State v. Medina ( 2014 )

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, NO. 89147-8
Respondent, ENBANC
v.
MARIO ALEJANDRO MEDINA, Filed APR 1 7 2014
Petitioner.
GORDON McCLOUD, J.-While petitioner Mario Medina was awaiting
retrial on charges of second degree murder, he was ordered to participate in two King
County Community Center for Alternative Programs (CCAP) (pronounced "sea-
cap"): "CCAP Enhanced" and "CCAP Basic." Medina participated in these
programs for approximately five years before his second trial resulted in a
conviction. He argues that he is entitled, as a matter of both statutory and
constitutional law, to credit for time served in the alternative programs. Both the
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected this argument. We granted review and
now affirm.
FACTS
Medina was originally charged with first degree intentional murder in 1998.
The jury convicted Medina and his codefendant, Felipe Ramos, of second degree
felony murder based on the predicate offense of second degree assault. Those
convictions were vacated in light of In re Personal Restraint ofAndress, 147 Wn.2d
602, 56 P.3d 981 (2002), which held that assault was not a predicate offense for
felony murder. State v. Ramos, 124 Wn. App. 334, 101 P.3d 872 (2004).
On remand in 2005, Medina was arraigned on first degree manslaughter
charges. He moved to dismiss, the trial court denied the motion, and this court
granted direct review. In 2008, this court affirmed, meaning that the trial could
proceed. State v. Ramos, 163 Wn.2d 654, 661-62, 184 P.3d 1256 (2008). Pending
retrial, the trial court released Medina on personal recognizance on several
conditions, including participation in CCAP.
CCAP is "a weekly itinerary ... of structured programs" administered at the
Y esle.r Building in downtown Seattle. 1 There are two different CCAP tracks: CCAP
1
Dep't of Adult and Juvenile Detention, KING COUNTY COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS
ALTERNATIVES AND SERVICES, http://www.kingcounty.gov/courts/detention/
community_corrections/ programs.aspx#ccap_(last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
2
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
Enhanced and CCAP Basic. 2 Offenders ordered into CCAP Enhanced report in
person to the Yesler Building daily, while those ordered into CCAP Basic report
only by phone. 3 From January 2007 until July 2011, Medina alternated between
CCAP Enhanced and CCAP Basic. He spent a total of about nine months in CCAP
Enhanced and about three years and nine months in CCAP Basic. 4
King County established CCAP under the auspices of former RCW 9.94A.380
(1988)/current RCW 9.94A.680. 5 That statute has authorized courts to impose
"alternatives to total confinement" for "offenders [with sentences] for less than one
2
Clifton Curry, Metropolitan King County Council Law, Justice and Human
Services Committee Staff Report (re Proposed Ordinance 2008-0496), Sept. 18, 2008,
available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/agendas.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
3
Debra Srebnik, The Relationship of Intensive Outpatient Chemical Dependency
Treatment at the Community Center for Alternative Programs to Community Corrections
Placements, KING COUNTY DEP'T OF COMMUNITY AND HUMAN SERVICES, May 2011.
4
The trial court ordered Medina into the CCAP Enhanced program on January 12,
2007. 2 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 179-81. On April6, 2007 he was ordered into the CCAP
Basic program, 2 CP at 182-83, where he remained until October 31, 2007, when he was
moved back to the Enhanced program, 2 CP at 186-88. On April23, 2008, he was ordered
back into the CCAP Basic program and on July 5, 2011, back to the Enhanced program. 2
CP at 189, 191-93. On July 13, 2011 he was placed on electronic home detention pending
his appeal. 2 CP at 19 5.
5
Curry, supra, n.2 (proposing an amendment to the King County Code to "more
clearly define CCAP as a 'county supervised community option"' in order to "take
advantage of the provisions of [RCW 9.94A.680(3)]").
3
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
year," since 1983. LAWS OF 1983, ch. 115, § 9. In 1999, it was amended to give
sentencing courts permission to allow county jails to "convert jail confinement to an
available county supervised community option." LAWS OF 1999, ch. 197, § 6.
When Medina was in CCAP Enhanced, he reported in person to the Y esler
Building every weekday morning at 9:00a.m. and remained there "until discharged
by department staff." 6 Beyond that bare fact, the record does not contain any
information about the nature of Medina's participation in CCAP Enhanced, but we
note that in 2008 the King County Code (KCC) was amended to provide that
offenders ordered into a '"county supervised community option' ... must participate
for a minimum of six hours per day of structured programs offered through, or
approved by, the community corrections division." KCC 5.12.010(B). 7
At his sentencing after retrial, Medina requested credit for the time he spent
in both CCAP Enhanced and CCAP Basic. The trial judge stated that he would grant
the request if he could-because Medina's conduct while awaiting retrial had been
6
CP at 186 (Conditions of Conduct for Persons Ordered by the King County
Superior Court into the CCAP Enhanced) ("You shall report to [CCAP] by 9:00 AM on
11/7/07 and report each weekday Monday through Friday thereafter. You shall remain on
the premises until discharged by department staff.").
