Watson v. City of Seattle ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •                              NOTICE: SLIP OPINION
    (not the court’s final written decision)
    The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the
    written opinions that are originally filed by the court.
    A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions
    can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an
    order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential
    purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits
    (for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the
    opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court
    decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An
    opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of
    the court.
    The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it
    has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official
    text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes
    of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the
    language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of
    charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports.
    For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential
    (unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see
    https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    This opinion was filed for record
    1
    at ~    ,00~ on::AtJtlAJ}~1
    \\Cr
    D
    \'W
    SUS NL.CARLSON
    SUPREME COURT CLERK
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    PHILIP WA ISON, an individual; RAY
    CARTER, an individual; FARWEST
    SPORTS, INC., d/b/a OUTDOOR
    EMPORIUM, a Washington corporation;
    PRECISE SHOOTER, LLC, a Washington
    limited liability company; THE SECOND
    AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, INC., a
    Washington nonprofit corporation;
    NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF
    AMERICA, INC., a New York nonprofit                        NO. 93723-1
    association; and NATIONAL SHOOTING
    SPORTS FOUNDATION, a Connecticut
    nonprofit association,
    ENBANC
    Appellants,
    V.
    Filed   AUG 1 0 !017
    CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipality; ED
    MURRAY, Mayor of the City of Seattle, in his
    official capacity; SEATTLE DEPARTMENT
    OF FINANCE and ADMINISTRATIVE
    SERVICES, a department of the City of
    Seattle; and GLEN LEE, Director of Finance
    and Administrative Services, in his official
    capacity,
    Respondents.
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City of Seattle, et al., 93723-1
    STEPHENS, J.-This case concerns Seattle Ordinance 124833 (Ordinance),
    which imposes a "Firearms and Ammunition Tax" on each firearm and round of
    ammunition sold within the city limits. Its stated purpose is to raise revenue for public
    health research relating to gun violence and to fund related social programs. Two
    individual gun purchasers, Phillip Watson and Ray Carter, along with various
    organizations     (hereinafter   Watson),1     brought   this   suit   challenging    the
    constitutionality of the Ordinance.
    RCW 9.41.290 forbids the local regulation of guns. Watson argues that the
    Ordinance is actually a regulation, not a tax, and is preempted by RCW 9.41.290 in
    any case. Watson also argues that even if the Ordinance is a tax, it exceeds Seattle's
    delegated taxing authority. The King County Superior Court ruled in favor of
    Seattle, holding that the Ordinance imposes an authorized tax and that this tax is not
    preempted by RCW 9 .41.290. Watson appealed, and the Court of Appeals certified the
    matter to this court.
    We affirm the trial court. Under Washington law, a charge intended to raise
    revenue for the public benefit is a tax. While courts should be dubious of regulations
    masquerading as taxes (and vice versa), in this case Watson offers no convincing
    evidence that the Ordinance has a regulatory purpose or intent. It is a tax. The
    1Watson and Carter have been dismissed from this suit, but we refer collectively to
    the appellants as "Watson" for ease of reference.
    -2-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    Ordinance is also authorized by the broad grant of taxing authority delegated to cities
    like Seattle. Finally, the Ordinance is not preempted by state law; RCW 9.41.290
    preempts only municipal gun "regulation," not taxation.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In August 2015, the Seattle City Council (Council) unanimously passed the
    Ordinance, and Mayor Ed Murray signed it into law.               The Ordinance imposes a
    "Firearms and Ammunition Tax" of $25.00 on each firearm and $0.02 to $0.05 per
    round of ammunition sold within the city limits. 2 The tax applies only to licensed retail
    sellers of guns and ammunition. 3 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 76 (applying the tax to "every
    person engaging within the City in the business of making retail sales of firearms or
    ammunition"). The Ordinance became effective on January 1, 2016. Id. at 80.
    The Council designed the Ordinance to fund gun safety programs and related
    public health research. The Ordinance recites that "gun violence directly affects the
    City and its residents," id. at 68, and notes it is difficult for cities to obtain outside
    funding for related research. Id. at 67 (stating that Congress has blocked federal funding
    for gun violence research since 1996). The Council locally funded a 2014 study by the
    2
    "The tax rate shall be $25 per firearm sold at retail, $.02 per round of ammunition
    that contains a single projectile that measures .22 caliber or less sold at retail, and $.05 per
    round of ammunition for all other ammunition sold at retail." Clerk's Papers at 76.
    3
    Retailers selling no more than one firearm (or fewer than 50 rounds of ammunition)
    per tax quarter are exempt. Id. at 77-78. Sales of antique firearms are also exempt. Id. at
    77.
    -3-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    Harborview Injury Prevention and Research Center on the predictors and consequences
    of gun violence. Id. at 67 (noting that Harborview Medical Center leveraged that
    research to develop a hospital-based gun violence intervention program). The Council
    passed the Ordinance in part to create a local source of funding for gun violence
    research and programming. Id. at 68 ("[T]he City intends to ... provide broad-based
    public benefits for residents of Seattle ... by funding programs that promote public
    safety [and] prevent gun violence."). To this end, the Ordinance created the "Firearms
    and Ammunition Tax Fund," which is authorized to support "basic research" and
    "programs that promote public safety, prevent gun violence and address in part the cost
    of gun violence in the City." Id. at 78. The tax will generate an estimated $300,000 to
    $500,000 per year. Id. at 135.
    Watson challenged the Ordinance in King County Superior Court, alleging that
    the "tax" imposed under the Ordinance is actually a regulation preempted by state gun
    laws. CP at 32-35; RCW 9.41.290 (the legislature "fully occupies and preempts the
    entire field of firearms regulation"). Watson argued in the alternative that even if the
    Ordinance is a tax, it exceeds Seattle's constitutional taxing authority. In response,
    Seattle argued that the Ordinance is a tax rather than a regulation, is not preempted by
    RCW 9.41.290, and is a lawful exercise of Seattle's taxing authority. Both parties filed
    motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of Seattle. In a December
    -4-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City of Seattle, et al., 93723-1
    22, 2015 order, the court held that the Ordinance imposes a tax because its primary
    purpose is to raise revenue; that the tax is authorized by RCW 35.22.280(32); and that
    state preemption does not apply because RCW 9 .41.290 preempts conflicting
    regulations, not taxes. The court granted Seattle's motion and dismissed the case.
    Watson appealed.
    Division One of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to RCW 2.06.030 and RAP 4.4,
    certified the following question to this court: "Whether a municipal ordinance imposing
    a tax on retail firearm and ammunition sales within the municipality is a constitutional
    and lawful exercise of taxing authority?" Order of Certification, Watson v. City of
    Seattle, No. 74534-4-I (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2016). We accepted direct review.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review constitutional challenges and questions of statutory interpretation de
    novo. See, e.g., Okeson v. City ofSeattle, 
    150 Wn.2d 540
    , 548-49, 
    78 P.3d 1279
     (2003).
    City ordinances are presumed to be valid and constitutional; the challenging party has
    the burden of showing unconstitutionality. See State v. Kirwin, 
    165 Wn.2d 818
    , 825,
    
    203 P.3d 1044
     (2009); State v. Immelt, 
    173 Wn.2d 1
    , 6,
    267 P.3d 305
     (2011). As with
    statutory interpretation, the primary objective of courts interpreting an ordinance is to
    "ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent" by giving effect to the ordinance's
    "plain meaning." Arborwood Idaho, LLC v. City ofKennewick, 
    151 Wn.2d 359
    ,367,
    -5-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    
    89 P.3d 217
     (2004); see also Bowie v. Dep 't of Revenue, 
    171 Wn.2d 1
    , 11, 
    248 P.3d 504
     (2011).
    ISSUES
    (1)    Does the Ordinance levy a tax or instead assess a regulatory fee?
    (2)    If the Ordinance imposes a tax, is that tax within Seattle's taxing
    authority under RCW 35.22.280(32)?
    (3)    Is the Ordinance preempted by RCW 9.41.290?
