Randolph Town Officce Decision/Zoning Application ( 2006 )


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  •                               STATE OF VERMONT
    ENVIRONMENTAL COURT
    }
    Randolph Town Office Zoning Appeal }                  Docket No. 106-6-05 Vtec
    (Appeal of Rydjeski)          }
    }
    Decision and Order
    Letita H. Rydjeski appeals from the decisions of the Town of Randolph (Town)
    Development Review Board (DRB) granting site plan approval and a zoning permit to
    Appellee-Applicant Town for the renovation and expansion of their municipal office
    building on 7 Summer Street in the Town’s Commercial zoning district. Appellant
    appears and represents herself; the Town is represented by Peter M. Nowlan, Esq.; and
    William J. Kevan and Interested Person Leigh R. Wright appeared and represent
    themselves.
    This appeal is on-the-record, since the Town has adopted and implemented the
    procedures necessary for such appeals, pursuant to 24 V.S.A. §§ 4471 and 4472. Mr.
    Wright and the Town have filed briefs on the merits of this appeal for the Court’s
    consideration. William J. Kevan has also filed a motion to intervene, pursuant to 10
    V.S.A. § 8504(n).   Appellant and Mr. Kevan also filed a “Motion for de Novo
    Proceedings,” asserting that a trial de novo is warranted because the tape recording of
    the hearings was allegedly inaudible and was not transcribed.
    I.    Summary Issues
    Appellant’s Statement of Questions raises a variety of issues in seven questions,
    almost all of which are not appropriate for our consideration in this permit appeal
    proceeding. Appellant’s first Question, labeled Question A, asks, “Why is the proposed
    addition now placed over an existing VCP sewer?” Appellant neither cites nor refers to
    any provisions in the Town’s Zoning or Subdivision Regulations prohibiting the
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    placement of the proposed addition over an existing sewer. Moreover, Appellant never
    expresses concern about the sewer in her letters or responsive motions to the Court. In
    the absence of any specific reference to a bylaw or regulatory provision being violated
    by building the proposed addition on top of a municipal sewer, and being unable to
    find such provision ourselves, the Court declines to answer that question, and it is
    hereby DISMISSED.
    Appellant’s second Question, actually labeled Question 1, concerns why the
    Town presented different plans to the DRB for the proposed addition to the municipal
    office building than were presented to the public at a November 2, 2004 bond issue vote
    for the same addition. Similarly, Appellant’s fourth Question, labeled Question 3, also
    concerns a change in plans from those presented at the time of a municipal bond issue
    vote. While we sympathize with Appellant’s position, we cannot address this specific
    concern because our review of the DRB’s decision in this on-the-record appeal is limited
    to the application presented to the DRB below. We cannot address matters beyond the
    Town’s current plans and applications, as presented to the DRB.
    This Court does not have jurisdiction to review decisions of a Town Selectboard
    or issues of public indebtedness arising under Chapter 53 of Title 24 relating to the
    impropriety of a bond issue, a vote on a particular bond issue, or on the plans
    submitted pursuant to a bond issue vote. Our jurisdiction is limited to certain appeals,
    as articulated in 4 V.S.A. § 1001 (2005):
    10 V.S.A. Chapters 201 and 220 and matters arising under 24 V.S.A.
    Chapters 201 and 220 and matters arising under 24 V.SA. Chapter 117 and
    Chapter 61, subchapter 12. In addition, the judges shall have original
    jurisdiction to revoke permits under 10 V.S.A. Chapter 151.
    Appellant’s allegations relating to the impropriety of the Town’s bond issue for
    improvements to the municipal offices are therefore not within this Court’s jurisdiction.
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    Appellant’s remaining questions for our review, Questions 2, 4, 5, and 6, concern
    the Town’s planned removal of a flowering crab apple tree located to the south of the
    existing municipal office building in the middle of green space adjacent to the existing
    municipal offices. The crab apple tree is labeled on the Town’s site plan as “existing 20″
    apple” tree and is considered a public shade tree under the control of the Town’s tree
    warden. See 24 V.S.A. § 2502.
