Frias v. Asset Foreclosure Servs., Inc. ( 2014 )

IN CLEitKI OFFICE
..,._COURT, 8'f.ln OF WASHINGTON
:;;;,~ ZD14
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JUS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CERTIFICATION FROM THE )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT )
COURT FOR THE WESTERN )
DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON )
IN )
)
FLORENCE R. FRIAS, ) No. 89343-8
)
Plaintiff, ) ENBANC
)
v. ) Filed: SEP 1 8 2014
)
ASSET FORECLOSURE )
SERVICES, INC.; LSI TITLE )
AGENCY, INC.; U.S. BANK, N.A.; )
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC )
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; )
and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-20, )
)
Defendants. )
_______________________)
FAIRHURST, J.-We have been asked by the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington to determine whether state law recognizes a
cause of action for monetary damages where a plaintiff alleges violations of the
deeds of trust act (DTA), chapter 61.24 RCW, but no foreclosure sale has been
Frias v. Asset Foreclosure, Inc., No. 89343-8
completed. We are also asked to articulate the principles that would apply to such a
claim under the DTA and the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW.
We hold that the DTA does not create an independent cause of action for
monetary damages based on alleged violations of its provisions where no foreclosure
sale has been completed. The answer to the first certified question is no-at least not
pursuant to the DTA itself. We further hold that under appropriate factual
circumstances, DTA violations may be actionable under the CPA, even where no
foreclosure sale has been completed. The answer to the second certified question is
that the same principles that govern CPA claims generally apply to CPA claims
based on alleged DTA violations.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 2008, plaintiff Florence R. Frias entered a promissory note
secured by a deed of trust encumbering real property in Marysville, Washington.
Defendant U.S. Bank National Association was identified on the note and deed of
trust as the lender, and defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc.
was identified as the beneficiary on the deed of trust. Frias eventually defaulted on
her payments and attempted to contact representatives from U.S. Bank to obtain a
loan modification. While Frias was waiting for a response from U.S. Bank, she
received a notice of default followed by a notice of trustee's sale. Frias continued
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working towards a loan modification, and the trustee's foreclosure sale was
voluntarily discontinued.
Frias received another notice of trustee's sale in May 2011, which relied on
the prior notice of default. The notice of trustee's sale included an itemization of the
fees Frias needed to pay to stop the sale, including an auctioneer fee, a bankruptcy
check fee, an assignment recording fee, and a fee for the anticipated cost of recording
a trustee's deed following the trustee's sale, all of which Frias alleges are, at best,
unreasonable in amount and, at worst, simply illegal.
Approximately 90 days later, in July 2011, Frias received a loan modification
offer from U.S. Bank. Frias alleges the modification offer was unworkable because
it required her to devote more than half of her gross income to her monthly mortgage
payments. The May 2011 notice of trustee's sale did not indicate the sale would be
delayed to accommodate Frias' efforts at loan modification, and the sale was not
discontinued or postponed after U.S. Bank made its July 2011 modification offer.
In August 2011, Frias contacted a housing counselor in an attempt to
participate in mediation pursuant to the Washington foreclosure fairness act. LAws
OF 2011, ch. 58. Frias' case was referred to the appropriate agency and a mediator
was appointed. At the scheduled mediation session, Frias appeared, but no one
appeared on behalf of the beneficiary. The mediation was rescheduled and U.S.
Bank's attorney confirmed the foreclosure sale would be stayed pending mediation.
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At the second scheduled mediation session, Frias learned the sale had gone
forward as originally scheduled-after the first scheduled mediation session but
before the second. U.S. Bank was the successful bidder, but the sale was not
completed because the deed to the property was not issued. A third mediation session
was scheduled to give U.S. Bank time to reverse the wrongful foreclosure sale and
produce the required documentation. At that third session, U.S. Bank still did not
have all its required documentation and refused to consider modifying Frias' loan.
The mediator determined U.S. Bank had not participated in mediation in good faith.
Frias claims she is now uncertain of her status-she still has title to her home
but has not entered a loan modification agreement and has not made any payments
on her promissory note since mediation, though she would like to. Frias alleges this
uncertainty has caused her emotional distress accompanied by physical symptoms.
Frias filed a summons and complaint in Snohomish County Superior Court.
She named a cause of action against all defendants under the CPA, alleging that U.S.
Bank refused to mediate in good faith in violation of the DTA, that various
defendants made numerous misrepresentations to her, that defendants Asset
Foreclosure Services Inc. and LSI Title Agency Inc. do not have legal authority to
act as foreclosing trustees in Washington, and that the defendants falsely inflated the
costs of the improper foreclosure sale for their own profit. Frias also named a cause
of action for violations of the DTA against Asset Foreclosure and LSI as purported
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trustees. Frias alleges these defendants violated their duties of good faith by
initiating the foreclosure sale when they did not have legal authority to act as trustees
and when they made demands for unreasonable payments not permitted by the DTA.
