State v. Ramirez , 191 Wash. 2d 732 ( 2018 )

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CHIEF JUSTKG
IN THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OE WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent, NO. 95249-3
V.
EN BANC
DAVID ANGEL RAMIREZ,
Petitioner. Filed SEP 2 0 2018
STEPHENS, J.—In State v. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 827, 839, 344 P.3d 680
(2015), we held that under former RCW 10.01.160(3)(2015), trial courts have an
obligation to conduct an individualized inquiry into a defendant's current and future
ability to pay before imposing discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs) at
sentencing. This case provides an opportunity to more fully describe the nature of
such an inquiry. An adequate inquiry must include consideration of the mandatory
factors set forth in Blazina, including the defendant's incarceration and other debts,
and the court rule GR 34 criteria for indigency. Id. at 838. The trial court should
also address what we described in Blazina as other "important factors" relating to
State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
the defendant's financial circumstances, including employment history, income,
assets and other financial resources, monthly living expenses, and other debts. Id.
The trial court in David A. Ramirez's case failed to conduct an adequate
individualized inquiry before imposing LFOs on Ramirez. While this Blazina error
would normally entitle Ramirez to a resentencing hearing on his ability to pay
discretionary LFOs, such a limited resentencing is unnecessary in this case.
Engrossed Second Substitute House Bill 1783, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess.(Wash. 2018)
(House Bill 1783), which amended two statutes at issue and now prohibits the
imposition of certain LFOs on indigent defendants, applies prospectively to
Ramirez's case on appeal. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for the trial
court to strike the improperly imposed LFOs from Ramirez'sjudgment and sentence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A jury convicted Ramirez of third degree assault and possession of a
controlled substance, and found by special verdict that he committed the assault with
sexual motivation and displayed an egregious lack ofremorse. Clerk's Papers(CP)
at 63-66.
At sentencing, the State sought an exceptional sentence of 10 years based on
Ramirez's prior record and offender score. 2 Verbatim Report ofProceedings(Mar.
7,2016)(VRP)at 346. Following the State's argument for imposing an exceptional
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
sentence, Ramirez took the opportunity to directly address the trial court. Ramirez
explained to the court that despite the State's representations, he "was doing
ever54:hing right" before his arrest. Id. at 360. Ramirez shared that prior to his arrest,
he was working a minimum wage job at Weyerhaeuser as part of a "temporary
service team" and paying all his household bills, including a DirecTV subscription
that included Seattle Seahawks games. Id. at 359-60, 362-63. Ramirez had opened
a bank account for the first time in his life, was planning on getting his driver's
license, and had moved into his own apartment with the help of his wife. Id. at 360,
362. Ramirez discussed these favorable aspects of his life in an effort to show that
despite his criminal history, he did not deserve an exceptional sentence. Suppl. Br.
of Pet'r at 3. He lamented that because of his drug relapse and arrest, "I missed out
on all of that." VRP at 363.^
The trial court sentenced Ramirez to five years for the third degree assault
conviction and two years for possession of a controlled substance, to be served
consecutively. Id. at 372-73. The trial court also imposed $2,900 in LFOs,including
a $500 victim assessment fee, a $100 DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) collection fee, a
$200 criminal filing fee, and discretionary LFOs of $2,100 in attorney fees, and set
^ Ramirez's full statement was, "I missed out on all of that because I screwed up
before even the first Seahawk game. That was the weekend that I screwed up. It was the
Saturday before the first Seahawk game." VRP at 363.
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
a monthly payment amount of $25. Id. at 375-76. After the court announced the
sentence, Ramirez presented a notice of appeal and a motion for an order of
indigency, which the court granted. Id. at 373; Suppl. CP at 1-4. According to the
financial statement in his declaration ofindigency, Ramirez had no source ofincome
or assets and no savings, and owed more than $10,000 at the time of sentencing
(apparently previously imposed court costs and fees). Suppl. CP at 2-4.
Prior to imposing LFOs, the trial court asked only two questions relating to
Ramirez's current and future ability to pay, both of which were directed to the State.