    Although the Randolph tree warden also happens to be the Town Zoning
    Administrator, the Legislature has limited our jurisdiction to those provisions of the
    Vermont Statutes Annotated enumerated in 4 V.S.A. § 1001. Decisions of tree wardens
    are not reviewable in this Court, as they arise under Chapter 67 of Title 24. Appellant
    may find the relief she seeks in Superior Court. However, we cannot make an advisory
    statement as to whether an action in Superior Court will succeed or even be heard.
    Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction over Appellant’s remaining Questions, relating to
    the crab apple tree, specifically Questions 2, 4, 5, and 6.
    II.    Kevan Intervention Request
    Before reviewing the Town’s decision on the proposed municipal office building
    addition, we must first address Mr. Kevan’s motion to intervene under 10 V.S.A.
    § 8504(n). Section 8504(n) sets out six instances when it is permissible for a person to
    intervene. As we have already ruled in our July 15, 2005 Entry Order, Mr. Kevan does
    not meet sub-sections 1, 2, or 5, as he did not appear in the action appealed from, is not
    a party of right under 10 V.S.A. § 8502(5), and does not qualify as an interested person
    under 24 V.S.A. § 4465. Subsection 3 and 4 are similarly inapplicable because Mr.
    Kevan is not a member of the natural resources board or a panel of that board, nor is he
    a “person aggrieved” under 10 V.S.A. § 8502(7) because this is not an appeal of an act or
    decision by a district commission or coordinator, the secretary of the Agency of Natural
    Resources, the environmental court, or the supreme court.
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    The only possible avenue for allowing Mr. Kevan to intervene in this proceeding
    is whether he would be allowed to intervene under the standards established by the
    Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure (V.R.C.P.). 10 V.S.A. § 8504(n)(6). V.R.C.P. 24 allows
    a party to intervene when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene, which is
    not the case here, or when the potential intervener can demonstrate an interest relating
    to the property which is the subject of this action and where the disposition of the action
    may as a practical matter impair or impede the potential intervener’s ability to protect
    that interest, unless the potential intervener’s interest is adequately represented by
    existing parties. V.R.C.P. 24(a).
    Mr. Kevan’s interest related to property at issue in this appeal is a mortgage
    interest in the property of Russell Royce at 13 Summer Street. Mr. Royce is the record
    title holder of that property, but Mr. Kevan holds a mortgage interest. In Town of
    Sandgate v. Colehamer, 
    156 Vt. 77
    , 81-83 (1990), our Supreme Court held that the
    interest of a possessor of property who made mortgage payments on that property on
    behalf of the titleholder was an insufficient interest for standing to appeal a zoning
    decision under 24 V.S.A. § 4464(b) (now § 4465).         We find the Court’s reasoning
    instructive and find that Mr. Kevan cannot intervene under V.R.C.P. 24(a) and 10 V.S.A.
    § 8504(n)(6) because any disposition relating to the Town’s expansion of their municipal
    office building will not directly affect Mr. Kevan‘s mortgage interest in the property at
    13 Summer Street. Moreover, Mr. Kevan’s interests are already adequately represented
    by Appellant who lives at 6 Summer Street, which is closer to the Town’s municipal
    office than the property in which Mr. Kevan holds a mortgage interest. Mr. Kevan’s
    motion to intervene under 10 V.S.A. § 8504(n) is hereby DENIED.
    III.   Factual Background
    In an on-the-record appeal, the factual findings of the administrative body below
    are given great weight, although they are not conclusive. This Court must determine if
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    substantial evidence exists in the record as a whole from which the factual findings of
    the DRB might reasonably be inferred. See In re Town of Sherburne, 
    154 Vt. 596
    , 604-05
    (1990); Appeal of Lussier and No., Docket No. 116-5-02 Vtec (Vt. Envtl. Ct., Sept. 16,
    2002). If there is conflicting evidence, the DRB is the body charged with weighing this
    evidence. Appeal of Doyle, Docket No. 100-5-02 Vtec (Vt. Envtl. Ct., Jan. 21, 2003). This
    Court will not disturb factual findings rendered by an appropriate municipal panel if
    supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 
    Id.
