.W.’s in-person testimony
was necessary to satisfy Williams’s “right to confront and cross-examine the witness against
him.” Williams did not object to admission of the letter.
Expressly considering the factors enumerated in Code § 19.2-268.3, the trial court found
that K.W. had “personal knowledge of the event” because “she is the victim.” The trial court
further found that “[t]he letter that [K.W.] authored to her sister, the recorded interview would
support the finding of credibility.” Continuing, the trial court found that K.W. “did not have any
motive to falsify or distort the events,” the forensic interview “provide[d] sufficient safeguards
against any bias or coercion,” Williams had an “opportunity” to commit the alleged acts of abuse
“while the mother was at work,” and “[i]t appears from the interview that [K.W.] did not suffer
from any pain or distress in making her statements.” Therefore, the trial court concluded that
“the time, content, and totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement supplies sufficient
indicia of reliability so as to render it inherently trustworthy.” (Emphasis added). The trial court
also found that the Confrontation Clause would be satisfied because K.W. would testify at trial.
It thus ruled that both the forensic interview video and letter were admissible.
At trial, K.W. testified that she told the truth during the forensic interview. 6 She said that
in 2017, Williams began molesting her by rubbing her “butt” while her mother was at work.
Later that summer, Williams began to ask K.W. to touch him sexually. K.W. testified that he
would wake her up in the morning, take her into his room, close the door, and threaten her,
“Don’t tell nobody.” Williams would then “[g]rab [her] wrist” and force her to “rub” his penis
6
The Commonwealth introduced the forensic interview video and letter into evidence at
trial.
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by placing her hand on top of the groin area of his pants. K.W. testified that Williams made her
do this multiple times and, when she did so, his penis felt “hard.”
K.W. testified that Williams became progressively more abusive, at one point exposing
his “private part” and placing it into her mouth. 7 As Williams pushed her head “back and forth,”
K.W. felt Williams insert his penis past her lips and teeth. Williams eventually stopped and
K.W. “spit it out and ran to [her] room.” Williams later asked her to do “it” again, but she
refused.
K.W. testified that after Williams was incarcerated and her family moved to a new
residence, she wrote the letter disclosing her abuse for the first time because she was “tired of
holding it in” and had feared upsetting Williams while they lived together. K.W. acknowledged
that one time when Williams had touched her “behind,” they were in her brother’s room and her
brothers were also present. That said, she maintained that she loved Williams and said she
wished she did not have to be on the stand and testify. 8
Denying K.W.’s allegations, Williams testified 9 that he had a “wonderful” relationship
with his children and did not know why K.W. had accused him of sexually abusing her.
Williams claimed that Francine first informed him of the alleged abuse during a phone
conversation while he was incarcerated after his arrest in December 2017. He also
acknowledged that he called K.W. “from jail” and said, “I’m sorry,” but maintained that he did
7
She asked to write down a more specific word rather than say it aloud and wrote down
“penis” on a sheet of paper, which the Commonwealth introduced as an exhibit.
8
At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, the trial court denied Williams’s
motion to strike the charges. After the defense presented its case-in-chief, the trial court denied
Williams’s renewed motion to strike, which he argued on the same grounds.
9
Williams acknowledged his criminal record comprising two felonies and two
misdemeanors involving crimes of moral turpitude.
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so because he regretted “being away from her for two years,” not because he had sexually
assaulted her. 10
The jury found Williams guilty of each charge. During sentencing deliberations, the jury
asked, “Can we request that the sentence run at the same time? Concurrently[.]” After
discussing the matter with counsel, the trial court, without objection, advised the jury,
You should impose such punishment as you feel is just under the
evidence that you’ve heard and within the instructions of the
Court, and so having said that, you have to follow the instructions.
I will file this and understand that your question was for what it
was worth and take that into consideration at the appropriate time.
The jury then recommended that the trial court impose a sentence of life plus four years’
imprisonment.
At the later sentencing hearing, Williams moved to set aside the jury’s verdict. He
contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove the charges because inconsistencies in
K.W.’s account, her delay in reporting the allegations, and the lack of corroboration rendered her
testimony inherently incredible. Williams also argued that the jury’s recommended sentence of
mandatory life imprisonment for the sodomy conviction was “cruel and unusual punishment”
because “it does not allow any room for rehabilitation” and “sends a message that . . . this one
particular offense is more serious than killing somebody.” The trial court found that the jury had
watched the forensic interview video and heard the forensic interviewer’s expert testimony,
which corroborated K.W.’s testimony. In addition, the trial court found that the General
Assembly had “removed” the trial court’s “discretion . . . to impose anything other than the
10
At trial, the Commonwealth played a portion of an audio recording of the “jail call”
during which Williams apologized to K.W. but did not introduce it as a formal exhibit.
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mandatory minimum sentence.” 11 Therefore, the trial court denied the motion and sentenced
Williams in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Williams appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Admissibility Challenges under Code § 19.2-268.3
Williams argues that the trial court erred in admitting the forensic interview video and
K.W.’s letter under Code § 19.2-268.3 because Spagnuolo “tainted” the forensic interview by
“coach[ing]” K.W.’s statements and the trial court failed to make statutorily-mandated factual
“findings regarding the letter prior to its admission.” We agree with the Commonwealth that
Williams has not preserved these arguments for appellate review.
