State v. Maynard ( 2015 )

This opfnion was fffed for record
at 8:ooAm on M?Aj '2~ ,'J-OIS.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 89786-7
Respondent, )
)
v. )
) EnBanc
CHRISTOPHER NELSON MAYNARD, )
)
Petitioner. )
) Filed MAY 2 8 2015
MADSEN, C.J.-The State charged Christopher Nelson Maynard in juvenile court
with six counts of malicious mischief. Less than one month later, he turned 18 years old.
Maynard's counsel did not move for an order to extend the court's statutory jurisdiction
as provided in RCW 13.40.300(1)(a) before Maynard turned 18. As a result, the juvenile
court ruled that it had lost jurisdiction and dismissed the case without prejudice. The
State then filed the case in superior court. Maynard moved to dismiss, arguing that
preaccusatorial delay and ineffective assistance of counsel deprived him of the benefits of
juvenile court jurisdiction, including the opportunity to accept a plea offer from the State.
The trial court agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice.
No. 89786-7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ineffective assistance of
counsel, not preaccusatorial delay, caused the loss of jurisdiction. We agree. The court,
however, determined that remand to adult trial court for a new trial was the proper
remedy. We vacate that order and, instead, direct the State to reoffer the plea proposal of
deferred disposition and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the
Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW.
FACTS
On August 18, 2010, Woodland City police officers arrested Maynard on
suspicion of malicious mischief after he went to take photographs of a skate park that he
had recently tagged with graffiti. Maynard gave a signed confession. He admitted that
he had defaced several local properties with graffiti and also provided the names of other
participants. Maynard had just turned 17 years old on August 1.
On September 14, the Woodland City police finished their investigation in the
case and turned over their reports and supporting documents to the Cowlitz County
Juvenile Court. These documents included a probable cause statement, which gave
amounts for each victim's property damage along with Maynard's confession. The
prosecutor assigned to the case requested more information from police. The prosecutor
received the requested information on November 17, and turned the case over to the
juvenile court for consideration of diversion. The juvenile court denied diversion on
December 10.
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On July 7, 2011, the prosecutor formally charged Maynard by filing an
information in juvenile court. Maynard received a summons to appear in court on July
12-19 days before his 18th birthday. The prosecutor delayed filing in juvenile court in
order to seek "'more information, specifically in regards to restitution amounts owed to
the victims."' Clerk's Papers (CP) at 108. On July 12, Maynard appeared in court and
the court appointed him an attorney. The court scheduled arraignment for the following
week
On July 19, Maynard appeared for arraignment with his attorney and entered a
plea of not guilty. Maynard's attorney did not notice that her client would soon tum 18,
even though the information clearly stated her client's date of birth. She also did not ask
her client about his birthday. Consequently, Maynard's attorney did not move at the
arraignment to extend juvenile court jurisdiction, which the court must extend before the
juvenile defendant turns 18 or else it loses authority to adjudicate the case. See RCW
13.40.300(1)(a).
On July 25, the prosecutor sent Maynard's attorney a plea proposal that included a
recommendation of deferred disposition if Maynard pleaded guilty to two of the charges.
The offer stated that it expired on August 9, and Maynard intended to accept the offer.
After the prosecutor sent the plea proposal, she noticed that Maynard would tum
18 on August 1, so she e-mailed Maynard's attorney and informed her about his
impending birthday. Maynard's attorney, however, did not read this e-mail before he
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turned 18. Without an extension of jurisdiction, the juvenile court lost authority over the
case and dismissed the charges without prejudice.
The prosecutor then filed charges in Cowlitz County Superior Court. Maynard
appeared with new representation. He moved to dismiss the charges with prejudice based
on two arguments. First, he argued that negligent preaccusatorial delay violated his due
process rights because the delay resulted in the loss of juvenile jurisdiction. Second, he
argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to
extendjuveni1e court jurisdiction before he turned 18. The trial court dismissed the
charges with prejudice, finding both arguments provided a separate and distinct basis to
dismiss.
The Court of Appeals reversed in a partially published opinion.· State v. Maynard,
178 Wash. App. 413,418-19, 315 P.3d 545 (2013). The court held that ineffective
assistance, not preaccusatorial delay, caused Maynard to lose the benefits of juvenile
court jurisdiction. I d. As a remedy, the court concluded that remand for trial as an adult
would adequately resolve the harm caused by counsel's ineffective assistance.