7 Available at http://www.kingcounty.gov/council/legislation/KC_code/
08_Title_5.aspx. It is not clear whether that amendment changed the minimum
requirements for CCAP participation or whether it merely codified preexisting
requirements.
4
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
exemplary-but that he believed it was barred by statute. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, and Medina petitioned this court for review. State v. Ramos, noted at 174
Wn. App. 1072, 2013 WL 1956640, review granted sub nom., State v. Medina, 178
Wn.2d 1018, 312 P.3d 651 (2013).
ANALYSIS
I. The Sentencing Reform Act Does Not Entitle Medina to Credit for
Time Served in CCAP Enhanced or CCAP Basic
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), a defendant must be
sentenced in accordance with the law in effect at the time of his or her offense. RCW
9 .94A.345. In 1997, when Medina committed his offense, credit for time served was
governed by former RCW 9.94A.030(8) (1988) and former RCW 9.94A.030(26)
(1991), former RCW 9.94A.120(16) (1988), and former RCW 9.94A.380 (1988).
Former RCW 9.94A.030(8) (1988) provides that '"[c]onfinement' means total
or partial confinement as defined in [RCW 9.94A.030]." LAWS OF 1996, ch. 289, §
1. Former RCW 9.94A.120(16) (1988) provides that "[t]he sentencing court shall
give the offender credit for all confinement time served before the sentencing if that
confinement was solely in regard to the offense for which the offender is being
sentenced." LAWS OF 1996, ch. 275, § 2. Neither of these statutes has been amended
since Medina's offense (although the latter has been recodified as RCW
9.94A.505(6)).
5
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
Former RCW 9.94A.030(26) (1991) defines "partial confinement." It
provides that
"[p] artial confinement" means confinement for no more than one year
in a facility or institution operated or utilized under contract by the state
or any other unit of government, or, if home detention or work crew has
been ordered by the court, in an approved residence, for a substantial
portion of each day with the balance of the day spent in the community.
Partial confinement includes work release, home detention, work crew,
and a combination of work crew and home detention as defined in this
section.
LAws OF 1996, ch. 289, § 1. This statute has not been amended since 1997, but it
has been recodified as RCW 9.94A.030(35).
The State contends, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that former RCW
9.94A.030(26) (1991) must be read together with former RCW 9.94A.180(1) (1988),
which provided that "[a]n offender sentenced to a term of partial confinement shall
be confined in the facility for at least eight hours per day." LAws OF 1991, ch. 181,
§ 4. When these statutes are harmonized, the State argues, it is clear that "a
substantial portion of each day" really means "at least eight hours." See Suppl. Br.
ofResp't at 12; Ramos, 2013 WL 1956640, at *6 ("an offender must demonstrate
that this partial confinement included at least eight hours per day in a 'facility"' in
order to qualify for time served in partial confinement.). The State argues, and the
Court of Appeals concluded, that since CCAP did not confine Medina for at least
6
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
eight hours each day, it did not constitute "partial confinement." 2013 WL 19 56640,
at *6.
We disagree with that analysis. This court has held that a defendant's
ineligibility for a particular type of partial confinement postconviction is not relevant
to the question of whether that defendant must be credited for pretrial time served
in that same type of partial confinement. State v. Speaks, 119 Wn.2d 204, 208, 829
P.2d 1096 (1992) (offender convicted of child molestation entitled to credit for
presentencing time on electronic home detention (EHD) even though the SRA
prohibited courts from sentencing persons convicted of child molestation to EHD).
In reaching that conclusion, we noted that "[t]he appropriateness of a type of
postconviction confinement . . . is a different issue . . . than whether the [SRA]
affords credit for a type of presentence restraint." ld. In light of the Speaks analysis,
we decline to "harmonize" former RCW 9.94A.030(26) (1991) and former RCW
9.94A.180(1) (1988) the way that the Court of Appeals below did. Ramos, 2013 WL
1956640, at *6.
Nevertheless, we agree with the State that Medina is not entitled to credit for
time in CCAP. Former RCW 9.94A.030(26) (1991) defines "partial confinement"
in a manner that equates "confinement" with "residence" as contrasted with "work."