Under Rule 5A:18, “[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for
reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except
for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” “The purpose of th[e]
contemporaneous objection requirement [in Rule 5A:18] is to allow the trial court a fair
opportunity to resolve the issue at trial, thereby preventing unnecessary appeals and retrials.”
Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 185, 195 (2015). Accordingly, “this Court ‘will not
consider an argument on appeal [that] was not presented to the trial court.’” Farnsworth v.
Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 490, 500 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Ohree v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308 (1998)), aff’d, 270 Va. 1 (2005). If a party fails to timely
and specifically object, he waives his argument on appeal. Arrington v. Commonwealth, 53
Va. App. 635, 641 (2009).
11
Under Code § 18.2-67.1(B)(2), upon conviction of sodomy of a victim less than
thirteen years of age while the perpetrator is eighteen years of age or older, “the punishment shall
include a mandatory minimum term of confinement for life” that “shall be served consecutively
with any other sentence.”
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During the hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion to admit the forensic interview and
the letter, Williams argued only that the video was “more prejudicial than probative and
cumulative” of K.W.’s expected testimony, that its admission would violate his right to
confrontation, that the forensic interviewer had not asked K.W. about any pressures that may
have been placed on her before the interview, and that it was “more appropriate” for K.W. to
testify in-person to authenticate the video and “identify” the letter. 12 After the trial court ruled
that the video and letter were admissible, Williams did not raise any further objection or
argument. Nor did he raise any other objection when the Commonwealth introduced the video
and the letter at trial. Thus, Williams waived his argument that the forensic interviewer
“coached” K.W., tainting the interview, as well as any objection to admission of the letter,
because he advances them for the first time on appeal. Farnsworth, 43 Va. App. at 500.
Williams has not invoked the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18, and we
will not do so sua sponte. Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 761 (2003) (en banc).
II. Sufficiency
Williams contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions because
K.W.’s testimony was inherently incredible as a matter of law. Williams asserts that K.W.’s
testimony was unworthy of belief because K.W. did not immediately report her abuse, the
forensic interviewer “pushed her” to say that Williams “compelled her to perform fellatio,” and
her brothers “took no action” to report her abuse despite their presence during one of the sexual
assaults. We disagree.
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
12
In this case, K.W. testified at trial and Williams had a full opportunity to cross-examine
her about the forensic interview as well as the letter.
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support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)
(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does
not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,
228 (2018)). “Instead, we ask only ‘whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Secret, 296 Va. at
228). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to
substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the
finder of fact at the trial.’” Id. (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161
(2018)).
Such deference stems, in part, from the trial court’s “opportunity to observe the testimony
and demeanor of all witnesses.” Lopez v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 70, 81 (2021).
Accordingly, settled principles dictate that “[d]etermining the credibility of witnesses . . . is
within the exclusive province of the [fact finder], which has the unique opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525
(2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304
(1993)). “[T]he conclusions of the fact finder on issues of witness credibility may be disturbed
on appeal only when we find that the witness’[s] testimony was ‘inherently incredible, or so
contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.’” Ragsdale v. Commonwealth,
38 Va. App. 421, 429 (2002) (quoting Ashby v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 548 (2000)).
“Evidence is not ‘incredible’ unless it is ‘so manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to
believe it’ or ‘shown to be false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of which
reasonable men should not differ.’” Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 487 (2018) (quoting
Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415 (2006)).
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The record supports the trial court’s finding that Williams sexually abused K.W. as she
alleged. It is well-settled that “a conviction for rape and other sexual offenses may be sustained
solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App.
73, 87 (2005). At trial, K.W. testified that Williams “rubb[ed]” her “butt” several times and
forced her to fellate him by grabbing her head and inserting his penis into her mouth. That
testimony alone was sufficient to sustain Williams’s convictions. Cf. Alvarez Saucedo v.
Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 31, 48-49 (2019) (holding ten-year-old victim’s testimony that the
defendant “touched her vagina with his tongue,” “‘open[ed]’ her vagina,” and “lick[ed] around
all of [her] vagina” was sufficient to prove oral sodomy (alterations in original)). Consistent
with her trial testimony, K.W. told the forensic interviewer that Williams had groped her
“behind” and forced her to perform oral sex.
Although K.W. did not immediately report her sexual assault, that circumstance did “not
render [her] testimony inherently incredible as a matter of law.” Corvin v. Commonwealth, 13
Va. App. 296, 299 (1991). Rather, “[t]he jury was entitled to attribute such significance as it
deemed appropriate to this delay.” Id. At trial, K.W.’s testimony reflected her fear that
Williams would be “mad” if she reported him when they lived together, and she did not report
her abuse until Williams was incarcerated. That testimony provided the jury with a rational
explanation for her delayed disclosure of the abuse. See id. (holding the “victim’s youth, fright
and embarrassment” provided the jury with “an acceptable explanation” for his delayed reporting
of sexual abuse); Woodard v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 24, 28 (1994) (holding the victim’s
delay in reporting was “explained by and completely consistent with the all too common
circumstances surrounding sexual assault on minors—fear of disbelief by others and threat of
further harm from the assailant”).
