Alexandra Bedford v. State of Mich. ( 2018 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 18a0055n.06
Case No. 17-1344
FILED
Jan 30, 2018
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
ALEXANDRA BEDFORD, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
STATE OF MICHIGAN; COUNTY OF ) MICHIGAN
KALAMAZOO, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
____________________________________/ )
Before: MERRITT, MOORE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
MERRITT, Circuit Judge. This federal case arises from domestic-relations litigation in
family court in Kalamazoo, Michigan, in which plaintiff Alexandra Bedford was a party.
Plaintiff appeals from a district court ruling in favor of defendants, the State of Michigan and the
County of Kalamazoo, Michigan, dismissing pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) her
claims under the broad language of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. In the state-court
action, plaintiff claimed as an “invisible disability” her particular tendency to become stressed or
extremely nervous when engaged in litigation. She asked the state court judge presiding over her
domestic relations case to allow her to have a “disability advocate” represent her rather than a
lawyer. She asks this court to recognize “litigation stress” as a disability and as a basis for
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substituting a “disability advocate” with training in “litigation stress syndrome” to represent her
in her domestic relations case. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal
of plaintiff’s complaint. She has failed to state a claim demonstrating that she was denied a
required accommodation for a recognized disability.
At the outset, it should be noted that the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.
509 (2004), upheld the constitutionality of Title II against Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendment
claims. The Court cautioned nevertheless that “Title II does not require States to employ any and
all means to make judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities, and it does not require
States to compromise their essential eligibility criteria for public programs.” Id. at 531-32.
I.
Plaintiff was a litigant appearing before the state family court pro se when she sought
accommodations for her alleged disability. Plaintiff is represented by counsel in this action
before our court, and she was represented by counsel below in the federal district court. Plaintiff
calls her disability a “diagnosed invisible disability,” specifically “extreme anxiety” that triggers
symptoms that include an “inability to concentrate, understand, and speak in an effective manner
when under stress.” Second amended complaint at ¶¶ 1, 4. Claiming physical and emotional
injury, plaintiff maintains that
Defendants have discriminated intentionally against Plaintiff in violation of Title
II of the ADA, by refusing to provide auxiliary aids and services necessary to
ensure an equal opportunity for Plaintiff to participate in Defendants’ programs
and activities.
Second amended complaint at ¶¶ 59-60 (citation omitted). Plaintiff submitted numerous requests
to the Michigan state court to provide accommodations during three hearings held in 2015. In
her second amended complaint, filed in federal district court below, she included the following
five requested accommodations she made to the state court: (1) that telephonic hearings be held
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for nonevidentiary hearings; (2) allow short breaks in proceedings if plaintiff was becoming
symptomatic, i.e., “stressed”; (3) allow plaintiff to digitally record proceedings for her immediate
and private use to offset memory deficits brought on by her condition, and for which written
transcripts would not be available in a timely manner; (4) allow a “disability advocate” to act on
her behalf during court proceedings; and (5) access to a court administrator regarding her
accommodations.
Contrary to plaintiff’s claim that the state court denied her requests for accommodations,
the record discloses that the state court specifically allowed plaintiff to appear by telephone for
nonevidentiary hearings, and stated it always tried to accommodate litigants’ reasonable requests
for short breaks during proceedings.1 The court denied her request to record proceedings
because all court proceedings are recorded and transcripts are available. The court denied her
request for representation by a “disability advocate” because the advocate was not a lawyer, and
it denied her request for access to a court administrator to the extent that plaintiff wished
unfettered, direct access to court personnel. Instead, the court ruled that plaintiff’s requests for
accommodations must be in writing to be considered.
In late 2015, plaintiff filed her first complaint in federal court claiming violation of Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act by numerous individual and
institutional defendants in the State of Michigan. After two more amendments to the complaint,
the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cognizable claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act on two grounds: (1) that plaintiff did
not “allege specific facts that would plausibly describe a qualifying disability;” and (2) failure to
1
In addition to the allegations in the complaint, we may also consider other materials that are integral to the
pleadings or are attached to the pleadings, including public records, and documents that are otherwise appropriate
for the taking of judicial notice, such as transcripts and filings from a state court proceeding. See Ashland, Inc. v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 648 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2011).