    Upon consideration of the record and the parties’ memoranda, the Court
    determines that the following DRB factual findings are supported by substantial
    evidence in the record.*
    1.      On March 30, 2005, the Town submitted a substantially complete zoning
    permit and site plan approval application to the DRB for an expansion of the Town’s
    municipal offices on their 19,403 square-foot lot located at 7 Summer Street. Municipal
    office buildings are a conditional use in the Commercial District, see Zoning
    Regulations, at 37 (Chart of Permitted and Conditional Uses), but because the Town’s
    proposal is an expansion of an existing use, conditional use approval is not required.
    2.      The Town proposes constructing a 3,207 square-foot addition southerly of
    the existing 2,170 square-foot municipal office building. The new building would thus
    have a total footprint of 5,377 square feet, which leads to a lot coverage of
    approximately 28%. The DRB sets the maximum lot coverage during site plan review.
    3.      The DRB sets the front, side, and rear setback requirements for the
    Commercial District during site plan review. Zoning Regulations § 6.7.2. The shortest
    setbacks for the municipal office building are 22 feet between the front of the building
    and Summer Street and between the municipal office building and the post office
    property to the south.
    *
    Appellant’s challenge to the adequacy of the record is discussed in more detail below, in conjunction
    with our consideration of Appellant’s motion for a de novo hearing.
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    4.     Off-street parking for the municipal office building is sufficient. One off-
    street parking space is required for every 250 square feet of gross floor area, Zoning
    Regulations § 5.14.3. The proposed municipal building has a gross floor area of 7,447
    square feet, so thirty off street spaces are required. The adjacent parking lot contains a
    total of seventy-four parking spaces. The only change proposed for that parking lot is a
    relocation of the handicapped spaces so that they are closer to the proposed pedestrian
    access to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act.
    5.     The area surrounding the proposed municipal office expansion consists of
    densely mixed residential and commercial uses, which will be mostly unaffected by the
    Town’s proposed addition. To the extent that the proposed expansion will result in a
    reduction in lighting and decreased safety on Summer Street, the Town proposes
    mitigating the loss of lighting by adding replacement lighting to bring street lighting to
    a level equal or greater than what currently exists. To the extent that the municipal
    office expansion results in the loss of green space and a crab apple tree, the Town will
    plant new crab apple trees along the southern side of the building and new hackberry
    trees along Summer Street.
    IV.   Discussion
    Appellant has not adequately contested the DRB’s decision by raising proper
    questions for review in her Statement of Questions, but she does raise judiciable issues
    in her responses to the Town’s motion for judgment that we will address here for the
    sake of fairness to Appellant and Interested Person Wright. First, Appellant alleges that
    the DRB violated the procedural requirements of the Municipal Administrative
    Procedure Act, 24 V.S.A. §§ 1201–10 (2005), because no transcript was provided and
    because the recording of the DRB’s hearings on the Town’s application is inaudible.
    She further argues that there are not sufficient facts in the record to support a finding
    that the Town’s proposed municipal office expansion is “of such a location and in such
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    size and character that it will be in harmony with the appropriate and orderly
    development of the surrounding area.” Zoning Regulations § 4.1(b). Lastly, Appellant
    argues that the Town’s application is not in conformance with numerous statements of
    the Town Plan.
    Appellant argues that language in Town Plan suggesting public involvement in
    reviewing the municipal building committee’s recommendations on the municipal
    office building expansion was not followed. Appellant’s allegations may have merit in
    that the Town’s building committee may not have consulted the public; however,
    hortatory provisions in a Town Plan such as these have no regulatory effect unless
    specifically incorporated in the Town’s Zoning Regulations. Appeal of Waters, Docket
    No. 186-10-03 Vtec, slip op. at 7 (Vt. Envtl. Ct., Mar. 17, 2004). As our Supreme Court
    has stated, “Although the plan may recommend many desirable approaches to
    municipal development, only those provisions incorporated in the bylaws are legally
    enforceable.” Kalakowski v. John A. Russell Corp., 
    137 Vt. 219
    , 225-26 (1979). This Plan
    statement was not incorporated into the Zoning Regulations.           Thus, the Town’s
    building committee is not required to consult with the public before pursuing changes
    to the municipal office building.