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The record does not support Williams’s contentions that K.W.’s brothers “took no action”
to uncover her sexual abuse or that her account was “coached.” First, although K.W. testified
that her brothers were present when Williams touched her buttocks, no evidence established that
her brothers saw Williams do so or were otherwise aware of the sexual assaults.
Second, the record contains no evidence that Spagnuolo coerced K.W.’s statements
during the forensic interview. To the contrary, Spagnuolo testified that she conducted the
forensic interview in “neutral” conditions using standardized procedures, had no input in
determining the course of Williams’s criminal investigation, and noticed that K.W. was unafraid
during questioning. And the forensic interview occurred after K.W. had written the letter
alleging that Williams had sexually touched her and forced her to perform oral sex.
Furthermore, although K.W. was reluctant to testify against Williams at trial, she said
that she reported her abuse because she was “tired of holding it in.” The jury could have
reasonably inferred from that evidence that K.W. disclosed her abuse to the forensic interviewer
willingly—even if reluctantly.
In sum, K.W.’s testimony that Williams sexually abused and sodomized her more than
once was competent, not inherently incredible, and sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was guilty of forcible sodomy of a child under thirteen while he was over eighteen, two
counts of indecent liberties with a child under fifteen, and two counts of aggravated sexual
battery. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was not plainly wrong and we do not disturb it.
III. Sentencing
Williams assigns error to the trial court “finding a mandatory minimum life sentence was
constitutional under [Code] § 18.2-67.1(B)(2)” and “sentencing Mr. Williams to life in prison.”
While Williams includes a heading in his brief stating a life sentence is “cruel and unusual,” he
provides no argument or caselaw to support this heading. Instead, Williams focuses on the right
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to trial and sentencing by jury, and asks this Court to recommend en banc review of two prior
decisions that he asserts create “a discrepancy between Code § 19.2-295, statutes which call for a
mandatory minimum sentence, and Va. Const. Art. I, §§ 2 and 8.” 13 Williams also argues that
neither the jury nor the victim or her family believed imposition of a mandatory life sentence was
just and that therefore the trial court erred in imposing the statutorily required sentence.
Because Rule 5A:20(e) requires that an appellant’s opening brief contain the “principles
of law, the argument, and the authorities relating to each question presented,” Turner v.
Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 72, 77 (2017) (quoting Bartley v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App.
740, 744 (2017)), we find any argument about the mandatory life sentence being cruel and
unusual was waived.
Assuming, without deciding, that Williams preserved, through the motion for
reconsideration filed after sentencing, his argument that the victim, her family, and the jury
believed a mandatory life sentence was unjust, we find no error here. The jury complied with the
sentencing instructions and sentenced the defendant to mandatory life imprisonment on the
forcible sodomy conviction and one year on each of the remaining four convictions. That the
jury asked if the sentence could run concurrently does not indicate that they found the sentence
inappropriate. The record also lacks any indication that K.W. and her family’s views were
disregarded in the sentencing process. 14 In any event, the jury sentenced Williams to the
13
The two cases Williams identifies are Commonwealth v. Greer, 63 Va. App. 561, 569
(2014) (court “obligated to reject the jury’s verdict” beneath the mandatory minimum sentence
and must “impanel a new jury to determine punishment within the prescribed limits established
by the legislature”), and Blowe v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 457, 471-73 (2020) (affirming
that a jury may not nullify a mandatory minimum sentence). We note that Virginia’s
constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment is found in Article I, § 9.
14
At the sentencing phase before the jury, Francine testified that “this is, honestly, not the
outcome we were hoping for” and that the sentence would cause “suffering for my whole
family” and “being gone away from his children any longer would be detrimental to our family.”
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minimum sentence allowable by law, so any error in the sentencing process would be harmless.
See Blowe v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 457, 471 (2020) (“The fact that the jury set
[defendant’s] term of incarceration at the minimum allowed by law all but conclusively
established that [he] suffered no prejudice” from the error at sentencing.); see also Nunez v.
Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 152, 159 (2016) (citing with approval Holley v. State, 651 So. 2d
50, 54 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), finding sentencing error harmless because the defendant received
the minimum sentence).
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
K.W. did not testify, and no statement from her was introduced as evidence. To the extent
Williams argues that K.W. and her family’s rights as victims under Code § 19.2-11.01(A)(4)(d)
were violated, those arguments were waived as Williams neither argued at sentencing that a
victim impact statement should be introduced nor that the Commonwealth had disregarded any
written request of the victim to be consulted on the disposition of the case. See Rule 5A:18. The
trial court also considered letters from Francine and Williams’s children sent directly to the court
after the jury imposed its sentence to be ex parte communications and was not asked to consider
them at sentencing. Williams has not challenged this ruling on appeal.
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