State v. Porter ( 2016 )

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IN CLERKS OFFICE '
11JPREME COURT, STAlE Cl' WASHINGTON
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·Supreme cOurt Clerk ·
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Petitioner, NO. 92060-5
v.
ENBANC
CLIFFORD MELYIN PORTER, JR.,
Filed _-=:J-=-UL=-._1_4_2_~_16_
Respondent.
STEPHENS, J.-The State challenges a Court of Appeals decision reversing
Clifford Porter's conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle. At issue is
whether an information charging possession of a stolen motor vehicle must allege
that the defendant withheld or appropriated the vehicle for the use of a person other
than the true owner.
Applying a liberal construction, we hold that the charging document
adequately captured the essential elements of the crime of possession of a stolen
motor vehicle. The information referenced the applicable criminal statutes and
State v. Porter (Clifford Melvin, Jr.), 92060-5
stated that Porter "did unlawfully and feloniously knowingly possess a stolen motor
vehicle." Clerk's Papers (CP) at l. The State was not required to include language
specifying that Porter withheld the vehicle from the true owner, as such language
merely defines and limits the scope of the crime of possession of a stolen motor
vehicle. State v. Johnson, 180 Wn.2d 295, 302, 325 P.3d 135 (2014) ("The State
need not include definitions of elements in the information."). We reinstate Porter's
conviction and remand to the Court of Appeals to address his remaining issues on
appeal.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a search warrant, police discovered portions of a stolen vehicle on
Porter's property. The State subsequently charged Porter by information with
unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, stating
[t]hat CLIFFORD MELVIN PORTER, JR., in the State ofWashington,
on or about the 27th day of August, 2011, did unlawfully and
feloniously knowingly possess a stolen motor vehicle, lmowing that it
had been stolen, contrary to RCW 9A.56.068 and 9A.56.140, and
against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.
CP at 1.
At the close of trial, the jury convicted Porter as charged. On appeal, Porter
argued for the first time that his conviction should be overturned because the
charging document was constitutionally deficient for failing to allege that Porter
withheld or appropriated the vehicle from the true owner. Suppl. Br. of Appellant
at 2-6. Relying on its decision in State v. Satterthwaite, 186 Wn. App. 359, 344 P.3d
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State v. Porter (Clifford Melvin, Jr.), 92060-5
738 (2015), issued while Porter's appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals held that
this language constitutes an essential element of the crime, and reversed Porter's
conviction. State v. Porter, noted at 188 Wn. App. 1051 (2015). We granted review.
State v. Porter, 184 Wn.2d 1026, 364 P.3d 119 (2016).
ANALYSIS
Porter argues that his conviction should be overturned because the charging
document omitted an essential element ofthe offense of possession of a stolen motor
vehicle: RCW 9A.56.140(1 )'s provision stating that possession means to "'withhold
or appropriate [stolen property] to the use of any person other than the true owner or
person entitled thereto."' Suppl. Br. ofResp't at 4 (quoting RCW 9A.56.140(1)).
The State contends the information need not include the "withhold or appropriate"
language because it merely defines the essential element of possession and is not
itself an essential element. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 4-8. For the reasons explained
below, we conclude the State has the better argument.
The Charging Document Captured All Essential Elements of the Crime of
Unlawful Possession of a Stolen Motor Vehicle
Individuals charged with crimes have the constitutional right to know the
charges against them. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. The State
formally gives notice of the charges by information, which "shall be a plain, concise
and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged."
CrR 2.1(a)(l).
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State v. Porter (Clifford Melvin, Jr.), 92060-5
The information is constitutionally sufficient "only if all essential elements of
a c1ime, statutory and nonstatutory, are included in the document." State v.
Vangerpen, 125 Wn.2d 782, 787, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995). "'An essential element is
one whose specification is necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior
charged."' State v. Zillyette, 178 Wn.2d 153, 158, 307 P.3d 712 (2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Ward, 148 Wn.2d 803, 811, 64 P .3d 640
(2003)). "Words in a charging document are read as a whole, construed according
to common sense, and include facts which are necessarily implied." State v.
Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 109, 812 P.2d 86 (1991). When, as here, the information
is challenged for the first time on appeal, the charging document will be construed
"quite liberally." State v. Hopper, 118 Wn.2d 151, 156, 822 P.2d 775 (1992); see
also State v. McCarty, 140 Wn.2d 420, 435, 998 P.2d 296 (2000).