First, the court asked,"And when he is not in jail, he has the ability to make money
to make periodic payments on his LFOs,right?" VRP at 348. The State responded
that Ramirez had the ability to pay his LFOs "[wjhen he's not in jail and when he is
in jail," noting that Ramirez could work while incarcerated. Id. The trial court then
asked the State to once more confirm that LFOs were appropriate in Ramirez's case:
"But as far as you are concerned, the LFOs should be imposed." Id. The State
answered,"Yes." Id.
The trial court did not directly ask Ramirez or his counsel about his ability to
pay at any point during sentencing. The only statement made by Ramirez concerning
his ability to pay came after the trial court announced its decision to impose
discretionary costs. After finding that Ramirez had "the ability to earn money and
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
make small payments on his financial obligations," the court listed the specific costs
imposed and ordered Ramirez to pay "25 bucks a month starting [in] 60 days." Id.
at 375-76. Ramirez then asked,"How am I going to do that from inside?" Id. at
376. Ramirez's counsel responded,"I will explain." Id. The discussion then moved
on to a different subject.^
On appeal, Ramirez argued that the trial court failed to make an adequate
individualized inquiry into his ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs,
contrary to Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d at 837-38.^ In a 2-1 unpublished opinion. Division
Two of the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the court
"conducted an adequate individualized inquiry and did not err in imposing the
discretionary LFOs." State v. Ramirez, No. 48705-5-II, slip op. at 13 (Wash. Ct.
App. Oct. 24, 2017) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/
pdfD2%2048705-5-II%20Unpublished%200pinion.pdf. In reviewing the trial
court's decision to impose discretionary LFOs on Ramirez, the Court of Appeals
majority applied an overall abuse of discretion standard; it cited the information
^ Ramirez's counsel made only one mention of LFOs,in correcting the trial court's
original estimate of the amount of attorney fees. The court initially stated that these
discretionary costs totaled $900, but Ramirez's counsel clarified that $2,100 was the
correct amount. VRPat375.
^ Ramirez's appeal additionally raised several guilt-phase claims of error, which the
Court ofAppeals rejected. State v. Ramirez, No.48705-5-II, slip op. at 7-11, 13-15(Wash.
Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/
D2%2048705-5-II%20Unpublished%200pinion.pdf. These issues are not before us.
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
offered by Ramirez in his statement to the trial court as sufficient grounds for finding
Ramirez able to pay LFOs. Id. at 12-13.
In dissent, Chief Judge Bjorgen argued that the question of whether a trial
court made an adequate inquiry into a defendant's ability to pay discretionary LFOs
should be reviewed de novo, not for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 16(Bjorgen, C.J.,
dissenting). Applying the de novo standard. ChiefJudge Bjorgen concluded that the
trial court's inquiry into Ramirez's financial status fell short of the Blazina
standards. Id. at 19.
On March 7, 2018, we granted Ramirez's petition for review "only on the
issue of discretionary [LFOs]." Order Granting Review, No. 95249-3 (Wash. Mar.
7,2018). On March 27,2018,just weeks after we granted Ramirez's petition. House
Bill 1783 became law. Laws of 2018, ch. 269. House Bill 1783's amendments
relate to Washington's system for imposing and collecting LFOs and are effective
as of June 7, 2018. House Bill 1783 is particularly relevant to Ramirez's case
because it amends the discretionary LFO statute to prohibit trial courts Jftom
imposing discretionary LFOs on defendants who are indigent at the time of
sentencing. Id. at § 6(3).
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
ANALYSIS
This case concerns Washington's system ofLFOs, specifically the imposition
of discretionary LFOs on individuals who lack the current and future ability to pay
them. State law requires that trial courts consider the financial resources of a
defendant and the nature of the burden imposed by LFOs before ordering the
defendant to pay discretionary costs. See RCW 10.01.160(3).
We addressed former RCW 10.01.160(3) in Blazina and held that the statute
requires trial courts to conduct an individualized inquiry into the financial
circumstances of each offender before levying any discretionary LFOs. 182 Wash. 2d
at 839. As Ramirez's case demonstrates,however, costs are often imposed with very
little discussion. We granted review in this case to articulate specific inquiries trial
courts should make in determining whether an individual has the current and future
ability to pay discretionary costs.