LAWS OF 1996, ch. 289, § 1 ("' [p]artial confinement' means confinement for no more
7
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
than one year in a facility or institution ... or, if home detention or work crew has
been ordered ... in an approved residence" (emphasis added)). By extension, we
do not think that participation in the educational, counseling, and service-oriented
programs entailed in CCAP meets the statutory definition of "confinement."
Participation in these programs is similar to reporting for work or school-clearly,
the CCAP facility is not a residence.
While this is sufficient to resolve the question presented, we note that our
conclusion also derives substantial support from the legislative history of former
RCW 9.94A.380 (1988)/current RCW 9.94A.680.
Former RCW 9.94A.380 (1988)/current RCW 9.94A.680 governs
"alternatives to total confinement." In 1997, that statute read as follows:
Alternatives to total confinement are available for offenders with
sentences of one year or less. These alternatives include the following
sentence conditions that the court may order as substitutes for total
confinement:
( 1) One day of partial confinement may be substituted for one
day of total confinement;
(2) in addition, for offenders convicted of nonviolent offenses
only, eight hours of community service may be substituted for one day
of total confinement, with a maximum conversion limit of two hundred
forty hours or thirty days.
For sentences of nonviolent offenders for one year or less, the
court shall consider and give priority to available alternatives to total
8
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
confinement and shall state its reasons in writing on the judgment and
sentence form if the alternatives are not used.
LAWS OF 1988, ch. 157, § 4.
This statute has been amended three times smce 1997, and two of those
amendments are relevant here. 8 In 1999, former RCW 9.94A.380 (1988)/current
RCW 9.94A.680 was amended to provide that "[f]or offenders convicted of
nonviolent and nonsex offenses, the court may authorize county jails to convert jail
confinement to an available county supervised community option and may require
the offender to perform affirmative conduct pursuant to section 2 of this act." LAWS
OF 1999, ch. 197, § 6. In 2009, it was amended to directly address credit for
presentence time served in a "county supervised community option"; it now permits
courts to credit such time "[f]or offenders convicted of nonviolent and nonsex
offenses":
For offenders convicted of nonviolent and nonsex offenses, the court
may credit time served by the offender before the sentencing in an
available county supervised community option and may authorize
county jails to convert jail confinement to an available to an available
county supervised community option, may authorize the time spent in
the community option to be reduced by earned release credit consistent
with local correctional facility standards, and may require the offender
to perform affirmative conduct pursuant to RCW 9.94A.607.
8
The third amendment occurred in 2002, when the term "community service" was
replaced with the term "community restitution." LAws OF 2002, ch. 175, § 12. Former
RCW 9.94A.380 (1988) was recodified as RCW 9.94A.680 in 2001. LAWS OF 2001, ch.
10, § 6.
9
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
LAWS OF 2009, ch. 227, § 1.
We agree with the State that if the 2009 amendment applied to Medina's
sentence, it would prohibit a court from granting him credit for presentence time in
CCAP. Under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the 2009
amendment must be construed as permitting credit for CCAP time only for
nonviolent offenders-and as impliedly prohibiting such credit for those convicted
of violent offenses. 9 But because Medina's eligibility for credit is governed by the
SRA provisions in effect in 1997, subsequent amendments are relevant only to the
extent that they shed light on the meaning and operation ofthe 1997 law.
Here, the 2009 amendment sheds significant light on the earlier law. When
this amendment was proposed, it was accompanied by a bill report explaining that it
was designed to "resolve[] the disincentive to go into an alternative sentencing
option rather than serving less time sitting injail." 10 The report clearly indicates an
9
Wash. Natural Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County, 77 Wn.2d
94, 98,459 P.2d 633 (1969) ("[w]here a statute specifically designates the things or classes
of things upon which it operates, an inference arises in law that all [other] things or classes
of things . . . were intentionally omitted by the legislature" (citing State v. Roadhs, 71
Wn.2d 705, 707, 430 P.2d 586 (1967))).
10
H.B. REP. on H.B. 1361, at 3, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009); see also S.B.
REP. on H.B. 1361, at 2, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009) ("It is sometimes easier for a
person to sit in jail than participate in a program that requires affirmative conduct. This
bill will remove some of the barriers to getting people to participate.").
10
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
intent to expand eligibility for credit for time served. If the 2009 amendment was
enacted to create an incentive for pretrial participation in "community option"
programs, it is reasonable to infer that this incentive did not exist before.