The matter was removed to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington, and all defendants successfully moved for dismissal under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As to the CPA claim, the federal court held Frias failed to
allege any compensable injury because her property had not been sold and she had
not paid any foreclosure fees. As to the DTA claim, the federal court held Frias could
not state a cause of action under the DTA because no foreclosure sale had occurred.
These holdings are consistent with prior western district decisions. E.g., Vawter v.
Quality Loan Serv. Corp. of Wash., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1123-24, 1129-30 (2010).
Frias moved for reconsideration. While her motion was pending, Division
One of the Court of Appeals held in a published opinion that Washington law
recognizes a cause of action for monetary damages under both the DTA and CPA
for alleged DTA violations, even if no foreclosure sale has been completed. Walker
v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., 176 Wash. App. 294, 313, 320, 308 P.3d 716 (2013). In
light of Walker, the federal court refrained from ruling on Frias' motion for
reconsideration and instead certified two questions to this court.
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II. CERTIFIED QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Under Washington law, may a plaintiff state a claim for damages
relating to breach of duties under the [DTA] and/or failure to adhere to
the statutory requirements of the [DTA] in the absence of a completed
trustee's sale of real property?
2. If a plaintiff may state a claim for damages prior to a trustee's
sale of real property, what principles govern his or her claim under the
[CPA] and the [DTA]?
Order Certifying Questions to the Wash. Supreme Ct. at 3.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Certified questions are matters of law we review de novo. Carlsen v. Global
Client Solutions, LLC, 171 Wash. 2d 486, 493, 256 P.3d 321 (2011). We consider the
questions presented in light of the record certified by the federal court. I d. Because
the federal court certified these questions in connection with a motion for dismissal
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), all facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true. Bell At!. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
IV. ANALYSIS
In light of the submissions made in this case, we must first specify the scope
and nature of our analysis. We then analyze whether the DTA implies a cause of
action for damages premised on DTA violations absent a completed foreclosure sale,
and we conclude it does not. Finally, we hold that the ordinary principles governing
CPA claims generally apply to CPA claims premised on alleged DTA violations.
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A. Our analysis is one of statutory construction, and we decline to consider
submissions that make factual assertions and public policy arguments
As a preliminary matter, we must address submissions by some parties and
amici that make factual assertions and policy arguments. In matters of statutory
construction, we are tasked with discerning what the law is, not what it should be.
We are in no position to analyze the large-scale impacts of accepting or rejecting
Frias' position. Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 175 Wash. 2d 83, 109, 285 P.3d 34
(2012) ("The legislature, not this court, is in the best position to assess policy
considerations."). And because this case is before us on certified questions from the
federal court, our decision will be made on the certified record. RCW 2.60.01 0( 4)-
(5); RAP 16.16(d); cf Bain, 175 Wash. 2d at 114 (declining to answer a certified
question because "resolution of the question before us depends on what actually
occurred with the loans before us, and that evidence is not in the record").
We therefore decline all explicit and implicit requests that we take judicial
notice of irrelevant submissions, including all of the following: materials and
decisions from unrelated cases brought in federal bankruptcy courts or state superior
courts; cases interpreting unrelated federal statutes; studies about the impacts of
DTA-based actions on costs and on the availability of loan modifications; studies
showing Washington's continued economic volatility, linking foreclosure rates to
physical health problems, noting the financial disparity between borrowers and
lenders, and pointing to the presence of hedge funds and out-of-state lenders in the
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loan servicing market; and news articles about unrelated instances of lender
misconduct and other homeowners' negative experiences with nonjudicial
foreclosure.
B. The DTA does not create a cause of action for violations of its terms in the
absence of a completed foreclosure sale
A statute can create a cause of action either expressly or by implication.
Ducote v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 167 Wash. 2d 697, 702-03, 222 P.3d 785
(2009). At oral argument, Frias conceded that no provision of the DTA expressly
creates a cause of action for monetary damages premised on a trustee's material DTA
violations in the absence of a completed foreclosure sale. Wash. Supreme Court oral
argument, Frias v. Asset Foreclosure Servs., Inc., No. 89343-8 (Feb. 27, 2014), at 3
min., 20 sec., audio recording by TVW, Washington State's Public Affairs Network,
available at http://www.tvw.org. Frias' concession is well taken, and we consider
only whether such a cause of action is implied.