After we granted review, the legislature enacted House Bill 1783, which
amends former RCW 10.01.160(3) to categorically prohibit the imposition of any
discretionary costs on indigent defendants. Laws of 2018, ch. 269, § 6(3). House
Bill 1783 also amends the criminal filing fee statute, former RCW 36.18.020(2)(h)
(2015),to prohibit courts from imposing the $200 filing fee on indigent defendants.
Laws of 2018, ch. 269, § 17(2)(h). According to Ramirez's motion for an order of
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
indigency, which the trial court granted, Ramirez unquestionably qualified as
indigent at the time of sentencing: Ramirez had no source of income or assets and
no savings, and owed more than $10,000 at the time of sentencing. Suppl. CP at
3-4.
This case presents two issues. The primary issue is whether the trial court
conducted an adequate individualized inquiry into Ramirez's ability to pay, as
required under Blazina and former RCW 10.01.160(3). A separate but related issue
is whether House Bill 1783's statutory amendments apply to Ramirez's case on
appeal.
I. The Trial Court Did Not Conduct an Adequate Individualized Inquiry into
Ramirez's Current and Future Ability To Pay LFOs
The threshold issue in this case is whether the trial court performed an
adequate inquiry into Ramirez's present and future ability to pay before imposing
discretionary LFOs. In addressing this issue, we must decide what standard of
review applies to a trial court's decision to impose discretionary LFOs. The Court
of Appeals was seemingly split on this question, with the majority applying an
overall abuse of discretion standard and the dissenting judge applying de novo
review. We address the proper standard of review before turning to the merits of
Ramirez's argument.
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
A. The Adequacy ofthe Trial Court's Individualized Inquiry into a Defendant's
Ability To Pay Discretionary LFOs Should Be Reviewed De Novo
As Ramirez correctly points out, the question of whether the trial court
adequately inquired into his ability to pay discretionary LFOs involves both a factual
and a legal component. Suppl. Br. ofPet'r at 16. On the factual side, the reviewing
court determines what evidence the trial court actually considered in making the
Blazina inquiry. Chief Judge Bjorgen aptly observed that the factual determination
can be decided by simply examining the record for supporting evidence.'^ Ramirez,
slip op. at 17 (Bjorgen, C.J., dissenting). On the legal side, the reviewing court
decides whether the trial court's inquiry complied with the requirements ofBlazina.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions below recognized that this legal inquiry
merits de novo review. See id. at 13 n.4 ("[wjhether or not a trial court makes an
individualized inquiry is reviewed de novo"), 17 (Bjorgen, C.J., dissenting)
(describing this as "an unalloyed legal question").
^ Ramirez criticizes Chief Judge Bjorgen for embracing a "clearly erroneous"
standard of review for factual determdnations, based on prior appellate decisions. See
Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 17 & n.6. Ramirez insists that "substantial evidence" is the correct
Washington standard, while "clear error" applies in federal courts. Id. We believe the
distinction is semantic in this context. The very case Ramirez cites as identifying different
state and federal standards says,"[W]e review [factual findings] for substantial evidence,
which is analogous to the 'clear error' test applied by the federal courts." Steele v.
Lundgren, 85 Wash. App. 845, 850, 935 P.2d 671 (1997).
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
Given their shared recognition that de novo review applies to the question of
whether the trial court complied with Blazina, the split in the Court of Appeals may
be more a difference in emphasis than in substance. Blazina establishes what
constitutes an adequate inquiry into a defendant's ability to pay under state law, and
the standard of review for an issue involving questions of law is de novo. State v.
Hanson, 151 Wash. 2d 783, 784-85, 91 P.3d 888 (2004). Ramirez is correct that the
Blazina inquiry is similar to other inquiries trial judges make that are subject to de
novo review. See Suppl. Br. ofPet'r at 16-17(citing State v. Vicuna, 119 Wn. App.
26,30-31,79 P.3d 1 (2003)(applying de novo review to determination of whether a
conflict exists between attorney and client); State v. Ramirez-Dominguez, 140 Wn.
App. 233, 239, 165 P.3d 391 (2007)(applying de novo review to determination of
whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to
a jury trial)).
That said, the trial court's ultimate decision whether to impose discretionary
LFOs is undoubtedly discretionary. The trial court must balance the defendant's
ability to pay against the burden ofhis obligation, which is an exercise of discretion.