The primary purpose of the essential element rule is "to apprise the accused
of the charges against him or her and to allow the defendant to prepare a defense."
Vangerpen, 125 Wn.2d at 787. A secondary purpose for the essential element rule
is to bar "'any subsequent prosecution for the same offense."' State v. Nonog, 169
Wn.2d 220,226, 237 P.3d 250 (2010) (quoting State v. Leach, 113 Wn.2d 679, 688,
782 P.2d 552 (1989)). If the State fails to allege every essential element, then the
information is insufficient and the charge must be dismissed without prejudice. I d.
at 226 n.3.
Porter was charged with unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle under
RCW 9A.56.068. That statute reads, "A person is guilty of possession of a stolen
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State v. Porter (Clifford Melvin, Jr.), 92060-5
vehicle if he or she possess [possesses] a stolen motor vehicle." RCW 9A.56.068(1)
(alteration in original). Porter argues that the information is deficient because it does
not contain the statutory definition of"possess." Suppl. Br. ofResp't at 4-5. Under
RCW 9A.56.140(1), '"[p]ossessing stolen property' means knowingly to receive,
retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen
and to withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any person other than the true
owner or person entitled thereto." At issue is whether RCW 9A.56.140(1) merely
defines the essential element of "possession" or instead provides an additional
essential element the State must allege when charging a criminal defendant with
possession of a stolen motor vehicle.
In reversing Porter's conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, the
Court of Appeals relied on Satterthwaite, 186 Wn. App. 359, which addressed the
identical issue presented in this case. In Satterthwaite, the Court of Appeals held
that RCW 9A.56.140(1) constituted an essential element of possession of a stolen
motor vehicle-rather than a definition of an essential element-because
withholding the stolen property from the owner is what ultimately makes possessing
the stolen vehicle illegal. !d. at 365. Otherwise, the Court of Appeals reasoned, the
law would not differentiate between "a person attempting to return known stolen
property and a person choosing to keep, use, or dispose of known stolen property."
!d. at 364. The Court of Appeals therefore held that '"withhold or appropriate'" is
an essential element ofRCW 9A.56.068 because it establishes the very illegality of
the act. !d. at 365.
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State v. Porter (Clifford Melvin, Jr.), 92060-5
The State argues Satterthwaite is inconsistent with Johnson. Suppl. Br. of
Pet'r at 8. We agree. In Johnson, this court clarified the difference between an
essential element and a definition of an element, holding that the "State need not
include definitions of elements in the information." 180 Wn.2d at 302. In Johnson,
the defendant was charged with unlawful imprisonment. I d. at 301. The information
read:
"And I, Daniel T. Satterberg, Prosecuting Attorney aforesaid further
do accuse J.C. JOHNSON of the crime of Unlawful Imprisonment -
Domestic Violence, based on a series of acts connected together with another
crime charged herein, committed as follows:
"That the defendant J.C. JOHNSON in King County, Washington,
during a period of time intervening between May 4, 2009 through May 6,
2009, did knowingly restrain [J.J.], a human being;
"Contrary to RCW 9A.40.040, and against the peace and dignity of
the State of Washington."
Id. (alteration in original). The defendant challenged the information, arguing it was
constitutionally insufficient for not including the definition of "restrain." I d. at 301-
02. Finding the charging document sufficient, this court held that the State was not
required to include definitions of elements and that it was enough for the State to
allege all of the essential elements found in the unlawful imprisonment statute. I d.
Under our analysis in Johnson, the information charging Porter with unlawful
possession of a stolen vehicle passes constitutional muster. Contrary to Porter's
argument, the State was not required to include the definition of"possess." Like the
definition of "restrain," the definition of "possess" defines and limits the scope of
the essential elements of the crime of unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle.
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State v. Porter (Clifford Melvin, Jr.), 92060-5
the essential elements of the crime of unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle.
See also State v. Allen, 176 Wn.2d 611, 626-30, 294 P.3d 679 (2013) (upholding an
information charging felony harassment as constitutional when it did not articulate
the constitutional limitation that only true threats may be charged because the "true
threat" concept merely defines and limits the scope of the essential threat element in
the harassment statute).
