2014-12

State of Washington v. Ethan D. York ( 2014 )

Menu:

FILED
DEC. 9,2014
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 31272-1-II1
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
ETHAN D. YORK, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
KORSMO, J. - Ethan York challenges his juvenile court adjudications for first
degree malicious mischief and reckless endangerment on the basis that the trial court
erroneously admitted into evidence his statements to the investigating detective. We
conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the statements were not the subject
of custodial interrogation and affirm the adjudications.
FACTS
Two Spokane County Sheriffs Deputies, working under the sheriffs contract with
the City of Spokane Valley, responded at high speeds to a report of a large fight in
progress in the city. The first deputy's vehicle hit some object but continued down the
road, while the second deputy's vehicle hit a different object, went into a spin, and
ultimately overturned, injuring the deputy. An investigation determined that tree
branches and a log had been placed on the street. The log had caused the accident.
I
!
t
No. 31272-1-II1
State v. York
Detectives investigating the incident received a tip that Curtis Whittikind and his
cousin, Ethan York, were responsible for the accident. The detectives spoke with
Whittikind who told them how to find Mr. York. Detective Welton and Deputy Moser
went to the home of Erin Carlson, the mother of Mr. York's girl friend. Ethan York was
living at the Carlson home at the time. Ms. Carlson invited the two investigators into the
home to speak with York about a criminal investigation.
Mr. York and his girl friend came up from the basement and sat on a couch in the
living room with the detective. Ms. Carlson stood in the doorway to the living room
while Deputy Moser stood in the foyer. Welton told York that he was investigating "a
crime" and had spoken to Whittikind, who had "spilled it to me." Mr. York became
glum. Detective Welton encouraged York to speak, but did not question him. Mr. York
admitted his involvement with "putting things in the road" and wrote a statement to that
effect.
The statement was admitted at the adjudication after the juvenile court concluded
it was not the product of a custodial interrogation. The statement was the sole evidence
connecting Mr. York to the incident. The court concluded that Mr. York had committed
both of the charged offenses.
Mr. York then timely appealed to this court.
,,
l
I
2
I
i
,
~
No. 31272-1-III
State v. York
ANALYSIS
The sole issue presented in this appeal is a contention that the court erred by
concluding Mr. York's statements were not the products ofa custodial interrogation.
Well settled law confirms that the trial judge correctly assessed the situation.
Prior to conducting a custodial interrogation, an officer must first advise the
suspect of his rights regarding the interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444,

86 S. Ct. 1602

16 L. Ed. 2d 694

(1966). A defendant is in custody for purposes of
Miranda when his freedom of action is curtailed to the degree associated with a formal
arrest. Berkemer v. McCarty,

468 U.S. 420

, 440,

104 S. Ct. 3138

82 L. Ed. 2d 317

(1984). I Interrogation is "express questioning or its functional equivalent" by police.
Rhode Islandv. Innis,

446 U.S. 291

, 300-01,100 S. Ct. 1682,64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980).
The "functional equivalent" of questioning involves behavior that police should know is
"reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."

Id. at 302.

The United States Supreme Court extended the protections of Miranda to juveniles
in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,42-57,

87 S. Ct. 1428

18 L. Ed. 2d 527

(1967). However,
juveniles are not extended additional Miranda-type protections.

Id. at 55;

State v. Miller,

165 Wash. App. 385

, 389,

267 P.3d 524

(2011), review denied,

173 Wash. 2d 1035

(2012).
I In Berkemer, the court concluded that routine roadside seizure and questioning
did not amount to custodial

interrogation. 468 U.S. at 440

.
3
No. 31272-1-111
State v. York
Here, the juvenile court determined that Mr. York was not in custody and was not
subject to interrogation since he was simply encouraged to tell his story. We agree with
the determination that Mr. York was not in custody and, therefore, need not address his
argument that the interview was the functional equivalent of interrogation.
Because Miranda "custody" is equated with a formal arrest, questioning that takes
place in public or private environments outside of police control frequently is not
considered "custodial." For example, juveniles questioned in Spokane's Riverfront Park
were not "in custody." State v. Heritage, 152 Wn.2d 210,95 P.3d 345 (2004). An adult
questioned in the course of a search of her apartment was not in custody in State v. Rosas-
Miranda,