As in all questions of statutory construction, our goal is to discern and give
effect to legislative intent. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 15, 100 S. Ct. 242,62 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1976). To do so, we consider the following:
"[F]irst, whether the plaintiff is within the class for whose 'especial' benefit the
statute was enacted; second, whether legislative intent, explicitly or implicitly,
supports creating or denying a remedy; and third, whether implying a remedy is
consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation." Bennett v. Hardy, 113
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Wn.2d 912, 920-21, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990) (quoting In reWash. Pub. Power Supply
Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Frias is within the class for whose benefit RCW 61.24.127 was enacted. We
can find no explicit legislative intent that addresses the issue presented, but implicit
legislative intent supports denying a remedy. Implying the cause of action Frias
seeks to assert would be neutral as to most underlying purposes of the legislation
and detrimental to one. Therefore, we hold the DTA does not imply a cause of action
for monetary damages premised on DTA violations absent a completed foreclosure
sale.
1. Frias is a member of the class for whose especial benefit RCW
61.24.127 was enacted
The plain language ofRCW 61.24.127, which is our primary focus, leaves no
doubt that it was enacted to benefit borrowers or grantors subjected to nonjudicial
foreclosure of owner-occupied real estate by preserving their right to bring damages
claims that might have been deemed waived before the statute was enacted. E.g.,
Brown v. Household Realty Corp., 146 Wash. App. 157, 169, 189 P.3d 233 (2008).
Frias is certainly a borrower who has been subjected to nonjudicial foreclosure
proceedings of her owner-occupied real property and so is within the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted.
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2. There is no legislative history that explicitly supports creating or
denying a remedy, but there is implicit support for denying it
Next, we look to explicit and implicit legislative intent. RCW 61.24.127(1)
provides, in relevant part, "The failure of the borrower or grantor to bring a civil
action to enjoin a foreclosure sale under this chapter may not be deemed a waiver of
a claim for damages asserting: ... (c) Failure of the trustee to materially comply
with the provisions of this chapter." Without question, this provision explicitly
recognizes an independent cause of action for damages premised on a trustee's
material DTA violations. However, it does not state when such a cause of action
accrues, so that is the question we must answer. Cf Ducote, 167 Wash. 2d at 703
(noting RCW 26.44.050 does create a cause of action for negligent investigation of
suspected child abuse but analyzing the class of individuals with standing to bring
such a claim as a separate inquiry).
We cannot find any explicit indicators that the legislature intended to either
allow or deny the cause of action Frias seeks to assert. Indicators of implicit
legislative intent, however, show that the legislature did not intend to imply a cause
of action for money damages under the DTA absent a completed foreclosure sale.
a) There is no explicit legislative intent on the issue presented
Something is "explicit" when it is "characterized by full clear expression
: being without vagueness or ambiguity : leaving nothing implied : UNEQUNOCAL."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 801 (2002). Frias contends
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there is explicit evidence of legislative intent supporting her position because "the
only logical reading" of RCW 61.24.127 is to presume that damages claims under
the DTA must exist prior to a foreclosure sale. Pl. Frias' Opening Br. on Questions
Certified to the Supreme Ct. by the U.S. Dist. Ct. at 50 (citing Walker, 176 Wash. App.
at 310-11); accord Bavandv. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., 176 Wn. App. 475,496,309
P.3d 636 (2013). This reading is logically mandated, Frias argues, because that
statute states a claim for damages under the DTA is not waived where the borrower
does not seek to enjoin the foreclosure sale, and, in order to be waived, the claim
must exist in the first place. Frias' interpretation, though reasonable, is not logically
mandated and does not provide the explicit legislative intent she attributes to it.
Frias conflates the right to bring a cause of action with the time at which a
particular claim accrues. One cannot waive a right that does not exist, but one can
waive the right to bring a claim for damages before the claim accrues. A classic
example is the contractual preinjury release-party A agrees not to bring a cause of
action for damages arising from the contract even if party B is negligent. Because at
the time the contract is signed, it is unknown whether Bever will be negligent, A's
claim for damages has not yet accrued. However, a contractual preinjury release will
be upheld as a valid waiver of A's right to bring a claim forB's negligence, should
it ever occur, so long as the provision does not violate public policy. See Vodopest
v. MacGregor, 128 Wash. 2d 840, 848, 913 P.2d 779 (1996).
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We can find no statute or legislative history that explicitly-that is, without
vagueness, ambiguity, or implication-addresses whether one can bring an action
for damages under the DTA absent a completed foreclosure sale. There is simply no
explicit legislative intent either way.
b) Implicit legislative intent counsels against accepting Frias'
position
Because there is no explicit statement of legislative intent regarding whether
a claim for damages under the DTA is actionable absent a completed foreclosure
sale, we must look for sources that might imply the answer. Frias contends that this
issue was not raised in the process of enacting RCW 61.24.127 because it was
already decided; that is, the legislature assumed it was already settled that a claim
for damages under the DTA absent a completed foreclosure sale is actionable. The
defendants contend that the legislature simply never considered whether to allow
such a claim or not, and so has not implicitly recognized it-at least not yet.
