In re Pers. Restraint of Speight ( 2014 )


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    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    In the Matter of the Personal                )
    Restraint of                                 )       No. 89693-3
    )
    ROLAND ARTHUR SPEIGHT,                       )
    )
    Petitioner.            )
    )       Filed          DEC 1 1 2014
    C. JOHNSON, I.-Petitioner Ronald Speight filed a timely personal
    restraint petition, claiming for the first time on collateral review that his right to a
    public trial under article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution, was
    violated when the trial court decided motions in limine and individually questioned
    potential jurors in chambers. 1 While Speight's public trial right claim has merit, his
    petition must be denied. Consistent with our holding in In re Personal Restraint of
    Coggin, No. 89694-1 (Wash. Dec. 11, 2014), a petitioner claiming a public trial
    1
    This case was certified to this court by Division One of the Court of Appeals with In re
    Personal Restraint of Coggin, No. 89694-1 (Wash. Dec. 11, 2014). Both cases present the same
    central issue but were not consolidated.
                                                  
    In re Pers. Restraint of Speight, No. 89693-3
    right violation for the first time on collateral review must show actual and
    substantial prejudice. Speight cannot show actual and substantial prejudice arising
    from the closure; therefore, his petition is denied.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On December 3, 2004, Speight drove Kelly Nixon to an inn where Speight
    was performing routine maintenance as a caretaker. While at the inn, Speight
    forced Nixon into oral and vaginal intercourse, resulting in torn clothing and
    injuries to Nixon's face and leg.
    Speight was charged with second degree rape in San Juan County. At the
    beginning of jury selection, the judge had jurors fill out questionnaires regarding
    any experiences they may have had with a sexual offense. While the jurors were
    filling out these questionnaires, the trial judge, counsel, the clerk, the sheriffs
    deputy, and the court reporter went into the judge's chambers for motions in
    limine. Then, in response to the juror's answers to the questionnaires, 14
    prospective jurors were questioned in chambers without the court engaging in the
    analysis required by State v. Bone-Club, 
    128 Wn.2d 254
    , 
    906 P.2d 325
     (1995).
    Several prospective jurors were then excused or dismissed for cause.
    2
                                                               
    In re Pers. Restraint ofSpeight, No. 89693-3
    Speight was convicted of second degree rape, and in 2006, the Court of
    Appeals affirmed his convictions in an unpublished opinion. 2 Speight filed a timely
    personal restraint petition in 2007, arguing that his right to a public trial was
    violated during the in-chambers conference regarding the motions in limine and the
    individual questioning ofjurors. 3 Division One stayed the petition multiple times,
    pending decisions by this court. Division One of the Court of Appeals then
    certified the case to this court in December 2013, alongside Coggin.
    ANALYSIS
    Speight claims that he was denied his constitutional public trial right during
    pretrial in-limine rulings and the jury selection process. A criminal defendant has a
    rig;ht to a public trial as guaranteed by our state and federal constitutions. U.S.
    CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I,§ 22 (providing "the accused shall have
    the right ... tohaye a speedy public trial"); State v. Paumier, 
    176 Wn.2d 29
    , 34,
    
    288 P.3d 1126
     (2012).
    ,•   ',       .  '
    ----------·---
    2
    State v. Speight, noted at 
    136 Wn. App. 1006
     (2006).
    3
    In his opening brief, Speight asserts that his article I, section 22 rights to a public trial
    and the public and !)tess's article I, section 10 rights to a public trial were violated. WASH.
    CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 22. However, Speight does not further analyze whether the public's right
    was violated during the individual questioning of jurors or when the motions in limine were
    decided in chambers. Therefore, we will analyze only the public trial right issue under article I,
    section 22.
    3
                                                    