    ANALYSIS
    Labeling something a tax does not make it so. Watson argues that Seattle levied
    a charge on the sale of firearms and ammunition in order to restrict gun sales, making
    the "tax" imposed by the Ordinance a regulatory fee that is facially preempted by RCW
    9.41.290. In the alternative, Watson argues that even if classified as a tax, the Ordinance
    exceeds Seattle's taxing authority under RCW 35.22.280(32). Watson also asserts an
    alternative preemption argument not raised below: that RCW 9 .41.290 preempts
    taxation as well as regulation and therefore preempts the Ordinance under either
    classification.
    We reject each of Watson's arguments. Following Covell v. City ofSeattle, 
    127 Wn.2d 874
    , 
    905 P.2d 324
     (1995), the Ordinance is a tax because its primary purpose is
    to raise revenue for public services. To be a valid tax, the Ordinance must be based on
    -6-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    a delegation oflegislative taxing authority. Here, the Ordinance is authorized by RCW
    35.22.280(32), which delegates broad taxing authority to first class cities. Finally, the
    Ordinance is not preempted. RCW 9 .41.290 preempts only "regulation" of firearms,
    not taxation. There is no basis for selectively invalidating the Ordinance while leaving
    traditional (and unchallenged) sales and gross receipts taxes in place.
    A.     Under the Covell Analysis, the Ordinance Imposes a Tax, Not a
    Regulatory Fee
    We turn first to the question of whether the charge imposed on firearm and
    ammunition sales is a tax or a regulatory fee. If the Ordinance is a regulation, it is
    facially preempted by RCW 9 .41.290 and our analysis ends. If the Ordinance instead
    levies a tax, we must then determine whether that tax is authorized. See infra Part B.
    Generally speaking, a charge "imposed to raise money for the public treasury" is
    a tax. Okeson, 150 Wn.2d at 551. Nontax charges, by contrast, may be imposed for
    regulatory purposes. This court refers collectively to nontax charges as '"regulatory
    fees."' Samis Land Co. v. City ofSoap Lake, 
    143 Wn.2d 798
    ,805, 
    23 P.3d 477
     (2001)
    (quoting Covell, 
    127 Wn.2d at 878
     n.l). Classifying a charge as a tax or a fee is
    important because distinct constitutional constraints govern each classification. Fees
    are generally based on a local government's police powers, while the taxing authority
    of Washington's municipalities largely depends on legislative delegation. See Covell,
    
    127 Wn.2d at 878
     (characterizing Seattle's police powers as "extensive"); Okeson, 150
    -7-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    Wn.2d at 551 (noting that "[a] local government does not have the power to impose
    taxes without statutory or constitutional authority"). Thus, there is a concern that cities
    could "avoid the constitutional limitations on taxes" by simply characterizing a tax as a
    regulatory fee. Id. at 552.
    Courts Consider the Covell Factors To Distinguish between Taxes and Fees
    To determine whether an ordinance imposes a tax or a fee, Washington courts
    follow the three-part test outlined in Covell. 
    127 Wn.2d at 879
    . The first-and most
    important-Covell factor asks whether the "'primary purpose"' of the ordinance is to
    raise revenue or to regulate. 
    Id.
     (quoting Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 
    97 Wn.2d 804
    , 809, 
    650 P.2d 193
     (1982) (Hillis Homes I)). If the legislative purpose
    behind the Ordinance is "'to accomplish desired public benefits which cost money,"'
    the charge is a tax. 
    Id.
     (quoting Hillis Homes I, 97 Wn.2d at 809). On the other hand,
    if the primary purpose is to exert regulatory control over those paying the fee, then the
    "charges are properly characterized as 'tools of regulation,' rather than taxes." Teter v.
    Clark County, 
    104 Wn.2d 227
    ,239, 
    704 P.2d 1171
     (1985).
    The second Covell factor asks "whether the money collected must be allocated
    only to the authorized regulatory purpose." Covell, 
    127 Wn.2d at 879
    . Collecting funds
    into a segregated, dedicated account indicates a regulatory fee. See, e.g., Hillis Homes,
    Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 
    105 Wn.2d 288
    , 300, 
    714 P.2d 1163
     (1986) (Hillis
    -8-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    Homes II) (water fees used to pay only for improvements to the water system). Tax
    revenue, by contrast, is more likely to be mixed into the general fund. See Samis Land
    Co., 143 Wn.2d at 810-11 (revenue from vacant lot tax applied to city-wide utility
    system expenses).       However, Covell itself recognized that this factor is "not
    dispositive."   
    127 Wn.2d at 885
     (determining that Seattle's street utility charge
    constituted a tax, despite the segregation of fees). While the segregation of fees is part
    of the analysis, segregation alone is not sufficient; the funds must also be used to
    "serve[] a regulatory purpose." Okeson, 150 Wn.2d at 553 ("All funds could be
    deposited into special accounts, and that would not necessarily turn taxes into fees.").
    Otherwise, taxes could be "guised as fees" simply by depositing them into a dedicated
    account. Id.
    The third Covell factor examines "whether there is a direct relationship between
    the fee charged and the service received [or] the burden produced by the fee payer."
    Covell, 
    127 Wn.2d at 879
    . If so, the charge is likely a regulatory fee. 
    Id.
     However, if
    the amount does not correlate to the cost of the burden (or the value of the benefit), the
    charge is likely a tax. 
    Id.
    In this context, "direct relationship" means that the amount paid is calculated to
    offset the burden created (or benefit received) by the payer. f d. This relationship does
    not need to be mathematically precise or individualized. See Teter, 
    104 Wn.2d at 238
    ;
    -9-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    Hillis Homes II, 
    105 Wn.2d at 301
    . Nevertheless, there must be some "'practical basis"'
    for asse1iing that it exists. Covell, 
    127 Wn.2d at 884
     (finding no direct relationship
    between a flat lighting tax, uniformly assessed, and the benefit received by individual
    utility users).
    Pursuant to Covell, the Ordinance Imposes a Tax
    Watson asse1is that the Ordinance is, in effect, a regulation masquerading as a
    tax. Watson argues that all three Covell factors indicate the Ordinance should be
    classified as a regulation. See Appellants' Opening Br. at 10. He argues that (1) the
    Ordinance's primary purpose is regulatory because it seeks to limit access to firearms,
    (2) segregation of funds indicates the Ordinance is a regulation, and (3) there is a "direct
    relationship" between the tax and the burden of gun violence. 
    Id. at 10-14
    . We
    disagree.
    The first Covell factor indicates that the Ordinance imposes a tax. The statutory
    text is clear: the purpose of the Ordinance is to "raise general revenue ... to provide
    broad-based public benefits for residents of Seattle." CP at 68. Revenue raised will
    "fund[] programs that promote public safety," including "youth education and
    employment programs," and support "basic research." 
    Id. at 78
    . Because public health
    research and gun safety programs are '" desired pub lie benefits which cost money,"' the
    Ordinance imposes a tax. Covell, 
    127 Wn.2d at 879
     (quoting Hillis Homes I, 97 Wn.2d
    -10-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City of Seattle, et al., 93723-1
    at 809). There is no regulatory language in the text of the Ordinance or evidence of a
    regulatory purpose. See CP at 66-79. As the superior court observed, other than
    requiring payment of the tax, the Ordinance "does not place any burden or restriction
    on the plaintiffs [or] prescribe any activity." 
    Id. at 180
    . The Ordinance does not limit
    retailers in the number or type of firearms and ammunition they can sell, nor does it
    restrict what a gun buyer can do with purchased firearms or ammunition.
    Nevertheless, Watson urges this court to look past the Ordinance's "textual
    wrapping paper," Appellant's Reply Br. at 3, to its alleged regulatory purpose:
    "burden[ing] the sale of firearms and ammunition." 
    Id.