Maynard petitioned this court for discretionary review, which we granted. State v.
Maynard, 180 Wash. 2d 1001, 321 P.3d 1207 (2013).
ANALYSIS
We review de novo whether preaccusatorial delay violated a defendant's right to
due process and whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.
Oppelt, 172 Wash. 2d 285, 290, 257 P.3d 653 (2011) (reviewing the issue ofpreaccusatorial
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No. 89786-7
delay de novo); State v. Sutherby, 165 Wash. 2d 870, 883, 204 P.3d 916 (2009) (reviewing
ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo).
Preaccusatorial Delay
The State argues that preaccustorial delay did not violate Maynard's right to due
process because he had an opportunity to extend jurisdiction before he turned 18. We
agree.
A court will dismiss a prosecution for preaccusatorial delay if the State's
intentional or negligent delay violates a defendant's due process rights. Oppelt, 172
Wash. 2d at 288-89. To determine ifpreaccusatorial delay violated a defendant's due
process rights, we apply a three-pronged test: (1) the defendant must show he or she was
actually prejudiced by the delay; (2) if the defendant shows actual prejudice, the court
must determine the reasons for the delay; and (3) the court must weigh the reasons for
delay and the prejudice to determine whether fundamental conceptions of justice would
be violated by allowing the prosecution. I d. at 295.
Although a defendant has no constitutional right to be tried as a juvenile, we have
recognized that juvenile court offers an offender important benefits. See State v. Dixon,
114 Wash. 2d 857, 860, 792 P.2d 137 (1990). For example, an adjudication as a juvenile
avoids the stigma of an adult criminal conviction. !d. It also provides less harsh
penalties. Id. By statute, a juvenile defendant loses the benefits of the JJA if the court
does not extend jurisdiction before the defendant turns 18. RCW 13.40.300(1)(a). We
have therefore held that a defendant meets his or her burden to show actual prejudice
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when the preaccusatorial delay causes the loss of juvenile jurisdiction. State v. Salavea,
151 Wash. 2d 133, 139, 86 P.3d 125 (2004).
In this case, Maynard cannot meet the first prong-actual prejudice-because
preaccusatorial delay did not cause the loss of juvenile jurisdiction. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that preaccusatorial delay does not cause the loss of jurisdiction when
the State files charges before juvenile jurisdiction expires and the defendant has an
opportunity to extend it. See Maynard, 178 Wash. App. 413; see also Oppelt, 172 Wash. 2d at
290. Maynard appeared for arraignment on July 19-12 days before he turned 18 years
old on August 1. Maynard's attorney did not move to extend jurisdiction at that time or
at any time before he turned 18, but she could have. This failure and the consequential
loss of jurisdiction was not the result of the State's actions.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that
counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that this
deficient conduct resulted in prejudice to the defendant-that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for the deficient conduct, the outcome of the proceeding would be
different. State v. Rezchenbach, 153 Wash. 2d 126, 130, 101 P.3d 80 (2004). Although
courts strongly presume that defense counsel's conduct was not deficient, a defendant
rebuts this presumption when no conceivable legitimate tactic exists to explain counsel's
performance. !d.
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Here, the conduct of Maynard's counsel fell below objective standards of
reasonableness. She did not notice her client's impending birthday, even though the
information clearly stated it. Consequently, she did not move to extend the juvenile
court's jurisdiction before he turned 18, not because of a legitimate tactic but because of
an absence of judgment. An attorney who represents a juvenile should promptly learn his
or her client's birthday because the client may lose the benefits of juvenile prosecution if
the attorney does not move to extend jurisdiction before the client turns 18.
Maynard also suffered prejudice because of counsel's deficient conduct: he lost
the benefits of being prosecuted as a juvenile. If counsel had moved to extend
jurisdiction, the juvenile court could have entered an appropriate order.
We now must determine the remedy for the harm caused by the ineffective
assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that a new trial in
adult court would adequately remedy the harm in this case. 1 Maynard, 178 Wash. App. at
419. Without any remedy, Maynard already faces the prospect of trial as an adult
1
The Court of Appeals relied on In re Personal Restraint ofDalluge, 152 Wash. 2d 772, 100 P.3d
279 (2004), and concluded that it should remand to adult court for a new trial. Maynard, 178
Wash. App. at 419. But Dalluge does not control this case because Maynard did not request a new
trial as a remedy. In Dalluge, the State charged a 17-year-old defendant with crimes that
automatically granted exclusive jurisdiction to the adult criminal court. 152 Wash. 2d at 776.