    In re P~rs. RestraintofSpeight, No. 89693-3
    We have repeatedly held that the public trial right applies to jury selection.
    Specifically, it is well established that the public trial right in voir dire proceedings
    e~tends   to the qtlestioningof individual prospective jurors. State v. Wise, 
    176 Wn.2d 1
    , l(j719, 288. V3d 1113 (2012). While the right to a public trial is not
    absolute~   the trial court here did not conduct the analysis required by Bone-Club
    either implicitly or explicitly and therefore, the closure violated the defendant's
    right to a public trial. The State argues that the closure satisfies the five factors
    required by Bone-Club, but "[a] trial court is required to consider the Bone-Club
    factors before closing a trial proceeding that should be public." Wise, 176 Wn.2d at
    12 (citing Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d at 261 ). From the record, the trial court did not
    ..
    consider any of these factors in its decision whether to question individual jurors in
    chambers.J.v1oreover, a trial court should "'resist a closure motion except under the
    most unusual circumstances."' Wise, 176 Wn.2d at 11 (quoting Bone-Club, 128
    \yn.2d at 259). Here, the
    . defendant's constitutional right to a public
    .
    trial was
    violated.
    We have not yet addressed whether a closure occurs when a trial judge
    discusses and rules on motions in limine in chambers. This court uses the
    experience and logic test to evaluate whether a particular proceeding implicates the
    public trial right. State v. Sublett, 
    176 Wn.2d 58
    , 73, 
    292 P.3d 715
     (2012). In State
    4
                                                 
    In re Pers. Restraint of Speight, No. 89693-3
    v. Smith, 
    181 Wn.2d 508
    , 
    334 P.3d 1049
     (2014), we alluded to the fact that
    evidentiary motions may not implicate the public trial right, but because sidebars,
    and not evidentiary conferences, were at issue in that case we did not decide
    definitively one way or the other. See Smith, 181 Wn.2d at 512 n.3 ("Although the
    parties disagreed about whether to characterize these hallway conferences as
    'sidebars' or something else, we analyze them as sidebars here because that is the
    role these conferences played in the trial. The analysis would not change for on the
    record evidentiary conferences in chambers."). Since jurors were privately
    questioned, a closure occurred, and we need not decide whether a second closure
    exists in this case.
    Because Speight's public trial right violation has merit, we must determine
    whether he must show that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the
    violation. We addressed the issue-whether actual and substantial prejudice must
    be shown from a public trial right violation in order to obtain relief by personal
    restraint petition-in Coggin. Because the issue is identical and the facts are
    similar, we incorporate the reasoning from that case here. To summarize,
    generally, for a petitioner to prevail on collateral review, the petitioner must
    establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the constitutional error worked to
    his actual and substantial prejudice. In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 
    118 Wn.2d
                                                          5
                                                  
    In re Pers. Restraint of Speight, No. 89693-3
    321,328, 
    823 P.2d 492
     (1992). We carved out an exception to this general rule in
    In rePersonalRestraintofMorris, 
    176 Wn.2d 157
    , 166,
    288 P.3d 1140
     (2012),
    where we held that we will presume prejudice for a petitioner who alleges a public
    trial right violation through an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.
    But in Coggin we refused to extend this exception any further and held that our
    interest in finality required us to draw a line and not presume prejudice when a
    petitioner raises a public trial right violation for the first time on collateral review.
    Coggin, slip op. at 10. Therefore, in Coggin we held that a petitioner claiming a
    public trial right violation for the first time on collateral review must comply with
    the general rule for personal restraint petitions and show actual and substantial
    prejudice.
    As a result, Speight can prevail only if he can show that the public trial right
    violation actually and substantially prejudiced him. Speight does not argue that he
    was actually and substantially prejudiced, nor do the facts suggest that he was. As
    a result of the individual questioning, he likely received a more fair trial and an
    impartial jury.
    6
                                   
    In re Pers. Restraint of Speight, No. 89693-3
    CONCLUSION
    The petition is denied.
    WE CONCUR:
    7
                                                       
    In re Pers. Restraint of Speight (Roland Arthur)
    No. 89693-3
    MADSEN, C.J. (concurring)-Like in the companion case, In re Personal
    Restraint of Coggin, No. 89694-1 (Wash. Dec. 11, 2014), I agree with the lead opinion's
    decision to deny Roland Speight's personal restraint petition, but for different reasons.
    First, I believe that this court must decide whether motions in limine implicate the public
    trial right, and I would decide this question in the negative. Second, I would hold that
    Mr. Speight invited the judge to conduct portions of voir dire in chambers. Thus, in
    contrast to the lead opinion and in line with my concurrence in Coggin, I believe we need
    not determine the prejudice showing required of personal restraint petitioners.
    Nevertheless, because guidance is needed I would agree with the majority that the
    error here, failure to engage in the analysis outlined in State v. Bone-Club, 
    128 Wn.2d 254
    , 
    906 P.2d 325
     (1995), requires a petitioner in a personal restraint petition to prove
    prejudice unless he can demonstrate that the error in his case '"infect[ ed] the entire trial
    process"' and deprive the defendant of "'basic protections,"' without which "'no criminal
                                                      