     Watson relies heavily on
    "legislative history" to support this analysis, quoting pro-gun-control statements by the
    Council's members as evidence that the Ordinance is part of a broader regulatory
    scheme to limit gun access. Appellants' Opening Br. at 10-11 (citing CP at 52, 61-62,
    88).   Watson's argument would unwisely embroil courts in second-guessing the
    motives oflawmakers. Statements by "individual legislator[s] do[] not show legislative
    intent." State ex rel. Citizens Against Tolls (CAT) v. Murphy, 
    151 Wn.2d 226
    ,238, 
    88 P.3d 375
     (2004); Seattle Times Co. v. County ofBenton, 
    99 Wn.2d 251
    ,255 n.1, 
    661 P.2d 964
     (1983) (resort to statements by legislators inappropriate unless "more
    substantial" legislative history is unavailable, such as bill reports specific to the statute
    -11-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    before the court). 4 As a tool of statutory interpretation, an examination of legislative
    history is intended to supplement textual analysis-not to replace it entirely, as Watson
    urges here. See, e.g., Seattle Times, 
    99 Wn.2d at 255
     n.l. Covell addressed the primacy
    of statutory language when differentiating a tax from a fee: classification "turns on a
    determination of the primary purpose of the fees as derived from the language of the
    authorizing and implementing legislation." 
    127 Wn.2d at 886
     (emphasis added). Here,
    the plain language of the Ordinance states it imposes a "tax." CP at 75.
    The second Covell factor is inconclusive. Because revenue is segregated into the
    Firearms and Ammunition Tax Fund, this factor initially suggests that the Ordinance
    may be a regulation. CP at 78; see also Lane v. City ofSeattle, 
    164 Wn.2d 875
    , 883,
    
    194 P.3d 977
     (2008) (segregation into a dedicated account indicates a regulatory fee).
    However, segregation of funds is not the only requirement for classification as a fee;
    the funds must also be "allocated only to the authorized regulatory purpose." Covell,
    
    127 Wn.2d at 879
    . An ordinance with no regulatory language cannot "authorize" a
    regulatory purpose, much less dedicate funds to that end. 
    Id.
     Here, the Ordinance
    dedicates the revenue to education and research. CP at 78. Because the Ordinance
    segregates funds but allocates them for a nonregulatory purpose, the second factor is
    4
    Furthermore, even if the entire Council expressed support for gun regulations, it
    does not follow that this Ordinance must be a regulation. See, e.g., Samis Land Co., 143
    Wn.2d at 809 (classifying charge as a tax because although it was part of an "overall
    regulatory design," the specific purpose of the charge was to raise revenue).
    -12-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    inconclusive. See Okeson, 150 Wn.2d at 553 (revenue deposited into the city's light
    fund, absent a regulatory purpose, is inconclusive); Covell, 
    127 Wn.2d at 885
    (segregation of funds is "not dispositive").
    Watson maintains that the Ordinance does allocate funds to a regulatory purpose,
    because it requires the "tracking[] and auditing of the number of firearms and rounds of
    ammunition sold by retailers." Appellants' Opening Br. at 11. But Watson does not
    explain how requiring retailers to keep sales records for tax purposes-already
    mandated by RCW 82.32.070 with respect to the gross receipts tax and sales tax-
    constitutes regulation. See 
    id.
     On this record, the second factor remains inconclusive.
    Finally, the third Covell factor also indicates that the Ordinance is a tax. The
    Ordinance imposes a flat charge of $25.00 per firearm sold, and $0.02 to $0.05 per
    round of ammunition. CP at 76. There does not appear to be a "direct relationship"
    between the amount of annual revenue the Ordinance is expected to generate ($300,000
    to $500,000, see CP at 135) and the economic burden of gun violence in King County
    (roughly $180 million per year, see CP at 66). Covell, 
    127 Wn.2d at 879
    . Moreover, a
    flat tax is uniformly applied, while we would expect a regulatory fee to vary according
    to the value of the burden or benefit. 
    Id. at 884-85
    .
    Watson advances a more lax interpretation of Covell, noting that a fee may be
    regulatory even if it is not individually calculated. See Appellants' Opening Br. at 13
    -13-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    (citing Okeson, 150 Wn.2d at 554). Watson is correct that a "direct relationship,"
    Covell, 
    127 Wn.2d at 879,
     does not mean one that is mathematically precise. 5 See Teter,
    
    104 Wn.2d at 23 8
    . However, in this case it does not appear that the Council made any
    attempt to correlate the economic burden of gun violence with the revenue generated
    by the tax. The record does not reveal how the Council arrived at the tax rate imposed. 6
    Under Covell, when these "calculations" are completely absent, the charge is a tax. 
    127 Wn.2d at 884
     (classifying a flat $2 per unit charge as a tax). Without some mechanism
    to ensure the amount paid reflects the payer's burden, there is no '"practical basis'" for
    asserting a direct relationship between the two. 
    Id.
    In sum, the first and third Covell factors indicate that the Ordinance is a tax, not
    a regulation. The second factor is inconclusive. Under Washington law, the Ordinance
    is properly classified as a tax. See, e.g., Covell, 
    127 Wn.2d at 888
    ; Okeson, 150 Wn.2d
    at 553; Arborwood Idaho, LLC, 151 Wn.2d at 372-73 (classifying charge as a tax
    despite the second Covell factor indicating "fee"). Watson's first argument thus fails:
    5
    Watson also seems to argue that the direct relationship requirement is satisfied
    because the Ordinance will fund programs that "address" the "alleged burdens" created by
    Seattle gun sales. Appellants' Opening Br. at 14. This misunderstands the third Covell
    factor, which is specifically concerned with determining whether the tax rate was chosen
    to offset the economic burden. See Covell, 
    127 Wn.2d at 884
    .
    6
    It appears the Ordinance was likely modeled after a nearly identical Illinois tax.
    See CP at 124-30 (Ex. 1 to Deel. of Laurie Edelstein (ERP, Inc. v. Ali, No. 13 CH 07263,
    at 1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County, Jan. 22, 2014)) (upholding a $25 tax on firearms
    purchases)).
    -14-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City of Seattle, et al., 93723-1
    as a tax, the Ordinance is not facially preempted by state law. See RCW 9.41.290.
    However, we must further consider whether the Ordinance exceeds Seattle's municipal
    taxation authority.
    B.     The Ordinance Is Legislatively Authorized
    Local taxation must be authorized by a legislative delegation of taxing power.
    See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1. Watson acknowledges that RCW 35.22.280, which
    outlines the broad delegation of legislative power to first class cities, authorizes Seattle
    to levy local taxes. See Appellants' Opening Br. at 16. However, Watson argues that
    RCW 35.21.710 severely limits that authority, requiring business taxes to be uniform,
    measured by gross receipts, and capped at a certain rate. See Appellants' Opening Br.
    at 17-19.    Watson's argument is inconsistent with Washington's constitutional
    authorization of local taxing authority and this court's precedent. See Citizens for
    Financially Responsible Gov't v. City of Spokane, 
    99 Wn.2d 339
    , 343, 
    662 P.2d 845
    (1983) (holding that RCW 35.22.280(32) delegates broad taxing authority to first class
    cities). Further, Watson's statutory analysis is unsupported by RCW 35.21. 710, which
    standardizes gross receipts taxes but does not prohibit other forms of taxation.
    The Washington State Constitution generally vests taxing power in the state
    legislature. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1. Municipal corporations have no inherent
    power to tax.     See Arborwood Idaho, LLC, 151 Wn.2d at 365-66; 16                EUGENE
    -15-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS§ 44.5 (3d ed. 2013). However,
    the constitution contains at least two important exceptions to the legislature's plenary
    taxation authority. First, article VII permits the legislature to delegate tax powers to
    cities and towns. See WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 9 ("For all corporate purposes, all
    municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes.").
    Second, article XI actively limits the legislature's power by stating that certain taxes
    may be assessed only by cities:
    The legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns
    or other municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for
    county, city, town, or other municipal purposes, but may, by general laws, vest
    in the corporate authorities thereof, the power to assess and collect taxes for
    such purposes.
    WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 12. Article XI expressly authorizes the legislature to grant
    cities the power to levy taxes for "county, city, town, or other municipal purposes." Id.
    More significantly, it strips the legislature of the authority to directly impose such taxes.
    Only local authorities, exercising duly delegated taxing power, may levy local taxes.
    Id.