Available sources support the defendants' position.
It is undisputed that the legislature's primary purpose m enacting RCW
61.24.127 was to supersede the Court of Appeals' holding in Brown, 146 Wash. App.
157. See Hr'g on S.B. 5810 Before the S. Fin. Insts., Hous. & Ins. Comm. 61st Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Feb. 18, 2009), at 58 min., 33 sec.; 1 hr., 12 min., 14 sec.; Hr'g on S.S.B.
5810 Before the S. Fin. Insts., Hous. & Ins. Comm. 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 24,
2009), at 36 min., 55 sec.; Hr'g on E.S.B. 5810 Before the H. Judiciary Comm. 61st
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Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mar. 23, 2009), at 45 min., 7 sec. 1 Brown held that a cause of action
for damages under the DTA is waived when the borrower does not seek to enjoin
the foreclosure sale before it happens. The damages claim at issue in Brown was not
brought until well after a completed foreclosure sale, and the question of whether to
allow a damages claim under the DTA absent a completed foreclosure sale was not
raised in connection with the enactment of RCW 61.24.127 in any source we can
locate.
Other than her argument that RCW 61.24.127 necessarily presumes a cause
of action for damages under the DTA absent a completed foreclosure sale, Frias does
not point to, and we cannot locate, any provision or legislative history implicitly
supporting her position. As discussed above, we do not find that argument
persuasive. We also cannot simply resort to our general rule of construing the DTA
in favor of borrowers to resolve the question. The purpose of that rule is to protect
the borrowers' interests in his or her own real property, but construing the DTA as
Frias advocates here would not protect her real property interests-it would provide
monetary compensation in the absence of damage to Frias' real property interests.
Cf Udall v. TD. Escrow Servs., Inc., 159 Wash. 2d 903, 916, 154 P.3d 882 (2007)
(rejecting borrower's argument that his interpretation should prevail because the act
complained of"does not injure the borrower's interests").
1
Recordings of all committee hearings cited herein are available at http://www.tvw.org.
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On the other hand, the defendants' position finds support in RCW
61.24.127(2), which sets restrictions on the nonwaived claims enumerated in RCW
61.24.127(1 ). The way the legislature phrased these restrictions strongly implies that
a cause of action under the DTA for a trustee's material statutory violations is not
available until after a completed foreclosure sale:
The non waived claims listed under subsection ( 1) of this section are
subject to the following limitations:
(a) The claim must be asserted or brought within two years from
the date of the foreclosure sale or within the applicable statute of
limitations for such claim, whichever expires earlier;
(c) The claim may not affect in any way the validity or finality
of the foreclosure sale or a subsequent transfer of the property;
(d) A borrower or grantor who files such a claim is prohibited
from recording a lis pendens or any other document purporting to create
a similar effect, related to the real property foreclosed upon;
(e) The claim may not operate in any way to encumber or cloud
the title to the property that was subject to the foreclosure sale, except
to the extent that a judgment on the claim in favor of the borrower or
grantor may, consistent with RCW 4.56.190, become a judgment lien
on real property then owned by the judgment debtor.
RCW 61.24.127(2). Notably, all of these limitations refer to "the" foreclosure sale.
The use of a definite article "the"-as opposed to an indefinite article "a"-is
indicative of the legislature's intent to specify or particularize the word that follows.
City of Olympia v. Drebick, 156 Wash. 2d 289, 297-98, 126 P.3d 802 (2006) (citing
Cowiche Growers, Inc. v. Bates, 10 Wn.2d 585,618, 117 P.2d 624 (1941) (Simpson,
J., dissenting)). Plainly, the specific foreclosure sale referred to in RCW
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61.24.127(2) is the foreclosure sale the borrower or grantor did not bring a civil
action to enjoin. While foreclosure generally is a process rather than an event, "the
foreclosure sale" is a single, specific event, and the limitations in RCW 61.24.127(2)
all speak of that foreclosure sale in the past tense, clearly contemplating it has
already happened. 2
From the limited evidence available, we find there is no legislative intent that
implicitly supports recognizing the DTA cause of action Frias seeks to assert; all the
evidence implies that the legislature has not yet considered whether to allow a cause
of action for damages under the DTA absent a completed foreclosure sale. Because
the legislature has never considered the issue, it would be strange to hold the
legislature has already implicitly decided it-we are not in a position to impute to
the legislature the intent we think it will have if it does consider the issue. Further,
the limitations in RCW 61.24.127(2) provide implicit support for the defendants'
position-under the current statutory framework, there is no independent cause of
action under the DTA for DTA violations absent a completed foreclosure sale.