    No. 89693-3
    Madsen, C.J. concurring
    punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair."' Neder v. United States, 
    527 U.S. 1
    ,
    8-9, 
    119 S. Ct. 1827
    , 
    144 L. Ed. 2d 35
     (1999) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
    507 U.S. 619
    , 630, 
    113 S. Ct. 1710
    , 
    123 L. Ed. 2d 353
     (1993); Rose v. Clark, 
    478 U.S. 570
    , 577,
    578, 
    106 S. Ct. 3101
    ,
    92 L. Ed. 2d 460
     (1986)).
    Discussion
    In contrast to the companion case, here the petitioner alleges two different public
    trial right violations. First, he challenges the trial court's decision to hear argument on
    motions in limine in chambers rather than in the courtroom, alleging that this behavior
    implicated his right to a public trial. While venire members were filling out
    questionnaires in the courtroom, the parties and the judge discussed motions in limine on
    the record in chambers. The State moved to bar the defendant from inquiring about the
    alleged victim's drug convictions. The defense brought several motions, including
    motions for the State to disclose certain information, to exclude mention of prior contact
    between the defendant and complainant, and to exclude mention of the defendant's
    mental disorder. In addition to challenging the judge's consideration of these motions in
    limine in chambers, Mr. Speight also makes an identical argument to William Coggin,
    namely that the in-chambers voir dire questioning of some venire members violated his
    public trial rights. In particular, the trial court conducted voir dire in chambers for 14
    prospective jurors who had indicated a preference for private questioning on their written
    questionnaire.
    2
                                                        
    No. 89693-3
    Madsen, C.J. concurring
    In State v. Smith, this court outlined a three step inquiry to assess alleged public
    trial right violations. 
    181 Wn.2d 508
    , 513,
    334 P.3d 1049
     (2014) (citing State v. Sublett,
    
    176 Wn.2d 58
    , 92, 
    292 P.3d 715
     (2012) (Madsen, C.J., concurring)). We first consider
    whether the public trial right is even implicated and only then determine whether there
    was in fact a closure and, if so, whether that closure was justified. !d. The lead opinion
    acknowledges this framework but does not use it to evaluate the petitioner's motion in
    limine challenge. Lead opinion at 4-5. Instead, the lead opinion reasons that "[s]ince
    jurors were privately questioned, a closure occurred, and we need not decide whether a
    second closure exists in this case." Lead opinion at 5. I disagree with this analysis. The
    petitioner raises two separate public trial right violations, each of which must be
    separately analyzed. Before reaching the question of whether petitioners must prove
    prejudice for collateral challenges to public trial rights, this court should consider, first,
    whether the petitioner may be precluded from bringing the challenge due to invited error
    or affirmative waiver and, second, following the three step analysis, whether his public
    trial rights were violated.
    Turning first to the motion in limine issue, I would hold that under the first prong
    of the Smith analysis, motions in limine do not implicate public trial rights. As the lead
    opinion recognizes, under Smith's first step we use "the experience and logic test to
    evaluate whether a particular proceeding implicates the public trial right." Lead opinion
    at 4 (citing Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 73).
    3
                                                      