When liberally construed as required under Kjorsvik, the charging document
clearly put Porter on notice that possessing a stolen vehicle was illegal, which is the
primary purpose of the essential element rule. Vangerpen, 125 Wn.2d at 787. The
charging document also alleged that Porter knowingly possessed property he knew
to be stolen, and it referenced RCW 9A.56.140, which provides the applicable
definition of "possess." Though "[m]erely citing to the proper statute and naming
the offense is insufficient to charge a crime unless the name of the offense apprises
the defendant of all of the essential elements of the crime," here the information
sufficiently articulated the essential elements of the crime for which Porter was
charged, making further elaboration of what it means to unlawfully possess stolen
property unnecessary. !d. While it certainly could have been more elaborate, the
information was constitutionally sufficient. The Court of Appeals erred by vacating
Porter's conviction.
Because the Court of Appeals relied on Satterthwaite, we take this opportunity
to disapprove that decision. Satterthwaite is erroneously premised on the notion that
the illegality of the conduct proscribed in RCW 9A.56.068 is withholding a stolen
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State v. Porter (Clifford Melvin, Jr.), 92060-5
motor vehicle from the true owner. But that is contrary to RCW 9A.56.068's plain
terms. Under RCW 9A.56.068, a "person is guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle
if he or she ... [possesses] a stolen motor vehicle." RCW 9A.56.068(1) (second
alteration in original). The fact that "possession" is more precisely defined in a way
that might vindicate someone who unwittingly possesses the stolen property and thus
does not withhold it from the true owner does not add to the essential elements of
RCW 9A.56.068. Instead, it limits and defines the scope of the essential element,
which the State is not required to allege under Johnson.
To support his argument that the definition of"possess" is an essential element
of the crime for which he is charged, Porter points to the fact that the jury instructions
at trial contained that definition. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 6-7. Porter cites no
authority-binding, persuasive, or otherwise--to support his argument that charging
documents must mirror pattern to-convict jury instructions. And for good reason:
charging documents and jury instructions serve very different purposes. Jury
instructions "allow[] each party to argue its theory of the case" and "must convey to
the jury that the State bears the burden of proving every essential element of a
criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303, 307,
165 P.3d 1241 (2007) (citing Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5-6, 114 S. Ct. 1239,
127 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1994)). Charging documents serve to put the defendant on notice
of the crime against him. Vangerpen, 125 Wn.2d at 787.
Finally, Porter's reliance on State v. Moavenzadeh, 135 Wn.2d 359, 956 P.2d
1097 (1998), and State v. McKinsey, 116 Wn.2d 911, 810 P.2d 907 (1991), is
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State v. Porter (Clifford Melvin, Jr.), 92060-5
misplaced. In Moavenzadeh, this court reversed a defendant's conviction when an
information charging three counts of first degree possession of stolen property
"contain[ed] no language which c[ ould] fairly be read to allege that [the defendant]
knew the property was stolen." 135 Wn.2d at 363. Overruling prior cases, the court
held that the knowledge element of possession of stolen property is an essential
element. Id. at 363-64. Here, the charging document clearly put Porter on notice
that he was being charged for "possess[ing] a stolen motor vehicle, knowing that it
had been stolen." CP at 1. Further elaboration of how a person may "possess" stolen
property was unnecessary. And although this court in McKinsey included the words
"withhold or appropriate" in setting out the elements of the crime that must be
proved, it did not announce them as essential elements of the crime for charging
purposes. 116 Wn.2d at 913. Instead, the issue in McKinsey was whether possession
of stolen property is a crime of dishonesty admissible for impeachment purposes.
Id. at 912. McKinsey does not undercut the clear holding in Johnson recognizing
that not all aspects of proof that are necessary at trial constitute essential elements
that must be included in the information. Johnson, 180 Wn.2d at 301-02.
CONCLUSION
Liberally construed, the charging document included all essential elements of
the crime of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The State was not required to
include the definitional element of "possess" to properly charge Porter.
Accordingly, we reinstate Porter's conviction for unlawful possession of a stolen
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State v. Porter (Clifford Melvin, Jr.), 92060-5
motor vehicle and remand to the Court of Appeals to address Porter's remaining
claims.
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State v. Porter (Clifford Melvin, Jr.), 92060-5
WE CONCUR:
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