Later, the State amended the charges, rendering the adult court's jurisdiction no longer
mandatory but subject to the juvenile court declining jurisdiction. Id. at 77 6, 783. The trial court
did not remand to juvenile court for a decline hearing as required. Id. at 776. Instead, the trial
court proceeded to trial, where the jury convicted the defendant. Id. We held that the trial court
erred by not remanding for a decline hearing. Id. at 789. As a remedy, the defendant was
entitled to a hearing to determine if the juvenile court should have retained jurisdiction, and if so,
the defendant requested a new trial in adult court. Id. at 786-87, 775. Apparently, the defendant
felt a new trial would provide adequate relief. Here, Maynard does not ask for a new trial; he
asks for dismissal, a remedy that we find unwarranted. We do, however, agree with Maynard
that a new trial in adult court would not adequately resolve the harm.
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because the juvenile court's statutory authority lapsed. To hold that his remedy is to be·
tried as an adult means, in effect, that he will receive no remedy at all. Maynard argues
that our only option is to dismiss his case with prejudice, but we can fashion an
appropriate remedy short of dismissal.
When confronting deprivations under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, "remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional
violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests." United States v.
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S. Ct. 665, 66 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1981). In the plea
bargain context, when ineffective assistance of counsel causes a plea offer to lapse, an
appropriate remedy could require the prosecutor to reoffer the plea. See Lafler v. Cooper,
_U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012). In Frye, the State
charged the defendant with driving with a revoked license and offered the defense
attorney two plea offers, stating that both offers would expire on a specified date.
Missouri v. Frye,_ U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012). The
attorney failed to advise the defendant of the offers, and the offers expired. I d.
Counsel's failure to communicate the offers constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
I d. In a companion case, the Court stated that the appropriate remedy may require the
prosecutor to reoffer the lapsed plea proposal. See id.; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 13 89. That
remedy, the Court observed, would place the defendant in the same position he was in
before he was deprived, through the ineffective assistance of counsel, of the opportunity
to accept the State's proposal. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389. A similar remedy for the
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No. 89786-7
deprivation in this case must place Maynard in the same position he was in before the
violation of his right to effective representation.
A juvenile defendant has the statutory right to be prosecuted under the provisions
of the JJA if the State files charges before the defendant turns 18, subject to limited
exceptions. 2 See RCW 13.04.030; RCW 13.40.300. Title 13 RCW states that the
juvenile court has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over cases that involve juvenile
defendants. RCW 13.04.030. But used in this context, the word "jurisdiction" is more
properly understood as authority. Jurisdictionally, juvenile courts and superior courts are
not separate and distinct; juvenile courts exist as a division of the superior court. State v.
Posey, 174 Wash. 2d 131, 141,272 P.3d 840 (2012) (Posey II); RCW 13.04.021. Properly
understood, then, Title 13 RCW entitles a juvenile to the protections of the JJA, requires
the juvenile division of the superior court to apply the JJA, with some exceptions, to a
juvenile defendant, and authorizes the court to extend the act beyond a defendant's 18th
birthday for a variety of explicit reasons. See Posey II, 174 Wash. 2d at 141; RCW
13.40.300. The only absolute prohibition we see to applying the JJA is when the
defendant allegedly committed the crime after the age of 18. RCW 13.40.300(4). Under
the circumstances of this case, we see no prohibition to extending the trial court's
authority to apply provisions of the JJA as a remedy for the violation of a juvenile's right
to effective assistance of counsel.
2
For example, the juvenile court lacks authority over a juvenile charged with a serious violent
offense if the juvenile was 16 or 17 years old on the date of the alleged offense. See RCW
13 .04.030(1 )(v)(A).