    No. 89693~3
    Madsen, C .J. concurring
    "The first part of the test, the experience prong, asks 'whether the place and
    process have historically been open to the press and general public."' Sublett, 176 Wn.2d
    at 73 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press II), 
    478 U.S. 1
    , 8, 
    106 S. Ct. 2735
    , 
    92 L. Ed. 2d 1
     (1986)). Motions in limine concern interlocutory pretrial decisions
    made by the trial court, typically involving legal questions about the admissibility of
    certain evidence. Often these pretrial decisions will be revisited during the course of
    proceedings as the evidence develops. As with rulings on contemporaneous objections to
    evidence, motions in limine are decided outside the hearing of the jury. See ER 103.
    In Smith, this court applied the experience and logic test to hold that sidebar
    conferences involving evidentiary rulings on contemporaneous objections do not
    implicate the public trial right. Smith, slip op. at 6-14. There, we noted the history of
    conducting sidebars out of view of the public and the practical difficulties with removing
    jurors from a courtroom. !d. at 7-8. The reasoning in Smith applies here. During voir
    dire in Speight's case, the venire members were using the courtroom to fill out juror
    questionnaires before counsel began voir dire questioning in court. The trial judge used
    this downtime to discuss motions in limine in chambers rather than moving jurors in and
    out of the courtroom multiple times.
    The second part of the test, the logic prong, asks "'whether public access plays a
    significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.'" Sublett,
    176 Wn.2d at 73 (quoting Press II, 478 U.S. at 8). "The guiding principle [for the logic
    prong] is 'whether openness will enhance[] both the basic fairness of the criminal trial
    4
                                                      
    No. 89693-3
    Madsen, C.J. concurring
    and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system."' Smith,
    slip op. at 6-7 (second alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
    Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 75). For motions in limine, I believe the answer to these questions
    is no. In Smith, this court reasoned that sidebars do not "invoke any of the concerns the
    public trial right is meant to address regarding perjury, transparency, or the appearance of
    fairness." Smith, slip op. at 12. Specifically, we noted that the sidebars at issue were
    immediately recorded and made available to the public and emphasized the dense legal
    nature of the questions considered during such discussions. Id. at 12-13. The same
    reasoning applies in the motion in limine context. Here, the motions in limine considered
    in chambers were contemporaneously recorded verbatim. Thus, the public was not
    denied access to the proceedings. As with sidebars, the presence of the public would not
    have added anything to the discussion between the judge and counsel regarding questions
    of admissibility under the rules of evidence.
    Applying the experience and logic test, I would hold that as long as these
    discussions occur on the record and concern primarily evidentiary matters, the public trial
    right does not attach.
    Turning to petitioner's second public trial right allegation, I would hold that Mr.
    Speight invited the error of conducting voir dire interviews in chambers. As I outline in
    my concurrence in the companion case Coggin, in the voir dire context the key inquiry is
    whether the defendant "'actively participated"' in the conduct that led to the error.
    Coggin, slip op. (concurrence) at2-3 (quoting State v. Wise, 
    176 Wn.2d 1
    ,15 n.8, 288
    5
                                                   
    No. 89693-3
    Madsen, C.J. concurring
    P.3d 1113 (2002)). In State v. Momah, we reasoned that invited error principles applied
    where defense counsel agreed beforehand to a juror questionnaire that permitted
    individual questioning, never objected to the proposal to conduct this questioning in
    chambers (presumably because the private questioning benefited his client), and actively
    participated in the questioning. 
    167 Wn.2d 140
    , 145-46, 153-56, 
    217 P.3d 321
     (2009);
    see also Wise, 176 Wn.2d at 15 n.8 (reaffirming that defendants can invite public trial
    violations, pointing to factors outlined in Momah). Similarly, here defense counsel
    participated in a pretrial telephone conference between the parties and the judge where
    they discussed the creation of a juror questionnaire that would allow jurors to note a
    preference for private questioning. Defense counsel then participated in the questioning
    of the 14 jurors that occurred in chambers without raising any objection. Though the
    language ofthe questionnaire did suggest an "in court" private questioning experience to
    the potential jurors, the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the in-chambers
    questioning was in line with defense counsel's expectations following the pretrial
    telephone call. Defense counsel did more than simply acquiesce to the trial court's
    decision to conduct questioning in chambers; he spoke with opposing counsel and the
    judge about the need for a mechanism for private voir dire questioning, agreed to the
    questionnaire proposed by the prosecutor, did not question the judge's decision to hold
    that private questioning in chambers, and in fact engaged in questioning the prospective
    jurors. By all accounts, defense counsel "actively participated" in the in chambers
    questioning of jurors and consequently invited the public trial error that resulted.
    6
                                                    