    Appellant also argues that the Town has not developed an “adequate record” in
    accordance with 24 V.S.A. § 4471(b) and the Municipal Administrative Procedure Act
    because the recording of the DRB proceedings below are inaudible and could not be
    transcribed. MAPA requires that the proceedings below be recorded and also requires
    that “[t]ranscriptions of the proceedings of contested hearings shall be made upon the
    request [of] and upon payment of the reasonable costs of transcription by any party.”
    24 V.S.A. § 1209 (emphasis added). Thus, the MAPA requires municipal hearings to be
    recorded and that recording must be of a high enough quality to be capable of being
    transcribed. See Appeal of Walters, Docket No. 206-11-03 Vtec, slip op. at 2-3 (Vt. Envtl.
    Ct., Oct. 8, 2004).
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    In the instant case, the DRB recorded the hearing on audio cassette. Contrary to
    Appellant’s suggestion, after listening to the recording of the DRB hearing of April 26,
    2005, submitted on August 10, 2005, the Court finds the recording to be clearly audible,
    capable of being transcribed, and in compliance with the provision of the Municipal
    Administrative Procedure Act requiring the hearing “to be recorded.”           24 V.S.A.
    § 1205(c). There is no requirement that the DRB’s hearings be transcribed in the absence
    of a request and subsequent payment of the costs of the transcription.         24 V.S.A.
    § 1209(f). Appellant’s motion for a de novo hearing is therefore DENIED.
    Finally, Appellant argues that there is insufficient evidence in the record to
    support a finding consistent with Zoning Regulations § 4.1(b) that the proposed
    development is “of such a location and in such size and character that it will be in
    harmony with the appropriate and orderly development of the surrounding area.” As
    stated above, this Court will not disturb factual findings rendered by an appropriate
    municipal panel if supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Appeal
    of Doyle, Docket No. 100-5-02 Vtec.
    The DRB found in its Notice of Decision that the character of the area
    surrounding the municipal office building is “dense mixture” of residential and
    commercial uses. Finding of Fact 12. The adjacent property to the south contains the
    Town’s post office. Finding of Fact 14. Submissions in the record indicate that other
    surrounding properties include office, residential, commercial, and church uses.
    Additional Information for Site Plan Review, at 2.
    According to the submitted Floor Plan, the Town’s proposed addition is a one-
    story addition with a basement. The Exterior Elevation Plan submitted also indicates
    that the proposed expansion incorporates the design of the existing municipal office
    building with the addition of a clock tower and complies with handicapped accessibility
    requirements, Finding of Fact 1. The Town proposes adding replacement lighting to
    mitigate the impact of lighting lost by construction of the addition. Finding of Fact 15.
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    The Town also proposes to screen the unsightly dumpster on all four sides. Finding of
    Fact 11.
    From our review of the record and the Town’s Notice of Decision, we find
    substantial evidence in the record from which the Town could conclude that the
    proposed expansion of the existing municipal office building is in such a location and of
    such a size to be in harmony with the appropriate and orderly development of the
    surrounding area. Zoning Regulations § 4.1(b).
    Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED
    that the decisions of the Town of Randolph Development Review Board granting site
    plan review approval and a zoning permit for the Town’s proposed expansion of their
    municipal office building at 7 Summer Street is AFFIRMED, as the DRB decisions are
    supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Appellant’s motion for a de
    novo hearing and Mr. Kevan’s motion to intervene are DENIED.                Because the
    remaining questions in Appellant’s Statement of Questions raise issues not appropriate
    for this Court’s consideration, they are dismissed from this appeal. The consequence of
    all these decisions is that no questions remain outstanding. This appeal is therefore
    concluded.
    Done at Berlin, Vermont, this 30th day of March, 2006.
    Thomas S. Durkin, Environmental Judge
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Document Info

Docket Number: 106-6-05 Vtec

Filed Date: 3/30/2006

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/24/2018