2
While a foreclosure sale did occur in this case, it was voided, as allowed by RCW
61.24.050(2). Once something is declared void, it never happened at all for legal purposes.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1709 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "void" as "[o ]fno legal effect; null").
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3. Implying the remedy Frias seeks would not promote the purposes
behind RCW 61.24.127 and the DTA
Finally, we consider the purposes behind RCW 61.24.127 specifically and the
DTA generally to determine whether implying a cause of action for a trustee's
material DTA violations absent a completed foreclosure sale is consistent with those
purposes. Deciding the issue in Frias' favor would be inconsistent with one of the
purposes of the DTA and neutral to the other relevant purposes.
As discussed above, the purpose behind RCW 61.24.127 was to supersede
Brown. Brown dealt with a damages action brought after a completed foreclosure
sale, and so implying a damages action absent a completed foreclosure sale neither
furthers nor hinders the legislature's specific purpose in passing RCW 61.24.127.
The purposes of the DTA generally are well established: '"First, the
nonjudicial foreclosure process should remain efficient and inexpensive. Second, the
process should provide an adequate opportunity for interested parties to prevent
wrongful foreclosure. Third, the process should promote the stability ofland titles."'
Schroeder v. Excelsior Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 177 Wash. 2d 94, 104, 297 P.3d 677 (2013)
(quoting Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wash. 2d 383, 387, 693 P.2d 683 (1985)). Clearly, if a
borrower's claim for damages accrues as soon as the trustee engages in material
noncompliance with the DTA (or as soon as the borrower reasonably should know
of the facts tending to show such noncompliance), nonjudicial foreclosure will be
rendered less efficient and more expensive.
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The accrual of a damages claim prior to a completed foreclosure sale is neutral
as to the purpose of giving interested parties adequate opportunities to prevent
wrongful foreclosure. Wrongful foreclosure is prevented when a borrower obtains a
restraining order or injunction based on material DTA violations, while wrongful
foreclosure is compensated when a borrower recovers damages for material DTA
violations. There is no indication that stability of land titles will be either promoted
or impeded by accepting Frias' interpretation ofRCW 61.24.127 because a cause of
action for damages under RCW 61.24.127 cannot serve to affect title to the real
property at issue. RCW 61.24.127(2).
Thus, implying a presale damages action under RCW 61.24.127 would be
inconsistent with the DTA's purpose of efficient and inexpensive foreclosure, and is
neutral as to the other purposes relevant to our consideration.
We therefore hold that, while Frias is a member of the class for whose especial
benefit RCW 61.24.127 was passed, available sources of legislative intent indicate
the legislature has never actually considered whether to create a cause of action for
monetary damages under the DTA absent a completed foreclosure sale. What the
legislature would do upon considering the issue is beyond our judicial ken. Imputing
to the legislature an intent to create this cause of action would be at odds with RCW
61.24.127(2) and would not serve the purposes underlying RCW 61.24.127 or the
DTA generally. Under the existing statutory framework, we hold there is no
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actionable, independent cause of action for monetary damages under the DTA based
on DTA violations absent a completed foreclosure sale.
C. Even in the absence of a completed foreclosure sale, violations of the DTA
may be actionable under the CPA under ordinary CPA principles
Frias' CPA claim must be analyzed under the same principles that apply to
any CPA claim. Even where there is no completed foreclosure sale and no allegation
the plaintiff has paid any foreclosure fees, it is possible for a plaintiff to suffer injury
to business or property caused by alleged DTA violations that could be compensable
under the CPA.
1. RCW 61.24.127 does not modify the elements of a cause of action
under the CPA or the time at which such an action accrues
Unlike a DTA-based cause of action for damages, the CPA is a preexisting
statutory cause of action, with established elements. RCW 61.24.127 plainly intends
to preserve, rather than modify, the availability of a CPA claim where a borrower
does not seek to enjoin a foreclosure sale before it happens. See RCW
61.24.127(2)(£) (preserving statutory CPA remedies, notwithstanding limitations on
damages for other nonwaived claims under RCW 61.24.127). Further, because CPA
actions, unlike DTA actions for a trustee's material violations, are governed by their
own body of statutes and case law, the limitations in RCW 61.24.127(2) are not at
odds with a CPA cause of action absent a completed foreclosure sale, as they are in
the case of a DTA cause of action for damages.