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“allege facts to show that she was denied ‘access’ to the courts either ‘solely’ by reason of such
‘disability’ or that she would have been treated differently ‘but for’ her ‘disability.’” D. Ct. op.
at 6.
II.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege facts with sufficient specificity to
state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79
(2009). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully,” id. at 678, and instead “calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of [unlawful conduct].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007). Under the standard set out in Iqbal and Twombly, a court accepts as true all
factual allegations, but the court does not apply this presumption of truth to conclusory or legal
assertions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. If the plaintiff’s facts, accepted as true, do not state a
claim that has facial plausibility, the plaintiff has not satisfied the pleading requirements under
Rule 8, and the complaint will be dismissed. We review the district court’s ruling on a motion to
dismiss de novo. In re NM Holdings Co., 622 F.3d 613, 618 (6th Cir. 2010).
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, states in broad
language that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of
a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” The broad language of the
statute and regulations leaves it to the federal judiciary to define what is a “disability” and what
action constitutes a required accommodation for such disability. To sustain a claim, a disabled
person must be denied meaningful access to a benefit or service. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 301 (1985). Reasonable accommodation may be necessary to ensure meaningful access;
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and a refusal to modify a program or policy may, in view of the circumstances, become
unreasonable and discriminatory. Id.; see also Ability Center v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901,
907 (6th Cir. 2004). The language of Title II generally tracks the language of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and the jurisprudence interpreting either section is applicable to both and
should be interpreted and applied consistently. See MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington,
293 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2002).
To establish a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, a plaintiff must
show: (1) that she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that she was excluded from
participation in a public entity’s services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated
against; and (3) that such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of her disability. See
Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 357 (6th Cir. 2015).
A. Plaintiff’s Alleged Disability
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that she is disabled
within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and that such “impairment
[ ] substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Major life
activities include, but are not limited to, “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
The district court ruled that plaintiff’s pleading contained “merely conclusory assertions
that she has a disability” because she does not allege specific facts that would plausibly describe
a qualifying disability. D. Ct. op. at 6 (citing Marks v. Tennessee, 562 F. App’x 341, 346 (6th
Cir. 2014)). While we agree that the “bare bones” description in plaintiff’s pleading is lacking in
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detail, plaintiff’s accommodation request for the hearing dated June 4, 2015, describes her
“functional impairments” more fully:
Bedford is concerned that her symptoms have caused her to be misperceived by
the Court as uncooperative or resistant. In fact problems with expressive speech
and concentration slows her reaction time. It is important to notice that Dr.
Bedford’s impairment is an injury that is largely invisible. When under the stress
of litigation, she may appear to be functional on a superficial level even when she
is not. Dr. Bedford’s functioning is highest when she is in supportive and safe
environments. Her functioning deteriorates when she is in non-supportive, unsafe
environments, or when she is under any perceived time pressure or stress.
Concentration is affected causing communication difficulties. Stress is causing
somatic symptoms. Dr. Bedford—during litigation—cannot sleep normally, rest,
or recuperate due to traumatic stress symptoms including nightmares and startle
responses (i.e., she jumps when doorbell rings). She has hyper reactivity/hyper
arousal and she can’t eat or sleep or digest food normally.
Accommodation Request at 2.
Although we uncovered no case where a court has recognized stress caused by litigation
to qualify as a disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation
Act, and we do not do so here, depression and severe anxiety, whatever its cause, can rise to the
level of a disability. See, e.g., Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 572
(4th Cir. 2015) (anxiety can be a valid disability for purposes of the ADA); Santos v. City of New
York, No. 01-cv-0120, 2001 WL 1568813, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2001) (stress and depression
may be considered impairments depending on whether they result from a documented
physiological or mental disorder); Reilly v. Revlon, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 524, 539 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (finding that depression may qualify as a disability for purposes of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, “provided that the condition is not a ‘temporary psychological impairment’”).