    In part, these provisions reflect Washington's adoption of what scholars refer to
    as "home rule"-shorthand for the presumption of autonomy in local governance. See,
    e.g., Hugh Spitzer, "!-Jome Rule" vs. "Dillon's Rule" for Washington Cities, 38
    SEATTLEU.L. REV. 809 (2015); Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov't, 99 Wn.2d
    at 343 (describing the legislature's delegation of"broad powers" to cities). The "home
    -16-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    rule" principle seeks to increase government accountability by limiting state-level
    interference in local affairs. See Spitzer, supra, at 809. This is particularly important
    with respect to local taxation authority. See, e.g., Matthew Senechal, Revisiting Granite
    Falls: "Why the Seattle Monorail Project Requires Re-examination of Washington's
    Prohibition on Taxation without Representation, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 63, 73 (2005)
    (noting that "home rule" is "consistent with the deep-seated Anglo-American principle
    of keeping taxation as close to the tax-burdened electorate as possible"); Br. of Amicus
    Curiae Wash. State Ass 'n of Mun. Att'ys at 3 (establishing the legislature has delegated
    local taxing authority "[s]ince the beginning of statehood"). In this context, it is
    appropriate for Washington courts to "liberally construe[]" legislative grants of power
    to cities, particularly first class cities. Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov 't, 99
    Wn.2d at 343.
    RCW 35.22.280(32) Grants Seattle the Authority To Tax Local Businesses
    RCW 35.22.280 enumerates the broad legislative powers delegated to first class
    cities, including Seattle.7 In part, RCW 35.22.280 empowers Seattle to "grant licenses
    for any lawful purpose, and to fix by ordinance the amount to be paid therefor." Id. at
    (32). Licensing authority includes the authority to raise revenues by taxing local
    businesses. See Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov't, 99 Wn.2d at 343; Pac. Tel.
    7
    See RCW 35.22.010 (establishing Seattle as a first class city).
    -17-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    & Tel. Co. v. City ofSeattle, 
    172 Wash. 649
    , 654, 
    21 P.2d 721
     (1933), ajf'd, 
    291 U.S. 300
    , 
    54 S. Ct. 383
    , 
    78 L. Ed. 810
     (1934). This taxation must fall into one of three
    categories: property, income, or excise taxes. See WASH. STATE DEP'T OF REVENUE,
    TAX REFERENCE MANUAL 3 (Jan. 2010). This court categorizes business license taxes
    as excise taxes. See Pac. Tel., 172 Wash. at 654.
    As the court explained in Pacific Telephone, the "power granted to the city to
    issue licenses is dual: (1) for regulation; (2) for revenue." Id. When the power is
    exercised for revenue purposes, licensing is merely the "method provided for raising
    the revenues." Id. A tax that is imposed pursuant to this power is an excise because it
    is "levied upon the right to do business, not upon the right to exist." Id. The most
    common tax paid by Washington businesses, the business and occupation (B&O) tax,
    is an excise tax. See TAX REFERENCE MANUAL, supra, at 3 (noting that although a B&O
    tax is measured by gross income or receipts, "it is levied on the privilege of engaging
    in business and is categorized ... as an excise tax"). In this case, the Ordinance imposes
    a different type of excise tax: a flat tax on "the business of making retail sales of firearms
    or ammunition." C:P at 76.
    A Flat Tax on Firearms and Ammunition Sales Is Not Limited by RCW 35.21. 710
    Watson acknowledges that RCW 35.22.280(32) grants Seattle the authority to
    impose excise taxes on retailers as a condition of doing business in the city. Appellants'
    -18-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City of Seattle, et al., 93723-1
    Opening Br. at 16. The tax in this case, a flat tax on the sale of firearms and ammunition,
    is an excise tax. See supra Part B. Nevertheless, Watson argues that the Ordinance is
    prohibited by RCW 35.21.710, which regulates another type of excise tax: the
    municipal B&O tax. Appellants' Opening Br. at 16-17; RCW 35.21.710 (establishing
    maximum rate for B&O taxes measured by gross receipts). Watson asserts that all
    municipal business license taxes must comply with RCW 35.21.710. Appellants'
    Opening Br. at 17-18. Watson's reading ofRCW 35.21.710 is incorrect.
    RCW 35 .21. 710 states in part:
    Any city which imposes a license fee or tax upon business activities consisting
    of the making of retail sales of tangible personal property which are measured
    by gross receipts or gross income from such sales, shall impose such tax at a
    single uniform rate upon all such business activities. The taxing authority
    granted to cities for taxes upon business activities measured by gross receipts or
    gross income from sales shall not exceed a rate of .0020.
    SEATTLE MUNICIPAL CODE 5.45.050(C) (raising the statutory maximum rate in Seattle
    to .00215). Watson argues that the Ordinance violates RCW 35.21.710 because a tax
    targeting a single type of retailer is not uniform, and any additional tax on retailers
    would exceed the statutory rate. See Appellants' Opening Br. at 19-21. However,
    RCW 35.21.710 does not address all city taxes on business activities. By its plain
    language, the statute applies only to taxes "which are measured by gross receipts or
    gross income." RCW 35.21.710 (emphasis added) (requiring that "such" taxes-i.e.,
    -19-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City of Seattle, et al., 93723-1
    those measured as a percentage of gross receipts-must be uniform and not exceed the
    statutory rate).
    The tax in this case is measured differently. The Ordinance imposes a flat $25.00
    tax on each gun sold, and a flat $0.02 to $0.05 tax on each round of ammunition,
    regardless of price. CP at 76. The tax is calculated on a per unit basis, rather than
    measured as a percentage of the retailer's income. Id. Nor does the Ordinance affect
    gun retailers' B&O tax rate. By asserting that it does, Watson apparently confuses the
    rate of a single tax with gun retailers' aggregate tax burden. See Appellants' Opening
    Br. at 24-25. RCW 35.21.710 caps the B&O gross receipts tax rate, not the sum total
    of all taxes that can be levied on businesses. Statutory restrictions on one type of tax
    should not be misinterpreted as capping a taxpayer's total liability.
    Despite the clear statutory language, Watson argues that RCW 35.21.710's
    "reference to gross receipts is not ... a limitation on the statute's restriction of local
    taxing authority." Id. at 26. Unsurprisingly, Watson provides no support for the
    assertion that statutory language should not serve as a "limitation" on statutory
    application. Watson also seems to argue that because RCW 35.21.710 was designed to
    "restrict the tax rates local governments could assess," the statute impliedly repeals
    Seattle's authority to levy all types of taxes on business (other than the B&O tax
    discussed). W Telepage, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 
    140 Wn.2d 599
    , 613, 
    998 P.2d 884
    -20-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    (2000) (emphasis added); Appellants' Opening Br. at 19. This is incorrect. Restraints
    on taxing authority will be found only if there is "specific, express statutory language."
    Enter. Leasing, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 
    93 Wn. App. 663
    , 669, 
    970 P.2d 339
     (citing
    Commonwealth Title Ins. Co. v. City a/Tacoma, 
    81 Wn.2d 391
    ,
    502 P.2d 1024
     (1972)),
    aff'd, 
    139 Wn.2d 546
    , 
    988 P.2d 961
     (1999). The legislature has not provided such
    language here.
    Watson's restrictive characterization of municipal taxing authority is
    inconsistent with Washington case law. See Puget Sound Energy, Inc. v. City of
    Bellingham, 
    163 Wn. App. 329
    ,337,
    259 P.3d 345
     (2011) (cities may freely define their
    taxation categories). Absent restriction, RCW 35.22.280(32) grants Seattle broad
    authority to tax retailers for the privilege of doing business within city limits. See
    Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov 't, 99 Wn.2d at 343. 8 To hold otherwise would
    significantly restrict constitutionally authorized and legislatively recognized local
    8
    Nor is RCW 35.22.280(32) Seattle's only statutory grant of taxing authority. RCW
    35.22.570 also grants first class cities all powers Title 35 RCW gives to other cities. See
    Br. ofResp'ts at 25 n.7. With respect to municipal business taxes, Seattle has the authority
    to "collect a license tax for the purposes of revenue and regulation," a power granted to
    second class cities. RCW 35.23.440(8). Seattle also possesses the same tax authority
    granted to code cities, empowering it to "impose excises for regulation or revenue." RCW
    35A.82.020.