State V. Baldwin, 63 Wash. App. 303, 312, 818 P.2d 1116 (1991). But, discretion is
necessarily abused when it is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds
or reasons. State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668,701,940 P.2d 1239(1997). Ifthe trial
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
court fails to conduct an individualized inquiry into the defendant's financial
circumstances, as RCW 10.01.160(3) requires, and nonetheless imposes
discretionary LFOs on the defendant, the trial court has per se abused its
discretionary power. Stated differently, the court's exercise of discretion is
unreasonable when it is premised on a legal error. The focus ofRamirez's argument
for de novo review is squarely on the trial court's legal error in failing to conduct an
individualized inquiry. Thus, while the State is correct that the abuse of discretion
standard of review is relevant to the broad question of whether discretionary LFOs
were validly imposed, de novo review applies to the alleged error in this case: the
failure to make an adequate inquiry under Blazina.
B. The Trial Court's Inquiry into Ramirez's Ability To Pay Discretionary LFOs
Was Inadequate under Blazina
The legal question before us is whether the trial court's inquiry into Ramirez's
current and future ability to pay discretionary LFOs was adequate under Blazina. In
Blazina, we held that former RCW 10.01.160(3) requires the trial court to conduct
an individualized inquiry on the record concerning a defendant's current and future
ability to pay before imposing discretionary LFOs. 182 Wash. 2d at 839. We explained
that "the court must do more than sign a judgment and sentence with boilerplate
language stating that it engaged in the required inquiry." Id. at 838. As part ofthis
inquiry, the trial court is required to consider "important factors," such as
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
incarceration and the defendant's other debts, when determining a defendant's
ability to pay. Id. Additionally, we specifically instructed courts to look for
additional guidance in the comment to court rule GR 34, which lists the ways a
person may prove indigent status for the purpose of seeking a waiver of filing fees
and surcharges. Id.\ City ofRichland v. Wakefield, 186 Wash. 2d 596, 606-07, 380
P.3d 459(2016). As we further clarified,"ifsomeone does meet the GR 34 standard
for indigency, courts should seriously question that person's ability to pay LFOs."
Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d at 839.
Here, the record shows that the trial court asked only two questions
concerning Ramirez's ability to pay LFOs,both of which were directed to the State.
First, the court asked,"And when he is not in jail, he has the ability to make money
to make periodic payments on his LFOs,right?" VRP at 348. The State responded,
"When he's not in jail and when he is in jail," noting that Ramirez could work while
incarcerated. Id. The court then asked the State for clarification on the LFO issue:
"But as far as you are concerned, the LFOs should be imposed." Id. In response,
the State simply answered,"Yes." Id. The record reflects that these two questions,
directed to the State, are the only questions asked by the trial court relating to
Ramirez's ability to pay discretionary LFOs before ordering him to pay $25 per
month starting in 60 days. When Ramirez asked,"How am I going to do that fi-om
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
inside?" id. at 376, the trial court said nothing. Ramirez's counsel said, "I will
explain," and the court moved on. Id.
The court made no inquiry into Ramirez's debts, which his declaration of
indigency listed as exceeding $10,000 at the time of sentencing (apparently
previously imposed court costs and fees). Suppl. CP at 4. Nor does the record reflect
that the trial court inquired into whether Ramirez met the GR 34 standard for
indigency. Had the court looked to GR 34 for guidance, as required imder Blazina,
it would have confirmed that Ramirez was indigent at the time of sentencing—^his
income fell below 125 percent ofthe federal poverty guideline. As we explained in
Blazina, "if someone does meet the GR 34 standard for indigency, courts should
seriously question that person's ability to pay LFOs." 182 Wash. 2d at 839; Wakefield,
186 Wash. 2d at 607. The record does not reflect that the trial court meaningfully
inquired into any ofthe mandatory Blazina factors.
The trial court also failed to consider other "important factors" relating to
Ramirez's current and future ability to pay discretionary LFOs, such as Ramirez's
income, his assets and other financial resources, his monthly living expenses, and
his employment history. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d at 838. InR/azma, weheldthat"[t]he
record must reflect that the trial court made an individualized inquiry into the
defendant's current and future ability to pay," which requires the court to consider
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
"important factors," in addition to the mandatory factors discussed above. Id. The
only information in the record about Ramirez's financial situation came during
Ramirez's allocution and was offered to show how he had been putting his life in
order prior to his arrest. The court made no inquiry.