Moreover, the 2009 amendment made credit for time served in community
options like CCAP merely discretionary. LAWS OF 2009, ch. 227, § 1 ("[f]or
offenders convicted of nonviolent and nonsex offenses, the court may credit time
served by the offender before the sentencing in an available county supervised
community option" (emphasis added)). If these community options were forms of
partial confinement under former RCW 9.94A.030(26) (1991), credit for time spent
participating in those programs would not be discretionary. Rather, it would be
mandatory under RCW 9.94A.505(6) ("The sentencing court shall give the offender
credit for all confinement time served before the sentencing if that confinement was
solely in regard to the offense for which the offender is being sentenced" (emphasis
added)).
This shows that the 2009 legislature perceived a need to expand credit for time
'
served in "county supervised community options." Medina has not offered (and we
are not aware of) any contrary evidence that defendants were already regularly
receiving credit for time served in CCAP programs. Hence, neither CCAP Enhanced
11
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
nor CCAP Basic constitutes "partial confinement" under the SRA for purposes of
mandatory credit for time served.
II. The United States Constitution Does Not Entitle Medina to Credit for
Time Served in CCAP Prior to Sentencing
Medina also claims that a failure to credit his CCAP time violates the equal
protection and double jeopardy clause protections guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. We disagree.
A. The equal protection clause does not require that Medina receive
credit for time spent in CCAP
In Reanier v. Smith, 83 Wn.2d 342, 346, 517 P .2d 949 (197 4), this court held
that "an accused person, unable to or precluded from posting bail or otherwise
procuring his release from confinement prior to trial" was entitled to credit for time
served upon sentencing. The court based its decision on "principles of due process
and equal protection" and on "potential implications of double jeopardy." !d. at 34 7.
It reasoned that a contrary decision would result in two separate sets of sentencing
ranges-one for "those unable to procure pretrial release from confinement and
another for those fortunate enough to obtain such release"-and concluded that such
a sentencing regime would not survive rational basis review. !d. at 346-47. The
Reanier decision was applied to total confinement: "We conclude that considerations
of due process, equal protection and the prohibition against multiple punishments
12
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
dictate that presentence jail time be credited against maximum and mandatory
minimum terms where applicable." Id. at 352-53.
The Reanier decision absolutely bars the legislature from distinguishing
between rich defendants and poor defendants for the purpose of credit for time
served, but the legislature remains free to draw many other distinctions. In Harris
v. Charles, 171 Wn.2d 455,458-59, 256 P.3d 328 (2011), this court held that neither
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution nor article I, section 12
of the Washington Constitution prohibited the legislature from crediting felons, but
not misdemeanants, for time served on EHD prior to trial. If the legislature wants
to credit pretrial time that does not amount to confinement-like the CCAP time at
issue here-for nonviolent offenders, but not for violent offenders, it may do so
under Harris. This distinction is rational.
B. Denying Medina credit for time served in CCAP did not subject him
to double jeopardy
To determine whether a government action is sufficiently punitive to trigger
the double jeopardy protections provided by the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 9 of our state constitution, 11 this court
11We interpret article I, section 9 of the Washington Constitution to provide the
same protections that the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides.
Harris, 171 Wn.2d at 467 n.7.
13
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
applies a two-part test. Harris, 171 Wn.2d at 467 (citing State v. Catlett, 133 Wn.2d
355, 366, 945 P.2d 700 (1997)). First, it asks whether the government intends the
action to be punitive. !d. If not, then it asks whether the action's purpose or effect
is nevertheless so punitive as to negate the government's nonpunitive intent. !d. In
Harris, this court concluded that EHD imposed as a condition of release pending
sentencing pursuant to Criminal Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (CrRLJ)
3.2 was not punitive for purposes of double jeopardy. Id. at 467-69. It based this
conclusion on the fact that CrRLJ 3.2 and Superior Court Criminal Rules (CrR) 3.2
were intended to "alleviate some of the burdens imposed upon an accused individual
awaiting trial" while at the same time ensuring his appearance, id. at 468 (emphasis
added), and the fact that EHD is not such a severe restriction on liberty that it negates
CrRLJ 3.2's nonpunitive intent. Id. at 470-73.
Harris is directly on point because Medina was ordered into CCAP pursuant
to CrR 3.2. There is no indication that Medina's release to CCAP was more punitive
(in either intent or effect) than the release to EHD at issue in Harris. Moreover,
Medina bears the burden of proof on this issue. He has not offered any evidence that
his CCAP participation was punitive in effect, and indeed it appears that CCAP is
rehabilitative in design. The failure to credit Medina's CCAP time does not violate
double jeopardy clause protections.
14
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
CONCLUSION
Neither the SRA nor the United States Constitution entitles Medina to credit
for time served in the community option lmown as CCAP. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
15
State v. Medina (Mario Alejandro), No. 89147-8
WE CONCUR:
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16