Kenneth R. Kranz v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Apr 27 2018, 6:13 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Vincent L. Scott Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kenneth R. Kranz, April 27, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A02-1703-CR-631
v. Appeal from the Hamilton
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven R. Nation,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
29D01-1507-FA-5840
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Kenneth R. Kranz (“Kranz”) was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of
Class A felony child molesting and two counts of Class C felony child
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molesting in the Hamilton Superior Court. The trial court sentenced Kranz to
consecutive terms of fifty years for each Class A felony and to concurrent terms
of six years for each Class C felony for an aggregate sentence of one hundred
years. On appeal, Kranz argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
sentenced him.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] A.K. was born to Kranz and his wife in 1999. The first time A.K. remembers
her father touching her inappropriately was when she was six years old. A.K.
woke up in the middle of the night to Kranz covering her mouth and putting his
fingers inside her vagina. Kranz continued to molest A.K. until she was 16
years old including exposing himself to her, pinning her to the ground and
humping her, sleeping in her bed and touching her inappropriately under her
clothes, and attempting to walk in on her while she was in the bathroom.
[4] Kranz also began molesting his intellectually disabled daughter K.K., born in
2002, when she was around nine years old. On one occasion, K.K. was asleep
in her parents’ car while she and her siblings waited for their mom to get off
work. While waiting in the car, Kranz touched K.K.’s vagina with his fingers.
Kranz first had sexual intercourse with K.K. when she was twelve and
continued to do so several more times. Kranz molested K.K. until she was
fourteen years old.
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[5] In the summer of 2015, when A.K. was sixteen, she told a camp counselor
about her father’s molestation. Law enforcement was informed, and both A.K.
and K.K. were interviewed. Kranz was arrested and charged with two counts of
Class A felony child molesting, two counts of Class B felony incest, and two
counts of Class C felony child molesting. A three-day jury trial commenced on
January 9, 2017, after which the jury found Kranz guilty as charged.
[6] At Kranz’s sentencing hearing on March 2, 2017, the trial court identified nine
aggravating factors including: (1) the ongoing nature of the abuse; (2) that there
were distinct acts done to both girls; (3) that there were two victims; (4) the
extent of physical and mental anguish and harm caused by the acts; (5) Kranz’s
prior criminal history involving sexual matters; (6) that Kranz was in the
position of care, custody, and control of the girls; (7) that K.K. had special
needs; and (8) A.K.’s tender age at the time the molestation began. Tr. Vol. 4,
p. 198.
[7] Kranz offered mitigating factors for consideration “that his upbringing was
inappropriate” and that he has “educational, cognitive learning disabilities.” Id.
at 199. However, the trial court declined to find them as mitigating factors
because “nothing that the Court found concerning the incidents happening to
these two girls were diminished by any of those factors.” Id. The court then
sentenced Kranz to fifty years for each Class A felony and to concurrent terms
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of six years for each Class C felony for an aggregate sentence of one hundred
years.1
[8] Kranz now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Kranz claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.
Sentencing decisions are generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). However, a trial court may
be found to have abused its discretion in sentencing for: (1) failing to enter a
sentencing statement; (2) entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons
for imposing a sentence where the record does not support the reasons
provided; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are both
clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration; or (4) entering
a sentencing statement in which the reasons provided are improper as a matter
of law. Id. at 490–91. The reasons or omissions of reasons given by the trial
court for a particular sentence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
[10] Kranz first argues that “[t]he court here has failed to enter a sentencing
statement at all.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. Kranz is mistaken. The court provided a
detailed oral sentencing statement just before pronouncing its sentence:
The Court finds concerning the sentencing in this cause that the
Court looks at the aggravating circumstances of the length of the
1
The trial court did not enter judgment on the Class B felony incest counts due to double jeopardy concerns.
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numerous acts, of the ongoing nature of the abuse, that they were
distinct acts as to both victims, and that there were two victims.
The extent of physical and mental anguish and harm caused by
it, prior criminal history involving sexual matters, that he was in
the position of care, custody, and control of these children. The
testimony that was presented concerning K.K. being special
needs and that A.K., the tender age at the time when these
molestations started. The Court finds, notes for the mitigating
circumstances that it does note that his upbringing was not
appropriate and that he does have educational, cognitive learning
disabilities. But nothing that the Court found concerning the
incidents happening to these two girls were diminished by any of
those factors so the Court will note them, but not find them as
mitigating factors.
Tr. Vol. 4, pp. 198–99. Here, the trial court identified eight aggravating factors,
and it noted the two mitigating circumstances offered by Kranz, but it declined
to find them as mitigating factors and provided its reason for not doing so.
[11] The statement proffered allows us to “carry out our function of reviewing the
trial court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing” as it provides “reasons for
imposing the sentence” and facts that are particular to Kranz and the crime he
committed. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490 (quoting Page v. State, 424 N.E.2d
1021, 1023 (Ind. 1981)). And the finding of mitigating factors rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490–91. Simply
put, the trial court’s sentencing statement was sufficient. See id. at 492; Gleason v.
State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[12] Kranz also contends that the trial court improperly used a material element of
the offense—A.K.’s age—as an aggravated circumstance justifying the
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enhanced sentence. We disagree. An element of child molestation is that the
child is under fourteen years of age, see Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3, and one of the
aggravating factors that the trial court found here was “the tender age [of A.K.]
at the time when these molestations started.” Tr. Vol. 4, p. 198. But our
supreme court has explained “that even where the age of the victim is an
element of the offense, the very young age of a child can support an enhanced
sentence as a particularized circumstance of the crime.” Kimbrough v. State, 979
N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 2012).
[13] Here, A.K. was only six years old when her father began molesting her. This is
eight years below the statutory threshold for the offense. I.C. § 35-42-4-3. And
the molestation of A.K. occurred over a ten-year period. Thus, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it considered A.K.’s young age as a proper
aggravating circumstance justifying an enhanced sentence. See Buchanan v. State,
767 N.E.2d 967, 971 (Ind. 2002) (finding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion during sentencing when it noted the “victim’s particularly tender
years (age 5)” as an aggravating circumstance); Reyes v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1124,
1128 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it considered the age of the nine-year-old victim who was molested over a
period of years as an aggravator).
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Conclusion
[14] The trial court here provided a sufficient oral sentencing statement, and it did
not abuse its discretion when it found A.K.’s young age as a proper aggravating
circumstance. Accordingly, we affirm.
Najam, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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