    -21-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City of Seattle, et al., 93723-1
    taxation authority. We decline to do so, and find that the Firearms and Ammunition
    Tax is authorized. 9
    C.     RCW 9.41.290 Does Not Preempt Authorized Municipal Taxes on
    Firearm and Ammunition Sales
    A state statute preempts an ordinance if the statute occupies the field or if the
    statute and the ordinance irreconcilably conflict. See Brown v. City of Yakima, 
    116 Wn.2d 556
    , 559, 
    807 P.2d 353
     (1991); Lawson v. City ofPasco, 
    168 Wn.2d 675
    , 679,
    
    230 P.3d 1038
     (2010) ("[A] state statute preempts an ordinance on the same subject if
    the statute occupies the field, leaving no room for conc.urrent jurisdiction, or if a conflict
    exists such that the statute and the ordinance may not be harmonized.").                Field
    preemption occurs when there is express legislative intent to occupy the entire field, or
    when such intent is necessarily implied. Brown, 
    116 Wn.2d at 560
    . Legislative intent
    may be implied from the statute's purpose and factual circumstances. See HJS Dev.,
    Inc. v. Pierce County, 
    148 Wn.2d 451
    ,477, 
    61 P.3d 1141
     (2003). Conflict preemption
    occurs when "an ordinance permits what state law forbids or forbids what state law
    permits." Lawson, 168 Wn.2d at 682. An ordinance is constitutionally invalid when it
    9  Our conclusion should be understood in the context of the arguments raised in this
    case. Watson has not argued that the tax imposed by the Ordinance is confiscatory or
    violates due process. We have not been asked to consider the full range of possible
    restrictions on municipal authority to tax, much less the natural, political limitations the
    City acknowledges. Wash. Supreme Court oral argument, Watson v. City of Seattle, No.
    93723-1 (Feb. 16, 2017), at 37 min., 35 sec. through 38 min., 57 sec., video recording by
    TVW, Washington State's Public Affairs Network, http://www.tvw.org.
    -22-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    "directly and irreconcilably conflicts with the statute." Brown, 
    116 Wn.2d at 561
    .
    However, if the statute and ordinance may be read in harmony, no conflict will be
    found. Lawson, 168 Wn.2d at 682.
    The Legislature included clear preemption language in chapter 9.41 RCW:
    The state of Washington hereby fally occupies and preempts the entire field of
    firearms regulation within the boundaries of the state, including the registration,
    licensing, possession, purchase, sale, acquisition, transfer, discharge, and
    transportation of firearms .... Cities, towns, and counties or other municipalities
    may enact only those laws and ordinances relating to firearms that are
    specifically authorized by state law.
    RCW 9.41.290 (emphasis added).
    Watson argues this language is proof the legislature intended RCW 9.41.290 to
    have a "wide and exhaustive" preemptive effect. Appellants' Opening Br. at 32.
    Essentially, Watson argues that the legislature has occupied the entire field of gun-
    related laws and ordinances unless specifically authorized by state law. Id.                We
    disagree. First, as explained, regulation is not taxation. RCW 9.41.290 does not
    expressly or impliedly preempt taxation. Further, Seattle's broad statutory taxing
    authority pursuant to RCW 35.22.280(32) does not conflict with RCW 9.41.290's
    narrow regulation of municipal B&O taxes.
    Initially, there is no evidence of express preemption.              As discussed, the
    Ordinance imposes a tax, not a regulation. See supra Part A. On its face, RCW
    9.41.290 is inapplicable here because it preempts only the "regulation" of firearms.
    -23-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    RCW 9.41.290 expressly operates in the regulatory context. RCW 9 .41.290 (occupying
    the field of "firearms regulations," including regulations relating to the "sale" and
    "licensing" of guns). RCW 9.41.290 makes no mention of taxation. In fact, RCW
    9 .41.290 's focus on regulation is consistent with its broader statutory context-in all of
    chapter 9.41 RCW, the word "tax" appears only once. See RCW 9.41.010 (exempting
    unlicensed transfers from sales taxes if the buyer and seller comply with background
    check requirements). Legislative silence is a poor foundation on which to build a case
    for express field preemption. 10 See, e.g., Brown, 
    116 Wn.2d at 560
    .
    In the absence of explicit language preempting taxation, Watson's argument is
    best understood as a case for implied field preemption. Watson cites a series of
    legislative amendments to chapter 9.41 RCW, each expanding the preemptive scope of
    RCW 9.41.290. See Appellants' Opening Br. at 32-33 (citing LAWS OF 1985, ch. 428,
    §§ 1-2; LAWS OF 1994, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 7, §§ 428-429); see also Chan v. City of
    Seattle, 
    164 Wn. App. 549
    , 551-53, 
    265 P.3d 169
     (2011) (summarizing history).
    Watson argues that these legislative changes, each in response to a purported attempt
    10 Seattle goes further, urging this court to construe the omission of taxation as
    explicit evidence of legislative intent to allow local firearms taxes. See Br. of Resp'ts at
    35 (citing Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm 'n, 
    141 Wn.2d 245
    , 280, 
    4 P.3d 808
     (2000) ("Where a statute specifically lists the things upon
    which it operates, there is a presumption that the legislating body intended all
    omissions.")). We do not draw so much from legislative silence, believing this argument
    is more appropriate in the context of implied field preemption, discussed infra.
    -24-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    by Washington courts to narrow the preemptive field, "reaffirmed or expanded the all-
    inclusive scope ofRCW 9.41.290." Appellants' Opening Br. at 33.
    As the State points out in its amicus brief, each of Watson's examples relates
    only to regulatory preemption-not taxation. See Amicus Br. of the State of Wash. at
    13-14. At issue in each case was an attempt by city government to control or regulate
    firearms. See Second Amendment Found. v. City ofRenton, 
    35 Wn. App. 583
    ,
    668 P.2d 596
     (1983) (firearm possession in bars); City ofSeattle v. Ballsmider, 
    71 Wn. App. 159
    ,
    
    856 P.2d 1113
     (1993) (discharge of firearms in populated areas); Chan, 
    164 Wn. App. 549
     (firearm possession in public parks). Rather than advancing Watson's argument,
    these examples further highlight the regulatory focus of chapter 9.41 RCW.
    Furthermore, because they address only regulatory preemption, these cases are not
    instructive as to whether preemption of firearm taxation is necessarily implied by RCW
    9 .41.290. Brown, 
    116 Wn.2d at 560
    . Repeals by implication are disfavored. See State
    ex rel. King County v. State Tax Comm'n, 
    174 Wash. 336
    ,342, 
    24 P.2d 1094
     (1933).
    Expanding preemption in one area does not mean that the legislature intended to extend
    preemption to other areas.
    The statutory purpose and context for chapter 9 .41 RCW also weigh against a
    finding of implied field preemption. See HJS Dev., Inc., 148 Wn.2d at 477 (when
    appropriate, field preemption may be inferred from "the purposes of the particular
    -25-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    legislative enactment and [the] facts and circumstances upon which the statute was
    intended to operate"). In Cherry v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, this court
    found that the purpose of chapter 9.41 RCW was to "advance uniformity in criminal
    firearms regulation." 
    116 Wn.2d 794
    , 801, 
    808 P.2d 746
     (1991) (emphasis added).
    The statute can achieve this legislative purpose without restricting municipal tax
    authority. Moreover, in its statutory context, chapter 9.41 RCW is an exercise of
    legislative authority to remove select regulatory powers from Washington's municipal
    corporations. The statute thus acts as a limitation on municipal police powers. It does
    not follow that chapter 9.41 RCW also restricts cities' taxing power, which relies on a
    distinct source of statutory authority. See RCW 35.22.280(32); supra Part B.