Consistent with Blazina's instruction that courts use GR 34 as a guide for
determining whether someone has an ability to pay discretionary costs, we believe
the financial statement section of Ramirez's motion for indigency would have
provided a reliable framework for the individualized inquiry that Blazina and RCW
10.01.160(3) require. In determining a defendant's indigency status, the financial
statement section ofthe motion for indigency asks the defendant to answer questions
relating to five broad categories:(1)employment history,(2)income,(3)assets and
other financial resources, (4) monthly living expenses, and (5) other debts. See
Suppl. CP at 2-4. These categories are equally relevant to determining a defendant's
ability to pay discretionary LFOs.
Regarding employment history, a trial court should inquire into the
defendant's present employment and past work experience. The court should also
inquire into the defendant's income, as well as the defendant's assets and other
financial resources. Finally, the court should ask questions about the defendant's
monthly expenses, and as identified in Blazina, the court must ask about the
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
defendant's other debts, including other LFOs,health care costs, or education loans.
To satisfy Blazina and RCW 10.01.160(3)'s mandate that the State cannot collect
costs from defendants who are unable to pay, the record must reflect that the trial
court inquired into all five of these categories before deciding to impose
discretionary costs. That did not happen here.
The State argues, and the Court of Appeals majority agreed, that despite any
lack ofinquiry by the trial court into Ramirez's ability to pay,statements by Ramirez
during his allocution were adequate to support the imposition ofdiscretionary LFOs.
Resp't's Br. at 4. In opposing the State's request for an exceptional sentence,
Ramirez told the court he was "doing everything right" prior to his arrest—^he was
working a minimum wage job at Weyerhaeuser on a "temporary service team," his
wife had helped him get his own apartment, he was paying his household bills,
including a DirecTV subscription, and he had opened a bank account for the first
time in his life and was hoping to get a driver's license. VRP at 359-363. Ramirez
did not offer this information in the context of assessing his current and future ability
to pay LFOs,but rather in an effort to "counter the State's negative portrayal of him
and direct the court's attention to his accomplishments in order to persuade the court
he was deserving of a lesser sentence." Suppl. Br. ofPet'r at 19.
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
Notably, while the Court of Appeals majority viewed Ramirez's statements as
supporting imposition of discretionary costs, there is no indication in the record that
the trial court actually relied on any of Ramirez's statements. See Ramirez, slip op.
at 13.^ Nor would reliance on Ramirez's statements be reasonable, given that
Ramirez was describing his circumstances and the positive strides he had made in
the months prior to his arrest. As his statements at sentencing and his declaration of
indigency make clear, all ofthat changed. Indeed,Ramirez lamented that after being
on the right track, he "screwed up" and lost everything. VRP at 363.
RCW 10.01.160(3) requires the trial court to inquire into a person's present
and future ability to pay LFOs. This inquiry must be made on the record, and courts
should be cautious of any after-the-fact attempt to justify the imposition of LFOs
based on information offered by a defendant for an entirely different purpose.
Judges understand that defendants want to appear in their best light at sentencing. It
^ The Court of Appeals inferred that the trial court's decision was based on
Ramirez's statements:
Here, the court considered that Ramirez had recently been released
from custody, was working in a minimum wagejob, and had been paying his
household bills. Ramirez also told the court that he had opened a bank
account for the first time in his life and "was just getting on trackf.]" He
added that although he was working a minimum wage job "it was fine
because it took care of everything." Thus, we hold that the court conducted
an adequate individualized inquiry and did not err in imposing the
discretionary LFOs.
Ramirez, slip op. at 13 (citations omitted).
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
is precisely for this reason that thejudge's obligation is to engage in an on-the-record
individualized inquiry into the defendant's ability to pay discretionary LFOs.