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No. 89786-7
Our decision in Posey II provides guidance. There we upheld the trial court's
application of the JJA to an adult improperly denied juvenile jurisdiction. Posey II, 174
Wash. 2d at 133. The State charged 16-year-old Posey with three counts of second degree
rape and one count of first degree assault. !d. By statute, the charge of first degree
assault required the juvenile court to automatically decline juvenile jurisdiction, and the
case proceeded to trial in superior court. !d. at 134. The jury convicted Posey of two
counts of second degree rape but acquitted Posey on the count of first degree assault-the
charge that automatically transferred the case from juvenile court to superior court. !d.
The trial judge then sentenced Posey under adult sentencing guidelines. Id. We affirmed
the convictions but held that the trial judge should have remanded the case to juvenile
court for a declination hearing and possible sentencing, presuming the juvenile court
would not decline jurisdiction. See State v. Posey, 161 Wash. 2d 638, 647, 167 P.3d 560
(2007). The mandate for our opinion issued less than a month after Posey turned 21.
Posey II, 174 Wash. 2d at 134. On remand, Posey argued that the juvenile court lacked
jurisdiction to sentence him because he was 21 years old and the trial judge agreed. !d.
The trial judge, however, acting as a superior court judge, sentenced Posey within the
standard juvenile sentencing range. Id. at 135. We affirmed the trial court's sentence.
Id. at 142.
Similarly, to remedy the harm caused by the ineffective assistance of counsel in
this case, we remand for further proceedings in accordance with the JJA. We also direct
the State to reoffer the plea proposal of deferred disposition. This remedy will put
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No. 89786-7
Maynard in the same position he was in before the statutory time to extend juvenile court
jurisdiction elapsed. As in Posey II, if Maynard is convicted, the trial court may still
impose a juvenile sentence. See id.
CONCLUSION
Preaccusatorial delay did not cause the loss of juvenile jurisdiction under RCW
13.40.300. The State filed charges before Christopher Maynard's 18th birthday, and he
had an opportunity to extend jurisdiction. Therefore, the State did not violate Maynard's
right to due process. Instead, the violation of Maynard's Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel caused Maynard to lose the benefits of being prosecuted as
a juvenile. If defense counsel had recognized her client's impending 18th birthday, as an
attorney representing a child in juvenile court should, she could have properly moved to
extend jurisdiction pursuant to the statute.
To remedy the harm caused by the ineffective assistance of counsel, we remand
for further proceedings in accordance with the JJA. We also direct the State to reoffer the
plea proposal of deferred disposition that lapsed after the juvenile court lost statutory
authority.
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WE CONCUR:
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State v. Maynard
No. 89786-7
OWENS, J. (dissenting) - Eleven months after Christopher Maynard was
arrested on suspicion of malicious mischief, the State charged him in juvenile court.
Though the stated reason for the delay in bringing charges was to gather more
information on the case, the prosecutor relied entirely on the probable cause statement
prepared at the time of the arrest when filing charges. Twenty days after he first
appeared in juvenile court, Maynard turned 18. No party mentioned his impending
birthday to the court, nor did any party move to extend juvenile jurisdiction before he
turned 18. As a result, Maynard lost the benefit of having his case adjudicated in
juvenile court. 1 The majority places full responsibility for the loss of juvenile
1
The majority concludes that courts can reinstate juvenile jurisdiction after a defendant
has turned 18. This is contrary to RCW 13.40.300(l)(a), which states that a juvenile
court may retain jurisdiction over a defendant past his or her 18th birthday "only if prior
to the juvenile's eighteenth birthday ... the court by written order setting forth its reasons
extends jurisdiction of juvenile court over the juvenile beyond his or her eighteenth
birthday." (Emphasis added.) As the majority suggests no reason why this statute would
not apply, I must respectfully dissent to that holding as well.
State v. Maynard
No. 89786-7
Owens, J., Dissenting
jurisdiction on Maynard's defense attorney and fails to acknowledge that the
prosecutor's lengthy and-on this record-unjustified delays significantly contributed
to the loss of juvenile jurisdiction. The trial court correctly recognized that the
prosecutor shares responsibility for Maynard's loss, and I would affirm that ruling.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
ANALYSIS
There is a "fundamental difference between juvenile courts and adult courts-
unlike wholly punitive adult courts, juvenile courts remain[] rehabilitative." State v.