    When the legislature does intend to preempt taxation, it typically does so
    explicitly. For example, RCW 82.02.020 explicitly preempts municipal taxes on
    cigarette sales, stating that "the state preempts the field of imposing retail sales and use
    taxes and taxes upon ... cigarettes, and no county, town, or other municipal subdivision
    shall have the right to impose taxes of that nature." 11 This sounds nothing like the
    language used in RCW 9.41.290 ("[t]he state ... fully occupies and preempts the entire
    field of firearms regulation").    RCW 82.02.020, by its plain language, preempts
    11
    RCW 82.02.020 further preempts taxes on building construction and certain types of
    gambling. Other statutes provide similar examples of explicit language preempting taxation.
    See, e.g., RCW 82.38.280 (prohibiting municipal excise taxes on special fuel); RCW
    48.14.020(5) (preempting the field of imposing excise or privilege taxes on insurers).
    -26-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    municipal taxation; RCW 9.41.290, by contrast, contemplates limiting the exercise of
    municipal regulatory control over firearms. We decline to infer intent to preempt taxes
    from statutory language contemplating regulation. As the Supreme Court of Virginia
    observed in a similar case, the legislature is "well aware of how to say taxation when it
    means taxation." City of Virginia Beach v. Va. Rest. Ass'n, Inc., 
    231 Va. 130
    , 133-34,
    
    341 S.E.2d 198
     (1986).
    The Illinois Circuit Court, which considered a preemption question nearly
    identical to the issue here, came to a similar conclusion. See CP at 127 (ERP, Inc. v.
    Ali, No. 13 CH 07263, at 1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County, Jan. 22, 2014) (holding that an
    Illinois statute preempting local '"regulation, licensing, possession, registration, and
    transportation'" of firearms did not preempt taxation: "Taxes are conspicuously absent
    from the list of measures that are preempted." (quoting 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 66/90,
    65/131))). Virginia Restaurant Ass'n and ERP, Inc., while nonbinding, highlight a
    familiar refrain: courts should not speak for the legislature when it can speak for itself.
    With respect to chapter 9.41 RCW and the preemption of local firearms taxation, it has
    not done so.
    Finally, Watson seems to argue that the Ordinance and chapter 9.41 RCW stand
    in conflict. See Appellants' Opening Br. at 30. RCW 9.41.290 states that cities "may
    enact only those laws and ordinances relating to firearms that are specifically authorized
    -27-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City of Seattle, et al., 93723-1
    by state law." Watson characterizes the Ordinance as an unauthorized "law passed
    directly and exclusively on the sale of firearms and ammunition in the City of Seattle."
    
    Id.
     By authorizing the tax, reasons Watson, the Ordinance "permits what state law
    forbids." Lawson, 168 Wn.2d at 682.
    Watson's argument is unpersuasive. First, it leads to an absurd result: because
    no taxation of firearms is "specifically authorized" by chapter 9.41 RCW, Watson's
    interpretation would exempt firearms sales from all forms of taxation-including the
    basic sales tax and the B&O tax. This is clearly not the statute's effect, and Watson
    does not explain how RCW 9 .41.290 can preempt this Ordinance while leaving other
    taxes in force. 12 Second, Watson reads the "specifically authorized" sentence out of
    context. See Burns v. City of Seattle, 
    161 Wn.2d 129
    , 140, 
    164 P.3d 475
     (2007)
    (instructing Washington courts to interpret "the words of a particular provision in the
    context of the statute in which they are found"). In context, the meaning is clear:
    because the legislature preempted the "regulation" of firearms, all regulatory "laws and
    ordinances" must be "specifically authorized." 13 RCW 9.41.290. The operative words
    are in the same paragraph, separated by only three lines. 
    Id.
     We reject Watson's
    12  In any event, the tax levied by the Ordinance is authorized-by RCW
    35.22.280(32). See supra Part B.
    13
    The Legislature goes so far as to give an example in the same sentence of RCW
    9.41.290: "specifically authorized by state law, as in RCW 9.41.300." RCW 9.41.300 is a
    regulatory measure; it prohibits firearms possession in certain locations, and allows cities
    to prohibit them in others.
    -28-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    attempt to read them in isolation. See ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Dalman, 
    122 Wn.2d 801
    ,
    807, 
    863 P.2d 64
     (1993) ("Statutory provisions must be read in their entirety and
    construed together, not piecemeal.").
    In sum, we hold that RCW 9.41.290 does not occupy the field of taxation relating
    to firearms and ammunition and that the statute and the Ordinance do not irreconcilably
    conflict. We hold that RCW 9.41.290 does not preempt the Ordinance.
    CONCLUSION
    Seattle Ordinance 124833 is constitutionally valid and not preempted by RCW
    9 .41.290. Under Covell, the Ordinance imposes a tax because its primary purpose is to
    raise revenue for the public benefit. That tax is specifically authorized under RCW
    35.22.280(32), which grants first class cities broad tax powers, including the authority
    to levy a flat tax on gun sales. Finally, the Ordinance is not preempted by RCW
    9 .41.290 because the plain meaning of the statutory text excludes taxation from its
    preemptive scope. We affirm the superior court.
    -29-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson, et al. v. City ofSeattle, et al., 93723-1
    WE CONCUR:
    -30-
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle
    No. 93723-1
    GONZALEZ, J. (concurring)-RCW 9.41.290 declares the State's intent to
    "preempt[] the entire field of firearms regulation." Phillip Watson and the other
    plaintiffs (collectively Watson) argue that the city of Seattle's (City) "tax" on
    firearms and ammunition is actually a "regulation" disguised as a tax and therefore
    preempted by RCW 9.41.290. I agree with the majority that this "tax" is a tax, but
    write separately to discuss the scope of evidence that courts should consider in
    deciding whether a fee constitutes a tax or a regulation.
    The City's Ordinance 124833 (Ordinance) charges retail purchasers $25.00
    for each firearm and either $0.02 or $0.05 for each round of ammunition,
    depending on the caliber. The City labeled the Ordinance a "tax," but we do not
    take labels at face value. See Okeson v. City of Seattle, 
    150 Wn.2d 540
    , 552, 
    78 P.3d 1279
     (2003) (citing Samis Land Co. v. City of Soap Lake, 
    143 Wn.2d 798
    ,
    805, 
    23 P.3d 477
     (2001)). Generally, a "regulation" governs conduct and may
    incidentally generate revenue, see 
    id. at 551-52
     (citing Samis, 143 Wn.2d at 805),
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring)
    whereas a "tax" generates revenue and may incidentally govern conduct, see id. at
    551 (citing Dean v. Lehman, 
    143 Wn.2d 12
    , 25, 
    18 P.3d 523
     (2001)). 1
    The majority applies Covell's three-factor test2 to determine if the City
    correctly labeled the Ordinance a "tax." While I agree with the dissent that the
    Covell test may not be an adequate test in all preemption cases, I ultimately agree
    with the majority that Covell is helpful and dispositive in this case involving
    alleged regulatory fees. In addition to the three Covell factors, however, a fourth
    factor is relevant-the charge' s regulatory effect, separate from its purpose. See
    Dean, 143 Wn.2d at 27 (suggesting a regulatory fee that provided more than an
    incidental benefit to the general public could transform the regulation into a tax);
    Teter v. Clark County, 
    104 Wn.2d 227
    ,233, 
    704 P.2d 1171
     (1985) (suggesting a
    regulatory fee that was not "incidental" to the regulatory scheme could transform
    the regulation into a tax). Although Watson alleges that the "amounts charged to
    firearm and ammunition businesses make it impractical or impossible to sell
    firearms and ammunition in Seattle," he acknowledges that his allegations are
    unsupported by any evidence. 3 Appellants' Opening Br. at 40. If Watson could
    1
    See Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confitsion, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 335,352 (2003)
    ("Properly understood, regulatory fees are charges to cover the cost of the state's use of its
    regulatory powers which can be allocated to those who are either voluntarily or involuntarily
    receiving special attention from government regulators." (emphasis omitted)).
    2
    Covell v. City ofSeattle, 
    127 Wn.2d 874
    , 879, 
    905 P.2d 324
     (1995).