We hold that the trial court failed to make an adequate individualized inquiry
into Ramirez's current and future ability to pay prior to imposing discretionary
LFOs. Normally, this Blazina error would entitle Ramirez to a full resentencing
hearing on his ability to pay LFOs. The timing ofRamirez's appeal, however,makes
this case somewhat unusual. After we granted review, the legislature passed House
Bill 1783, which amends two LFO statutes at issue. Laws OF 2018, ch. 269. House
Bill 1783 amends the discretionary LFO statute, former ROW 10.01.160,to prohibit
courts from imposing discretionary costs on a defendant who is indigent at the time
of sentencing as defined in ROW 10.101.010(3)(a) through (c). Laws OF 2018, ch.
269, § 6(3). House Bill 1783 also amends the criminal filing fee statute, former
ROW 36.18.020(h),to prohibit courts from imposing the $200 filing fee on indigent
defendants. Lawsof2018,ch. 269, § 17(2)(h).
Ramirez argues that House Bill 1783's amendments apply to his case on
appeal because he qualified as indigent at the time of sentencing and his case was
not yet final when House Bill 1783 was enacted. Suppl. Br. ofPet'r at 8-10. As for
the remedy, Ramirez asks us to strike the discretionary LFOs and the $200 criminal
filing fee fi-om his judgment and sentence rather than remand his case for
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
resentencing. For the reasons discussed below, we agree that House Bill 1783
applies on appeal to invalidate Ramirez's discretionary LFOs(and the $200 criminal
filing fee) and that resentencing is unnecessary in this case.
11. House Bill 1783 Applies Prospectively to Ramirez's Case Because the
Statutory Amendments Pertain to Costs and His Case on Direct Review Is Not
Yet Final
House Bill 1783's amendments modify Washington's system of LFOs,
addressing some of the worst facets of the system that prevent offenders from
rebuilding their lives after conviction. For example. House Bill 1783 eliminates
interest accrual on the nonrestitution portions of LFOs, it establishes that the DNA
database fee is no longer mandatory if the offender's DNA has been collected
because of a prior conviction, and it provides that a court may not sanction an
offender for failure to pay LFOs unless the failure to pay is willful. Laws OF 2018,
ch. 269, §§ 1, 18, 7. Relevant here. House Bill 1783 amends the discretionary LFO
statute,former RCW 10.01.160,to prohibit courts from imposing discretionary costs
on a defendant who is indigent at the time of sentencing. Laws OF 2018, ch. 269,
§ 6(3). It also prohibits imposing the $200 filing fee on indigent defendants. Id.
§ 17. Because House Bill 1783 was enacted after we granted Ramirez's petition for
review, we must decide whether House Bill 1783's amendments apply to Ramirez's
case on appeal. We hold that House Bill 1783 applies prospectively to Ramirez
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
because the statutory amendments pertain to costs imposed on criminal defendants
following conviction, and Ramirez's case was pending on direct review and thus not
final when the amendments were enacted.
At the time of Ramirez's sentencing in 2016, the discretionary cost statute
provided that "[t]he court shall not order a defendant to pay costs unless the
defendant is or will be able to pay them." Former RCW 10.01.160(3). In making
this determination, the statute instructed the trial court to "take account of the
financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of
costs will impose." Id. The statutory language directs that the trial court must
consider a defendant's current and future ability to pay before deciding to impose
discretionary costs on the defendant.
House Bill 1783 amends former RCW 10.01.160(3) to expressly prohibit
courts from imposing discretionary costs on defendants who are indigent at the time
ofsentencing:"The court shall not order a defendant to pay costs ifthe defendant at
the time of sentencing is indigent as defined in RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)through (c)."
Laws of 2018, ch. 269, § 6(3). Under RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)through (c), a person
is "indigent" ifthe person receives certain types ofpublic assistance, is involuntarily
committed to a public mental health facility, or receives an annual income after taxes
of 125 percent or less of the current federal poverty level. If the defendant is not
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
indigent, the amendment instructs the court to engage in the same individualized
inquiry into the defendant's ability to pay as previously required under former RCW
10.01.160(3), i.e., to assess "the financial resources ofthe defendant and the nature
of the burden that payment of costs will impose." Id. In this case, there is no
question that Ramirez satisfied the indigency requirements of RCW
10.101.010(3)(c) at the time of sentencing. Accordingly, if House Bill 1783 applies
to Ramirez's case, the trial court impermissibly imposed discretionary LFOs on
Ramirez.