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2. Frias arguably pleaded injuries that could be compensable under the
CPA
Compensable injuries under the CPA are limited to "injury to [the] plaintiff in
his or her business or property." Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco
Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 780, 719 P .2d 531 ( 1986). Without question, where
a plaintiff actually loses title to her house in a foreclosure sale or actually remits
foreclosure fees, that plaintiff has suffered injury to his or her property. However,
those injuries are not necessary to state a CPA claim-other business or property
injuries might be caused when a lender or trustee engages in an unfair or deceptive
practice in the nonjudicial foreclosure context. We believe Frias did allege some
injuries that may be compensable under the CPA.
The CPA's requirement that injury be to business or property excludes
personal injury, "mental distress, embarrassment, and inconvenience." Panag v.
Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 166 Wash. 2d 27, 57, 204 P.3d 885 (2009). The financial
consequences of such personal injuries are also excluded. Ambach v. French, 167
Wash. 2d 167, 178, 216 P.3d 405 (2009). Otherwise, however, the business and
property injuries compensable under the CPA are relatively expansive.
Because the CPA addresses "injuries" rather than "damages," quantifiable
monetary loss is not required. Panag, 166 Wash. 2d at 58. A CPA plaintiff can establish
injury based on unlawful debt collection practices even where there is no dispute as
to the validity of the underlying debt. !d. at 55-56 & n.13. Where a business demands
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payment not lawfully due, the consumer can claim injury for expenses he or she
incurred in responding, even if the consumer did not remit the payment demanded.
!d. at 62 ("Consulting an attorney to dispel uncertainty regarding the nature of an
alleged debt is distinct from consulting an attorney to institute a CPA
claim. Although the latter is insufficient to show injury to business or property, the
former is not." (citations omitted)). The injury element can be met even where the
injury alleged is both minimal and temporary. Mason v. Mortg. Am., Inc., 114 Wash. 2d
842, 854, 792 P.2d 142 (1990).
Here, Frias alleges she was denied the chance to obtain a reasonable loan
modification because U.S. Bank refused to participate in mediation in good faith.
Where a more favorable loan modification would have been granted but for bad faith
in mediation, the borrower may have suffered an injury to property within the
meaning ofthe CPA. Cf Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 176 Wash. 2d 771, 795, 295 P.3d
1179 (2013) (holding a CPA injury was pleaded where a falsely backdated
notarization allowed a foreclosure sale to happen earlier than it could have
otherwise, cutting short the borrower's chance to close sale on the real property with
a private purchaser for a higher price).
Frias further alleges numerous illegal fees have been added to her debt. Even
though she has not paid those fees, expenses incurred in investigating their legality
may be compensable, and she may be entitled to equitable relief in the form of those
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fees being stricken, if they have not already been. Panag, 166 Wash. 2d at 62-63. Frias
also alleges that she appeared for a scheduled mediation session and no one appeared
on behalf of U.S. Bank and that when Frias appeared for the rescheduled mediation
session, U.S Bank was not prepared. The expenses Frias incurred in the extra
mediation sessions allegedly necessitated by U.S. Bank's failure to prepare and
mediate in good faith could be an injury compensable under the CPA. !d. at 64.
Although Frias' alleged emotional distress and associated physical symptoms
are not compensable under the CPA, she did plead other injuries to her property that
could be compensable under the CPA. Loss of title or payment of illegal fees are
sufficient, but not necessary, to plead an injury compensable under the CPA based
on alleged DTA violations.
3. CPA claims alleging DTA violations are governed by the same
principles as other CPA claims
As noted above, nothing about the DTA indicates a CPA claim should be
subject to a different analysis where the CPA claim is premised on alleged DTA
violations as opposed to any other alleged wrongful acts. In response to the second
certified question, we hold that the analysis of the elements of a CPA action premised
on alleged DTA violations is the same as the analysis of the elements of a CPA claim
premised on any other allegedly unfair or deceptive practice with a public interest
impact occurring in trade or commerce that has allegedly proximately caused injury
21
Frias v. Asset Foreclosure, Inc., No. 89343-8
to a plaintiffs business or property. See, e.g., ch. 19.86 RCW; Klem, 176 Wash. 2d at
782-97; Panag, 166 Wash. 2d at 37-65; Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash. 2d at 783-93.
V. CONCLUSION
We hold the answer to the first question certified by the federal court is no:
Washington does not recognize an independent cause of action under the DTA
seeking monetary damages for alleged DTA violations absent a completed
foreclosure sale.
We hold the answer to the second question is that under appropriate
circumstances DTA violations may be actionable under the CPA regardless of
whether a foreclosure sale has been completed. Such claims are governed by the
ordinary principles applicable to all CPA claims.