    No. 89693-3
    Madsen, C.J. concurring
    In sum, I would address petitioner's motion in limine challenge but would hold
    that under our experience and logic test, motions in limine do not implicate public trial
    rights. I would also dismiss petitioner's challenge to the voir dire procedure on invited
    error grounds and thus would not reach the question of prejudice considered by the
    majority. I concur in the majority's decision to deny Mr. Speight's petition.
    7
                                 
    No. 89693-3
    Madsen, C .J. concurring
    8
                                               
    In re Pers. Restraint of Speight (Roland Arthur)
    No. 89693-3
    STEPHENS, J. (dissenting)-This case turns largely on the same issue as In
    re Personal Restraint of Coggin, No. 89694-1 (Wash. Dec. 11, 2014): whether a
    personal restraint petitioner who suffered a violation of his right to a public trial
    should be denied a new trial when the petitioner does not also allege ineffective
    assistance of appellate counsel. I would hold that personal restraint petitioners
    should not have to make a special showing of prejudice beyond establishing the
    prejudice of stn1ctural public trial error. The reasoning and facts in both cases on
    this issue do not differ, so I incorporate the reasoning from my dissent in Coggin
    here. Because the lead opinion in both cases "requires personal restraint petitioners
    to prove the impossible, and because its holding erodes the promise of open justice
    in our courts, I respectfully dissent." Slip op. (dissent) at 2.
    I also point out that because I would grant William Speight's personal restraint
    petition on the basis of the improper voir dire closure, it is unnecessary for me to
    consider whether the closed motion in limine hearing also warrants a new trial. The
    lead opinion does not have this luxury, though it practically ignores the motion in
    limine issue. Lead opinion at 4-5. Having determined that the closure of individual
    voir dire constituted a public trial violation, the lead opinion moves to the prejudice
       In rePers.    of
    Restraint    
    Speight (Roland            
    Arthur), 89693-3        J.Dissent)
    (Stephens,             
    issue and finds no prejudice. !d. at 5-6 (citing Coggin, slip op. at 10). It concludes
    that Speight was not actually and substantially prejudiced because "[a]s a result of
    the individual questioning, he likely received a more fair trial and an impartial jury."
    !d. at 6.
    The individual questioning of jurors took place after the motions in limine
    were heard, so whatever prejudice might have occurred from the closed motion
    hearing would already have tainted the trial before voir dire began. Thus, the lead
    opinion needs to address the motions hearing, not only as to prejudice but as to
    whether the public trial right attaches to such a hearing. Its conclusion that the closed
    voir dire was not prejudicial because it likely benefited Speight is insufficient; how
    did the closed motion hearing work to his benefit? 1 The lead opinion's prejudice
    analysis is incomplete under its own post hoc analysis and provides no basis to
    dismiss this personal restraint petition in its entirety. See Coggin, slip op. (dissent)
    at 9 n.2 (explaining that the lead opinion's prejudice analysis constitutes a post hoc
    appellate Bone-Club 2 inquiry).
    1
    The State claims that the motions in limine occurred in chambers because the
    venire was completing questionnaires in the courtroom. Resp. toPers. Restraint Pet. at 4.
    So, it might be argued that the closure facilitated selecting an impartial jury because the
    closure shielded prospective jurors from exposure to potentially inadmissible evidence.
    This argument fails because the "purpose of a motion in limine is to dispose oflega1 matters
    so counsel will not be forced to make comments in the presence of the jury which might
    prejudice his presentation." State v. Evans, 
    96 Wn.2d 119
    , 123, 
    634 P.2d 845
     (1981). The
    venire could have filled out questionnaires elsewhere while the court considered the
    motions in limine in open court. See In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 
    152 Wn.2d 795
    , 810,
    
    100 P.3d 291
     (2004) (concerns stemming from "courtroom management and convenience"
    without consideration of-the-public-trial right was insufficient to justify closure of voir
    dire).
    2
    State v. Bone-Club, 
    128 Wn.2d 254
    , 
    906 P.2d 325
     (1995).
    -2-
        rePers.   of               J. Dissent)
       
    In          Restraint   Speight (Roland  Arth~r), 89693-3 (Stephens,
    For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
    -3-
       1n re
    Pers.                      J.Dissent)
    
    '   .
    Restraint of Speight (Roland A.rth~r), 89693-3 (Stephens,
    4