    3
    In Watson's motion for summary judgment, he distinguished actual regulations from de facto
    regulations and attempted to reserve arguments on whether "the Ordinance will result in de facto
    regulation of the sale of firearms or ammunition." Clerk's Papers at 31-32 n.2. He repeats that
    2
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring)
    prove the Ordinance would cause a significant regulatory effect, such as a stark
    drop in firearm sales, or demonstrate that the Ordinance significantly influences
    purchasing decisions, he might have a stronger argument that the "tax" is actually a
    regulation disguised as a tax. Even so, the outcome in this case may very well be
    the same considering Covell' s first and third factors weigh heavily in favor of
    classifying the Ordinance as a tax rather than a regulation.
    Also, the majority improperly discounts the importance of legislative history
    in deciding whether a charge is a tax or regulation. See majority at 11-12.
    Evidence of legislative intent to circumvent a state preemption statute is important
    evidence that an ordinance may not be what the municipality purports it to be.
    Ordinarily, "the court will not go behind the legislative declaration in the absence
    of evidence tending to show that the declaration is sham, and that the ordinance is,
    in reality, a revenue measure." Kimmel v. City of Spokane, 
    7 Wn.2d 372
    , 374, 
    109 P.2d 1069
     (1941) (emphasis added). But where there is evidence ofpretextual
    lawmaking, a different rule applies. In this case, Watson provides evidence that
    that the City crafted the Ordinance to avoid statutory preemption, see Appellants'
    Opening Br. at 5-6, which necessitates increased judicial scrutiny of the label the
    request in this court and urges us to remand for additional discovery should we rule against him.
    Appellants' Opening Br. at 40. At that stage, the burden was on Watson to show a disputed issue
    of material fact as to whether the tax would have a significant regulatory effect on firearm sales,
    which he did not. The trial court's dismissal was proper.
    3
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring)
    City applied to the Ordinance. While this case warrants increased scrutiny, such
    scrutiny does not mean Watson prevails. Though Watson proves that the City was
    conscious of the preemption statute and drafted an ordinance that would avoid
    preemption, there is nothing wrong with knowing the law and acting within its
    bounds-indeed, it is required. Watson failed to show that the City's tax label is a
    sham.
    In the alternative to distinguishing taxes from regulations, Watson interprets
    "regulation" broadly to include taxation, so that any local tax on firearms or
    ammunition would conflict with state law. While taxes could be described as a
    form of regulation because taxes certainly can have an incidental regulatory effect,
    it is our duty to harmonize state and local laws. Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 
    6 Wn.2d 545
    , 556, 
    108 P.2d 348
     (1940). "A state statute may preempt a local ordinance in
    two ways: it will 'preempt[] an ordinance on the same subject if the statute
    occupies the field, leaving no room for concurrent jurisdiction, or if a conflict
    exists such that the statute and the ordinance may not be harmonized."' Cannabis
    Action Coal. v. City ofKent, 
    183 Wn.2d 219
    ,226,
    351 P.3d 151
     (2015) (alteration
    in original) (quoting Lawson v. City ofPasco, 
    168 Wn.2d 675
    ,679,
    230 P.3d 1038
    (2010) ). Here, state law is plain and unambiguous; it says the State "fully occupies
    and preempts the entire field of firearms regulation." RCW 9 .41.290 (emphasis
    4
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City ofSeattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring)
    added). It makes no mention oftaxation. 4 It follows that local taxes on firearms
    are permissible, but local firearm regulations are not.
    In sum, I concur. The City's firearm tax is lawful. The record does not
    contain evidence that the City intended for this "tax" to be a regulation or that this
    "tax" had a significant regulatory effect.
    4
    Notably, chapter 9.41 RCW does not address taxation and our constitution distinguishes a local
    government's taxing authority from regulatory authority. CONST. art. XI,§§ 11, 12.
    5
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, No. 93723-1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring)
    6
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, 93 723-1
    (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
    No. 93723-1
    GORDON McCLOUD, J. (dissenting)-As the majority acknowledges,
    "RCW 9 .41.290 forbids the local regulation of guns." Majority at 2. It is an explicit
    preemption provision; the statute "preempts the entire field of firearms regulation."
    RCW 9.41.290. It is a complete preemption provision; the statute says, "The State
    of Washington hereby fully occupies and preempts the entire field of firearms
    regulation .... " Id. And it is an expansive preemption provision; the legislature
    has amended it to bar more and more local activity in the firearms field over the last
    3 0 years. It now preempts not just local regulations, but local "laws and ordinances"
    of all kinds that "relat[e] to firearms." Id. Seattle Ordinance 124833 is clearly a
    local "law[] or ordinance[]," and it clearly "relat[ es] to firearms." It is therefore
    clearly preempted.
    The majority reaches a different conclusion because it holds that this
    ordinance is not a regulatory fee under the Covell 1 factors and so it must, instead, be
    a tax. Majority at 10-15. And I agree completely with the majority's conclusion on
    1 Covell   v. City ofSeattle, 
    127 Wn.2d 874
    , 879, 
    905 P.2d 324
     (1995).
    1
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City a/Seattle, 93723-1
    (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
    that Covell point. But Covell was designed to distinguish between property taxes,
    which must be "uniform upon the same class of property," WASH. CONST. art. VII,
    § 1, and regulatory charges, which are not subject to that uniformity mandate. Covell
    was not designed to distinguish between regulations, "laws[,] and ordinances" that
    are preempted by a specific statute on the one hand, and taxes on the other. When
    statutory preemption is at issue, we use a different inquiry.
    That different inquiry centers on the language of the preemption statute itself.
    Here, RCW 9.41.290 uses deliberately broad language that clearly encompasses both
    regulations and "laws and ordinances" if they have any relationship to "the
    registration, licensing, possession, purchase, sale, acquisition, transfer, discharge,
    and transportation of firearms, or any other element relating to fireanns or parts
    thereof." RCW 9.41.290. Seattle Ordinance 124833 has a very close relationship
    with the "purchase, sale, acquisition, [and] transfer" of firearms--it targets them!
    Thus, while a uniform local tax that incidentally hits on sales of this product (while
    taxing various and sundry products) might not have a sufficient relationship with
    firearms to suffer preemption, this ordinance-which targets only firearms-
    certainly does. I therefore respectfully dissent.
    2
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, 93723-1
    (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
    ANALYSIS
    When conducting statutory analysis, we start with the plain language of the
    statute. Davis v. Cox, 
    183 Wn.2d 269
    ,280,
    351 P.3d 862
     (2015) (citing Eubanks v.
    Brown, 
    180 Wn.2d 590
    ,597,
    327 P.3d 635
     (2014)). RCW 9.41.290, the preemption
    statute at issue here, provides in relevant part:
    The state of Washington hereby fully occupies and preempts the entire
    field of firearms regulation within the boundaries of the state, including
    the registration, licensing, possession, purchase, sale, acquisition,
    transfer, discharge, and transportation of firearms, or any other element
    relating to firearms or parts thereof. . . . Cities, towns, and counties or
    other municipalities may enact only those laws and ordinances relating
    to firearms that are specifically authorized by state law, as in RCW
    9.41.300, and are consistent with this chapter. Such local ordinances
    shall have the same penalty as provided for by state law. Local laws
    and ordinances that are inconsistent with, more restrictive than, or
    exceed the requirements of state law shall not be enacted and are
    preempted and repealed, regardless of the nature of the code, charter,
    or home rule status of such city, town, county, or municipality.
    (Emphasis added.)
    The breadth of the statute in its current form is apparent from this plain
    language. Indeed, since the legislature enacted chapter 9.41 RCW in 1983, it has
    amended this statute three times, each time directly in response to an ordinance or
    judicial decision attempting to limit the statute's scope. See Chan v. City of Seattle,
    
    164 Wn. App. 549
    , 551-53, 
    265 P.3d 169
     (2011) (reciting history of legislative
    amendments). And each time, the legislature has only broadened the statute's
    3
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, 93723-1
    (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
    scope-reducing local governments' ability to legislate regarding :firearms, not
    expanding it. See LAWS OF 1994, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 7, § 429(2); City of Seattle v.