22
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WECONCUR:t
f Judge C.C. Bridgewater participated as a ju8tice pro tempore at the
argument of this appeal but died prior to the filing of the opinion.
23
Frias v. Asset Foreclosure, Inc., eta/. No. 89343-8
Wiggins, J., dissenting in part/concurring in part
No. 89343-8
WIGGINS, J. (dissenting in part/concurring in part)-The United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington certified two questions for our review.
While I agree with the majority's answer to the second question, I disagree with the
majority's answer to the first. The first certified question is whether "a plaintiff [may)
state a claim for damages relating to a breach of duties under the Deed of Trust Act
and/or failure to adhere to the statutory requirements of the Deed of Trust Act in the
absence of a completed trustee's sale of real property." Order Certifying Questions
to the Wash. Supreme Ct. at 3. The majority's answer is no; the answer should be
the careful, lawyerly response: it depends. It depends on who the defendant is (e.g.,
a borrower, grantor, trustee, or guarantor) and which statutory duty the defendant
breached. The majority categorically precludes claims for damages absent a
completed trustee's sale under the deeds of trust act (DTA), chapter 61.24 RCW,
without a discussion of the various duties created in the statute. See majority at 2. I
would focus on the trustee's duty of good faith to the borrower, beneficiary, and
grantor, which is the violation Florence Frias asserts. I conclude that a borrower, like
Frias v. Asset Foreclosure, Inc., eta/. No. 89343-8
Wiggins, J., dissenting in part/concurring in part
Frias, may sue a trustee for breach of this duty, even in the absence of a completed
trustee's sale.
ANALYSIS
The legislature may implicitly or explicitly create a cause of action. See Ducote
v. Oep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 167 Wash. 2d 697, 702-03, 222 P.3d 785 (2009).
Whether a statute creates a cause of action is a matter of statutory construction.
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15, 100 S. Ct. 242, 62 L.
Ed. 2d 146 (1979). As in most matters of statutory construction, our ultimate goal is
to determine the intent of the legislature. See id. at 15-16. If the legislature does not
expressly create a cause of action, our court utilizes a three-part test to determine the
legislature's intent. Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash. 2d 912, 920-21, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990).
We determine whether the plaintiff is "within the class for whose 'especial' benefit the
statute was enacted"; whether "legislative intent, explicitly or implicitly, supports
creating or denying a remedy"; and "whether implying a remedy is consistent with the
underlying purpose of the legislation." /d.
Using this test, I conclude that the legislature implicitly created a cause of action
against a trustee for breach of its duty of good faith that is not dependent on a
completed trustee's sale.
Part 1: Frias is a member of the class protected by the statute
The first part of the test is satisfied because Frias is "within the class for whose
'especial' benefit the statute was enacted .... " Bennett, 113 Wash. 2d at 920. RCW
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Frias v. Asset Foreclosure, Inc., eta/. No. 89343-8
Wiggins, J., dissenting in part/concurring in part
61.24.01 0(4) states, "The trustee or successor trustee has a duty of good faith to the
borrower, beneficiary, and grantor." The clear legislative intent is to protect borrowers,
beneficiaries, and grantors from actions taken in bad faith by trustees. Frias is a
borrower under the act, whose interest the legislature sought to protect.
Part 2: Legislative intent supports creating a claim
Legislative intent explicitly and implicitly supports creating a cause of action
against the trustee (even prior to a completed trustee's sale). Bennett, 113 Wash. 2d at
920. The explicit support is found in RCW 61.24.127. The statute states that a
borrower or grantor does not waive a claim for damages due to a trustee failing to
"materially comply with the provisions of this chapter" by failing to enjoin a foreclosure
sale. RCW 61.24.127(1 )(c). This recognition of a claim against the trustee supports
the creation of a cause of action for breach of a trustee's duty of good faith. The
legislature placed no explicit limitation on when a borrower or grantor may bring suit.
The majority reaches a different conclusion. Majority at 10. It agrees that RCW
61.24.127 recognizes a cause of action against a trustee but concludes the claim is
available only after a trustee's sale. See id. It relies on RCW 61.24.127(2), which
subjects the nonwaived claims to certain limitations. The limitations include, for
example, the claim must be brought within two years of the "foreclosure sale or within
the applicable statute of limitations for such claim, whichever expires earlier," and the
claim cannot affect the validity of the foreclosure sale or cloud the title. RCW
61.24.127(2)(a), (c), (e). The majority relies on the fact that all of the limitations rely
3
Frias v. Asset Foreclosure, Inc., eta/. No. 89343-8
Wiggins, J., dissenting in part/concurring in part
on a past foreclosure sale to support its conclusion that the legislature intended a
claim for damages only after a foreclosure sale.