176 Wash. App. 773

309 P.3d 728

(2013). A juvenile rape suspect questioned in
his own home in his mother's presence was not found to be "in custody" in State v. SJ. W,

149 Wash. App. 912

206 P.3d 355

(2009).
Similarly here, Mr. York was not in custody while he sat with his girl friend on the
couch in the living room of the house where he was residing. There were no hallmarks of
a formal arrest that could have turned this conversation into a custodial setting. 2 The
juvenile court correctly concluded that Mr. York was not in custody.
2 This court has even concluded that advising a suspect that he was under arrest and
placing him in a patrol car did not constitute an arrest because he was not deprived of his
telephone. See State v. Radka,

120 Wash. App. 43

83 P.3d 1038

(2004).
4
No. 31272-1-111
State v. York
The adjudications are affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
~J
~rsmo,J.
WE CONCUR:
Siddoway, C.J. 
5
31272-1-111
FEARING, 1. (concurring) -    1 concur in the affirmation of Ethan York's
conviction, although I disagree that the same standard applied to an adult necessarily
applies to whether a minor has undergone a custodial interrogation. That question should
await another day.
In United States v. Mendenhall,

446 U.S. 544

100 S. Ct. 1870

, 64 1. Ed. 2d 497
(1980), the United States Supreme Court established the test for what constitutes a
seizure, which test Washington courts employ today. See State v. Harrington, 167 Wn.2d
656,663,222 P.3d 92 (2009). A seizure occurs when, "in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave."

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554

; accord

Harrington, 167 Wash. 2d at 663

; State v. Rankin, 151 Wn.2d 689,695,92 P.3d 202 (2004). Stated differently, a
police contact constitutes a seizure only if, under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, "terminate the encounter, refuse to
answer the officer's question, or otherwise go about his business." State v. Thorn,

129 Wash. 2d 347

, 353,

917 P.2d 108

, overruled on other grounds by State v. O'Neill,

148 Wash. 2d 564

62 P.3d 489

(2003). Whether a reasonable person would believe he was
No. 31272-1-III
State v. York- concurring
detained depends on the particular, objective facts surrounding the encounter. State v.
Ellwood,

52 Wash. App. 70

, 73,757 P.2d 547 (1988).
Since the courts use a reasonable person standard, the test of whether a person
considers himself or herself detained is the same no matter the citizen's race, sex, mental
acuity, and social background. Nevertheless, neither the United States Supreme Court
nor the Washington Supreme Court has analyzed whether the reasonable person standard
changes when the police contact is with a minor. In State v. Heritage, our high court
expressly declined "to decide whether the age of the suspect can ever be taken into
account for purposes of the Miranda custody requirement." 152 Wn.2d 210,219,95
P.3d 345 (2004).
Psychological literature teaches that people feel compelled to comply with
authority figures, particularly law enforcement. This compulsion may be stronger with
youth. Because of limited experience and judgment, children cannot sign legally binding
contracts or bring lawsuits. RCW 26.28.015; Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.8., 148 Wn. App.
205,214,

199 P.3d 1010

(2009), reversed on other grounds, Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.8.,

171 Wash. 2d 695

257 P.3d 570

(2011). Washington law tolls the statute of limitations for
personal injury to minors, since they generally lack the understanding, knowledge and
resources to effectively assert their rights. DeYoung v. Providence Med. etr.,

136 Wash. 2d 136

, 146,960 P.2d 919 (1998). The capacity ofa minor, including a 16-year-old boy, for
2
No. 31272-1-III
State v. York- concurring
negligence or fault in torts is a question of fact based on the child's age, intelligence, and
maturity. Brown v. Derry,

10 Wash. App. 459

, 463,518 P.2d 251 (1974).
In his appellate brief, Ethan York observed that he recently turned 16 years old
when the officers spoke to him, "so his youthfulness and naivety must be taken into
account." Br. Appellant at 11. York provided no authority for this argument. This court
does not review errors alleged but not argued, briefed, or supported with citation to
authority. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Avellaneda v. State,

167 Wash. App. 474