Saenz, 175 Wash. 2d 167, 173, 283 P.3d 1094 (2012). Prosecutors and defense attorneys
both bear a duty to ensure that criminal offenders are not unfairly denied juvenile
court jurisdiction. Prosecutors must not engage in intentional or negligent delay when
deciding when to charge an offender. See State v. Norby, 122 Wash. 2d 258, 262-63,
858 P.2d 210 (1993) (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,97 S. Ct. 2044,
52 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977)). Inexcusable delay that results in the loss of juvenile court
jurisdiction can violate a defendant's due process rights. State v. Dixon, 114 Wash. 2d
857, 865-66, 792 P.2d 137 (1990). And defense attorneys have a constitutional duty
to provide their clients effective assistance of counsel. State v. Thomas, 109 Wash. 2d
222, 225, 743 P.2d 816 (1987). An attorney who fails to move for extended juvenile
court jurisdiction before a defendant's 18th birthday may well violate a defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel.
2
State v. Maynard
No. 89786-7
Owens, J., Dissenting
The right to counsel-including the right to effective assistance of counsel-
exists "to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process." United States v.
Morrison, 449 U.S. 361,364, 101 S. Ct. 665,66 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1981). In Morrison,
the United States Supreme Court recognized that conduct on behalf of the government
can have a negative effect on counsel's ability to provide effective assistance. 2 Id. It
noted that courts have "been responsive to proved claims that governmental conduct
has rendered counsel's assistance to the defendant ineffective." ld. The Court opined
that "[c]ases involving Sixth Amendment [to the United States Constitution]
deprivations are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the
injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe
on competing interests." ld.
In this case, the prosecutor interfered with counsel's effective assistance by
unnecessarily delaying the prosecution at every opportunity. First, after the
prosecutor requested more information from the police to prepare for diversion
consideration, the prosecutor delayed one month after receiving the requested
information before turning the case over for diversion. Next, the prosecutor delayed
for seven months after diversion was denied, again asking the police for more
2
The defendant in Morrison was improperly contacted by federal agents after she was
indicted on several drug charges. 449 U.S. at 362. The agents spoke to her alone and
made comments that potentially interfered with her representation. I d. The Court
ultimately dismissed the claim for lack of prejudice. Id. at 366-67.
3
State v. Maynard
No. 89786-7
Owens, J., Dissenting
information. Then the prosecutor delayed for over three weeks after the prosecutor
prepared the charging documents before filing them 24 days before Maynard turned
18. None of these delays have been satisfactorily explained. These delays
significantly contributed to the loss of juvenile jurisdiction, as they gave court-
appointed defense counsel little time to notice the impending birthday and move to
extend juvenile jurisdiction. Together, these failings violated Maynard's
constitutional rights.
The majority asserts that the prosecutor bears no responsibility for the loss of
juvenile jurisdiction because he filed charges before juvenile jurisdiction expired and
thus Maynard had a (brief) chance to extend it. But as I explained above, prosecutors
do not have unfettered discretion to delay filing charges, even if they ultimately file
charges before the statutory deadline. State v. Oppelt, 172 Wash. 2d 285, 288-89, 257
P.3d 653 (2011). Instead, we ask whether the delay "'violate[ d) those fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions, and
which define the community's sense of fair play and decency,"' which requires the
court to make a qualitative assessment of the reasons for and effects of the delay. Id.
at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790). We do
not know the reasons, but we know the effects: the prosecutor's lengthy and repeated
delays significantly contributed to the loss of Maynard's juvenile jurisdiction.
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State v. Maynard
No. 89786-7
Owens, J., Dissenting
I do not mean to excuse defense counsel's performance in this case. Defense
counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced
Maynard's ability to receive fair treatment in the criminal justice process. See State v.
McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322,334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (describing the analysis
for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668,687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984))).
CONCLUSION
I am mindful of the competing interest in this case-i.e., the State's interest in
enforcing its criminal laws. But the State effectively waived that interest by delaying
prosecution for 11 months. The fundamental conceptions of justice would be violated
by allowing the prosecution to proceed. See Oppelt, 172 Wash. 2d at 287, 289-90
(describing the "core question" that must be answered when analyzing claims of
preaccusatorial delay). I would hold that the combined effect of both unjustified
preaccusatorial delay and ineffective assistance of counsel in this case denied
Maynard fair treatment in the adversary criminal process in violation of his
constitutional rights. The only meaningful remedy is to dismiss.
I respectfully dissent.
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State v. Maynard
No. 89786-7
Owens, J., Dissenting
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