I disagree with the majority's reasoning. Of course the limitations contemplate
a completed trustee's sale-the legislature was specifically discussing the effects of
failing to enjoin a sale on other claims that borrowers and grantors may bring. There
is no indication that the legislature intended for this language to limit the availability of
a claim for damages against a trustee for failing to materially comply with the DTA. 1
There is also implicit support for allowing a claim before a trustee's sale is
complete. We assume that the legislature is aware of the doctrine of implied cause
of action, which is that the legislature "would not enact a statute granting rights to an
identifiable class without enabling members of that class to enforce those rights."
Bennett, 113 Wash. 2d at 919-21. RCW 61.24.010 creates a duty and a corresponding
right. "The trustee or successor trustee has a duty of good faith to the borrower,
beneficiary, and grantor." RCW 61.24.01 0(4 ). Here, the legislature did not explicitly
provide a mechanism for protecting borrowers, beneficiaries, or grantors from a
trustee who acts in bad faith. 2 Therefore, we may assume that the legislature intended
1 Interestingly, the majority abandons its reasoning when discussing the Consumer Protection
Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW. RCW 61.24.127(1) treats violations of Title 19 RCW the
same as a claim against a trustee for failing to materially comply with the DTA, and subsection
(2) provides applicable limitations. The majority concludes that despite subsection (2)'s
limitations, a CPA claim may be commenced absent a completed trustee's sale. Majority at
18.
2 RCW 61.24.130 is not the mechanism. It allows borrowers, grantors, guarantors, or other
people interested in a lien to enjoin a trustee sale "on any proper legal or equitable ground."
RCW 61.24.130(1 ). However, it requires the applicant to pay the clerk of the court "the sums
that would be due on the obligation secured by the deed of trust if the deed of trust was not
4
Frias v. Asset Foreclosure, Inc., eta/. No. 89343-8
Wiggins, J., dissenting in part/concurring in part
that there would be a judicial mechanism to enforce the statutory right. I have no
reason to conclude that it intended this remedy only after a trustee's sale.
Part 3: Implying a remedy is consistent with the purpose of the statute
Implying a remedy is consistent with RCW 61.24.01 0(4 )-which imposes a duty
on the trustee to act in good faith toward borrowers, beneficiaries, and grantors-and
is consistent with the purposes of the DTA. This implied remedy encourages trustees
to act in good faith and allows early intervention for a breach of the duty.
A cause of action is also consistent with the overall objectives of the DTA. The
objectives are that '"[t]he nonjudicial foreclosure process should remain efficient and
inexpensive[;] ... the process should provide an adequate opportunity for interested
parties to prevent wrongful foreclosure[; and] the process should promote the stability
of land titles."' Schroeder v. Excelsior Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 177 Wash. 2d 94, 104, 297 P.3d
677 (2013) (quoting Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wash. 2d 383, 387, 693 P.2d 683 (1985)).
The majority opines that allowing a claim for damages to accrue as soon as a
trustee violates the DTA would be inconsistent with the first objective articulated by
Schroeder because the nonjudicial foreclosure will be rendered less efficient and more
expensive than judicial foreclosure. Majority at 16-17. The majority opinion provides
no reasoning for this conclusion, and I disagree. Allowing damage claims to accrue
before a trustee sale should incentivize the trustee to conform to the requirements of
being foreclosed." /d. It does not appear that the legislature intended this to be the sole
remedy for misdeeds by a trustee. The legislature did not make the trustee's duty contingent
on the ability of borrowers to pay their arrears.
5
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Wiggins, J., dissenting in part/concurring in part
the law from the beginning of the foreclosure process. When nonjudicial foreclosures
are pursued and completed lawfully, the process will ultimately be more efficient.
The remedy also supports the second purpose, which is to "'provide an
adequate opportunity for interested parties to prevent wrongful foreclosure."'
Schroeder, 177 Wash. 2d at 104 (quoting Cox, 103 Wash. 2d at 387). Under RCW 6, a
borrower, grantor, or guarantor may restrain a trustee's sale only if it pays the clerk of
the court sums that would be due on the obligation if there was no foreclosure. If a
borrower has insufficient resources to pay the sums due, the borrower will be unable
to stop a wrongful trustee's sale. Allowing the cause of action before the sale
encourages trustees to adhere to the required procedures.
All three parts of the implied cause of action test are satisfied. A cause of action
against a trustee for violation of its duty of good faith should be available even in the
absence of a completed trustee's sale. I disagree with the majority's answer to the
first certified question.
6
Frias v. Asset Foreclosure, Inc., eta/. No. 89343-8
Wiggins, J., dissenting in part/concurring in part
I dissent in part and concur in part.
7