    Ballsmider, 
    71 Wn. App. 159
    ,163,
    856 P.2d 1113
     (1993); LAWS OF 1985, ch. 428,
    § 1; Second Amendment Found. v. City of Renton, 
    35 Wn. App. 583
    ,588,
    668 P.2d 596
     (1983); LAWS    OF   1983, ch. 232, § 12. Most recently, our Court of Appeals
    recognized that RCW 9.41.290's broad language preempted the city of Seattle's
    attempt to limit :firearms in public parks. Chan, 164 Wn. App. at 562.
    The question in this case, therefore, is whether Seattle's latest attempt is
    fundamentally different from the one rejected in Chan. The city of Seattle certainly
    tried to avoid language that would obviously trigger the preemption statute. See,
    e.g., Clerk's Papers at 61. But the answer to this question does not depend-as the
    majority sug~ests-on whether the ordinance should be labeled a regulation or a tax
    under a legal test designed for a different purpose. Instead, it depends on the
    language of the statute. I find three key phrases relevant to determining whether the
    legislature intended RCW 9 .41.290 to reach the :firearm-specific tax at issue here. I
    address each one in turn.
    1. RCW 9 .41.290 Preemption Extends to All Laws "Relating to" Firearms
    RCW 9.41.290 preempts all local laws "relating to :firearms" that are
    "inconsistent with, more restrictive than, or exceed the requirements of state law."
    4
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, 93723-1
    (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
    "Relating to" is an extremely broad prepositional phrase. 2 See Smith v. United
    States, 
    508 U.S. 223
    ,229, 
    113 S. Ct. 2050
    , 
    124 L. Ed. 2d 138
     (1993); Shaw v. Delta
    Air Lines, Inc., 
    463 U.S. 85
    , 96-97, 
    103 S. Ct. 2890
    , 
    77 L. Ed. 2d 490
     (1983)
    (concluding with "no difficulty" that the words "relate to" in BRISA (Employee
    Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829)
    encompass and preempt general state anti discrimination laws). Indeed, in Smith, the
    Court interpreted a statutory provision penalizing use of a firearm '" during and in
    relation to"' a crime so broadly that it was held to encompass the exchange of a
    firearm for drugs. 
    508 U.S. at 229
    .
    I see no reason why that language would be subject to a narrower reading here.
    Starting with this statutory language, Seattle Ordinance 124833 's charge of $25.00
    per firearm and $0.02 to $0.05 per round of ammunition certainly "relat[es] to
    firearms."
    2. RCW 9.41.290 Preempts Not Just Local "Regulations" but All "Laws and
    Ordinances"
    As the majority points out, RCW 9 .41.290 uses the term "firearms regulation."
    On that basis, the majority concludes that RCW 9.41.290 "preempts only the
    2
    This phrase appears in the statute twice. See RCW 9 .41.290 ("or any other element
    relating to firearms or parts thereof'; "[ c]ities ... may enact only those laws and
    ordinances relating to firearms that are specifically authorized by state law").
    5
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, 93723-1
    (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
    'regulation' of firearms" and holds that "regulation is not taxation." Majority at 23.
    It bases this assertion on its analysis of the Covell factors.
    As noted above, I agree that under Covell, the ordinance should be considered
    a tax and not a regulatory fee for certain purposes; specifically, for purposes of
    determining whether the state constitutional "uniform[ity]" requirement applies.
    The majority acknowledges that this is the provenance and purpose of the Covell
    analysis, majority at 7, as indeed it must. See Okeson v. City of Seattle, 
    150 Wn.2d 540
    , 551, 
    78 P.3d 1279
     (2003) (local governments can impose fees under general
    police powers but may not impose taxes "without statutory or constitutional
    authority" ( citing Covell, 
    127 Wn.2d at 879
    )).
    But distinguishing between legislation subject to the constitutional uniformity
    requirement and legislation free from that requirement is very different from
    deciding whether a specifically worded preemption statute reaches firearm-specific
    taxes. The answer to the preemption question is located in the preemption statute at
    issue, not the "uniform[ity]" mandate, which is not at issue.
    And the preemption statute at issue here explicitly states that it "fully occupies
    and preempts the entire field of firearms regulation." RCW 9.41.290. It also clearly
    targets not only "regulations" in the narrow i sense, but all "[l]ocal laws and
    6
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, 93723-1
    (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
    ordinances ... regardless of the nature of the code, charter, or home rule status of
    such city, town, county, or municipality." RCW 9.41.290.
    This statutory language therefore encompasses within its preemptive scope
    not just "regulation[ s]" in the narrow sense. It encompasses any legislative action a
    municipality could take. It is a well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that
    "a single word in a statute should not be read in isolation, and that "'the meaning of
    words may be indicated or controlled by those with which they are associated."'"
    State v. Roggenkamp, 
    153 Wn.2d 614
    , 623, 
    106 P.3d 196
     (2005) (quoting State v.
    Jackson, 
    137 Wn.2d 712
    ,729,
    976 P.2d 1229
     (1999) (quoting Ball v. Stokely Foods,
    Inc., 
    37 Wn.2d 79
    , 87-88, 
    221 P.2d 832
     (1950))). The statute's later inclusion of the
    broader language reaching "laws and ordinances" must therefore inform our reading
    of the word "regulation"-and how broadly or narrowly that word is understood.
    It is also well established that "we interpret a statute to give effect to all
    language, so as to render no portion meaningless or superfluous." Rivard v. State,
    
    168 Wn.2d 775
    ,783,
    231 P.3d 186
     (2010). But in focusing exclusively on the word
    "regulation"-and ignoring the legislature's subsequent statement that RCW
    9 .41.290 also reaches other "laws and ordinances"-the majority does just that: it
    reads the broader words "laws and ordinances" out of the statute entirely.
    7
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, 93723-1
    (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
    The majority's holding also ignores cases in which our courts have analyzed
    RCW 9.41.290's impact on far more than just pure "regulations" in the narrow
    sense-including cases where the "regulation" at issue was a '"Rule/Policy"' issued
    by a city parks department, Chan, 164 Wn. App. at 555; a criminal violation of the
    Seattle Municipal Code, Ballsmider, 
    71 Wn. App. at 160
    ; or a common law cause of
    action recognized in other states, Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc., 
    50 Wn. App. 267
    , 276, 
    748 P.2d 661
     (1988).
    I would instead read the word "regulation" to encompass this ordinance,
    which singles out the "purchase, sale, acquisition, [and] transfer" of firearms and
    ammunition, and which clearly falls within the legislature's broader "laws and
    ordinances" language. RCW 9 .41.290.
    3. RCW 9 .41.290' s List of Preemption Topics Is Illustrative, Not Exclusive
    A third key term-"including"-also shows the breadth of the statute's
    preemptive reach. We have recognized that when the legislature uses the word
    "including" before a list of examples, it "plainly establishes" them to be "illustrative
    examples rather than an exhaustive list." State v. Larson, 
    184 Wn.2d 843
    , 849, 
    365 P.3d 740
     (2015) (statutory language '"including, but not limited to"' indicated
    illustrative, not exhaustive, list); see also Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck
    Lumber Co., 
    314 U.S. 95
    ,100, 
    62 S. Ct. 1
    , 
    86 L. Ed. 65
     (1941) ("the term 'including'
    8
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, 93723-1
    (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
    is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application
    of the general principle" (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Nat'! Labor Relations Ed.,
    
    313 U.S. 177
    , 189, 
    61 S. Ct. 845
    , 
    85 L. Ed. 1271
     (1941))). The legislature used the
    word "including" twice in RCW 9.41.290. This shows that the list of preempted
    topics is illustrative, not exclusive.
    CONCLUSION
    RCW 9 .41.290' s plain language demonstrates clear legislative intent to
    preempt local "laws and ordinances" that "relat[ e] to firearms" as broadly as
    possible.   A city tax that singles out the sale of firearms and ammunition for
    disadvantageous treatment is therefore preempted. I respectfully dissent.
    9
    For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.
    Watson et al. v. City of Seattle, 93 723-1
    (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting)
    j
    10