As noted. House Bill 1783 also amends the criminal filing fee statute, former
RCW 36.18.020(2)(h),to prohibit charging the $200 criminal filing fee to defendants
who are indigent at the time of sentencing. Laws OF 2018, ch. 269, § 17. Thus, if
House Bill 1783's amendments apply to Ramirez's case on appeal, the trial court
improperly imposed both the discretionary costs of $2,100 and the criminal filing
fee.
This is not our first occasion to consider the prospective application of cost
statutes to criminal cases on appeal. In State v. Blank, 131 Wash. 2d 230, 249, 930
P.2d 1213 (1997), we held that a statute imposing appellate costs applied
prospectively to the defendants' cases on appeal. In Blank, the defendants' appeals
were pending when the legislature enacted a statute providing for recoupment of
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
appellate defense costs from a convicted defendant. Id. at 234. In detennining
whether the statute applied to the defendants' cases, we clarified that '"[a] statute
operates prospectively when the precipitating event for [its] application ... occurs
after the effective date of the statute.'" Id. at 248 (alterations in original)(quoting
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Wash. Life & Disability Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 83 Wash. 2d 523, 535,
520 P.2d 162 (1974)). We concluded that the "precipitating event" for a statute
"concerning attorney fees and costs of litigation" was the termination of the
defendant's case and held that the statute therefore applied prospectively to cases
that were pending on appeal when the costs statute was enacted. Id. at 249 (citing
Kilpatrickv. Dep'tofLabor &Indus., 125 Wn.2d222,232,883 P.2d 1370,915 P.2d
519(1994)(holding that the right to attorney fees is governed by the statute in force
at the termination ofthe action)).
Similar to the statute at issue in Blank, House Bill 1783's amendments
concern the court's ability to impose costs on a criminal defendant following
conviction. House Bill 1783 amends former RCW 10.01.160(3) by expressly
prohibiting the imposition of discretionary LFOs on defendants like Ramirez who
are indigent at the time of sentencing; the amendment conclusively establishes that
courts do not have discretion to impose such LFOs. And, like the defendants in
Blank, Ramirez's case was on appeal as a matter of right and thus was not yet final
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
under RAP 12.7 when House Bill 1783 became effective. Because House Bill
1783's amendments pertain to costs imposed upon conviction and Ramirez's case
was not yet final when the amendments were enacted, Ramirez is entitled to benefit
from this statutory change.
Applying House Bill 1783 to the facts ofthis case, we hold that the trial court
impermissibly imposed discretionary LFOs of $2,100, as well as the $200 criminal
filing fee, on Ramirez. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for the trial
court to amend the judgment and sentence to strike the improperly imposed LFOs.
CONCLUSION
In Blazina, we held that under former RCW 10.73.160(3), trial courts have an
obligation to conduct an individualized inquiry into a defendant's current and future
ability to pay discretionary LFOs before imposing them at sentencing. Today, we
articulate specific inquiries trial courts should make in determining whether an
individual has the current and future ability to pay discretionary costs. Trial courts
must meaningfully inquire into the mandatory factors established by Blazina, such
as a defendant's incarceration and other debts, or whether a defendant meets the GR
34 standard for indigency. Trial courts must also consider other "important factors"
relating to a defendant's financial circumstances, including employment history,
income, assets and other financial resources, monthly living expenses, and other
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
debts. Under this framework,trial courts must conduct an on-the-record inquiry into
the mandatory Blazina factors and other "important factors" before imposing
discretionary LFOs.
We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the trial court failed to conduct
an adequate Blazina inquiry into Ramirez's current and future ability to pay.
Although this Blazina error would normally entitle Ramirez to a resentencing
hearing on his ability to pay, resentencing is unnecessary in this case. House Bill
1783, which prohibits the imposition of discretionary LFOs on an indigent
defendant, applies on appeal to invalidate Ramirez's discretionary LFOs (and the
$200 criminal filing fee). We remand for the trial court to strike the $2,100
discretionary LFOs and the $200 filing fee from Ramirez's judgment and sentence.
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State V. Ramirez(David Angel), 95249-3
WE CONCUR:
/
Z.
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