We will assume, at this stage of the litigation, that plaintiff has a qualifying disability.
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B. Plaintiff’s Requested Accommodations
In her brief for this appeal, plaintiff challenges the district court’s dismissal of her
complaint on the issue of whether she has sufficiently alleged a qualifying disability in her
second amended complaint. The accommodations she seeks reflect the nature of the disability
she asserts. Plaintiff has not made any argument in her brief on appeal discussing how the
handling of her accommodation requests excluded or limited her access to the state court, or how
she was otherwise discriminated against based on her alleged disability.
Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, an individual may assert a claim
against a state or its employees for violation of the right of access to the courts. Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–34. The Disabilities Act requires reasonable accommodations for persons
with disabilities, to provide them “an even playing field,” but does not require that disabled
persons be treated preferentially or necessarily be given the accommodation of their choice.
Goldblatt v. Geiger, 867 F. Supp. 2d 201, 210 (D.N.H. 2012) (quoting Felix v. New York City
Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2003)). In Lane, the Supreme Court held that Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act’s “requirement of program accessibility” in the context of
the right of access to the courts “unquestionably is valid . . . as it applies to the class of cases
implicating the accessibility of judicial services.” 541 U.S. at 534. But, as quoted in the
introduction to this opinion, Lane cautioned that Title II requires only “reasonable modifications
that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided,” not “to employ any and
all means to make judicial services accessible to persons with disabilities.” Id. at 531–32
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In her second amended complaint, plaintiff enumerated five accommodation requests she
submitted to the state court. Plaintiff’s primary complaint is focused on the state court’s denial
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of her request to present her case through a “disability advocate.” We note that in response to at
least one of plaintiff’s requests for a disability advocate, plaintiff was directed to file a written
motion with the court if she wanted her disability advocate to be present with her when she
appeared in court. Plaintiff objected to filing a written motion and apparently did not do so. At
the October 1, 2015, show-cause hearing concerning plaintiff’s failure to pay certain court-
ordered fees, plaintiff did not appear in person and instead sent her “disability advocate” to
represent her. Because the person was not a lawyer, the court denied the person permission to
speak on plaintiff’s behalf because Michigan does not allow the unauthorized practice of law.
See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.916(1).
As the state court judge ruled, Michigan law generally prohibits appointment of a
nonlawyer to represent a party in state court. Plaintiff points to no authority that would require a
court to allow a “disability advocate” to substitute for representation by a lawyer, and she fails to
explain why she did not file a written motion requesting her “disability advocate” participate in
the proceedings when told this was necessary for the state court to consider her request. The
Americans with Disabilities Act does not require that a state court in a family-court proceeding
approve an accommodation that allows a party to present her case through a nonlawyer
“disability advocate” in violation of state law when the party did not file a motion as directed.
Plaintiff has the same right as all litigants to be assisted in court proceedings by a lawyer or to
speak on her own behalf, with or without the assistance of a lawyer. Imposing a federal duty to
allow a litigant to act through a “disability advocate” without complying with the state court’s
requirement to file a written motion on the issue would “fundamentally alter the services”
provided by the court in violation of Lane and is not a reasonable modification. Plaintiff was not
denied access to the court or prevented from participating in the proceeding either pro se or with
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a lawyer. Plaintiff represented herself competently at numerous points throughout the state-court
proceeding. The number of filings made and hearings held in the proceeding belie plaintiff’s
allegation that she was denied meaningful access to the courts. And the state court did make
reasonable modifications to its proceedings in response to plaintiff’s other requests.
Even assuming plaintiff had a qualifying disability, she has not alleged facts to show that
she was denied access to the state court. In short, construing the second amended complaint,
with its allegations accepted as true and all reasonable inferences drawn in her favor, along with
consideration of the record in the state court proceeding, plaintiff failed to state a cognizable
claim.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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